Grimes v. Municipality of Riverside

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 14, 2025
Docket3:25-cv-02071
StatusUnknown

This text of Grimes v. Municipality of Riverside (Grimes v. Municipality of Riverside) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grimes v. Municipality of Riverside, (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 25-cv-2071-AJB-DEB 12 ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 (Doc. No. 2) AND MUNICIPALITY OF RIVERSIDE, 15 BAILIFF/DEPUTY SHERIFF #1, (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 16 BAILIFF/DEPUTY SHERIFF #2, WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR VAUGHN LIVING SERVICES, DAVID 17 FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE VAUGHN, SR., DIANA STARNES, REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 18 JOHN DOE #3 ACOSTA, JOHN DOE #4, BASTAMANTE, 19 20 Defendants. 21 22 I. INTRODUCTION 23 Plaintiff, Jerome L. Grimes, a detainee at Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility in 24 Riverside County, has filed a pro se Complaint and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 25 (“IFP”). (Doc. Nos. 1, 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges acts of retaliation, defamation 26 and deliberate indifference by Defendants. (See Doc. No. 1.) For the reasons discussed 27 below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismisses the case without prejudice. 28 / / / 1 II. IFP MOTION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 4 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Grimes, however, “face 5 an additional hurdle.” Id. 6 In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly 7 installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison 8 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 9 proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner: 10 . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 11 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 13 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 15 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 16 § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 17 v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (stating that 18 under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely 19 be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to 20 further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” 21 Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 23 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 24 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 25 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 26 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 28 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 1 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” 2 El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 3 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 4 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 5 of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “makes a plausible 6 allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “[T]he PLRA [also] 8 requires a nexus between [any] alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged 9 in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, to 10 qualify for an exception, “a three-strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious 11 physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint 12 and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. 13 B. Discussion 14 Grimes’s allegations are far from clear, but as best the Court can decipher, he seeks 15 to hold Defendants liable for retaliation, defamation and “deliberate indifference,” among 16 other things. (See Doc. No. 1 at 1.) However, Grimes does not include any “plausible 17 allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 18 of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 19 Courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 20 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” 21 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 22 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 23 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, this Court 24 takes judicial notice of federal docket proceedings available on PACER and finds that 25 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, currently identified as Douglas County Jail Inmate 26 #202528807, has filed over 600 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 27 28 1 country dating back to 1986. 2 These dockets show Grimes has been in and out of state and local custody over the 3 course of more than three decades, and due to his vexatiousness, has been denied leave to 4 proceed IFP while incarcerated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in the Northern District of 5 California, Western District of Louisiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Middle and 6 Northern Districts of Florida, the District of Maryland, and this district. See e.g., Grimes v. 7 Wan, et al., Civil Case No. 07-cv-1726-CW (PR), 2007 WL 1988530, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 8 3, 2007) (“On May 18, 2000, this Court informed Plaintiff that while he is a prisoner, he 9 generally is ineligible to proceed [IFP] in federal court under the ‘three-strikes’ provisions 10 of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”) (citing Grimes v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Moore v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
657 F.3d 890 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc.
285 F.3d 801 (Ninth Circuit, 2002)
Bias v. Moynihan
508 F.3d 1212 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Andrews v. Cervantes
493 F.3d 1047 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
O'NEAL v. Price
531 F.3d 1146 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)
Andrews v. King
398 F.3d 1113 (Ninth Circuit, 2005)
Adonai El-Shaddai v. Jeffrey Wang, Md
833 F.3d 1036 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)
Jason Lee Harris v. J. Kenneth Mangum
863 F.3d 1133 (Ninth Circuit, 2017)
Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez
590 U.S. 595 (Supreme Court, 2020)
Edward Ray, Jr. v. E. Lara
31 F.4th 692 (Ninth Circuit, 2022)
Berman Enterprises, Inc. v. Jorling
3 F.3d 602 (Second Circuit, 1993)
Tierney v. Kupers
128 F.3d 1310 (Ninth Circuit, 1997)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Grimes v. Municipality of Riverside, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-municipality-of-riverside-casd-2025.