OPINION OF THE COURT
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
This case presents the question whether a state court has the power to allow parties as part of a comprehensive court-approved settlement to release exclusive federal securities law claims arising from the same transaction or occurrence as the state law matters before it, even though the state court would not have jurisdiction to hear the federal claims in the first instance. A subsidiary issue presented is whether a non-resident owner of corporate stock who tendered his shares to the Delaware corporation in response to a proxy offer following a merger transaction had sufficient minimum contacts to be bound by the settlement and release entered into on behalf of the plaintiff class of shareholders by a Delaware state court. Answering both questions in the affirmative, we will affirm the district court.
I.
The complicated background giving rise to this lawsuit in federal court started with a merger agreement between two Delaware corporations. Vitalink Communications Corporation (“Vitalink”) was a manufacturer of computer internetworking products known as wide area bridges. Network Systems Corporation (“Network”), a manufacturer of data communications equipment which connects mainframe computers, minicomputers, and computer networks, entered into a merger agreement on May 6,1991, by which it would acquire the stock of Vitalink. It is not necessary for purposes of this opinion to lay out precisely the intricate details of the merger negotiations and the final agreement, other than to note that Network ultimately agreed to pay $10.60 in cash for each share of outstanding Vitalink stock.
On May 13,1991, Leslie G. Denend, President of Vitalink, sent a letter to all stockholders stating that the Vitalink Board of Directors had unanimously approved the merger, indicating that the Board of Directors believed the terms of the merger were fair, and recommending that the stockholders accept the offer. The plaintiffs in this action, C.L. Grimes, a Pennsylvania resident, and G.W. Holbrook, a Connecticut resident, were among the Vitalink stockholders.
Shortly after the merger agreement was announced seven state law actions were commenced, four in Delaware and three in California. The plaintiffs in these cases alleged that the Vitalink defendants breached their fiduciary duties and that the Network defendants aided and abetted the Vitalink defen[1555]*1555dants in doing so. The Delaware cases were consolidated and the parties engaged in expedited discovery. Within several days of commencing discovery, the parties agreed to a settlement. The California and Delaware plaintiffs entered into a Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise, Settlement and Release on June 13, 1991. They agreed to settle the dispute and release all claims arising from the merger transaction1 in exchange for a ten-day extension of the merger offer, a reduction in the amount payable to Network under a stock option agreement if a third party made an offer for Vitalink, and for an amendment limiting the reimbursement of Network’s fees by Vitalink in the event the merger agreement was terminated. In addition, the defendants agreed not to oppose an application by plaintiffs’ counsel for an award of attorneys’ fees not to exceed $275,000, and expenses not greater than $25,-000.
The merger was completed on July 1,1991, when Vitalink became a wholly owned subsidiary of Network. Vitalink shares that were not tendered were converted into the right to receive $10.50 per share or to seek appraisal. A notice of the completed merger was sent by Vitalink to all shareholders on July 11, 1991. In that letter, stockholders were given the option of surrendering their shares to the paying agent in exchange for $10.50 in cash per share, or to seek appraisal of the shares pursuant to Delaware corporation law. Mr. Holbrook tendered his shares in response to the letter from Vitalink, while Mr. Grimes did not do so.
On July 18, 1991, the Delaware Court of Chancery certified the Vitalink stockholders as a non-opt-out settlement class pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 23(b)(1) and (2).2 This class, consisting of all persons who owned Vitalink common stock between May 6, 1991 and July 1, 1991, included plaintiffs Grimes and Holbrook. A notification letter was sent to all class members discussing the pending class action litigation, describing the settlement benefits to the class, indicating that all class members had an opportunity to oppose settlement, and notifying the class of the date of the settlement hearing. Upon receiving written notice, a group of stockholders including Grimes filed objections to the settlement and presented argument at the subsequent hearing. Mr. Grimes and the other objectors argued that the interests of the stockholders were not adequately represented by the class representatives and that the settlement agreement did not result in any material benefits for the class. Mr. Hol-brook did not enter an appearance in the Delaware state court proceedings and never opposed settlement of the class action claims.
[1556]*1556The Delaware Court of Chancery approved the settlement by memorandum opinion issued on November 8, 1991. See In re Vitalink Communications Corp. Shareholders Litig., [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec. L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,585, 1991 WL 238816 (Del.Ch. Nov. 8, 1991). Mr. Grimes and the other objectors appealed this decision to the Delaware Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of Chancery in an unpublished disposition without opinion. See Grimes v. John P. McCarthy Profit Sharing Plan, 610 A.2d 725 (Del.1992) (table). In a petition for certiora-ri, Mr. Grimes argued that the Delaware court proceedings violated due process because the court did not develop a sufficient record to consider whether absent class members were adequately represented. The Supreme Court denied this petition on October 5, 1992. Grimes v. John P. McCarthy Profit Sharing Plan, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 179, 121 L.Ed.2d 124 (1992).
Prior to the disposition of the writ of cer-tiorari, Grimes and Holbrook filed the present action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their duty of disclosure pursuant to sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j & 78n(e) (1988). Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits alleging violations of these securities law provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988);3 Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 270 n. 15 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1048, 59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979). In addition, the plaintiffs complained that the procedures employed by the state courts in resolving the Delaware action denied them due process of law.
Vitalink, Network, arid the other defendants moved the district court to dismiss the federal action based on the judgment in the Delaware action. In essence, they argued that the state court approved a release of all claims arising from the merger, including exclusive federal claims, and that the federal court was required to adhere to that judgment consistent with full faith and credit.4 Grimes and Holbrook opposed dismissal of their suit and requested the district court to treat the motion as one for summary judgment. Likewise, they moved the district court for partial summary judgment and submitted several supporting documents to the court.
In a memorandum opinion dated February 27, 1993, the district court denied plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp., No. 92-2722, 1993 WL 56032 (E.D.Pa. Feb. 27, 1993). The district court ruled that the legal doctrines of collateral estoppel and release bar the federal court from considering the alleged violations of federal securities law stemming from the merger. Id. at *2-5. First, the district court found that the plaintiffs in this case were members of the non-opt-out state court class who were bound by the broad release approved by the Delaware Court of Chancery. Id. at *2-4. Second, and alternatively, the district court held that this federal securities case is barred by the collateral estoppel effect of the Delaware judgment because the predicate facts that underlie the federal case, which primarily involve issues of nondisclosure, overlap significantly with facts conclusively established in the state court proceeding. Id. at *4-5. Finally, the district court also examined the federal plaintiffs’ allegation that they were denied due process in the state court proceedings and concluded that this claim was not meritorious. Id. at *5-6.
[1557]*1557II.
The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. By granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the district court ordered the case dismissed. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as plaintiffs have appealed a final judgment of dismissal.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants is subject to plenary review. Wheeler v. Towanda Area School Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 129 (3d Cir.1991); American Medical Imaging Corp. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 949 F.2d 690, 692 (3d Cir.1991). To the extent the district court interpreted and applied Delaware law, the district court is not entitled to deference. The determinations regarding state law, where appropriate, will be reviewed de novo. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231, 111 S.Ct. 1217, 1221, 113 L.Ed.2d 190 (1991); Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir.1992).
III.
A.
The central issue raised in this appeal is whether a state court, which does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear exclusive federal claims, may nevertheless approve a settlement and release of those claims by the parties. The plaintiffs urge this court to adhere to the view that the Delaware release does not extinguish the exclusive federal claims because Congress did not authorize Delaware or other state courts to hear such claims in the first instance. As a starting point, however, it is important to emphasize that the Delaware court did not purport to exercise any inherent power to release causes of action that it had no jurisdiction to entertain. Rather, the Delaware court only acted to enter a settlement agreement that was initiated, negotiated, and adopted by the parties to a lawsuit that was properly before it.
It is significant to note that a release may take one of at least two distinct forms. In the first situation, a release may be entered into by parties engaged in a colorable legal dispute for which no formal complaint has been filed. The parties may negotiate a settlement of the dispute and in the process execute a release of all claims. The release acts as a simple contract between two private parties not engaged in a lawsuit. If one of the parties later breaches that contract by filing a complaint stemming from the relevant transaction, then the defendant may present the release as a defense to the lawsuit and argue that the claims alleged in court were contracted away by the plaintiff. Assuming that there is no relevant exception to the release defense, for instance that the release was only entered into on the basis of deception or coercion, see In re Complaint of Bankers Trust Co., 752 F.2d 874, 885 (3d Cir.1984), then the contract should be given full preclusive effect by the court.
In the second situation, which encompasses the case sub judice, a lawsuit has been commenced by one party asserting claims against the other. When the parties in a pending case negotiate a settlement, the resulting court order dismissing the case is a final judgment in that lawsuit. As a judgment, the settlement and release of claims is a contract that not only is agreed upon by the parties, but also is stamped with the imprimatur of the court with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the lawsuit. See Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 33 n. 2 (1st Cir.1991). Thus, the release is not simply a contract entered into by private parties, but is one that has been given a stamp of approval by the court.
When the underlying legal dispute is a class action, as is the present case, then the court has more than a ministerial duty to enter the negotiated settlement and release as a judgment. In this circumstance, the court has an elevated duty to ensure that the settlement is fair and adequate to all the plaintiff class members, not just the named representatives who negotiated its substantive terms. This duty is particularly acute when the class action is one certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) or (2), or their state counterparts, because the class members have been denied an opportu[1558]*1558nity to opt out of the putative class. In effect, all ordinary class members are bound by the deal struck by their named representatives in the event the court determines that they were adequately and fairly represented during the course of the negotiations.
That is not to say, however, that non-representative class members are without recourse in the event that they do not feel the negotiated settlement and release is in their individual or the class’ best interest. When this fairly usual circumstance arises, the objecting class members must be given an opportunity to address the court as to the reasons the proposed settlement is unfair or inadequate. The court then rules as to the adequacy and fairness of the settlement. See, e.g., Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 156—57 (3d Cir.1975) (discussing the factors a trial court should utilize when determining the fairness of a class action settlement for absent members of the plaintiff class).
As the district court noted, Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *3, the federal plaintiffs pursuing this case on appeal were provided with such an opportunity in the state court litigation. As the district court stated:
The plaintiffs, as class members, received notice of the Delaware proceedings and were provided an opportunity to be heard. Indeed, plaintiff Grimes vigorously exercised this opportunity. Both the Delaware Chancery Court and the Delaware Supreme Court rejected Mr. Grimes’ disclosure claims and found the settlement to be fair to the Vitalink stockholders.
Id. (citing the Delaware court dispositions); see also In re Vitalink, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,585, at 92,743-45, 1991 WL 238816 (Del.Ch. Nov. 8, 1991). Not only did plaintiff Grimes pursue the adequacy of representation and disclosure claims through the Delaware court system to its highest court, but when relief was denied he petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case. When the Supreme Court declined to disturb the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, see Grimes, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 179, he and the other class members had been granted all the process that was due. The members of the class, including Holbrook and Grimes, were provided an opportunity to be heard, actually litigated, and lost on the issue of whether they were deprived due process in the state court proceeding.
The plaintiffs’ attempt to relitigate the issue of whether they were adequately represented during the settlement negotiations and whether the state court considered sufficient evidence to make its determination is even less compelling than that of the federal plaintiffs in Nottingham Partners, the most analogous case on point. In Nottingham Partners, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court “in vain pursuit of back-door relief’ without even appealing the state court adjudication to the United States Supreme Court. 925 F.2d at 33. Here, the objectors pursued their direct appeal all the way to the Supreme Court without obtaining relief.
B.
Although plaintiffs concede they pursued the adequacy of representation issue on appeal through the Delaware court system, they argue that such process cannot bind non-resident, non-objecting class members like Holbrook who never entered an appearance during the pendency of the Delaware litigation.5 Plaintiffs would even take this argument one step further to assert that the Delaware judgment does not bind Holbrook because he did not formally consent to personal jurisdiction in the Delaware court and because he does not have “minimum contacts” with this forum for purposes of this adjudication. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
Although the class members in the present case were not provided with an opportunity to opt out, the state court had the requisite power to bind absent class members as long as they had minimum contacts with the forum and they were not otherwise denied due process. See id. at 317-18, 66 S.Ct. at 159 (minimum contacts in and of themselves suf[1559]*1559fice for specific jurisdiction). We first consider whether Holbrook had sufficient minimum contacts with the Delaware forum to be bound by its judgment. Addressing this issue, a Delaware court has held that it may exercise in personam, jurisdiction over absent members of a plaintiff class who have not been provided an opportunity to opt out based solely on the fact of ownership of Delaware corporate stock. Hynson v. Drummond, Coal Co., 601 A.2d 570, 575-79 (Del.Ch.1991). In Hynson, Chancellor Allen stated that:
it is not unreasonable — not inconsistent with traditional notions of fairness ... — to conclude that the law has long put the buyer of corporate stock on notice that corporate rights attaching to stock ownership may be adjudicated in a single proceeding in another jurisdiction, including at a minimum the corporation’s state of incorporation.
Id. at 579 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219-28, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2588-92, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Such an exercise of personal jurisdiction is inherently limited to adjudication of rights associated with ownership of that stock. Id. Thus, stock ownership alone suffices for “specific jurisdiction” but not “general jurisdiction.”
We have long recognized an important distinction between basing personal jurisdiction in a particular forum on contacts that are unrelated to the claim being adjudicated (general jurisdiction), as opposed to basing personal jurisdiction on contacts directly related to the claim or claims at issue (specific jurisdiction). E.g., Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Security Bank of Utah, 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir.1984); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 889 (3d Cir.1981) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part) (“Specific and general jurisdiction anal-yses are quite distinct.”), aff'd sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 102 5.Ct. 2099, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). Unlike establishing general jurisdiction where the party must be shown to have “maintained continuous and substantial forum affiliations,” Dollar Sav. Bank, 746 F.2d at 212, establishing specific jurisdiction, at a minimum, requires only that a party be shown to have committed at least one act in the relevant forum which is substantially related to the claim being adjudicated, see Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 146-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 61, 121 L.Ed.2d 29 (1992). The claims adjudicated in the Delaware Court of Chancery involved the duties of care and disclosure exercised by the members of the Vital-ink Board of Directors in accepting Network’s merger offer, as well as the fairness and adequacy of representation by the class representatives. An appropriate basis for the Delaware court’s power to bind nonresident shareholders in such a proceeding is ownership of Vitalink stock6 together with any other activity engaged in by the members of the class pursuant to their shareholder rights. Thus, in this collateral attack we are concerned with whether the Delaware Court of Chancery had specific jurisdiction to bind non-resident members of the plaintiff class like Holbrook.
In the present case, plaintiff Holbrook and all other class members owned stock in Vital-ink, a Delaware corporation. Nevertheless, we need not decide whether the single act of purchasing and owning stock in a Delaware corporation would provide sufficient contacts for the state court to exercise specific jurisdiction over every member of the class because the record discloses that Holbrook had an important further contact with the Delaware forum. By surrendering his shares in response to the tender offer with knowledge of his status as a member of the plaintiff class in a pending class action lawsuit containing all the attendant procedural protections designed to ensure that only a fair and adequate settlement judgment would be entered by the court, Holbrook purposefully availed himself of the privilege of having the Delaware Court of Chancery finally, and in a single lawsuit, determine the adequacy of the settlement agreement, “thus invoking the [1560]*1560benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1240, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
Prior to class certification, each member, including Holbrook, was provided with notice that the Vitalink Board had accepted a merger offer from Network that would provide a cash payment of $10.50 per share. This notice was followed by a letter from the Delaware Court of Chancery discussing the pen-dency of the class action litigation, describing the terms of the settlement agreement, and indicating that every class member had the right to oppose the settlement at a formal hearing. In response to these notifications, Holbrook elected to tender his shares to the Delaware corporation in exchange for the merger price. This affirmative act provided an important further contact with the Delaware forum. Based on his ownership of stock in Vitalink, a Delaware corporation, and his additional act of tendering his shares, we conclude that Holbrook had sufficient contacts with Delaware for its courts to exercise in personam jurisdiction for the limited purpose of determining the fairness of the settlement with respect to his stock ownership rights.7
Turning to the issue of the adequacy of process, the Supreme Court in a related context has indicated that the due process protections required for out-of-state class plaintiffs are significantly lower than those needed for defendants. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808-11, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 2972-74, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985). Plaintiffs require fewer due process protections because there are inherent protections built into the class action device and because they are subjected to lesser burdens than defendants. Id. at 809-11, 105 S.Ct. at 2973-74. Thus, the Delaware state court need only have provided “notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation” in order to satisfy due process.8 Id. at 812, 105 S.Ct. at 2974.
The Delaware Court of Chancery sent by mail to each class member, including Holbrook, written notice of the pendency of the class action containing a full disclosure of the proposed settlement and its ramifications.9 This disclosure statement also notified all class members that a hearing to determine the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement had been scheduled for September 16, 1991 before the Delaware Court of Chancery. [1561]*1561The class members were invited to appear at the hearing to “present any evidence or arguments that may be proper and relevant” concerning the settlement upon providing ten days written notice of their intent to appear. App. at 535. Despite receiving written notice and an opportunity to challenge the settlement, Holbrook made a conscious choice to accept the tender offer price of $10.50 per share without objecting. Although the present class members were not provided with an opportunity to opt out of the class, we conclude that the Delaware Court of Chancery provided sufficient due process protections to bind absent class members like Holbrook who failed to appear and object to the settlement.
The plaintiffs contend that In re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d 760, 762 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Tucson Unified School Dist., 493 U.S. 821, 110 S.Ct. 77, 107 L.Ed.2d 44 (1989), provides support for the proposition that the state court could not release Holbrook’s federal claims because it did not have personal jurisdiction to bind him. We agree with the district court, see Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *3, that this reading of Real Estate Title is mistaken.
If at all relevant to this case, Real Estate Title stands only for the limited principle that “an absent class member can[not] be enjoined from relitigation if the member does not have minimum contacts with the forum” or consent to jurisdiction. 869 F.2d at 769 (emphasis in original). The present case does not involve a suit brought by the merging corporations to enjoin the federal plaintiffs from relitigating any claims or issues. Rather, the defendants have only raised the state court release as a defense— it is a judgment that precludes relitigation of all claims that were released by the parties. More importantly, we have already concluded that Holbrook had sufficient contacts with Delaware to be bound by the judgment of the Court of Chancery concerning his Vitalink stock ownership rights. Therefore, Real Estate Title does not change our analysis of the personal jurisdiction issue.
We therefore conclude that the Delaware court had in personam jurisdiction over the class members, including Holbrook, who tendered their shares in response to the proxy mailing and who did not make an appearance at the hearing to voice objections to the adequacy of the negotiated settlement. Both Grimes and Holbrook were provided sufficient process by the Delaware court system to challenge the settlement. Despite the objections actually lodged, the settlement and release were approved by the Delaware court and thereby bind all who were parties to the lawsuit. As members of the plaintiff class, Grimes and Holbrook are bound by the terms of the release that was entered into on their behalf.
C.
We next consider whether the release defense interposed by the federal court defendants applies to preclude the federal securities case from proceeding forward. In the federal lawsuit, the plaintiffs have alleged claims that were resolved by the final judgment entered into by the state court.10 Even though the state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider a suit alleging violations of the federal securities laws, the judgment entered by the court must be given due accord by a subsequent federal court entertaining a lawsuit based upon facts and [1562]*1562transactions conclusively determined in the state court proceeding.
The district court made a factual finding that Grimes presented arguments during the state court proceeding concerning disclosure requirements under federal law. Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *2.11 The facts that underlie the federal non-disclosure claims were actually litigated during the state court proceeding and were conclusively resolved against the objectors, here the federal plaintiffs. Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *5 (“[T]he plaintiffs and the objectors, including plaintiff Grimes, actually litigated the disclosures accompanying defendants’ offer and merger into N[etwork]”). See also In re Vitalink, [1991-92 Transfer Binder] Fed.Sec.L.Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,585, at 92,743-45, 1991 WL 238816 (Del.Ch. Nov. 8, 1991) (the Delaware Court of Chancery fully considered and rejected all of the objectors’ non-disclosure arguments). As a result, the plaintiffs cannot relitigate in federal court the issues of nondisclosure and fairness of the settlement that were conclusively determined in the Delaware proceeding.
We are compelled to conclude that the present lawsuit is barred by the terms of the federal full faith and credit statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. “The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a subsequent federal lawsuit generally is determined by the full faith and credit statute, which provides that state judicial proceedings ‘shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken.’” Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 1331-32, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738). In Marrese, the Court considered whether the federal full faith and credit statute operates to preclude a federal court from considering exclusive federal antitrust claims that arose from the same transaction that was the subject of a prior state law action in which the state court entered a final judgment dismissing all claims.
The Court held that the federal full faith and credit statute can operate to bar the relitigation of issues decided by the state court, even though the state court would not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the federal claims in the first instance, if state law would give the state court judgment preclusive effect. Id. at 380-81, 105 S.Ct. at 1332. Viewed properly as an interpretation of the full faith and credit statute, the Marrese decision is consistent with earlier Supreme Court cases requiring a subsequent federal court to look to state law to determine whether issue preclusion is a necessary consequence of the prior state court litigation. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81, 104 S.Ct. 892, 896, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-82, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1897-98, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (The full faith and credit statute “does not allow federal courts to employ their own rules of res judicata in determining the effect of state judgments. Rather, it goes beyond the common law and commands a federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judgment is taken.”); cf. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415-16, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980) (federal courts are required to give collateral estoppel effect to prior state court judgments when state courts would do so). Thus, the Supreme Court instructs a federal court to inquire into the scope of state preclusion law when applying the full faith and credit statute to a prior state court judgment.
For present purposes, we find it unnecessary to determine whether operation of the full faith and credit statute could preclude a subsequent federal court from entertaining exclusive federal securities claims on the ba[1563]*1563Sis of res judicata. As the Marrese court held, where a state court would give a prior state judgment such broad res judicata effect, then a federal court is required to follow suit. 470 U.S. at 379-81, 105 S.Ct. at 1331-32.12 We need not address this question because the district court expressly ruled that the federal claims had been released as a part of the state court judgment. Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *3, and that these claims were precluded by the collateral estoppel effect of this judgment, id. at *4-5.
As we previously indicated, we agree with the district court that the language of this broad release manifests an intent by the parties to settle all claims arising from the merger transaction. See supra note 10. In addition, we have determined that all class members, including Grimes and Holbrook, are constitutionally bound by the prior judgment. Therefore, the full faith and credit statute-operates to bar a federal court from considering any claims arising from the merger'transaction if a Delaware state court would find that the judgment precludes the relitigation of any issues conclusively determined in the state court proceeding.
As the district court found when it analyzed state law, Grimes, 1993 WL 56032, at *4, Delaware follows the usual rule that a judgment in one case constitutes a final determination concerning questions of fact litigated by the parties. See E.B.R. Corp. v. PSL Air Lease Corp., 313 A.2d 893, 894 (Del.1973); Winkler v. Balentine, 254 A.2d 849, 851 (Del.1969); accord Nottingham Partners, 925 F.2d at 32. Since a state court would conclude that the plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from relitigating the factual issues of nondisclosure, adequacy of representation, and fairness of the settlement that they raise in this lawsuit, the district court correctly ruled that the federal defendants were entitled to summary judgment. In short, the full faith and credit statute requires the federal court to give collateral estoppel effect to the state court judgment. Since this judgment places the court’s stamp of approval on a broad release of all claims arising from the merger transaction, including any exclusive federal claims, the subsequent federal court is precluded from entertaining a case involving claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts.
D.
While this rule of law may seem anomalous at first glance, it is widely recognized that courts without jurisdiction to hear certain claims have the power to release those claims as part of a judgment. See, e.g., Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287-88 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 408, 121 L.Ed.2d 333 (1992) (a federal court may release not only claims alleged in the complaint, but also state claims arising from the same nucleus of operative facts over which the court would not have jurisdictional competency); TBK Partners Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir.1982) (same); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195, 221-22 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998, 102 S.Ct. 2283, 73 L.Ed.2d 1294 (1982) (same). This rule of law serves the important policy interest of judicial economy by permitting parties to enter into comprehensive settlements that “prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action.” TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460.
Nor is this rule of law limited to federal courts entering judgments that release state claims that they would not have jurisdictional competency to entertain in the first instance. We hold that as a matter of [1564]*1564federal law a state court has the power to enter a settlement negotiated by the parties as a judgment which releases exclusive federal claims that the state court could not itself entertain. With this holding, we follow several other federal courts that have recognized the broad power of state courts to approve and enforce settlements which reflect the parties’ intent to release all claims arising from a transaction regardless of whether the class action court has jurisdictional competency to hear those claims. See Nottingham Partners, 925 F.2d at 34; Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.1968). See also Sandler Assocs., L.P. v. BellSouth Corp., 818 F.Supp. 695, 704-05 (D.Del.1993), appeal filed, No. 93-7343 (3d Cir. May 12, 1993); Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int'l, No. 89-1071, 1989 WL 73254, 1989 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 7407, at *20 n. 15 (E.D.Pa. June 29, 1989).
Despite the well established authority for this legal proposition, the federal plaintiffs urge this court to hold that the state court did not have power to enter such a broad release based on the rationale put forth by Judge Friendly in National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18-19 (2d Cir.1981). In National Super Spuds, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a federal court was not precluded from entertaining a federal claim despite an earlier broad release entered into by the parties to a state court proceeding. Id. at 17-18. However, National Super Spuds is distinguishable from the case sub judice because the federal plaintiff brought claims based on unliquidated futures contracts, while the state court class was organized only to litigate claims based on futures contracts liquidated during the relevant time period. Id.
Thus, our holding today is not inconsistent with the holding of the National Super Spuds court that a state court class representative cannot release federal claims arising from a different factual predicate than that before the state court. Judge Friendly expressly limited the opinion to the facts before the court by recognizing that “a settlement could properly be framed so as to prevent class members from subsequently asserting claims relying on a legal theory different from that relied upon in the class action complaint but depending upon the very same set of facts.” Id. at 18 n. 7. While National Super Spuds was “not such a case,” id., the present one is.
IV.
We conclude that the district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants because all of the elements of a dispositive release defense were present. As a member of the plaintiff class who owned Vitalink stock and tendered his shares, plaintiff Holbrook had sufficient contacts with the Delaware forum such that the Court of Chancery could exercise specific jurisdiction to adjudicate his stock ownership rights. Furthermore, the state court judgment releasing all claims arising from the merger transaction was entitled to full faith and credit by the district court even though the state court did not have jurisdictional competency to entertain the present exclusive federal claims. We will affirm the judgment of the district court. Each party will bear its own costs.