H. W. Ariens v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation

382 F.2d 192, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5235, 56 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 31,963
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedAugust 29, 1967
Docket17205_1
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 382 F.2d 192 (H. W. Ariens v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
H. W. Ariens v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 382 F.2d 192, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5235, 56 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 31,963 (6th Cir. 1967).

Opinion

COMBS, Circuit Judge.

The question is whether plaintiffs-appellants, employees of Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, are entitled to overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., 1 for sleeping time which they were required to spend on the employer’s premises in the course of their employment.

The defendant contends that it comes within a saving clause of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259, which relieves an employer from liability for overtime compensation when it is shown that failure to pay for overtime was “in good faith in conformity with and in reliance on” a written interpretation or approval issued by the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. 2

The defendant’s good faith reliance on what it considered an interpretation or approval by the Administrator is established. The case turns on whether defendant in fact operated in conformity with the interpretation or approval.

The District Judge answered the question in the affirmative and entered judgment for defendant. We affirm.

Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation has operated the Indiana Ammunition Plant at Charlestown, Indiana, under its own name or through a wholly owned subsidiary, Liberty Powder Defense Corporation, since 1959. The plant is oper *194 ated under a contract with the United States Army.

The plaintiffs are thirty-six firefighter-guards employed by the defendant. Their duties include inspection of fire extinguishers, search of personnel for combustible materials, patrolling and posting streets and gates, directing traffic and fighting fires. When defendant assumed control of the plant, a three-platoon work schedule was installed for the firefighter-guard unit under which the men were required to remain on company premises for two twenty-four hour shifts and one eight hour shift each week. In a twenty-four hour shift approximately two-thirds of the platoon worked from 7:00 A.M. until 10:00 P.M.; they slept on the premises between 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M., and worked the final hour of the shift between 6:00 A.M. and 7:A.M.

In order to .maintain constant surveillance, the remaining one-third in each platoon slept from 2:00 P.M. until 10:00 P.M. and worked from 10:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. The daytime sleep period was assigned in rotation so that each man drew it every third week. Plaintiffs were not compensated for the sleep periods, except that they received overtime pay for the occasional call-out intervals which interrupted the periods. The claim here is for overtime pay for the entire sleep periods since 1959, and for liquidated damages.

When plaintiffs commenced work under this arrangement they signed a contract to be employed as firefighter-guards. They were issued, and were requested to read, a pamphlet entitled “Information for the Employees on Personnel Policy and Accident Prevention.” It was stated in the pamphlet that the firefighter-guards would work a three-platoon system, and “Firefighter-Guard Forces are stationed at entrances and patrol the Plant day and night seven days a week.”

Although only one of the plaintiffs testified that the work and compensation schedules were fully explained to him before he commenced work, all the men admitted they “found out” about the schedule on the first day of work. They, of course, realized they were not being compensated for the sleep periods when they received their first paycheck. Work schedules were posted. Some of the plaintiffs complained to the chief of the unit about the lack of compensation for the sleep periods but no paychecks were refused.

On September 14, 1964, during the period for which overtime is claimed, defendant entered into an agreement with the union representing plaintiffs which stated simply that “time designated as sleep time is not considered as hours worked and is not compensable.”

Defendant equipped two buildings with sleeping facilities. The equipment included beds, lockers, and bathroom and kitchen facilities. The rooms were heated in winter and airconditioned in summer. However, there were some complaints about the sleeping quarters. Some of the plaintiffs complained of noises emanating from an alarm panel adjacent to one bedroom; men in the street outside during a shift change; men using lockers and a water fountain in a room adjacent to one bedroom; the ringing of telephones in one building; radios in cars parked close to the buildings; a buzzer located in one building; and a television set near one of the bedrooms. The only witness who made a statement comparing these quarters with other types of dormitory sleeping arrangements said they were “as good as sleeping facilities on a military reservation.”

The Department of the Army required defendant to submit to the Department any work schedules subject to a federal statute, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. Upon submission the schedules were cleared, through channels, with the Administrator of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Division of the Department of Labor. Approval of the work schedule obtained from the Department of Labor was transmitted to the defendant by the Army with a copy of the Administrator’s letter enclosed.

*195 Defendant relies on a series of communications between the Administrator and the Charlestown Plant going back to 1951, when the plant was operated by another company, to sustain its position that sleeping time is not overtime.

The issue is perhaps most clearly presented by a letter from defendant’s Resident Manager dated November 20, 1959, and the reply to the Administrator dated December 22, 1959, which are as follows:

November 20, 1959
Major Raoul Valenzuela
Contracting Officer’s
Representative
Indiana Arsenal
Charlestown, Indiana
Dear Major Valenzuela:
Re: Method of Payment of Firefighter-Guards Operating on a Three-Platoon System at this Installation

The following plan is submitted for transmission through channels to the Wage and Hour Administrator, U. S. Department of Labor, for approval, in accordance with CACI T-1205.2.

For orderly and safe operation, it is necessary to set the work schedule for Firefighter-Guards on a three-platoon basis, each of which will be in the plant 56 hours each week but will receive pay for 40 hours, the remaining 16 being sleeping time without compensation. During each full twenty-four hour daily period served by a single platoon, sixteen hours (from 7:00 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. and 6:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M.) are assigned as working time and the remaining eight hours (from 10:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M.) are assigned as sleeping time which is non-compensible. On Wednesday, all hours of the three shifts are assigned and paid for as duty time.

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Bluebook (online)
382 F.2d 192, 1967 U.S. App. LEXIS 5235, 56 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 31,963, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/h-w-ariens-v-olin-mathieson-chemical-corporation-ca6-1967.