Grant v. Walker

148 U.S. 547, 13 S. Ct. 699, 37 L. Ed. 552, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2251
CourtSupreme Court of the United States
DecidedApril 10, 1893
Docket187
StatusPublished
Cited by44 cases

This text of 148 U.S. 547 (Grant v. Walker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Grant v. Walker, 148 U.S. 547, 13 S. Ct. 699, 37 L. Ed. 552, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2251 (1893).

Opinion

• ‘ Mr. Justice Jackson

delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit in equity, in the usual' form, for the alleged infringement of letters patent' No. 267,192, issued' to the *548 appellant, James M. Grant, on the 7th of November, 1882, for “ certain new and useful improvements in the art of reeling and winding silk and other thread.” The bill averred that the defendant had infringed the patent by making, using, vending and putting in practice, without complainant’s license, improvements described and claimed in the patent. The prayer was for an injunction and for an account of profits and damages. The answer set up, amongst other defences not necessary to be noticed, a denial that Grant was the original inventor of the improvements described in the patent; that there was a want of novelty in the invention, and a prior use of the improvements claimed as patentable by various designated parties. Replication was duly filed, proof taken, and the court below, upon the hearing of the cause, found in favor of the defendant, and accordingly dismissed the bill. 38 Fed. Rep. 594. From this decree the present appeal is prosecuted, and the appellant assigns for error the lower court’s “ denial of patentability to the skein which Grant claims, while awarding it to the process which he does not claim.” The court, however, did not decide that it was a valid process-patent, but suggested that if the improvement was a valid invention it was in the process and not in the product.

The material parts of the specification and the claims based thereon are as follows:

“ My invention relates to a novel manner of winding silk or other thread upon the reels in a reeling-machine preparatory to its being dyed.

“The object of my invention is to provide an improved skein of silk whereby a greater quantity can be reeled upon the same machine in a given time, and to provide at the same time for making these skeins in a proper form to receive the dye in the best manner, and be ready after the dyeing to be placed upon the swift for unwinding upon bobbins in. the customary manner.

“In the present method of manufacturing silk the thread, previous to dyeing, is wound into, skeins upon a reeling-machine, in which some twenty or more small skeins containing generally one thousand yards, or less, are wound upon *549 a set of parallel bars set around an axis forming a long reel. Each skein is tied up by itself, and the reel is taken down or collapses to release the separate skeins. These small skeins are then dyed and then placed separately upon swifts to again unwind them. Larger skeins than above named have been found inconvenient, if not impracticable, on account of becoming tangled in the dyeing and difficult to unwind. By means of my improvement I am enabled to wind skeins of twenty-four thousand yards, or more, in each separate skein upon the reels, thus saving a great amount pf labor in taking down the reels to remove the skeins, and the larger skeins wound in my improved manner can be placed at once upon the swifts and unwound .without difficuhy.

• “ My improvement consists in winding the silk or other thread upon the reel in the form of a wide band, in which the thread crosses from side to side as it is wound, somewhat in the manner now employed, but so arranged as not to form single skeins by passing one layer over the other. I prefer to have the thread cross in five-sixths of - one revolution of the reel, although other proportions will answer. When the required quantity has been wound, I lace the skein or band, before it is removed from the reel, in one or more places, generally on opposite sides of the reel, so as to divide it into a number of parts and hold it in its fiat or band-like condition. This lacing constitutes the chief point of my invention, and is what preserves the skein in its shape, and prevents its becoming entangled in the process of dyeing. After lacing, the skein is removed from the reel, and passes into the hands of the dyer. After winding in the manner above described.the skein is so laid, one thread crossing the other, that its texture is more open even than the small skeins wound in the ordinary manner, and) although much larger the dye easily penetrates to every part and insures a uniform color. The sevgral threads cannot become matted together, as with the ordinary skein wound in the customary manner. ,

“By means of my invention a great saving is made in the expense of manufacture, the waste of silk is greatly .reduced, and less skill is required in the winding after the dyeing, *550 thereby dispensing with the high-priced skilled operatives now employed upon this work.

“ "What I claim as my invention is:

“ (1.) A skein of silk, or other thread, wound upon a reel diagonally from side to side, in the manner described, and laced back and forth across its width to preserve its form, substantially as set forth.

“ (2.) The combination of the lacing B with a wide skein of silk or other thread in which the strands are diagonally crossed, substantially as, described.”

At the hearing of the case a disclaimer was filed in the Patent Office by the appellant “ to so much of said claim as does or might make such claim apply to a, skein which by reason of being coated with gum, or by reason of the manner of its lacing, or for any other reason, is not in condition for dyeing for ordinary manufacturing purposes.” By stipulation of the parties it was provided “ that this disclaimer may be made a part of the record in this suit, nunc pro time, as of the date of hearing thereof, as if the same had been filed on that date, to indicate the willingness of the complainant to limit his patent by said disclaimer, and as an aid in the construction of his patent, but without prejudice to the rights of this defendant on the question of delay in filing said disclaimer.”

The Circuit Court held that the claims of the patent covered a product and not a process, and that the patent was void for want of patentable novelty, for the reason that the form of skein described in the specification and covered by the claims was well known and in use long prior to Grant’s invention, which consisted in the method of dyeing and winding silk by the use of such well-known form of skein and not in the skein itself, and if valid to any extent, it was only upon the process. The court further held that the disclaimer could neither operate to give validity to the patent for the skein, nor change it into one for the process, and accordingly dismissed the bill.

As found by the Circuit Court, the evidence fully and clearly • established the fact that skeins of silk diagonally reeled and laced across the width, so as to separate the skein into two or more sections, were in use and well known to the silk trade *551 long prior to Grant’s improvement. The form of such skeins was substantially the same as that adopted by Grant. These anticipating skeins were in their construction similar to the construction of the skeins of the patent. They were'produced in the same manner by the horizontal to-and-fro motion of a guide-bar for carrying the thread in front of the reel as the latter revolved, thus causing the diagonal or cross-reeling in the formation of the skein.

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Bluebook (online)
148 U.S. 547, 13 S. Ct. 699, 37 L. Ed. 552, 1893 U.S. LEXIS 2251, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/grant-v-walker-scotus-1893.