Grossetti v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided September 26, 2019·No. 1:19-cv-06784·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK VICTOR E. GROSSETTI, JR., on behalf of Estate of Page Llewellyn Jackson, III, Plaintiff, 19-CV-6784 (CM) -against- ORDER COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Victor E. Grossetti, Jr., the Executor of the Estate of Page Llewellyn Jackson, III, brings this action pro se on behalf of the Estate to secure a federal income tax refund under 26 U.S.C. § 7422. Grossetti filed an application to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the IFP application and grants the Plaintiff Estate leave to pay the relevant fees – a $350.00 filing fee and a $50.00 administrative fee – and to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well- pleaded factual allegations as true. But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible

– that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND In September 2018, Grossetti was appointed the Executor of the Estate. Prior to his death, the decedent filed a tax return for 2017, but neglected to file Form 8962. After Grossetti was appointed Executor, he filed Form 8962 on behalf of the Estate in order to collect the decedent’s tax refund. Grossetti hired an accountant, who determined that the Estate was owed a refund of $3,722.60. The IRS informed Grossetti that it was going to reduce the refund by over $2,000, but did not provide a reason. The complaint alleges that the IRS has not paid the refund nor provided any additional information about the reduction. The Estate seeks the original amount of the refund, along with accounting and legal fees that the Estate has incurred as a result of the non- payment. Grossetti also filed an IFP application on behalf of the Estate, on which it appears he documented his personal financial resources rather than those of the Estate. DISCUSSION

A. IFP application The Court denies the IFP application. Only natural persons may proceed IFP under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Rowland v. California Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 196 (1993). Because an estate is not a natural person, it may not proceed IFP. See Gray v. Martinez, 352 F. App’x 656, 658 (3d Cir. 2009); In re Estate of Van Putten, 553 F. App’x 328 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Davis v. Yale New Haven Hosp., No. 16-CV-1578, 2017 WL 6459499, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 11, 2017). If the Estate decides to file an amended complaint, it must pay the $400.00 in relevant fees. B. Plaintiff’s pro se status A person who is not an attorney may only represent himself in a pro se action; he may not represent another entity. See Rowland, 506 U.S. at 202-03 (noting that courts do not allow

corporations, partnerships, associations, and other “artificial entities” to appear in court without an attorney); Pridgen v. Andresen, 113 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[A]ppearance pro se denotes (in law latin) appearance for one’s self; so that a person ordinarily may not appear pro se in the cause of another person or entity.”). An executor of an estate may not proceed pro se when the estate has beneficiaries or creditors other than the executor. Pridgen, 113 F.3 at 393. “Where there are other beneficiaries, ‘an action cannot be described as the litigant’s own, because the personal interests of the estate, other survivors, and possible creditors . . . will be affected by the outcome of the proceedings.’” Guest v. Hansen, 603 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1998)). Therefore, only an “administrator and sole beneficiary of an estate with no creditors may appear pro se on behalf of the estate.” Id. at 21. The complaint states that Grossetti is the Executor of the Estate, but it does not assert facts indicating that Grossetti is the sole beneficiary of the Estate and that the Estate has no creditors.

LEAVE TO AMEND The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. If Grossetti intends to proceed pro se on behalf of the Estate, an amended complaint must assert facts indicating that Grossetti is the sole beneficiary of the Estate and that the Estate has no creditors. If Grossetti is not the Estate’s sole beneficiary, or if the Estate has creditors, the Estate must obtain counsel in order to proceed with this action. Because an Estate may not proceed IFP, any amended complaint must be accompanied by the $400.00 in relevant fees required to commence an action in this Court. Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the

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Pridgen v. Andresen
113 F.3d 391 (Second Circuit, 1997)
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480 F.3d 636 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
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142 F.3d 553 (Second Circuit, 1998)
Gray v. Martinez
352 F. App'x 656 (Third Circuit, 2009)