Gwendolyn Price v. Joseph Tanner, Commissioner of Labor of the State of Georgia

855 F.2d 820

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: November 1, 1988
• Docket: 87-8045
• Status: Published

Opinions

VANCE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal involves the issue whether a Georgia Workers’ Compensation statute, Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-285, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Section 34-9-285 provides that where an employee is disabled by the aggravation of a pre-existing condition by an occupational disease, workers’ compensation benefits are limited to an amount representing the portion of disability attributable to the occupational disease. Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act, however, does not contain a similar provision limiting benefits to employees disabled by the aggravation of pre-existing conditions by work-related occurrences, such as accidents or injuries, other than occupational diseases. Finding that the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of ap-pellees. We affirm.

I.

During her childhood Gwendolyn Price suffered from numerous respiratory problems. In 1971, she was diagnosed as having chronic bronchiectasis disease. Two years later, Price began working for Litho-nia Lighting Company. Over the course of her employment at Lithonia Lighting Price was exposed to fumes, chemicals and dust which aggravated her respiratory condition. Due to her continuing respiratory problems, Price had to leave her job in January 1983.

Price filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits on January 11, 1983 with the State Board of Workers’ Compensation. An administrative law judge (“ALT”) found that Price had “sustained an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment which aggravated her pre-existing lung problem.” Finding that Price was totally disabled, the ALT awarded her $135 per week for total economic disability plus medical expenses. Lithonia Lighting appealed the ALJ’s decision to the full board of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation. On appeal it was determined that only ten percent of Price’s disability was attributable to the aggravation of her condition as a result of her employment. Accordingly, Price’s award was reduced to $13.50 per week pursuant to section 34-9-285.¹

Price sought review of the administrative award in the state courts. After the Superior Court of Rockdale County, Georgia affirmed the award, Price filed an application for a discretionary appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of section 34-9-285. The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. See Price v. Lithonia Lighting Co., 256 Ga. 49, 343 S.E.2d 688 (1986).²

While awaiting the resolution of the state court proceedings, Price instituted this action in federal district court alleging that section 34-9-285 violated her federal constitutional rights.³ Price maintained that section 34-9-285 violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because of the statute’s restrictive rule for determining benefits for persons disabled due to the aggravation of a pre-ex-isting condition by an occupational disease. In the complaint, Price alleged that “[t]here is no rational basis for the distinction drawn by [the] statute between disability resulting from occupational factors and disability resulting from all other aggravating factors.” The district court held that there was a rational basis for the distinction.⁴ The district court found that the rational basis test was satisfied by the two justifications asserted by the state: (1) to alleviate a financial strain on certain industries; and (2) to recognize the problem arising from the gradual onset of occupational diseases of determining when the aggravation of a pre-existing condition becomes the cause of the disability. This appeal followed.

II.

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. A violation of the equal protection clause may occur when a legislative body enacts a law which “has a special impact on less than all the persons subject to its jurisdiction....” New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587-88, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1367, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979). The Supreme Court, however, consistently has recognized that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to states the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.” Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75, 92 S.Ct. 251, 253, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). An equal protection analysis, therefore, requires as a “preliminary step” a determination of “whether persons who are similarly situated are subject to disparate treatment.” Johnson v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1334, 1336 (11th Cir.1983).

Georgia’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the “Act”), Ga.Code Ann. §§ 34-9-1 et seq., does not compensate all disabled employees in the same manner. Employees receive full compensation for compensable disabilities arising solely as a result of a work-related injury,⁵ solely as a result of an occupational disease,⁶ or as a result of the aggravation of a pre-existing condition by a work-related injury other than an occupational disease. If, however, an employee is disabled by the aggravation of a noncompensabie, pre-existing condition by an occupational disease, compensation is reduced to the proportion the occupational disease is the cause of the disability. Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-285. Employees who are disabled due to the aggravation of preexisting conditions are similarly situated with other disabled employees with respect to the purpose of the legislation. Because the compensation for these disabled employees is calculated in a different manner, we find that the preliminary step is satisfied.

Where groups are similarly situated “[t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 99 S.Ct. 939, 943, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). Where the classification interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class, an equal protection analysis requiring strict scrutiny is substituted for the general rule. City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3255; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566-67, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976).

The parties agree that the standard of review applicable to this case is the “rational basis” test.⁷ Under this test “we will not overturn ... a statute unless the varying treatment of different ... persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature’s actions were irrational.” Vance, 440 U.S. at 97, 99 S.Ct. at 943, see Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 674, 101 S.Ct. 2070, 2086, 68 L.Ed.2d 514 (1981) (equal protection challenge will not succeed if the state’s purpose is legitimate and the rational relationship question is “ ‘at least debatable’ ”) (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 58 S.Ct. 778, 784, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938)). The application of the rational basis test to social or economic legislation “allows the states wide latitude.” City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3254; see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174, 101 S.Ct. 453, 459, 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).

The state asserts that section 34-9-285 ensures three legitimate state purposes: (1) to alleviate a heavy financial burden on industries where individuals are likely to file more claims; (2) to recognize that occupational diseases have a gradual onset making it difficult to determine when an aggravating injury actually occurs; and (3) to encourage the employment of handicapped persons. We note that appellees have not provided great assistance to this court by identifying compelling reasons for the legislation. We have some question that either of the first two justifications may be classified as a legitimate state interest.⁸ Because only one reason, however, is necessary to sustain the statute, see Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 465, 101 S.Ct. 715, 724, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), we turn to the third purpose advanced by the state.

The third justification offered by appel-lees initially was presented to this court during oral argument. Although this argument was not presented to the district court, we are obligated under the rational basis test to consider any legitimate state interest however it comes before us. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co., 451 U.S. at 674, 101 S.Ct. at 2086 (in determining the validity of legislation under the equal protection clause the court may analyze considerations presented to the state legislature and those of which it takes judicial notice) (quoting Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. , 58 S.Ct. at 784-85); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1156-57 n. 6, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970) (an appellee may assert any justification in support of a judgment in its favor “whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court”).

The third justification offered by appel-lees provides a basis for sustaining section 34-9-285. This justification, encouraging the employment of the handicapped, is a legitimate state interest. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1162, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). Furthermore, as appellees maintain, the statute is rationally related to this objective. We believe that the Georgia legislature could reasonably find that the employment of persons afflicted with occupational diseases could be enhanced by reducing employers’ potential exposure to extraordinary compensation costs resulting from such preexisting diseases.

Appellant does not question the justifications asserted by the state. Rather, appellant asserts that the disparate treatment of employees disabled by the aggravation of a pre-existing condition is not relevant to the state’s purpose of providing support for all disabled persons. Appellant argues that the “etiology of an injury” should not limit the amount of compensation because any disability affects a person’s earning capacity. The equal protection analysis, however, does not require this court to determine whether the legislation will fully achieve its articulated purposes. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 725. As a federal court we “do not sit as arbiters of the wisdom or utility of these laws.” Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir.1987), cert. denied — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1022, 98 L.Ed.2d 987 (1988). Instead, our sole inquiry is whether the Georgia legislative “could rationally have decided” that its purpose would be achieved. Clover Leaf Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. at 466, 101 S.Ct. at 725. We, therefore, hold that section 34-9-285 is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and does not violate the fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause.⁹

AFFIRMED.

1 . Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-285 provides in part:

Where an occupational disease is aggravated by any other disease or infirmity not itself compensable or where disability or death from any other cause not itself compensable is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any other wise contributed to by an occupational disease, the compensation payable shall be reduced and limited only to such proportion of the compensation that would be payable if the occupational disease were the sole cause of the disability or death as such occupational disease, as the causative factor, bears to all the causes of such disability or death.

2 . While it held that section 34-9-285 was constitutional, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the award and remanded the case to the superior court with an instruction that pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 34-9-261 an award of $25 per week be substituted. Price, 343 S.E.2d at 692.

3 . The district court found that appellant expressly reserved her right to seek redress of her federal constitutional claims by informing the state court of her intent. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 419, 421-22, 84 S.Ct. 461, 466-67, 467-68, 11 L.Ed.2d 440 (1964) (by informing the state court of an intention to return to federal district court should the state court decision be unfavorable, a party preserves the right to litigate federal claims in federal district court).

4 . In the motion for summary judgment, appel-lees initially requested the court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction. Stating that the abstention doctrine does not operate where, as in this action, the state court proceedings have concluded, the district court found that abstention was inappropriate. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). The district court also rejected appel-lee’s argument that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court reasoned that because the Georgia Supreme Court decision does not clearly indicate whether the federal constitutional issue was decided and appellant expressly reserved her right to litigate the federal claim in a federal court, the doctrine of res judicata also was inappropriate. Neither of these findings were appealed to this court, and we do not address them.

5 . The Act defines "injury" as “only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and shall not, except as hereinafter provided, include a disease in any form except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident.” Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-1(4).

6 . The Act provides a list of diseases considered as occupational diseases provided such listed disease “is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the employee is exposed to such disease.” Ga.Code Ann. § 34-9-280(3).

7 . Appellant did not allege the existence of any fundamental right or a suspect class so the rational basis test is appropriate.

8 . Even assuming that the second justification is legitimate, we believe that rather than alleviating this causation problem, the proportional compensation scheme of section 34-9-285 actually creates the problem advanced by the state.

9 . We wish to emphasize that it is not difficult to satisfy the rational basis test. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 84 L.Ed.2d 751. Indeed, we do not decide that section 34-9-285 "is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [Georgia] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised.” Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 487, 90 S.Ct. at 1162. Arguably a more equitable result could be achieved if the Georgia legislature amended this provision to provide full compensation to employees disabled as a result of occupational diseases. As the Supreme Court noted "the Constitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic processes.” City of Cleburne, 105 S.Ct. at 3254.