McGowan Investors LP v. Keefe Bruyette & Woods, Inc.

540 F. Supp. 2d 571, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22390, 2008 WL 746614
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 19, 2008
Docket07-cv-2464
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 540 F. Supp. 2d 571 (McGowan Investors LP v. Keefe Bruyette & Woods, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McGowan Investors LP v. Keefe Bruyette & Woods, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 571, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22390, 2008 WL 746614 (E.D. Pa. 2008).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ANITA B. BRODY, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

In January, 2004, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange (“PHLX”) demutualized. “De-mutualization” is the conversion of a mutual non-profit organization owned by seat owners into a for-profit corporation that issues stock. While considering demutual-ization, the PHLX Board of Governors (the “Board”) engaged Defendant Keefe Bruyette & Woods, Inc. (“KBW”) to advise it on demutualization and the alternatives. KBW recommended demutualization as the best option for keeping the PHLX financially viable. In November, 2003, the seat owners voted for demutualization, and in January, 2004, the PHLX was demutu-alized.

Unhappy with the decision to demutualize, the plaintiffs, McGowan Investors LP, Tim Lobach, Stephen J. Cheseldine, and Market Street Securities (collectively “McGowan” or “McGowan and the other plaintiffs”), a putative class of former seat owners, are suing KBW and its managing director, Joseph J. Spalluto. They claim damages they allegedly incurred when they followed KBW’s advice.

KBW moved to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that this case is barred by a court-approved release in the settlement of a Delaware class action suit. 1 I grant KBW’s motion.

*573 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In July, 2001, the PHLX Board hired KBW to provide financial services advice. On October 1, 2008, KBW sent the PHLX Board a letter (the “KBW Advisory”) in which KBW concluded:

1. The financial viability of PHLX, in its current operating structure is questionable.
2. Demutualization, while in itself not able to guarantee financial and/or operational success, does in fact (at the very least) position PHLX to pursue certain strategic alternatives, the pursuit and successful execution of which could assist the future financial performance and financial condition of the PHLX.
3. In its current mutual structure, with a charter providing that the Exchange is “not for profit” and that dividends cannot be paid, PHLX is either precluded completely from pursuing the stated alternatives, or handicapped significantly in its pursuit of them. The one exception identified by KBW — a strategic alternative focused on the reduction of operating costs — appears to be a viable near-term alternative if executed carefully, though it is unlikely to be a satisfactory long-term solution absent corresponding growth in revenue.
4. A near-term strategy centered on demutualization is a reasonable and appropriate strategy for PHLX and a substantially better alternative than the strategies that KBW believes are reasonably available to PHLX.

(KBW Advisory, Doc. # 7, Exhibit C).

On October 22, 2003, the PHLX Board sent the PHLX seat owners a letter explaining demutualization, attaching the KBW Advisory. In November, 2003, in part because of the KBW Advisory, the seat owners voted to demutualize the PHLX. In January, 2004, the PHLX was demutualized.

On January 21, 2004, the PHLX revealed to the former seat owners that the PHLX was actually in a stronger financial position than the former seat owners had been led to believe before they voted for demutualization. Consequently, there have been a number of suits in both state and federal courts about the demutualization of the PHLX and the investment decisions that followed.

A. The Present Action

McGowan alleges that KBW deceived the PHLX seat owners by fraudulently convincing them that the only real option to keep the PHLX operational was to de-mutualize the PHLX. Partly because of KBW’s advice, the seat owners chose to become shareholders in the demutualized PHLX, instead of accepting the option of an appraisal given to them by the Delaware Chancery Court. McGowan contends that if the former seat owners had exited through an appraisal, they would have received a minimum of $500,000 per seat, which is considerably more than their PHLX stock was worth.

McGowan seeks: (1) damages for violations of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder; (2) recission under § 29(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of the agreement between KBW and the PHLX in which the PHLX engaged KBW as an advisor; and (3) damages for civil RICO violations under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) with securities fraud as the predicate acts.

*574 B. The Ginsburg Action

Ginsburg v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2202-CC (Del. Chancery Ct., New Castle County) (the “Ginsburg Action”) was a shareholder class action lawsuit in the Delaware Chancery Court against the PHLX and other related parties. In that action, the Ginsburg plaintiffs argued that the PHLX and the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties by entering into strategic investments after demutualization. 2

The Ginsburg class was defined as:

[A]ll class A common stockholders of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc. (‘PHLX’), on April 20, 2005, and their transferees or successors in interest through June 20, 2007.

(Settlement Order, ¶ 4). This was a non-opt out class, hence class members could not choose to litigate separately. McGowan and the other plaintiffs were class A common stockholders of the PHLX on April 20, 2005 and thus were members of the class. KBW was not a defendant in the Ginsburg Action, but it was subpoenaed as a non-party witness and provided documents and two witnesses for depositions.

On September 4, 2007, the Ginsburg Action settled and the parties entered into a release of certain claims (the “Delaware Release”). During the hearing before the Delaware Chancery Court on whether to approve the proposed settlement, the Court heard the objections of McGowan and the other plaintiffs. The Delaware Chancery Court denied their objections to the proposed settlement agreement.

On October 22, 2007, the Delaware Chancery Court certified the non-opt out plaintiff class and approved the Ginsburg Action’s settlement agreement (see attachment). The Delaware Chancery Court’s Order and Final Judgment (“Settlement Order”) includes the following provisions:

Plaintiff and all members of the Class, Defendants, their respective affiliates, and anyone claiming through or for the benefit of any of them, are hereby permanently barred and enjoined from commencing, or in any way participating in the commencement of, any action or proceeding, in any forum, asserting against any of the Released Persons any Settled Claims, either directly, represen-tatively, derivatively, or in any other capacity.

(Settlement Order, ¶ 13).

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Related

McGowan Investors LP v. Frucher
392 F. App'x 39 (Third Circuit, 2010)
In Re Philadelphia Stock Exchange, Inc.
945 A.2d 1123 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 2008)

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Bluebook (online)
540 F. Supp. 2d 571, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22390, 2008 WL 746614, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcgowan-investors-lp-v-keefe-bruyette-woods-inc-paed-2008.