MICHAEL GREEN, Case No.: 3:21-cv-0588-JLS-WVG aka KEVIN DEAN BREWER, CDCR #AC-5033, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Plaintiff, AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) vs. AND (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING WARDEN, et al., FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. Defendant. § 1914(a)
(ECF No. 2) Plaintiff Michael Green, also known as Kevin Dean Brewer, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement, which the Court has liberally construed to be a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (See ECF No. 2.) /// /// /// “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner: . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee,” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with multiple claims within a single action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051– 52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints, which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it contains no “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here. A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue,’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, /// 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings publicly available on PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Michael Green, also known as Kevin Dean Brewer, identified as CDCR Inmate #AC-5033, while incarcerated, has had four prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They are: 1) Brewer v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Ctr., et al., Civil Case No. 3:08-cv-03149-SI (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) (order dismissing action for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (ECF No. 24) (strike one);
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
MICHAEL GREEN, Case No.: 3:21-cv-0588-JLS-WVG aka KEVIN DEAN BREWER, CDCR #AC-5033, ORDER (1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS Plaintiff, AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) vs. AND (2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE
FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING WARDEN, et al., FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. Defendant. § 1914(a)
(ECF No. 2) Plaintiff Michael Green, also known as Kevin Dean Brewer, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego, California, has filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his inmate trust account statement, which the Court has liberally construed to be a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (See ECF No. 2.) /// /// /// “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. In addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP in cases where the prisoner: . . . has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). “Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter “Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without prepayment of the full filing fee,” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” El- Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). “When . . . presented with multiple claims within a single action,” however, courts may “assess a PLRA strike only when the case as a whole is dismissed for a qualifying reason under the Act.” Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d. 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Washington v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051– 52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints, which “make[] a plausible allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.”). The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint and finds it contains no “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id. at 1120. That is the case here. A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing United States v. Author Servs., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1034 (C.D. Cal. 2015), and “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue,’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, /// 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)). Based on a review of its own dockets and other court proceedings publicly available on PACER, the Court finds that Plaintiff Michael Green, also known as Kevin Dean Brewer, identified as CDCR Inmate #AC-5033, while incarcerated, has had four prior civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. They are: 1) Brewer v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Ctr., et al., Civil Case No. 3:08-cv-03149-SI (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) (order dismissing action for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (ECF No. 24) (strike one);
2) Brewer v. Alta Bates Summit Medical Ctr., et al., Civil Case No. 3:11-cv-02703-THE (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2011) (order dismissing action for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A) (ECF No. 16) (strike two); 3) Brewer v. Oh, et al., Civil Case No. 5:15-cv-00877-MWF- AJW (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) (order denying request to proceed IFP based on finding complaint was frivolous, malicious, and failed to state a claim) (ECF No. 4) (strike three)1;
4) Green v. Hathaway, et al., Civil Case No. 2:17-cv-01598- MCE-CKD (E.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (order adopting report and recommendation dismissing second amended complaint for failing to state a claim) (strike four).
/// 1 See Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1143 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]hen (1) a district court dismisses a complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim, (2) the court grants leave to amend, and (3) the plaintiff then fails to file an amended complaint, the dismissal counts as a strike under § 1915(g).”). Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated at least three “strikes” as defined by § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Rodriguez, 169 F.3d at 1180 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”). For the reasons discussed, the Court: (1) DENIES Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (2) DISMISSES this civil action sua sponte without prejudice for failing to prepay the $402 civil and administrative filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to close the file. Dated: April 20, 2021 tt f te on. Janis L. Sammartino United States District Judge