Ground Systems, Inc. v. Albert (In Re Ground Systems, Inc.)

213 B.R. 1016, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8480, 97 Daily Journal DAR 13543, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1685, 1997 WL 671872
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedSeptember 30, 1997
DocketBAP No. CC-97-1030-SHMe, Bankruptcy No. SA 90-01359 JR
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 213 B.R. 1016 (Ground Systems, Inc. v. Albert (In Re Ground Systems, Inc.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ground Systems, Inc. v. Albert (In Re Ground Systems, Inc.), 213 B.R. 1016, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8480, 97 Daily Journal DAR 13543, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1685, 1997 WL 671872 (bap9 1997).

Opinion

OPINION

SNYDER, Bankruptcy Judge.

OVERVIEW

A Chapter 11 debtor requested that a final decree be entered in the case. The bankruptcy court interpreted the plan to require that the final decree be entered only after all of. the plan payments were made and denied the debtor’s request.. The debtor appeals.

BACKGROUND

On February 27, 1990, Ground Systems, Inc. (GSI), a corporation that provides ground transportation to airports in Los An-geles and Orange County, filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter ll. 2 On January 23, 1992, Theodor Albert (Albert) was appointed trustee. In February 1993, the bankruptcy court confirmed the chapter 11 trustee’s second amended plan of reorganization. ' The confirmed plan required the appointment of a plan agent. The plan agent would appoint the initial and successor members of the board of directors, meet weekly with management and'the board, and assume responsibility for distributions under the plan. Albert was appointed as plan agent. The plan invested management of the debtor in the plan agent for the first six months and “[a]fter that six months, and until a Final Decree is entered on the Docket, all powers of management shall be delegated to the Interim Board by.the Plan Agent.” .The plan further provided that shareholders would retain their shares and that

[a]s of the Final Payment Date, the Plan Agent will file a request for a Final Decree and, upon entry - of a Final Decree, the Plan Agent and any Interim Board will resign. Thereafter, shareholders wdth allowed interest may elect new management *1018 as the articles and bylaws of the Debtor allow.

The plan defines “Final Payment Date” as “that date when all allowed claims, plus interest as provided under the Plan, are paid in full. Under the Plan, this is the date of the last installment due on account of Class 4 [penalties and fines].”

On November 27,1996, GSI filed a motion for an order granting a final decree in the case in response to a request from the bankruptcy court’s clerk. Airport Service, Inc. (ASI), who held an allowed class 2 (general unsecured) claim under the plan, opposed the motion. ASI argued that, under the provisions discussed above,

the Plan Agent retains ultimate control of the reorganized debtor until both the completion of payments under the Plan and the entry of a final decree, events which were expressly contemplated to occur simultaneously. ... [Shareholders have no authority to elect a Board of Directors until all Plan payments have been made.

GSI responded to the objection, arguing, first, that closing the case was proper under 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) 3 and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3022 4 and, second, that the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to keep the ease open once the plan had been substantially consummated.

At a December 19, 1996 hearing on the motion, that focused principally on interpreting the plan, the bankruptcy court accepted ASI’s contention that issuing a final decree would violate the plan, and denied GSI’s motion to close the case:

I’m going to deny the motion. I did ask that this be brought. I was not aware that the plan required this case to stay open until it was fully consummated. If we’d picked up on that earlier, I would not have allowed that to have been a condition of this plan. It’s not an acceptable provision, and frankly, is in conflict with the [Bankruptcy Code] and it never should have gotten through. But it did, so we’re bound to carry out the specific provisions of the plan----

GSI filed this timely appeal.

ISSUE

Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it denied GSI’s request for a final decree.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue presented raises purely legal issues and is therefore reviewed de novo. In re Commercial Western Fin. Corp., 761 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir.1985).

DISCUSSION

Plan Does Not Violate the Bankruptcy Code

The bankruptcy court indicated that the confirmed plan’s requirement that the ease remain open until all payments under the plan had been made violated 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) and Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3022. The Bankruptcy Code and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure direct a court to close a Chapter 11 case once the debtor’s estate is “fully administered.” 11 U.S.C. § 350(a); Fed. R. Bankr.P. 3022. However, neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure define the term “fully administered.”

On appeal, GSI argues that we may determine whether a case'has been “fully administered” by referring to cases that have construed the term “substantial consummation.” The term “substantial consummation” is used to determine when a plan may no longer be modified. See 11 U.S.C. § 1127(b). Athough GSI acknowledges that the terms are used in different contexts, it argues that they are equivalent, citing In re BankEast Corp., 132 B.R. 665, 668 n. 3 (Bankr.D.N.H.1991). Therefore, according to GSI, because payments under the plan had commenced, the plan had been substantially consummated and a final decree should have been issued. *1019 See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2); In re Antiquities of Nev., Inc., 173 B.R. 926, 930 (9th Cir.BAP 1994).

We do not agree with the BankEast court that the terms “fully administered” and “substantial consummation” are interchangeable. “[T]he use of different language by Congress creates a presumption that it intended the terms to have different meanings.” Legacy Emanuel Hosp. and Health Ctr. v. Shalala, 97 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Washington Hosp. Ctr. v. Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 146 (D.C.Cir.1986)).

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213 B.R. 1016, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8480, 97 Daily Journal DAR 13543, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 1685, 1997 WL 671872, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ground-systems-inc-v-albert-in-re-ground-systems-inc-bap9-1997.