Gray Lumber Co. v. Devore

112 S.E.2d 457, 145 W. Va. 91, 1960 W. Va. LEXIS 10
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court
DecidedFebruary 16, 1960
DocketCC 850
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 112 S.E.2d 457 (Gray Lumber Co. v. Devore) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering West Virginia Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gray Lumber Co. v. Devore, 112 S.E.2d 457, 145 W. Va. 91, 1960 W. Va. LEXIS 10 (W. Va. 1960).

Opinion

Berry, Judge:

This is á certified case from the Circuit Court of Wyoming County. It involves the sufficiency of a notice of a mechanic’s lien. The suit was instituted by the Gray Lumber Company, Inc., a corporation, against Robert K. Devore and Margaret Devore, his wife; William K. Ward; E. H. Downs and William Y. McNemar, Jr., Trustees in a deed of trust in favor of the McDowell County National Bank, a corporation; and the McDowell County National Bank, a corporation. The defendant, Ward, did not appear or plead, and- it is not necessary to consider him in the disposition of this case. An answer was filed by the Bank and Trustees, which is not before this Court for action thereon, but which in effect says the same thing as the demurrer filed by the Devores which will be hereinafter discussed.

The plaintiff, Gray Lumber Company, furnished certain materials to William K. Ward, contractor for the defendants, Robert N. Devore and Margaret Devore, to be used in the construction of a residence for them in the town of Oceana, Wyoming County, West Virginia. Within sixty days from the time the last material was furnished to the contractor, a notice of mechanic’s lien was served on the defendants, Robert N. Devore and Margaret Devore, his wife, to secure the payment of $5,028.90, and within ninety days from the date the last material was furnished, a copy of said notice of mechanic’s lien was recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court of Wyoming County. The notice of the mechanic’s lien stated that materials had been furnished to the property owners’ contractor, described the property in ques[93]*93tion, indicated tbe total amount of tbe claim for tbe materials still dne and owing, and tbat a lien was claimed upon tbe property owners’ interest in said property. There was no itemization of tbe account witb regard to tbe material furnished, but a statement was contained in tbe notice tbat tbe materials were of tbe nature and were furnished on tbe dates and in tbe quantity and at tbe prices as shown on an account attached to tbe notice. Tbe account attached to tbe notice is a copy of a ledger sheet taken from tbe plaintiff’s ledger, showing the name of tbe contractor, William K. Ward, Glen Morgan, W. Va., a caption “Rating — Dr. Devore” and at tbe bottom of tbe sheet tbe names Robert N. Devore, wife, Margaret Devore. It merely shows dates, folio numbers, charges, small payments, and tbe balance. Tbe nature and quantity of tbe materials furnished is not listed or shown. Tbe notice was verified in accordance witb tbe statute.

Tbe plaintiff’s bill of complaint, which was timely filed, attached said notice to tbe bill, marked Exhibit C, and made it a part of tbe bill. Also filed witb tbe bill and marked Exhibit A, were all of tbe invoices for tbe material which described tbe nature of tbe material, tbe dates and tbe quantity and prices for each item of material furnished. These invoices, or a copy of same, were not served on tbe Devores witb tbe notice of mechanic’s lien, nor were they itemized in tbe notice, as required by statute, Code, 38-2-11. Tbe only itemization served witb tbe notice was a copy of tbe ledger sheet referred to hereinbefore.

The defendants, Robert N. Devore and Margaret Devore, bis wife, filed a demurrer to tbe bill claiming tbat it was not sufficient in law, in tbat it did not establish a cause of action against them because of tbe fact tbat Exhibit C, attached to tbe bill and made a part thereof, which was tbe notice of mechanic’s lien served on them, did not contain an itemized account of tbe materials furnished to the contractor for them, as required by statute.

[94]*94The Circuit Court sustained the defendants’ demurrer and upon joint application of the parties certified its ruling to this Court, under the provisions of Code, 58-5-2.

Three questions were certified by the Circuit Court to this Court for determination; namely, (1) Is the notice of mechanic’s lien, with a copy of a ledger sheet thereto attached and served upon the defendants, Robert N. Devore and Margaret Devore, a sufficient itemization of the account so as to comply with the requirements of Code, 38-2-11? (2) Is the notice of mechanic’s lien, with a copy of the ledger sheet attached thereto, recorded in the office of the County Clerk of Wyoming County, a sufficient compliance with the statute? (3) Is the bill of complaint sufficient in law?

The answer to all three questions is found when it is ascertained whether or not the notice of mechanic’s lien, served on the Devores, the property owners, complies with the requirement of the statute in such cases, because the statute applicable to the questions involved in this case provides for both notice and recordation. This is true because if the notice served on the Devores is sufficient, the recordation, not being as technical as the notice to the owners, is sufficient and the bill of complaint would be sufficient in law. In answering this question, we must first look to the statute in order to determine if it has been complied with.

The statute in question, Code, 38-2-11, provides that in order to perfect and preserve a lien, the material-man who furnishes material to a contractor in a case such as the one at bar, shall, within sixty days after he shall have ceased to furnish such materials, give to the owner, or his authorized agent, by any of the methods provided by law for the service of legal notice or summons, a notice of such lien, which notice shall be sufficient if in the form prescribed by said statute. The statute requires that the notice served on the [95]*95owner set out that the materialman furnished materials to the contractor on behalf of the owner for use in the construction of the buildings or other structures on the land to be charged; that the structures must be adequately described in the notice; that the materials were of the nature and were furnished on the dates and in the quantities and at the prices as shown in an itemized account inserted in said notice; that the materialman has not been paid the sum claimed and that it is still due and owing, and that he claims a lien upon the interest of the owner of the land and upon the buildings or other structures and improvements thereon to secure the payment of the said sum. The same statute further provides that such liens shall be discharged and avoided, unless, within ninety days after such materialman shall have ceased to furnish such materials he shall cause to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court of the county wherein such property is situate a notice of such lien, which shall be sufficient if in form and effect as that provided by Code, 38-2-8, which only requires that the total sum claimed and a description of the property upon which the lien is claimed be set out. No itemized account giving the dates, quantity and prices of the material furnished is required in the notice to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county court of the county wherein such property is located, and the statute which controls and governs the instant case, Code, 38-2-11, specifically states that the recorded notice need not include such itemized account. However, as heretofore stated, it specifically requires such itemized account to be contained in the notice of mechanic’s lien served on the property owner. Only a substantial compliance with the statute is required. Construction Co. v. Hotel Co., 99 W.Va. 5, 127 S.E. 641. The form of the notice need not be followed precisely but the substance of the notice provided by such statute must be contained in such notice and the effect must be the same. Forman v. Kelly, 104 W.Va.

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GRAY LUMBER COMPANY, INC. v. Devore
112 S.E.2d 457 (West Virginia Supreme Court, 1960)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
112 S.E.2d 457, 145 W. Va. 91, 1960 W. Va. LEXIS 10, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gray-lumber-co-v-devore-wva-1960.