Ryan, J.
Defendant Alcamo’s Holiday House and Alcamo’s Hall, Inc., known hereafter as Alcamo’s, appeals from the order of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment which dismissed a complaint seeking damages under § 221 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act.2
The facts are undisputed. Alcamo’s is a private rental hall located in Mt. Clemens, Michigan. It is available for private parties, banquets, and wedding receptions.
On the evening of June 11, 1971 a private wedding reception was held at the hall. The lease of the hall provided that alcoholic beverages were not to be sold on the premises unless the necessary licenses were obtained by the lessees. The alcoholic beverages which were consumed at the reception were all privately provided by the celebrants, with the exception of keg beer that was obtained through Alcamo’s at retail cost plus a fee for handling, tapping and setting up the keg. Alcamo’s provided a waiter and the facilities for the dispensation of the beverages at the reception.
[157]*157Among the guests at the gathering were the defendants Patrick and Lillian Bieniek. During the course of the evening Patrick Bieniek consumed an amount of alcoholic beverage. In the early morning hours of June 12, after leaving the reception, Patrick Bieniek drove his automobile broadside into another automobile resulting in the death of three of its occupants, including James D. Guitar, the plaintiffs decedent, and serious injury to a fourth.
The question for decision is whether Alcamo’s, under the presented facts, is subject to liability under § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act effective at the date of the incident.3 We hold it is not.
Resolution of the stated issue requires our decision as to the meaning of the word "person” as used by the Legislature to define the class of persons who may be liable under the so-called "dramshop”4 provision of § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act.
The word "person” is defined in the Liquor Control Act as:
"[A]ny person, firm, partnership, association or corporation.” MCLA 436.2k; MSA 18.972(11).
"The words and phrases used in this act shall be construed as defined in this section and in sections 2a to 2w, inclusive, unless the context shall otherwise require. ” MCLA 436.2; MSA 18.972. (Emphasis supplied.)
[158]*158Our inquiry necessarily focuses upon what the context "may otherwise require”.
The plaintiffs urge us to adopt a broad construction of the act in defining the class of person who may be liable under § 22 in view of the legislation’s remedial purpose. Defendant Alcamo’s, on the other hand, prefers a much narrower construction in view of the somewhat penal character of the statute and its imposition of civil liability in derogation of common law. We need not employ either tack, however, since the intent of the Legislature regarding the class of person to whom liability extends under the "dramshop provisions” of the act is readily ascertainable from an analysis of the context in which reference to such persons is made.
In determining the meaning of the language in question we are obedient to the settled principle that doubtful or ambiguous provisions of a statute are construed not in isolation but with reference to and in the context of related provisions, in order to give effect to the whole enactment.5 When, as here, reference to several related provisions of the statute makes manifest the legislative intent in employing specific language, it is outside our province to assign to such language, in the name of broad or narrow construction, a meaning at variance with the plain intent.6
The essentially operative language of § 22 provides:
[159]*159"[A person injured in his person or property] shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who shall by such selling or giving of any such liquor have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons or who shall have caused or contributed to any such injury * * * (Emphasis supplied.)
We must decide whether Alcamo’s is a "person” within the meaning of the foregoing paragraph. To do so, we are required to construe a section of a statute which is somewhat inartfully drawn and whose provisions are poorly organized. Our effort at construing the statute is almost reduced to the schoolroom diagramming and parsing exercises of a bygone day. An analytical perusal of § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act, as it was effective at the date of the incident,7 is essential to an adequate understanding of the proper breadth or scope of the liability provisions therein.
Because we are persuaded it will be of substantial assistance to the reader, we reluctantly burden the case report by reproducing the former entire § 22 in the margin just as it appeared in our former statute.8
The section begins with language which establishes the procurement of a bond as a condition [161]*161precedent to the approval and granting of any license to sell intoxicating liquors. Although having no direct applicability to the issue at hand, the first several provisions of § 22 establish the context in which the "persons” upon whom dramshop liability is imposed later in the section are identified.
"Sec. 22. As a condition precedent to the approval and granting of any license, the following persons shall make, execute and deliver to the commission a bond or bonds, said bond or bonds to be executed by any surety company or companies authorized to do business in the [162]*162state of Michigan or in the discretion of the commission by approved personal surety running to the people of the state of Michigan, in the following amounts:
"1. Manufacturers, a bond or bonds in the sum of $5,000.00; wholesalers, a bond or bonds in the sum of $2,500.00; warehousemen, a bond or bonds in the sum of $2,500.00; specially designated distributors and specially designated merchants, a bond or bonds in the sum of $1,000.00, for the faithful performance of the conditions of the license issued and compliance with the provisions of this act; any manufacturer who has given the bond or bonds herein provided for shall not be required to give any additional bond or bonds for any warehouse he may own or operate.” (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, in order to obtain a liquor license, manufacturers,9 warehousemen,10 specially designated distributors,11 and specially designated merchants12 are identified as the persons who must secure a bond in conformity with the above section.
There follows in the next succeeding paragraph what are essentially two distinct provisions made applicable to the same class of persons; that is, retailers13 of beer or wine, or spirits, for consump[163]*163tion on the premises.
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Ryan, J.
Defendant Alcamo’s Holiday House and Alcamo’s Hall, Inc., known hereafter as Alcamo’s, appeals from the order of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment which dismissed a complaint seeking damages under § 221 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act.2
The facts are undisputed. Alcamo’s is a private rental hall located in Mt. Clemens, Michigan. It is available for private parties, banquets, and wedding receptions.
On the evening of June 11, 1971 a private wedding reception was held at the hall. The lease of the hall provided that alcoholic beverages were not to be sold on the premises unless the necessary licenses were obtained by the lessees. The alcoholic beverages which were consumed at the reception were all privately provided by the celebrants, with the exception of keg beer that was obtained through Alcamo’s at retail cost plus a fee for handling, tapping and setting up the keg. Alcamo’s provided a waiter and the facilities for the dispensation of the beverages at the reception.
[157]*157Among the guests at the gathering were the defendants Patrick and Lillian Bieniek. During the course of the evening Patrick Bieniek consumed an amount of alcoholic beverage. In the early morning hours of June 12, after leaving the reception, Patrick Bieniek drove his automobile broadside into another automobile resulting in the death of three of its occupants, including James D. Guitar, the plaintiffs decedent, and serious injury to a fourth.
The question for decision is whether Alcamo’s, under the presented facts, is subject to liability under § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act effective at the date of the incident.3 We hold it is not.
Resolution of the stated issue requires our decision as to the meaning of the word "person” as used by the Legislature to define the class of persons who may be liable under the so-called "dramshop”4 provision of § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act.
The word "person” is defined in the Liquor Control Act as:
"[A]ny person, firm, partnership, association or corporation.” MCLA 436.2k; MSA 18.972(11).
"The words and phrases used in this act shall be construed as defined in this section and in sections 2a to 2w, inclusive, unless the context shall otherwise require. ” MCLA 436.2; MSA 18.972. (Emphasis supplied.)
[158]*158Our inquiry necessarily focuses upon what the context "may otherwise require”.
The plaintiffs urge us to adopt a broad construction of the act in defining the class of person who may be liable under § 22 in view of the legislation’s remedial purpose. Defendant Alcamo’s, on the other hand, prefers a much narrower construction in view of the somewhat penal character of the statute and its imposition of civil liability in derogation of common law. We need not employ either tack, however, since the intent of the Legislature regarding the class of person to whom liability extends under the "dramshop provisions” of the act is readily ascertainable from an analysis of the context in which reference to such persons is made.
In determining the meaning of the language in question we are obedient to the settled principle that doubtful or ambiguous provisions of a statute are construed not in isolation but with reference to and in the context of related provisions, in order to give effect to the whole enactment.5 When, as here, reference to several related provisions of the statute makes manifest the legislative intent in employing specific language, it is outside our province to assign to such language, in the name of broad or narrow construction, a meaning at variance with the plain intent.6
The essentially operative language of § 22 provides:
[159]*159"[A person injured in his person or property] shall have a right of action in his or her name against the person who shall by such selling or giving of any such liquor have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons or who shall have caused or contributed to any such injury * * * (Emphasis supplied.)
We must decide whether Alcamo’s is a "person” within the meaning of the foregoing paragraph. To do so, we are required to construe a section of a statute which is somewhat inartfully drawn and whose provisions are poorly organized. Our effort at construing the statute is almost reduced to the schoolroom diagramming and parsing exercises of a bygone day. An analytical perusal of § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act, as it was effective at the date of the incident,7 is essential to an adequate understanding of the proper breadth or scope of the liability provisions therein.
Because we are persuaded it will be of substantial assistance to the reader, we reluctantly burden the case report by reproducing the former entire § 22 in the margin just as it appeared in our former statute.8
The section begins with language which establishes the procurement of a bond as a condition [161]*161precedent to the approval and granting of any license to sell intoxicating liquors. Although having no direct applicability to the issue at hand, the first several provisions of § 22 establish the context in which the "persons” upon whom dramshop liability is imposed later in the section are identified.
"Sec. 22. As a condition precedent to the approval and granting of any license, the following persons shall make, execute and deliver to the commission a bond or bonds, said bond or bonds to be executed by any surety company or companies authorized to do business in the [162]*162state of Michigan or in the discretion of the commission by approved personal surety running to the people of the state of Michigan, in the following amounts:
"1. Manufacturers, a bond or bonds in the sum of $5,000.00; wholesalers, a bond or bonds in the sum of $2,500.00; warehousemen, a bond or bonds in the sum of $2,500.00; specially designated distributors and specially designated merchants, a bond or bonds in the sum of $1,000.00, for the faithful performance of the conditions of the license issued and compliance with the provisions of this act; any manufacturer who has given the bond or bonds herein provided for shall not be required to give any additional bond or bonds for any warehouse he may own or operate.” (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, in order to obtain a liquor license, manufacturers,9 warehousemen,10 specially designated distributors,11 and specially designated merchants12 are identified as the persons who must secure a bond in conformity with the above section.
There follows in the next succeeding paragraph what are essentially two distinct provisions made applicable to the same class of persons; that is, retailers13 of beer or wine, or spirits, for consump[163]*163tion on the premises. First, liability bonding provisions are established for on-premises beer, wine and liquor retailers and, second, there is imposed upon such retailers, as well as specially designated merchants, the duty to refrain from supplying alcoholic liquor to a minor or intoxicated adult and liability to respond in damages for doing so, if "such” person should, by reason of an unlawful supplying, injure another in the latter’s "person or property or means of support or otherwise”. It reads:
"2. Retailers of beer or wine for consumption on the premises, a bond or bonds in the sum of not less than $3,000.00 nor more than $5,000.00, in the discretion of the commission; retailers of spirits for consumption on the premises, a bond or bonds in the sum of not less than $5,000.00 nor more than $10,000.00 in the discretion of the commission, conditioned that any such retailer or specially designated merchant will not directly or indirectly, by himself, his clerk or agent or servant at any time sell, furnish, give or deliver any alcoholic liquor to a minor except as provided in this act, nor to any adult person whatever who is at the time intoxicated, and that he will pay all damages actual and exemplary that may be adjudged to any person or persons, including those hereinafter mentioned, for injuries inflicted upon him or them either in person or property or means of support or otherwise, by reason of his selling, furnishing, giving or delivering any such alcoholic liquor.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The final words of the foregoing, beginning with "and that he will pay all damages”, constitute the beginning of the statutorily established rights and liabilities commonly known as the "dramshop” legislation, with the persons in whose favor the [164]*164cause of action is created being described in part as "including those hereinafter mentioned”, thus suggesting that later provisions must be read in conjunction with the foregoing.14
There next appears in § 22 a reproduction of the entire form of the bond made mandatory by the antecedent paragraphs. This break in the continuity of the relevant liability portions of § 22 has been primarily responsible for the apparent confusion at issue today.
The confusion arises when one attempts to read the language of dramshop liability which follows the bond form as though it stood alone, rather than in the context of the companion liability language which precedes the bond form paragraph. Although the bonding and civil liability provisions of § 22 are recited in a somewhat cumbersome and poorly organized fashion, it is evident that in order to construe the meaning of the dramshop liability provisions of the act, the concluding paragraph of § 22 must be read with reference to the earlier liability language. We have observed as much on at least two prior occasions when construing related liability provisions of § 22. Maldonado v Claud’s Inc, 347 Mich 395, 403-404; 79 NW2d 847 (1956); Juckniess v Supinger, 323 Mich 566, 571-572; 36 NW2d 148 (1949).
[165]*165In Maldonado, supra, p 404, this Court noted:
"that the basis of the right of action created by the legislature is 'unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing to any such persons’ intoxicating liquors. The term 'such persons’ must be deemed to have reference to those to whom sales may not lawfully be made. The emphasis is obviously on unlawful transactions of the character mentioned. A sale to a minor falls within the category. The term 'such selling’ must be taken to mean selling in violation of the statute.”
Likewise, in this case, those against whom the action may be brought has reference to those charged with the duty to refrain from supplying liquor to minors and intoxicated persons. When in the concluding paragraph of § 22 it is stated that there shall exist "a right of action * * * against the person who shall by such selling or giving of any liquor have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person” the class of persons to be charged is to be identified by construing that language together with the earlier paragraph delineating those upon whom the duty is imposed to refrain from "such selling or giving of any liquor”; when so construed, the class of persons to be charged is obviously "any such retailer or specially designated merchant”.
In summary, then, in order to properly identify the person or class of persons upon whom liability may be imposed under the civil liability or "dram-shop” provision of §22, the paragraph immediately preceding and that immediately succeeding the bond form language must be read together as though uninterrupted. When that is done it is seen that the paragraph preceding the bond language of § 22 establishes a legal duty with which a certain [166]*166class of liquor traffickers is to be charged,15 while the paragraph succeeding the bond language describes the person entitled to initiate an action for damages16 and the procedural limitation upon such action.17
We disagree with plaintiffs view that the concluding paragraph of § 22 was intended to expand the class of persons who may be vicariously liable. We hold instead that liability is limited to persons within the class of liquor traffickers specifically delineated in the dramshop provision of the act, a class consisting of licensed retailers of beer, wine or spirits for consumption on the premises and Specially Designated Merchants.
It is implicit of course that "persons” maintain[167]*167ing operations tantamount to those embraced within the foregoing class but who have failed to obtain or maintain the required licensing are equally chargeable under the "dramshop” provision of the act.
In the instant case it is uncontroverted that while Alcamo’s procured keg beer for its lessee and even assisted with the dispensing of alcoholic beverages, it was neither a retailer of beer or wine, or spirits, for consumption on the premises, nor a Specially Designated Merchant. Moreover, the facts do not lend themselves to the conclusion that the operation of the rental hall by Alcamo’s was at all similar to the type of liquor trafficking contemplated in the "dramshop” provisions of § 22 of the Liquor Control Act.
It is evident from a reading of the narrow and restrictively drawn civil liability provisions of § 22 that the Legislature intended to impose a special legal duty upon a group of retailers who the Legislature may have believed needed additional encouragement to subject their immediate pecuniary interests to the ultimate welfare of their patrons and society as a whole. That encouragement has been made to consist in part of the resultant vicarious liability.
In the case at hand, the role of Alcamo’s does not fit logically within the manifest legislative purpose. Whereas the class of retailers specifically named in § 22 may be directly proprietorily motivated to dispense "that additional drink” which is "one too many”, such motivation is totally inapplicable to a social setting in which the alcohol is supplied as a mere social amenity.
As such, the instant and similar situations lie outside of the purview of "dramshop” liability. The Legislature, in balancing social and financial inter[168]*168ests, designated a specific group of "persons” to whom the civil liability provisions would apply. Those "persons” not literally or implicitly charged with the duty or condition imposed under § 22 of the Michigan Liquor Control Act are consequently not subject to liability thereunder.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the summary judgment of dismissal entered on behalf of Alcamo’s.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, Coleman, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.