Gregory O’Neal v. Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc.; City of Yuma

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: October 17, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01413
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 10 No. CV-25-01413-PHX-DGC 11 Gregory O’Neal, ORDER 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. 14 Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc.; and City of Yuma, 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff Gregory O’Neal asserts claims against Defendants Tanimura & Antle Fresh 19 Foods, Inc. (“Tanimura”) and the City of Yuma (the “City”), which stem from the City’s 20 approval of Tanimura’s housing project. Tanimura has filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff 21 has filed motions for entry of default and default judgment, motions to amend, motions to 22 remand, and other motions. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s default motions, grant 23 Tanimura’s motion to dismiss, grant Plaintiff leave to amend, and remand the case to state 24 court. 25 I. Background. 26 The City, acting through its planning and zoning authorities, approved Tanimura’s 27 development of a high-density agricultural worker housing project adjacent to Plaintiff’s 28 1 residence in a senior retirement community. Doc. 1-1 at 6. Plaintiff claims the project will 2 interfere with his ability to enjoy his residence and diminish the value of his property. Id. 3 Plaintiff filed his original complaint in Yuma County Superior Court on March 11, 4 2025. Doc. 1-1 at 5-13; see O’Neal v. Tanimura & Antle, S1400-CV-202500025 (Yuma 5 Cnty. Super. Ct. 2025). Tanimura moved to dismiss on April 4, 2025. Doc. 1-1 at 221-33. 6 Plaintiff filed the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”) on April 7, 2025. Id. at 7 243-57.1 The SAC asserts state law private nuisance and negligence claims against 8 Tanimura and the City (counts one and two), a state law inverse condemnation claim 9 against the City (count three), and a due process claim under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 10 against the City (count four). Id. at 246-54. 11 In response to Plaintiff’s filing of the SAC, Tanimura removed the case to this Court, 12 asserting federal question and diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 5-10 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 13 1331, 1332(a)). Since the removal, Plaintiff has filed two motions to remand (Docs. 14, 14 23), multiple motions to amend his pleading (Docs. 12, 18, 24, 26, 32, 34), motions for 15 entry of default and default judgment (Docs. 21, 22), several motions to strike his own 16 motions (Docs. 17, 25, 31), and a motion to allow electronic filing (Doc. 19). Tanimura 17 has filed a motion to strike certain documents filed by Plaintiff. Doc. 29. 18 II. Motions to Strike and Moot Motions. 19 Plaintiff moves to strike the following motions: motion for leave to amend pleading 20 (Doc. 12); motion to amend pleading (Doc. 18); motion to remand (Doc. 23); and motion

21 1 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on April 2, 2025, but the filing was 22 improper because Defendants were permitted to file a responsive pleading to the original complaint. The SAC is proper because Plaintiff filed it before his response to Tanimura’s 23 motion to dismiss was due. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course: (A) no later than 21 days after serving it if the pleading is one 24 to which no responsive pleading is permitted; or (B) . . . if a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f) is served, on or before the date on which a response to the motion is due[.]”); see also 25 Encanterra Residents Against Annexation v. Town of Queen Creek, No. 2 CA-CV 2020- 0002, 2020 WL 1157024, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2020) (discussing Rule 15(a)(1)); 26 Feliciano v. MCSO Sheriff Penzone, No. 1 CA-CV 18-0161, 2018 WL 6565375, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2018) (“[Defendants] jointly moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b) 27 on November 8, 2017. . . . [Plaintiff] moved to amend his complaint on November 21, 2017, before his responses to Defendants’ motions were due. Under Rule 15, he had the 28 right to amend his complaint absent court permission.”). 1 for supplemental pleading (Doc. 24). See Docs. 17, 25, 31. The Court will grant the 2 motions to strike and deem those motions withdrawn. The Court will deny Tanimura’s 3 motion to strike the withdrawn motions (Doc. 29) as moot. Plaintiff has filed two other 4 motions for supplemental pleading (Docs. 26, 31), which the Court will deny as moot in 5 light of Plaintiff’s more recent motion to amend pleading (Doc. 34). 6 III. Plaintiff’s Motions for Entry of Default and Default Judgment. 7 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, Plaintiff moves for entry of default 8 and default judgment against Tanimura and the City. Docs. 21, 22. Rule 55 provides for 9 entry of default where “a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought 10 has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or 11 otherwise[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). 12 Plaintiff served process on Tanimura on March 27, 2025. See Doc. 1-1 at 208. 13 Plaintiff contends that entry of default is warranted because Tanimura has filed no answer 14 to the complaint. Doc. 21 at 2. But Tanimura filed a timely motion to dismiss (Doc. 1-1 15 at 221-33), and the motion extends Tanimura’s time to answer to 14 days after the Court 16 rules on the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(4)(A); see Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 17 No. CV-08-1040-PHX-NVW, 2009 WL 383554, at *1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 13, 2009) (“A motion 18 to dismiss . . . tolls the time for a defendant to file an answer.”); Sorensen v. Bastian, No. 19 22-15320, 2023 WL 4421392, at *1 (9th Cir. July 10, 2023) (“The district court correctly 20 held that the defendants were not in default because they filed a timely Rule 12(b)(6) 21 motion to dismiss the amended complaint, instead of filing an answer.”). 22 Plaintiff states that he served process on the City on April 9, 2025, before the case 23 was removed to this Court. Doc. 21 at 2. Under Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 4.1, 24 municipal corporations such as cities and towns may be served “by delivering a copy of 25 the summons and the pleading . . . to the clerk of [the] municipal corporation.” Ariz. R. 26 Civ. P. 4.1(h)(3). The record includes a certified mail return receipt addressed to the City 27 and signed by Francisco Silva on April 9, 2025, but the receipt does not identify the 28 documents mailed or show that Mr. Silva is the City’s clerk. Doc. 1-2 at 42. And even if 1 Plaintiff mailed the summons and complaint to the City’s clerk, “Arizona’s Rules of Civil 2 Procedure . . . require ‘delivering’ a copy of the summons and complaint to a defendant 3 and do not authorize service by mail.” Robinson v. Heritage Elementary Sch., No. CV-09- 4 0541-PHX-LOA, 2009 WL 1578313, at *3 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2009). Because Plaintiff has 5 not shown that he properly served the City, his request for entry of the City’s default will 6 be denied. See Paradise v. California, No. 2:25-CV-02358-MRA-DFM, 2025 WL 7 2092821, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2025) (“The purpose of filing a proof of service is to 8 confirm that a defendant has been properly served. If the proof of service does not reflect 9 as much, then its presence on the docket alone is insufficient to deem a defendant properly 10 served. Plaintiff must show that service of process was effectuated[.]”); Tolbert v. Nevada, 11 No. 2:24-CV-01443-JAD-DJA, 2025 WL 1249134, at *1 (D. Nev. Apr. 29, 2025) 12 (“Without proper service of process, the district court has no power to render any judgment 13 against the defendant’s person or property unless the defendant has consented to 14 jurisdiction or waived the lack of process. So Tolbert’s motion for entry of default is 15 denied.”) (citation modified). 16 Even if default were to be entered, that would not automatically entitle Plaintiff to 17 a court-ordered judgment under Rule 55(b). See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. 18 Supp. 2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 19 1980) (“The district court’s decision whether to enter a default judgment is a discretionary 20 one.”). The rule in this Circuit is “that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored. Cases 21 should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel v. McCool, 782 22 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff does not address the factors to be considered in 23 deciding whether default judgment is appropriate: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the 24 plaintiff, (2) the merits of the claims, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the amount 25 of money at stake, (5) the possibility of factual disputes, (6) whether default is due to 26 excusable neglect, and (7) the policy favoring decisions on the merits. See id. at 1471-72. 27 Nor does Plaintiff present evidence to determine damages. While the Court may 28 generally take as true the factual allegations of the complaint, it may not simply accept the 1 amount of damages Plaintiff requests. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Geddes v. United Fin. 2 Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). “There must be an evidentiary basis for the 3 damages sought by [P]laintiff.” Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund 4 v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted); see 5 also Holtsinger v. Briddle, No. CIV-S-03-0732-MCE-CMK-P, 2007 WL 1080112, at *1 6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2007) (“When a plaintiff’s damages are unliquidated . . . they require 7 ‘proving up’ through an evidentiary hearing or some other means.”) (citations omitted). 8 Plaintiff presents no evidence to establish the actual damages to which he may be entitled, 9 let alone the $100,000 he seeks. See Doc. 22 at 4. 10 The Court will deny Plaintiff’s motions for entry of default and default judgment. 11 IV. Tanimura’s Motion to Dismiss. 12 Tanimura moves to dismiss the nuisance and negligence claims asserted in the SAC. 13 Docs. 7, 10. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal for failure to state 14 a claim is appropriate when the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege 15 facts sufficient to support its theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 16 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint that sets forth a cognizable legal theory will survive a motion 17 to dismiss if it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 18 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 19 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim has facial plausibility when the 20 plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 21 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court treats all well-pled 22 factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable 23 to the plaintiff. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). 24 A. Private Nuisance (Count One). 25 “A nuisance is the use of property or course of conduct, regardless of an actual 26 trespass or intention, which represents an unreasonable use of one’s own property, which 27 thereby obstructs or injures the right of another person, or that of the public[.]’” Bradford 28 v. City of Tucson, 573 P.3d 557, 561 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) (citations omitted). “A nuisance 1 is public when it affects rights of citizens as a part of the public, while a private nuisance 2 is one which affects a single individual or a definite number of persons in the enjoyment 3 of some private right which is not common to the public.” Id. (citation modified). 4 The SAC alleges that Tanimura’s high-density housing project near Plaintiff’s 5 property in a senior residential neighborhood will cause excessive noise, pollution, and 6 disruption; increase traffic volume; obstruct residents’ views; diminish their privacy; and 7 degrade the aesthetic and environmental character of the neighborhood. Doc. 1-1 at 8 246-47, ¶¶ 22-27. To constitute a nuisance, “[t]he interference must be ‘substantial, 9 intentional and unreasonable under the circumstances.’” Nolan v. Starlight Pines 10 Homeowners Ass’n, 167 P.3d 1277, 1284 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (citation omitted). The 11 alleged effects of which Plaintiff complains are common to large housing projects and are 12 not unreasonable under the circumstances, particularly given the utility of the housing 13 project at issue, which the City approved. See Brenteson Wholesale, Inc. v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. 14 Co., 524, 803 P.2d 930, 935 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that courts should consider the 15 utility and reasonableness of the conduct when evaluating a nuisance claim); see also Hopi 16 Tribe v. Ariz. Snowbowl Resort Ltd. P’ship, 430 P.3d 362, 366-67 (Ariz. 2018) (affirming 17 dismissal of nuisance claim where the plaintiff alleged interference with the enjoyment of 18 pristine natural surroundings); Sears v. Hull, 961 P.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Ariz. 1998) (holding 19 that plaintiffs’ nuisance allegations based on “urban crowding, traffic and stresses which 20 will detract from the quality of their immediate community” stated “only generalized harm 21 rather than any distinct and palpable injury”). 22 What is more, the SAC’s allegations describe effects that would impact the 23 neighborhood as a whole, but “a private nuisance is one affecting a single individual or a 24 definite small number of persons in the enjoyment of private rights not common to the 25 public[.]” Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 705 (Ariz. 1972); see 26 Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in Ariz., 712 P.2d 914, 917 27 (Ariz. 1985); Bradford, 573 P.3d at 561. 28 1 The Court will grant Tanimura’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s private nuisance 2 claim.2 3 B. Negligence (Count Two). 4 To plead a negligence claim under Arizona law, a plaintiff must allege “four 5 elements: (1) a duty requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of care; (2) a 6 breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) a causal connection between the defendant’s 7 conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 8 230 (Ariz. 2007). 9 “Whether a duty exists is a question of law and must be determined before case- 10 specific facts are considered.” Avitia v. Crisis Preparation & Recovery Inc., 536 P.3d 776, 11 782 (Ariz. 2023); see also Westerman v. Ernst, 563 P.3d 647, 652 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2025) 12 (“Duty is ‘for the court to decide’ as a threshold issue because ‘absent some duty, an action 13 for negligence cannot be maintained.’”) (quoting Gipson, 150 P.3d at 230); Johnson v. 14 Yuma Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. CV-22-01061-PHX-SMB, 2025 WL 2337120, at *2 (D. Ariz. 15 Aug. 13, 2025) (“[A] court determines whether a legal duty exists before considering the 16 case-specific facts and irrespective of whether a defendant’s conduct creates an 17 unreasonable risk of harm for foreseeable plaintiffs.”) (citing Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 416 18 P.3d 824, 828-29 (Ariz. 2018)). 19 Arizona law does not hold that “one owes a duty of reasonable care at all times to 20 all people under all circumstances[.]” Gipson, 150 P.3d at 233. Rather, “a duty in the 21 negligence context arises either from special relationships or public policy, and [courts] 22 look primarily to statutes and common law to create and define duty.” Avitia, 536 P.3d at 23

24 2 Plaintiff also appears to lack standing to maintain his private nuisance claim because he has moved from Yuma to Phoenix and no longer resides at the affected property. 25 See Docs. 1-2 at 79-80, 15 at 3. Plaintiff further lacks standing to assert claims for Tanimura’s alleged violations of A.R.S. §§ 13-2904 (public nuisance) and 13-2917 26 (disorderly conduct). See Doc. 11 at 2; Mayer v. Brnovich, No. CV-19-00338-TUC-DCB, 2019 WL 3816709, at *1 (D. Ariz. Aug. 14, 2019) (“Plaintiff, a private citizen lacks 27 standing to enforce the United States and/or Arizona criminal codes. In other words, enforcement authority over criminal codes lies with either the federal or state government, 28 respectively.”). 1 782. To show that a special relationship created a duty, “a plaintiff must establish ‘a 2 preexisting, recognized relationship between the parties,’ such as a common-law or familial 3 relationship, or a relationship stemming from a joint undertaking or contract.” Westerman, 4 563 P.3d at 652 (quoting Cal-Am Props. Inc. v. Edais Eng’g Inc., 509 P.3d 386, 389 (Ariz. 5 2022)). “[The] primary source for identifying a duty based on public policy is [Arizona] 6 state statutes.” Quiroz, 416 P.3d at 830. “[I]n the absence of a statute, [courts] exercise 7 great restraint in declaring public policy.” Id. 8 Tanimura argues that the negligence claim fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff 9 has not shown that Tanimura owed him a legal duty. Doc. 10 at 2. The Court agrees. 10 The SAC alleges that Tanimura had “a duty to exercise reasonable care in the 11 development, permitting, and operation of residential housing facilities in a manner that 12 would not unreasonably endanger the safety, comfort, health, or property rights of nearby 13 residents.” Doc. 1-1 at 248, ¶ 34. But the SAC alleges no special relationship between 14 Plaintiff and Tanimura giving rise to such duty. Nor does the SAC identify a statute or 15 public policy imposing the alleged duty. Plaintiff asserts in his response that the SAC 16 alleges Tanimura’s actions have caused harm through negligent design, construction, and 17 operation of the housing project (Doc. 8 at 2), but this says nothing about a legal duty 18 Tanimura may owe Plaintiff. 19 “[D]uty is not presumed; in every negligence case, the plaintiff bears the burden of 20 proving the existence of a duty.” Quiroz, 416 P.3d at 827. Because Plaintiff fails to allege 21 facts that would meet this burden, the Court will grant Tanimura’s motion to dismiss the 22 negligence claim. See Johnson, 2025 WL 2337120, at *3 (dismissing negligence claim 23 where the plaintiffs had not “adequately established public policy imposes a legal duty”); 24 Wahab v. J & S Operating Corp., No. CV-24-00417-PHX-JJT, 2025 WL 69332, at *5 (D. 25 Ariz. Jan. 10, 2025) (negligence claim fails because Plaintiff fails to identify a legal duty). 26 V. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. 27 Plaintiff moves to amend the SAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. 28 Doc. 34. Rule 15 provides that the Court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice 1 so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The policy favoring leave to amend must not only 2 be heeded, Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), it must be applied with “extreme 3 liberality,” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001). 4 Leave to amend may be denied on the basis of undue delay or bad faith on the part of the 5 moving party, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the proposed 6 amendment. Foman, 371 U.S. at 182. 7 Plaintiff seeks to remove other residents of the community as plaintiffs,3 reduce the 8 requested damages from $100,000 to $10,000, eliminate the federal due process claim, and 9 add a property value diminution claim. Doc. 34 at 1-2; see Doc. 35 (proposed third 10 amended complaint). 11 Plaintiff reasserts the private nuisance and negligence claims (Doc. 35 ¶¶ 20-38), 12 but the proposed amended complaint does not cure the defects in those claims. It simply 13 realleges that the housing project will cause excessive noise, pollution, and disruption; 14 increase traffic volume; obstruct Plaintiff’s views; diminish his privacy; and degrade the 15 aesthetic and environmental character of the neighborhood. Id. ¶¶ 23-26. The proposed 16 amended complaint also fails to identify a cognizable legal duty Tanimura owes Plaintiff. 17 See id. ¶¶ 32-38. Because reassertion of the private nuisance and negligence claims against 18 Tanimura would be futile, the Court will deny leave to amend in this regard. 19 Plaintiff seeks to add a property value diminution claim against Tanimura and the 20 City. Doc. 35 ¶¶ 54-58 (count four). While diminution in value may serve as a measure 21 of damages in certain tort or property cases, it does not appear to be a standalone cause of 22 action in Arizona. See Doc. 15 at 2; SC34 v. Desert Mountain Master Ass’n, No. 1 CA- 23 CV 11-0240, 2013 WL 1174135, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2013) (“Diminution of 24 value damages are an accepted remedy under Arizona law.”); Johnson v. Yuma Reg’l Med. 25 Ctr., 769 F. Supp. 3d 936, 947 (D. Ariz. 2024) (explaining that plaintiffs must do more

26 3 The Court notes that because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se he cannot represent or 27 bring claims on behalf of the other residents. See Galla v. State, No. 3:25-CV-01227-AB, 2025 WL 2295233, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 8, 2025) (“[I]t is well settled that pro se plaintiffs 28 cannot represent other parties.”) (citation omitted). 1 than assert general allegations of diminution in value in order to have compensable 2 damages for a negligence claim under Arizona law). 3 Plaintiff cites A.R.S. § 12-1134 (Doc. 35 ¶ 57), which “provides that an owner is 4 entitled to just compensation from a political subdivision of the state for diminution in 5 value of private real property if an existing right to use that property is reduced by a land- 6 use law enacted after the date the property is transferred to the owner.” Image Prods., LLC 7 v. City of Tempe, No. 1 CA-CV 22-0129, 2022 WL 17685266, at *4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 8 15, 2022). But any diminution in value claim under § 12-1134 against Tanimura would be 9 futile because Tanimura is not a political subdivision of the state.4 The Court will deny 10 leave to amend to the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert a property value diminution claim 11 against Tanimura. 12 The Court will grant leave to amend with respect to removal of other residents as 13 plaintiffs, reduction in damages, and elimination of the federal due process claim (count 14 four of the SAC). The Court will direct the Clerk of Court to file the lodged proposed 15 amended complaint (Doc. 35). As explained above, however, all claims against Tanimura 16 are dismissed.5 17 VI. Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand. 18 A defendant may remove to federal court any case filed in state court over which 19 the federal court would have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal subject 20 matter jurisdiction may be based on either federal question jurisdiction or diversity 21 jurisdiction. Id. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal question jurisdiction exists over civil actions 22 arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. Id. § 1331. District 23 24

25 4 Plaintiff cites two Georgia cases, but both involved zoning challenges, not private tort claims, and neither establishes an independent claim for property value diminution. 26 See Doc. 35 ¶ 54 (citing DeKalb Cnty. v. Wapensky, 315 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. 1984); Brand v. Wilson, 314 S.E.2d 192, 193 (Ga. 1984)). 27 5 The Court will not address claims asserted against the City because the City has 28 not moved to dismiss them. 1 courts have diversity jurisdiction over cases between citizens of different states where the 2 matter in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. § 1332(a). 3 Plaintiff moves to remand based on his amended pleading that removes the federal 4 due process claim and reduces the amount in controversy below the jurisdictional threshold 5 of $75,000. Doc. 14. Tanimura opposes remand, asserting that federal subject matter 6 jurisdiction existed at the time of removal. Doc. 16 at 4-7. Tanimura is correct that federal 7 question jurisdiction existed when this case was removed because Plaintiff asserted a claim 8 under federal law – the § 1983 due process claim. Doc. 1-1 at 252-54, ¶¶ 56-69 (count 9 four); see City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 969 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The general 10 rule, referred to as the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ is that a civil action arises under 11 federal law for purposes of § 1331 when a federal question appears on the face of the 12 complaint.”) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).6 13 Tanimura also asserts that once a case is properly removed, subsequent amendments 14 to the pleadings cannot eliminate federal jurisdiction. Doc. 16 at 5-6 (citing Williams v. 15 Costco Wholesale Corp., 471 F.3d 975, 976 (9th Cir. 2006)). This is not correct. 16 The Supreme Court recently made clear that “[w]hen a plaintiff, after removal, cuts 17 out all her federal-law claims, federal-question jurisdiction dissolves. And with any federal 18 anchor gone, supplemental jurisdiction over the residual state claims disappears as well. 19 The operative pleading no longer supports federal jurisdiction, and the federal court must 20

21 6 Tanimura asserts that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this case under § 1332. Doc. 1 ¶ 6. Section 1332 requires complete diversity between the parties – that is, 22 the citizenship of the plaintiff must be diverse from the citizenship of each defendant. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). As Tanimura acknowledges, both 23 Plaintiff and the City are citizens of Arizona. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 7, 9; see also Doc. 1-1 at 243, ¶¶ 4-6; City of Sacramento v. Altstatt, No. 2:18-cv-00333-MCE-GGH, 2018 WL 5801510, at 24 *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (“Altstatt, a citizen/resident of California also references an asserted diversity of citizenship between himself and the City of Sacramento. However, 25 political subdivisions in the State of California are treated as citizens of the State for diversity purposes.”) (citing Moor v. Alameda Cnty., 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973)). Contrary 26 to Tanimura’s assertion, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case. See Williams v. United Airlines, Inc., 500 F.3d 1019, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Although diversity jurisdiction 27 provides an independent basis for federal jurisdiction over state law claims, complete diversity is lacking in this case because both [Plaintiff] and [Defendant] are citizens of 28 California.”). 1 remand the case to the state court where it started.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. 2 Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 54-55 (2025); see Silva v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. 2:25-CV- 3 00142-DJC-JDP, 2025 WL 2345876, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2025) (“[W]hile the Ninth 4 Circuit has ‘long held that post-removal amendments to the pleadings cannot affect 5 whether a case is removable,’ Williams, 471 F.3d at 976, if a plaintiff files an amended 6 complaint that excises any federal law claims, the court may not exercise supplemental 7 jurisdiction over the state law claims.”) (citing Royal, 604 U.S. at 25-26); Botten v. 8 California, No. EDCV 23-257-KK-SHKX, 2025 WL 1951871, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 9 2025) (“The Supreme Court [has] stated that when a plaintiff originally ‘files a suit in 10 federal court based on federal claims and later scraps those claims, the federal court cannot 11 go forward with a now all-state-claim suit.’”) (quoting Royal Canin, 604 U.S. at 36). 12 Because Plaintiff’s amendment eliminates the § 1983 due process claim, federal 13 question jurisdiction no longer exists and the Court may not exercise supplemental 14 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See Hill v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s 15 Dep’t, No. 2:25-CV-01542 TLN SCR P, 2025 WL 2611915, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 16 2025) (“Plaintiff unambiguously amended his complaint to shed the § 1983 claim that 17 enabled removal on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Thus, . . . the undersigned 18 may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state-law claims.”). The 19 Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion and remand this case to state court.7 20 IT IS ORDERED: 21 1. Plaintiff’s motions to strike his own motions (Docs. 17, 25, 31) are granted 22 and the underlying motions (Docs. 12, 18, 23, 24) are deemed withdrawn. Tanimura’s 23 motion to strike (Doc. 29) is denied as moot. 24 25

26 7 Tanimura’s requests for awards of attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (Docs. 16 at 7-8, 28 at 6-7) are denied. See Koji IP, LLC v. Renesas Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 24-CV- 27 03089-PHK, 2025 WL 980796, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2025) (“With § 1927 as with other sanction provisions, ‘district courts enjoy much discretion in determining whether 28 and how much sanctions are appropriate.’”) (citations omitted). 1 2. Plaintiff's motions for entry of default and default judgment (Docs. 21, 22) 2| are denied. 3 3. Tanimura’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 7) is granted. 4 4. Plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. 34) is granted in part and denied in part 5 | asset forth above. The Clerk is directed to file the lodged Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 6| 35). Plaintiff's other motions to amend (Docs. 26, 32) are denied as moot. 7 6. Plaintiff's motion to allow electronic filing (Doc. 19) is denied. 8 5. Plaintiff's motion to remand (Doc. 14) is granted. The Clerk shall remand this case to state court. 10 Dated this 17th day of October, 2025. 11 Ly

13 David G. Campbell 14 Senior United States District Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28