Grant v. State

904 S.E.2d 338, 319 Ga. 490

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: July 2, 2024
• Docket: S24A0843
• Status: Published

Opinion

319 Ga. 490 FINAL COPY

S24A0843. GRANT v. THE STATE.

BETHEL, Justice.

After a jury trial in January 2020, Nelaunte Grant (“Grant”)

was convicted of felony murder in connection with the January 2018

shooting death of Shawntray Grant (“Shawntray”).1 In her sole

1 The record indicates no familial relationship between Nelaunte Grant

and Shawntray Grant. Shawntray was killed in the early morning hours of June 15, 2018. In February 2019, a Chatham County grand jury indicted Grant and co-indictees Osha Dunham, Jahonne Manigo, Malik McKenzie, Cordell Richardson, Donnell Richardson, and Jevon Williams, individually and as parties to the crime, in a 108-count indictment for crimes related to Shawntray’s death, as well as additional unrelated crimes. In connection with Shawntray’s death, Grant was charged with felony murder predicated on armed robbery and armed robbery; Grant was not charged with any involvement in the additional crimes. Grant, Dunham, and Donnell Richardson were tried jointly before a jury from January 7 to January 15, 2020. At trial, the jury found Grant guilty of felony murder and armed robbery. Dunham was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with Shawntray’s death; Dunham’s case is not part of this appeal. Richardson was found not guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Grant to serve life in prison on the felony murder count, and the armed robbery count merged with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes. Grant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was later amended through new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended motion on January 23, 2024. Grant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and her case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. enumeration of error, Grant contends that the evidence presented

at trial was insufficient both as a matter of constitutional due

process and under Georgia statutory law to support her conviction

for felony murder.2 Upon reviewing the evidence presented at trial,

we conclude that the evidence, though not overwhelming, was

sufficient to support Grant’s conviction. We therefore affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the

evidence presented at trial showed the following. On June 14, 2018,

Shawntray invited Erika Street and two others to accompany him

for an evening of gambling on a boat that departed from Brunswick.

Grant, a friend of Street’s who was temporarily staying with Street,

was included in the outing, and Shawntray picked the two of them

up. Street gave Grant money to play some games because Grant did

not have any and “was waiting on some money to come in.” While on

2 We consider Grant’s argument that the trial evidence was insufficient

to prove armed robbery only insofar as it bears on her contention that insufficient evidence supported her conviction for felony murder predicated on armed robbery. Because the armed robbery count merged into the felony murder count for sentencing purposes, any separate challenge to the armed robbery count is moot. See Morris v. State, 310 Ga. 443, 443 n.2 (851 SE2d 593) (2020). the boat, Shawntray won about $10,000, which was paid out mostly

in $100 bills. While Shawntray was accumulating these winnings,

Grant was sitting at a nearby slot machine but was not playing.

While observing Shawntray from her seat, Grant questioned

another patron about the approximate value of Shawntray’s

winnings, which the patron responded was over $10,000.

Because Shawntray had won such a large amount of money, he

and the others who had accompanied him, including Grant, were

permitted to disembark first with a security escort. Shawntray then

dropped off Grant and Street at Street’s residence. Upon their

arrival at Street’s house, Grant asked to borrow Street’s car to visit

a friend, and Street acquiesced. A short time later, Street received a

call informing her that Shawntray had been shot. Street called

Grant to return to the house. Upon Grant’s return, Grant, Street,

Street’s mother, and another person all drove to the scene of the

shooting where everyone, except Grant, exited the vehicle to see

what had happened.

Shawntray’s body was found lying next to his vehicle in the parking lot of his apartment complex. He had suffered multiple

gunshot wounds and was pronounced dead at the scene. Police

recovered five shell casings and several spent bullets from around

Shawntray’s body, as well as Shawntray’s empty wallet.

Shawntray’s Springfield XD 9mm handgun was also missing.

While investigating Shawntray’s death, police interviewed

Grant three times. Recordings of these interviews were admitted

into evidence and played for the jury at trial. In the interviews,

Grant denied seeing Shawntray the entire night on the boat, denied

observing him win money, and denied any knowledge of how much

he had won. Grant also denied being familiar with or ever

communicating with her co-defendant, Osha Dunham, before or

after the shooting.

However, some of Grant’s statements in her interviews with

police were contradicted by cell phone evidence that was introduced

at trial. In particular, Grant’s and Dunham’s cell phone records

showed that Grant communicated with Dunham multiple times

before and immediately following the shooting, including when Grant and Shawntray were on the boat, though this information had

been erased from Grant’s phone.3 Dunham’s cell phone records also

showed that he spoke with Grant shortly before the shooting and

was in the vicinity of Shawntray’s apartment soon after Shawntray

dropped off Grant and Street at Street’s home. Shortly after the

shooting, Dunham changed his cell phone number.

When responding to the scene of another crime in which

Dunham had been shot in the arm, police officers collected a gun

that a suspect had discarded.4 The gun was determined to be

Shawntray’s firearm, which had been listed as stolen during his

homicide. The firearm tested positive for Dunham’s DNA, and

Dunham’s phone showed that, on July 25, 2018 — ten days after

Shawntray was killed — Dunham had conducted a Google search on

a “Springfield XD nine millimeter 30 round magazine.”

3 The content of the communications between Grant and Dunham was

not admitted into evidence. 4 Shell casings from Shawntray’s gun were found at locations for multiple

other shootings. Dunham was ultimately arrested for Shawntray’s murder and other crimes associated with the unrelated shootings, and he was found guilty of those other crimes at trial. Grant was not charged with any involvement in these additional crimes, which occurred after and were unrelated to Shawntray’s murder. Investigators also uncovered a photograph taken the day Shawntray

was murdered of Dunham holding a large sum of cash. At trial, the

three people who accompanied Grant and Shawntray on the

gambling boat all denied knowing Dunham.

2. Grant contends that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient both as a matter of federal constitutional due process

and under Georgia statutory law to support her conviction for felony

murder. We address these arguments in turn.

(a) In challenging the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence,

Grant argues that the State failed to prove she was a party to the

crimes and that the evidence at trial showed only her mere

association with Dunham, the person directly responsible for

Shawntray’s death. Grant also complains that the State failed to

present evidence of the content of her communications with Dunham

or to show that she financially benefitted from Shawntray’s death.

We are not persuaded.

When we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdicts, and our review is limited to whether

the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational

jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the

crimes of which she was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.

S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Where, as

here, the defendant is charged as a party to the crime, conviction

“requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal intent

with the direct perpetrators of the crimes.” Coates v. State, 310 Ga.

94, 98 (849 SE2d 435) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Of

course, “mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient

evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime.” Frazier v. State,

308 Ga. 450, 453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020) (citation and

punctuation omitted). But “[a] jury may infer a common criminal

intent from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct

with other perpetrators before, during, and after the crimes.” Coates,

310 Ga. at 98 (citation and punctuation omitted). Applying these

principles, we conclude that the evidence presented at Grant’s trial

authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Grant shared a common criminal intent with Dunham, who the jury was

also authorized to conclude was the direct perpetrator of

Shawntray’s death.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence

showed that Grant had knowledge of Shawntray’s substantial

winnings, communicated with Dunham several times on the night

of the crimes both before and after Shawntray’s murder, attempted

to delete evidence of her communications with Dunham, and lied to

officers about those communications. From this evidence, the jury

could reasonably infer that Grant advised Dunham about

Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts, hatched a plan with

Dunham to rob Shawntray, and then attempted to conceal any

evidence of her participation in the crimes. Moreover, the jury could

infer that Grant’s refusal to get out of the vehicle with the others at

the scene of the crime was indicative of her involvement and her

guilty conscience. Thus, the jury was authorized to find that Grant

shared a common criminal intent with Dunham, at least to commit

the crime of armed robbery, and that she therefore shared responsibility for Shawntray’s death that occurred in the course of

that crime. See Frazier, 308 Ga. at 453-454 (2) (b) (evidence of

appellant’s actions before and after the crimes, including

communicating with the direct perpetrators and lying to

investigators, supported jury’s finding that appellant was a party to

the crimes rather than an innocent bystander); Fitts v. State, 312

Ga. 134, 142-143 (3) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (evidence of appellant’s

knowledge and actions before, during, and after the crimes “was

sufficient to show that [appellant] intentionally participated in the

criminal plan and was thus sufficient to sustain her convictions”);

Kim v. State, 309 Ga. 612, 617 (1) (847 SE2d 546) (2020) (noting that

the finder of fact “could reasonably infer that [appellant] lied to the

police because he shared a common criminal intent with his

associate and that the two acted in concert in committing the

crimes”). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (4) (“A person is concerned in

the commission of a crime only if he . . . [i]ntentionally advises,

encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the

crime.”). As to Grant’s complaints about the absence of certain evidence

at trial — specifically, evidence showing the content of her

communications with Dunham and any financial motive for her

participation in the crimes — the fact that the State did not produce

certain types of evidence does not mean that the evidence was

insufficient. Indeed, it is well settled that the State is required “to

prove its case with competent evidence,” and “there is no

requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of

evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796 SE2d 704) (2017).

Accordingly, this claim fails.

(b) Grant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to

support her conviction as a matter of Georgia statutory law, arguing

that the State’s case was based on circumstantial evidence and

failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than her guilt.

Specifically, Grant argues that the State failed to exclude the

“plausible explanation” that Grant “innocently” conveyed

information about Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts to

Dunham and later “declined to reveal the communications” out of fear “that she might be implicated.” Again, we disagree.

“When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the

State must present sufficient evidence to ‘exclude every other

reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’” Weems

v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 101 (2) (a) (897 SE2d 368) (2024) (quoting OCGA

§ 24-14-6). Of course, “not every hypothesis is a reasonable one, and

the evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or

hypothesis — only those that are reasonable.” Graves v. State, 306

Ga. 485, 487 (1) (831 SE2d 747) (2019) (citation and punctuation

omitted; emphasis in original). Whether alternative hypotheses are

reasonable “is usually a question for the jury, and this Court will not

disturb the jury’s finding unless it is insufficient as a matter of law.”

Frazier, 308 Ga. at 453 (2) (a). When assessing whether the

prosecution excluded every reasonable hypothesis, “we ask whether

the jury was entitled to discredit alternative theories that could have

explained the circumstantial evidence and to believe the State’s

theory of the case instead.” Fitts, 312 Ga. at 142 (3). And we bear in

mind that when considering circumstantial evidence, jurors are entitled to draw reasonable inferences “based on their own common-

sense understanding of the world that are ordinarily drawn by

ordinary people in the light of their experience in everyday life.” Id.

(citation and punctuation omitted). The evidence in this case meets

this standard.

Here, the evidence showed that Grant was the sole link

between Shawntray and Dunham, as Shawntray’s other companions

on the night of the crimes testified that they did not know Dunham.

And the State’s evidence showed that Grant not only communicated

with Dunham multiple times on the night of the crimes, beginning

while the group was still aboard the gambling cruise and continuing

until after Shawntray’s murder. Further, one of those calls took

place shortly after Shawntray dropped off Grant and Street at

Street’s house and headed home, and Dunham was shown to be near

Shawntray’s home at that time. The jury could infer from that

evidence that Grant told Dunham that Shawntray was on his way

home so that Dunham would be ready to rob Shawntray.

The evidence also showed that Grant concealed information from police officers and, at times, affirmatively misled them.

Although Grant asserts that she merely “declined to reveal the

communications” with Dunham to police, the evidence at trial

showed that she went beyond simply concealing the

communications. Besides the deletion of her communications with

Dunham from her phone, Grant told investigators that she did not

observe Shawntray win money on the boat, that she had no

knowledge of how much Shawntray won, and that she did not know

and had never communicated with Dunham before or after the

shooting — claims that were refuted by direct evidence at trial.

Thus, the jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable the

hypothesis that Grant “innocently” communicated information

about Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts to Dunham and later

made false statements to investigators out of fear. Instead, as we

discussed above, the jury could have inferred that Grant was trying

to conceal that she and Dunham had a motive to rob Shawntray and

hatched a plan to do so. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient as

a matter of Georgia statutory law to support Grant’s conviction, and this claim likewise fails. See OCGA § 24-14-6. See also McCoy v.

State, 315 Ga. 536, 542 (b) (883 SE2d 740) (2023) (“[W]here the jury

is authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial,

was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of

the guilt of the accused, as [it] did here, we will not disturb that

finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” (citation and

punctuation omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

Decided July 2, 2024.

Murder. Chatham Superior Court. Before Judge Karpf.

Amanda J. Walker, for appellant.

Shalena Cook Jones, District Attorney, Meredith L. Layman,

Richard S. Harrison, Lyle Burnham, Assistant District Attorneys;

Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Beth A. Burton, Deputy

Attorney General, Clint C. Malcolm, Meghan H. Hill, Senior

Assistant Attorneys General, Grace G. Griffith, Sarah J. Thomas,

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.