1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No. 25-cv-1979-BAS-MSB
12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ARGUETTA, et al., 15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(ECF No. 2); AND 16 Defendants. 17 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 18 FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 19 REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 20 21 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, a detainee at Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility in 25 Riverside County, has filed a pro se Complaint and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 26 (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges acts of retaliation, fraud, and 27 “abuse of authority” by Defendants. (See ECF No. 1.) For the reasons discussed below, 28 the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismisses the case without prejudice. 1 II. IFP MOTION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 4 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Grimes, however, “face 5 an additional hurdle.” Id. 6 In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly 7 installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the Prison Litigation 8 Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in 9 cases where the prisoner: 10 . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 11 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 13 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 15 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 16 § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 17 v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (stating that 18 under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely 19 be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to 20 further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” 21 Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 23 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 24 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 25 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 26 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 28 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 1 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 2 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 3 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 4 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 5 of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “makes a plausible 6 allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “[T]he PLRA [also] 8 requires a nexus between [any] alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged 9 in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, to 10 qualify for an exception, “a three-strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious 11 physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint 12 and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. 13 B. Discussion 14 Grimes’s allegations are far from clear, but as best the Court can decipher, he seeks 15 to hold a Shell gas station and its employees liable for assault and “defamation.” (See ECF 16 No. 1 at 8–11.) However, Grimes does not include any “plausible allegations” to suggest 17 he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 18 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 19 Courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 20 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” 21 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 22 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 23 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the Court 24 takes judicial notice of federal docket proceedings available on PACER and finds that 25 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, currently identified as Douglas County Jail Inmate 26 #202528807, has filed over 600 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 27 28 1 country dating back to 1986. 2 These dockets show Grimes has been in and out of state and local custody over the 3 course of more than three decades, and due to his vexatiousness, has been denied leave to 4 proceed IFP while incarcerated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in the Northern District of 5 California, Western District of Louisiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Middle and 6 Northern Districts of Florida, the District of Maryland, and this District. See, e.g., Grimes 7 v. Wan, et al., Civil Case No. 07-cv-1726-CW (PR), 2007 WL 1988530, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 8 July 3, 2007) (“On May 18, 2000, this Court informed Plaintiff that while he is a prisoner, 9 he generally is ineligible to proceed [IFP] in federal court under the ‘three-strikes’ 10 provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”) (citing Grimes v. Oakland Police Dept., C 00-1100 11 CW (Order Dismissing Complaint, 5/18/00)); Grimes v. Roman, et al., Civil Case No. 17- 12 cv-03288-JSW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2017) (ECF No.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JEROME L. GRIMES, Case No. 25-cv-1979-BAS-MSB
12 ORDER: Plaintiff, 13 v. (1) DENYING MOTION TO 14 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ARGUETTA, et al., 15 AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
(ECF No. 2); AND 16 Defendants. 17 (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 18 FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 19 REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) 20 21 22 23 I. INTRODUCTION 24 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, a detainee at Larry D. Smith Correctional Facility in 25 Riverside County, has filed a pro se Complaint and a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 26 (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges acts of retaliation, fraud, and 27 “abuse of authority” by Defendants. (See ECF No. 1.) For the reasons discussed below, 28 the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP motion and dismisses the case without prejudice. 1 II. IFP MOTION 2 A. Standard of Review 3 “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 4 Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Grimes, however, “face 5 an additional hurdle.” Id. 6 In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly 7 installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the Prison Litigation 8 Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in 9 cases where the prisoner: 10 . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was 11 dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 12 upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 13 14 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 15 provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to 16 § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews 17 v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (stating that 18 under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely 19 be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule[.]”). The objective of the PLRA is to 20 further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” 21 Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). 22 “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 23 were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 24 Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 25 styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 26 prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 27 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 28 dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 1 the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- 2 Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 3 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). 4 Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 5 of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he “makes a plausible 6 allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” 7 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). “[T]he PLRA [also] 8 requires a nexus between [any] alleged imminent danger and the violations of law alleged 9 in the prisoner’s complaint.” Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 700 (9th Cir. 2022). Thus, to 10 qualify for an exception, “a three-strikes prisoner must allege imminent danger of serious 11 physical injury that is both fairly traceable to unlawful conduct alleged in his complaint 12 and redressable by the court.” Id. at 701. 13 B. Discussion 14 Grimes’s allegations are far from clear, but as best the Court can decipher, he seeks 15 to hold a Shell gas station and its employees liable for assault and “defamation.” (See ECF 16 No. 1 at 8–11.) However, Grimes does not include any “plausible allegations” to suggest 17 he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 18 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 19 Courts “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 20 federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” 21 Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 22 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria 23 Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, the Court 24 takes judicial notice of federal docket proceedings available on PACER and finds that 25 Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, currently identified as Douglas County Jail Inmate 26 #202528807, has filed over 600 civil actions in multiple federal district courts across the 27 28 1 country dating back to 1986. 2 These dockets show Grimes has been in and out of state and local custody over the 3 course of more than three decades, and due to his vexatiousness, has been denied leave to 4 proceed IFP while incarcerated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in the Northern District of 5 California, Western District of Louisiana, Eastern District of Kentucky, Middle and 6 Northern Districts of Florida, the District of Maryland, and this District. See, e.g., Grimes 7 v. Wan, et al., Civil Case No. 07-cv-1726-CW (PR), 2007 WL 1988530, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 8 July 3, 2007) (“On May 18, 2000, this Court informed Plaintiff that while he is a prisoner, 9 he generally is ineligible to proceed [IFP] in federal court under the ‘three-strikes’ 10 provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).”) (citing Grimes v. Oakland Police Dept., C 00-1100 11 CW (Order Dismissing Complaint, 5/18/00)); Grimes v. Roman, et al., Civil Case No. 17- 12 cv-03288-JSW (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2017) (ECF No. 4) (noting that “[i]n 2003 alone, 13 [Grimes’s] failure to comply [with court orders granting leave to pay the full filing fee and 14 to state cognizable claims for relief] resulted in the dismissal of approximately thirty-six 15 actions under § 1915(g).”); Grimes v. Lewis, et al., Civil Case No. 5:12-cv-03159-EEF- 16 MLH (W.D. La. March 13, 2013) (ECF No. 16 at 1) (“Court records show that [Grimes] 17 has filed more tha[n] 350 complaints and appeals. Three or more of them have been 18 dismissed as frivolous.”); Grimes v. Medlock, et al., Civil Case No. 6:15-cv-00140-DCR 19 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 16, 2015) (“[T]he federal judiciary’s on-line database indicates that 20 ‘Jerome L. Grimes’ has filed almost 500 civil rights suits in the federal court system, mostly 21 in California.”) (ECF No. 8 at 3); Grimes v. Kelly, Civil Case No. 6:15-cv-02073-PGB- 22 DAB (M.D. Fla. Dec. 16, 2015) (ECF No. 5 at 2) (“A review of PACER confirms that 23 [Grimes] has filed hundreds of actions in several district courts in the United States and 24 has had three or more cases dismissed for failure to state a claim or as frivolous.”); Grimes 25 v. Files, et al., Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-00464-RV-CJK (N.D. Fla. April 12, 2018) (adopting 26 27 1 See https://pcl.uscourts.gov/pcl/pages/search/results/parties.jsf?sid=ae66c80e47444979 28 1 Report & Recommendation denying IFP and dismissing civil action under 28 U.S.C. 2 § 1915(g)) (ECF No. 10); Grimes v. Engram, et al., Civil Case No. 8:17-cv-01480-PX (D. 3 Md. June 5, 2017) (denying IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), noting Grimes’s eight 4 pending citations related to traffic violations in Montgomery County, Maryland in 2016, 5 and his filing of “hundreds of cases in the federal courts.”) (ECF No. 6 at 2); Grimes v. 6 Enter. Rent-a-Car Co. of Los Angeles, LLC, No. 22-cv-00657-RSH-KSC, 2022 WL 7 3109570, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2022) (denying IFP pursuant to § 1915(g), dismissing 8 case and noting Grimes had previously filed more than 600 civil actions in federal courts). 9 While Grimes’s litigation history shows he has not been precluded or dissuaded from 10 filing hundreds of federal civil actions since he was first notified of his inability to further 11 proceed in forma pauperis while incarcerated absent any plausible claims of imminent 12 danger, “[t]he point of the PLRA, as its terms show, was to cabin not only abusive but also 13 simply meritless prisoner suits.” Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. 595, 602–03 (2020). 14 Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff Jerome L. Grimes, while incarcerated, has had far more 15 than three prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, 16 or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 17 Some specific examples of “strikes” filed and dismissed while Grimes was in 18 custody of the California Medical Facility in Vacaville, California, and the Orange County 19 Corrections Department in Orlando, Florida are: 20 (1) Grimes v. Cal. Dept. of Corrections, et al., Civil Case No. 2:00-cv-00668- 21 WBS-JFM (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2000) (Order granting IFP and dismissing complaint sua 22 sponte with leave to amend for “fail[ing] to state a cognizable claim for relief” pursuant to 23 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)) (ECF No. 5); id., (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2000) (Findings and 24 Recommendations [“F&Rs”] to dismiss civil action for failure to amend) (ECF No. 7); id., 25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2000 Order adopting F&Rs and dismissing action) (ECF No. 9);2 26 27 2 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen (1) a district court 28 1 (2) Grimes v. CDC-CMF/Dept. of Mental Health, et al., Civil Case No. 2:00-cv- 2 00781-DFL-DAD (E.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2000) (F&R granting IFP and to dismiss complaint 3 sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as frivolous and for failing to state a claim) (ECF 4 No. 4); id. (E.D. Cal. June 22, 2000) (F&Rs to dismiss civil action for failure to amend) 5 (ECF No. 6); id. (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2000) (Order adopting F&Rs and dismissing action) 6 (ECF No. 7); 7 (3) Grimes v. Kelly, Civil Case No. 6:15-cv-01955-RBD-GJK (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8 30, 2015) (Order denying IFP and dismissing complaint requesting Defendant police 9 officer be subject to random drug and lie detector tests and to be “prosecuted paramilitarily” 10 “for fail[ing] to provide a . . . claim for relief.”) (ECF No. 3); 11 (4) Grimes v. Williams, et al., Civil Case No. 1:15-cv-03848-JKB (D. Md. Dec. 12 23, 2015) (Memorandum and Order granting IFP and dismissing complaint for failing to 13 state a claim for relief) (ECF Nos. 3, 4); and 14 (5) Grimes v. Tate, et al., Civil Case No. 1:15-cv-03849-JKB (D. Md. Dec. 23, 15 2015) (Memorandum and Order granting IFP and dismissing complaint for failing to state 16 a claim for relief) (ECF Nos. 3, 4). 17 Accordingly, because Grimes has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 18 the three “strikes” permitted by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and he fails to make any “plausible 19 allegations” that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed 20 his Complaint, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See 21 Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) 22 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; 23 it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to 24 abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 25
26 27 to amend, and (3) the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under § 1915(g).”). 28 1 || (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not 2 || right.”). 3 || CONCLUSION AND ORDER 4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Grimes’s Motion to Proceed 5 || IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); DISMISSES this civil action without 6 || prejudice based on Grimes’s failure to pay the full statutory and administrative $405 civil 7 || filing fee* required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this 8 Order would be frivolous and not taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); 9 DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the case. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 . 12 || DATED: August 28, 2025 B Hon. Cynthia Bashant, Chief Judge United States District Court 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 > In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $55. 27 || See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to 28 proceed IFP. /d. -7-