Grimes v. Darryl

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. California
DecidedAugust 25, 2022
Docket3:22-cv-00605
StatusUnknown

This text of Grimes v. Darryl (Grimes v. Darryl) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grimes v. Darryl, (S.D. Cal. 2022).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No.: 3:22-cv-00605-TWR-JLB Inmate #2022-0659, 12 ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS v. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 (ECF No. 2), AND (2) DISMISSING

15 CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT DARRYL DOE, Automobile Repair Shop PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO 16 Customer Service Representative; PAY FILING FEE REQUIRED BY 28 17 MOSSY NISSAN DEALERSHIP OF U.S.C. § 1914(a). KEARNEY MESA, Automobile Repair 18 Shop; JO LEAVE, Auto Repair Mechanic, 19 Defendants. 20 21 Plaintiff, Jerome L. Grimes, a pretrial detainee at the Douglas County Jail in Castle 22 Rock, Colorado, has filed a pro se complaint invoking diversity jurisdiction against a San 23 Diego County automobile dealership and its employees, and alleging acts of negligence 24 and breach of contract. (See “Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 1‒3.) Plaintiff has not paid the civil 25 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed in 26 forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See ECF No. 2.) 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 2 A. Standard of Review 3 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 4 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Grimes, however, “face 5 an additional hurdle.” Id. 6 In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly 7 installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison 8 Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to 9 proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner: 10 . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 11 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 13 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 15 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 16 § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 17 v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the 18 PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred 19 from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to further 20 “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney 21 v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 23 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 24 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 25 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 26 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 28 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 1 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 2 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 3 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 4 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 5 of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “makes a plausible 6 allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “[T]he PLRA [also] 8 requires a nexus between [any] alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged 9 in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, to 10 qualify for an exception, “a three-strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious 11 physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint 12 and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. 13 B. Discussion 14 Grimes’s allegations are far from clear, but as best the Court can decipher, he seeks 15 to hold a local Nissan dealership and its employees liable for failing to extend his rental 16 contract and negligently or falsely reporting to San Diego Police that his “loaner 17 vehicle/rental car” had been stolen and/or repossessed. (See Compl. at 5‒8.) Grimes seeks 18 $484,000 in damages based on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations, which he claims 19 “induc[ed]” a 74-day stay in jail and his “continuous imprisonment.” (Id. at 12.) However, 20 Grimes does not include any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger 21 of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 22 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Grimes also admits to having filed several similar lawsuits in 2021 and 23 2022.1 (See Compl. at 10.) 24 25 26 1 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 27 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, but “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least 28 1 Courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 2 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” 3 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 4 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 5 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, this Court 6 takes judicial notice of federal docket proceedings available on PACER and finds that 7 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, currently identified as Douglas County Jail Inmate #2022- 8 0659, has filed no fewer than 593 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 9 county dating back to 1986.2 10 These dockets show Grimes has been in and out of state and local custody over the 11 course of more than three decades, and due to his vexatiousness, has been denied leave to 12 proceed in forma pauperis while incarcerated pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

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Grimes v. Darryl, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grimes-v-darryl-casd-2022.