308 Ga. 520 FINAL COPY
S20A0176. MORRIS v. THE STATE.
BETHEL, Justice.
A Fulton County jury found Darius Morris guilty of malice
murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of
Jameson Bush.1 Morris appeals, arguing that he was denied the
1 The crimes occurred on August 8, 2007. Morris was indicted with Desmond Davis and David Handy by a Fulton County grand jury on February 1, 2008. Morris was indicted for malice murder, two counts of felony murder (one predicated on aggravated assault and one predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Davis’s and Handy’s cases are not part of this appeal. At a severed, bifurcated jury trial held from August 23 to 26, 2011, Morris was found not guilty of felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and not guilty of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He was found guilty of all remaining counts with which he was charged. On September 13, 2011, the trial court sentenced Morris to a term of life imprisonment for malice murder, a consecutive term of life imprisonment for armed robbery, and a consecutive term of five years’ imprisonment for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. All remaining counts were either vacated by operation of law or merged for sentencing purposes. Through his trial counsel, Morris filed a motion for new trial on September 7, 2011. Morris filed a pro se motion for new trial on September 30, 2011. Through new counsel, Morris filed an amended motion for new trial on January 9, 2017, which he subsequently amended twice in May and June 2018. After a hearing on January 10, 2019, the trial court denied Morris’s amended motion for new trial in an order dated February 5, 2019. Morris filed a notice right to a timely appeal, that the trial court erred in restricting voir
dire as to the religious beliefs and connections of potential jurors,
that the trial court erred by giving a confusing jury charge regarding
statements of co-conspirators, that the trial court erred by violating
his right to a public trial by ordering that the courtroom doors be
closed and locked during the court’s charge to the jury, and that his
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the
closure of the courtroom. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the
evidence presented at trial showed the following. In the early
evening hours of August 8, 2007, Jameson Bush went to Adom
Martin’s room at a boarding house located at 825 Beckwith Street in
Atlanta. The house is a duplex with both front and back entrances
on the ground floor. The front entrance faces south onto Beckwith
Street, and the back entrance opens to a lot that backs up to houses
along Drummond Street, which runs parallel to Beckwith Street to
of appeal on February 7, 2019, and an amended notice of appeal on August 16, 2019. This case was docketed to this Court’s term beginning in December 2019 and was submitted for a decision on the briefs. the north.
Several other individuals, including David Handy, Robert
Scott, and a man named Chris, were in Martin’s room over the
course of the evening. Handy and Martin were selling marijuana out
of Martin’s room. Several people in the room noticed that there was
tension between Handy and Bush that evening. Upon Bush’s arrival
at Martin’s room, Bush sat down, pulled out a “wad” of money, and
counted it. Bush owed Handy $250 but refused to pay anything to
him. After an argument between Bush and Handy, Handy went onto
the front porch of the house. He received a phone call from Morris
asking Handy for marijuana. Handy told Morris that he had some
marijuana but that he had something else for Morris to do as well.
Morris owed Handy $100. Handy told Morris that if he robbed Bush,
that would satisfy Morris’s debt to Handy.
In a series of phone calls, Handy and Morris discussed how to
complete the robbery of Bush. Handy told Morris he would leave the
back door of the boarding house open and would call Morris to tell
him when he was leaving. Morris wanted to know when Handy was going to leave and how many people were in Martin’s room. Handy
told Morris he would leave the house and go to the gas station
around the corner. When Handy left the house, he called Morris to
let him know that it was time for him to go through the back door
and get the money. Martin, Scott, Chris, and Bush were still in
Martin’s room when Handy left.
After Handy left the house, two armed men, who were later
identified as Morris and Desmond Davis, pushed their way into
Martin’s room. Morris and Davis told everyone in the room to get on
the ground. Morris and Davis were wearing masks and gloves. Davis
had a rifle, and Morris had a handgun.
Morris and Davis flipped over the furniture in the room and
made everyone in the room empty their pockets. Davis stood by with
his gun while Morris searched the room. They took all the money
and marijuana they found in the room and in everyone’s pockets and
kept asking about weapons and drugs. Morris and Davis also found
Martin’s gun in the room and took it.
Morris and Davis told those in the room that they were going to start shooting if Martin did not tell them where the rest of the
drugs were located. Davis asked, “Who are we going to kill first?”
Martin and Bush then began pleading with Morris and Davis not to
shoot.
At that point, Bush stood up behind a chair and told Morris
and Davis not to shoot him. Davis then suddenly shot Bush in the
arm. Bush screamed, “He shot me, he shot me!” and fell to the
ground. Morris and Davis then shot Bush eight more times. After
the shots were fired, Morris and Davis dropped some of the money
they were holding and ran out of the room and through the back door
of the house. No one else in the room was shot.
Several people in the house called 911. When police officers
responded to the 911 call, they found Bush in Martin’s room. He was
unresponsive. When the officers looked around the house, they
found that the back door of the house was open, the mattresses in
Martin’s room were overturned, and the room appeared to have been
“rummaged.” Money was strewn across the floor of Martin’s room
and on the ground outside the back door of the house. Three metal bullet fragments and ten cartridge casings were found on the floor
of the room, and police determined that at least ten rounds of
ammunition had been fired inside the room. The cartridge cases that
were recovered were for bullets commonly fired from AK or SKS
rifles. No firearms were located at the scene, but each of the
cartridges was determined to have been fired from the same rifle.
During an autopsy of Bush, the medical examiner also
recovered from Bush’s body a .38 caliber bullet that could have been
fired from a .357 Magnum revolver and three “rifle-type bullets.”
Bush suffered eight gunshot wounds. The medical examiner
determined that the cause of death was gunshot wounds to Bush’s
head and torso and that the manner of death was homicide.
At the time of the crimes, Morris and Davis lived together in a
house at 874 Drummond Street. Davis’s girlfriend testified that
about two weeks before Bush was shot, she saw a rifle and a .357
handgun at the house Morris and Davis shared. She did not see
those guns again after Bush was shot.
The day after Bush was shot, Handy went to 874 Drummond Street to see Morris. Morris tried to give Handy some money, and
Handy slapped it out of his hand. When Handy asked why Morris
and Davis shot Bush, Morris said they shot him because he would
not give them money. About a week later, Davis told his girlfriend
that he and Morris shot Bush because Bush would not give them the
money he was holding. Davis told his girlfriend that he shot Bush
three times and that Morris shot Bush twice.
Frank Saleem testified that he saw Morris and Davis sitting in
a car on a side street near 825 Beckwith on the evening of August 8,
2007, before the shooting occurred. About 20 minutes later, Saleem
went to 825 Beckwith to buy marijuana. As he reached the front door
of the house, Saleem heard commotion inside, followed by several
gunshots. He then ran away from the house and up the street to the
house of another neighbor named Dre. He told Dre that someone had
been shot, and he and Dre came back to 825 Beckwith. While
walking back to Beckwith Street, Saleem noticed that the car Morris
and Davis had been sitting in earlier was gone. Saleem also testified
that he saw a rifle and a handgun at Morris’s and Davis’s house on Drummond Street prior to Bush’s shooting. Saleem testified that he
never saw the guns again after August 2008.
Though not raised by Morris as error, in accordance with this
Court’s practice in appeals of murder cases, we have reviewed the
record and find that the evidence, as summarized above, was
sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Morris guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted.
See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)
(1979). See also Brown v. State, 302 Ga. 454, 456 (1) (b) (807 SE2d
369) (2017) (“It was for the jury to determine the credibility of the
witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the
evidence.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).
2. Morris argues that he was denied his right to a timely appeal
due to the State’s delay in filing a complete transcript of the
proceedings in the case. He argues that this delay violated his right
to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we agree with the
trial court that it did not. Morris’s trial counsel timely filed a motion for new trial on
September 7, 2011. The court reporter, Cheryl Gilliam, prepared
and submitted Volumes 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the five-part trial transcript
on November, 14, 2013, over two years after Morris filed his motion.
Volumes 1–3 included jury selection, opening statements, the State’s
presentation of evidence in the first part of the bifurcated trial, the
State and defense resting, and the beginning of the charge
conference. Volume 5 contained the conclusion of the sentencing
hearing.2
Volume 4, which was not submitted by Gilliam at that time,
ultimately contained the conclusion of the charge conference, closing
arguments, the charge of the court, questions submitted to the court
by the jury during its deliberations, the verdict, part of the
sentencing hearing, and the second part of the bifurcated trial as to
charges relating to Morris possessing a firearm by a convicted felon
and the corresponding felony murder charge. Gilliam was not
2 Volume 5 was apparently later supplemented to include the hearing on
Morris’s motion for new trial. present on the day of trial covered by Volume 4. Instead, a substitute
court reporter, Paulette Lester, was present in court that day.
The record reflects that Morris wrote seven letters to the
superior court clerk between January 2012 and December 2015
requesting his transcript and case records while his motion for new
trial remained pending. New appellate counsel for Morris was
appointed on December 7, 2015, but apparently withdrew from
representing Morris in early 2016. Morris’s current appellate
counsel was appointed in April 2016 and immediately began
requesting the transcripts. All volumes except Volume 4 were
provided. Only after Morris’s appellate counsel contacted the court
reporter on multiple occasions did counsel learn that Lester, not
Gilliam, was present on the day of trial covered by Volume 4.
On January 9, 2017, appellate counsel filed an amended
motion for new trial alleging that Morris’s right to a timely appeal
had been violated by the failure to provide Volume 4. On November
27, 2017, the State filed a motion for appointment of a successor
court reporter to produce a transcript of Volume 4. The court denied that motion on December 7, 2017, but instead issued a rule nisi to
Lester to detail the reasons for the delay in producing Volume 4. The
court held a hearing on December 20, 2017,3 at which time Lester
testified regarding the missing volume. She indicated that she had
trouble hearing the proceedings embodied in Volume 4 and that it
had taken some time to produce a transcript from the recordings she
had made. Lester agreed to file a transcript by January 22, 2018.
That deadline passed, and Morris filed additional motions notifying
the court of that fact and seeking a ruling on his amended motion
for new trial. Finally, on March 21, 2018, over six years after Morris
filed his motion for new trial, the official court reporter, Gilliam,
filed and certified Volume 4.
Morris argues that due to the series of delays occasioned by the
inability to obtain the full transcript of his trial proceedings, his
right to prosecute a timely appeal has been frustrated in violation of
his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
3 While the record reflects the occurrence of this hearing and the general
nature of what was discussed, a transcript of this hearing does not appear in the appellate record. United States Constitution. He also argues that the certification of
Volume 4 by Gilliam — who was not present in the court when the
proceedings embodied in Volume 4 occurred — is improper, as such
certification should have been made by Lester, who was present in
court that day. He further argues that the substantial delay was
attributable to the State and that he has been prejudiced by the
failure to provide the transcript given Lester’s admission that she
had difficulty hearing portions of the proceedings embodied in
Volume 4. He argues that reversal of his convictions and the grant
of a new trial is the only way to remedy this error.
We review Morris’s claim under the four-part balancing test set
forth in Chatman v. Mancill, 280 Ga. 253, 256-260 (2) (626 SE2d
102) (2006). Under Chatman, the court must examine the “length of
delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
280 Ga. at 256-257 (2) (a) (adopting the four-factor test for speedy-
trial claims set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 (92 SCt
2182, 33 LE2d 101) (1972), for claims involving a right to a timely appeal).
The State concedes that the delay in obtaining Volume 4 of the
transcript was significant, that it was the State’s duty to produce
the transcript, that the failure to do so was attributable to its errors,
and that Morris and his appellate counsel have been diligent in
seeking Volume 4. Even so, the State argues, and we agree, that
Morris has not shown any prejudice from the delay in obtaining
Volume 4 of the transcript. To do so, Morris must demonstrate that
but for the delay in obtaining the transcript, “the result of the appeal
would have been different.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Chatman, 280 Ga. at 260-261 (2) (e). Here, despite significant
delays, Volume 4 of the transcript was finally completed, certified,
and provided to Morris in March 2018. Once certified by Gilliam, the
transcript was presumed to be accurate and complete. See OCGA §
15-14-5 (“Subject only to the right of the trial judge to change or
require the correction of the transcript, the transcript so certified
shall be presumed to be true, complete, and correct.”). There has
been no showing by Morris of any inaccuracy or omission in Volume 4 of the transcript,4 and mere speculation that inaccuracies or
omissions exist due to difficulty on the part of Lester in hearing
portions of her recordings of the proceedings covered by Volume 4 of
the transcript is not sufficient to establish that Morris has been
prejudiced by the delay in obtaining the transcript. See Payne v.
State, 289 Ga. 691, 695 (2) (b) (715 SE2d 104) (2011) (appellant’s
“generalized speculation about the delay’s effect on witness
memories and evidence is not the kind of specific evidence required
to show prejudice in the appellate-delay context” (citation and
4 We note that Morris does not appear to have made any post-trial motion
to amend or correct the trial transcript. See OCGA § 5-6-41 (f). See also State v. Nejad, 286 Ga. 695, 699 (1) (690 SE2d 846) (2010) (“OCGA §§ 5-6-41 and 5- 6-48 provide means by which a purportedly-incomplete transcript may be amended and certified by the trial court: where a party contends the transcript does not fully disclose what transpired in the trial court and the parties are unable to agree thereon, the trial court has a hearing and resolves the difference.”). We also note that the appellate record does not reflect any attempt by Morris to obtain and review the substitute court reporter’s audio recordings of the proceedings embodied in Volume 4. Although such recordings are not part of the court record unless filed with the court and are not normally available to the parties or the public, such recordings “may be made available if some reason is shown to distrust the accuracy of the stenographic transcript.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Undisclosed LLC v. State, 302 Ga. 418, 432 (4) (a) (807 SE2d 393) (2017). In this case, review of such recordings might have alerted Morris to inaccuracies in Volume 4 or, at a minimum, enabled him to provide the trial court with evidence — rather than mere speculation — that portions of the recording were of such poor quality that they could not support an accurate transcription of the proceedings. punctuation omitted)). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court
that Morris has not demonstrated prejudice from the delay in
receiving Volume 4 of the trial transcript. His claim that such delay
violated his right to a timely appeal therefore fails. See Veal v. State,
301 Ga. 161, 168 (3) (800 SE2d 325) (2017) (“[W]e have repeatedly
found that the failure to make [a] showing [of prejudice] in an
appellate delay claim to be fatal to the claim, even when the other
three factors weigh in the appellant’s favor.”).
3. Morris argues that the trial court erred by impermissibly
restricting voir dire of potential jurors as to their religious beliefs
and connections. We disagree.
Just before voir dire of potential jurors commenced, the trial
court had the following discussion with the attorneys:
COURT: For gosh sakes, please don’t ask the religion question, anybody. Please don’t do that. If you ask the religion question, we’ll lose a bunch. If they have religious problems, they will tell us they have problems, okay, making a decision. So I don’t — even though it’s on that list, I don’t ask it, okay? PROSECUTOR: So you don’t want us to ask that either? COURT: I do not want you to ask it. It’s nothing but a devil’s playground. With all due respect to the religion question, I’ll rephrase that and say it’s God’s playground. Then everybody says, oh, I can’t do this. Oh, and so then we have to do this. We have to voir dire them extensively and find out that they really can make a decision because they make major decisions every day affecting everybody’s life. You know, the usual routine. If they have a religious problem, if they’re Jehovah’s Witnesses or they don’t want to make a decision about somebody’s life, they will tell us that. That’s my experience. So stay away, please. Now, I can’t order you to stay away, but I’m asking you to stay away.
Morris’s trial counsel made no objection to these statements by
the trial court when they were made, and after the jury was selected,
trial counsel offered no objection to the manner of selecting the jury.
Even so, Morris contends that these statements by the trial court
violated his rights to examine potential jurors under OCGA § 15-12-
133, particularly as to their “religious, social, and fraternal
connections.”5 Morris argues that the trial court’s request to avoid
5 OCGA § 15-12-133 provides, in relevant part:
In all criminal cases, both the state and the accused shall have the right to an individual examination of each prospective juror from which the jury is to be selected prior to interposing a challenge. . . . In the examination, the counsel for either party shall have the right to inquire of the individual prospective jurors examined touching any matter or thing which would illustrate any interest of the prospective juror in the case, including any opinion as to questions about religion relied upon a misguided assumption that
lay jurors would volunteer information that the attorneys would
need to assess their fitness as jurors.
As Morris’s appellate counsel conceded below, the trial court
did not order the parties to refrain from asking questions regarding
the potential jurors’ religious beliefs and connections, but rather
merely requested that they not do so.6 In any event,
[t]here was no objection by [Morris] to the court’s instruction that the attorneys stay away from these areas and no indication of what questions [Morris’s] attorney would have liked to ask. Therefore, even if there were questions which [Morris’s] attorney should have been allowed to ask on voir dire, there is no record of any attempt to ask such questions or the court’s refusing to allow them.
which party ought to prevail, the relationship or acquaintance of the prospective juror with the parties or counsel therefor, any fact or circumstance indicating any inclination, leaning, or bias which the prospective juror might have respecting the subject matter of the action or the counsel or parties thereto, and the religious, social, and fraternal connections of the prospective juror. 6 At the hearing on the motion for new trial, Morris’s appellate counsel
said, “I’ll certainly concede that the court did not order anybody not to ask the religion question.” In response to a question from the court, appellate counsel went on to note that the trial court’s statements about not asking questions about religion “was just dialogue” as opposed to a ruling by the trial court. Fugitt v. State, 254 Ga. 521, 522 (3) (330 SE2d 714) (1985). Because
Morris failed to preserve any objection to the trial court’s
statements, this enumeration fails. See Brockman v. State, 292 Ga.
707, 720 (8) (739 SE2d 332) (2013) (“[The appellant] raised no
objections on the stated grounds at the time of voir dire and, thus,
has not preserved these issues for appeal.”).
4. Morris argues that the trial court erred by giving a confusing
charge to the jury regarding admissions or statements of co-
conspirators. We disagree.
At the State’s request, when it charged the jury, the trial court
gave the then-current pattern jury instruction regarding admissions
or statements of co-conspirators with certain additions that had
been requested by the State:
Now, ladies and gentlemen, admissions or statements of co-conspirators. If the existence of a conspiracy has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence other than the out-of-court admissions or statements of any of the alleged co-conspirators, then any admission or statements made by one or more of the co- conspirators — or the conspirators during and in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy may be considered by you, the jury, against all of the conspirators. However, or rather, should you determine that there was no conspiracy or if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed at the time a particular admission or statement was made, that the defendant on trial was not . . . a party to a conspiracy, that the existence of a conspiracy has been shown only by the out-of-court admissions or statements of co-conspirators, that the alleged admissions or statements by co-conspirators were not made in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy, or that no admissions or statements were made to a third party by an alleged co-conspirator, then you are to disregard any testimony as to any alleged admissions or statements made out of the presence of the defendant by an alleged co-conspirator.
(Emphasis supplied for portions of instruction added to the language
of the pattern instruction at the State’s request.) See Suggested
Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, § 2.02.40 (2006).
Morris’s trial counsel objected to this instruction at the charge
conference, noting that one sentence in the instruction was over 120
words in length and that he did not “see how anybody can make
sense out of it.” Morris notes that, in the charge conference, the trial
court agreed that the charge was confusing when it stated, “I don’t
make sense of it, and that is okay. That is what the pattern is, other
than those qualifiers that I put in there.” Trial counsel reiterated the objection to this instruction once the trial court concluded its
charge to the jury.
“[A] jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence and
embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.”
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878, 880
(2) (644 SE2d 120) (2007). As Morris’s appellate counsel admitted at
the hearing on the motion for new trial, the instruction given by the
trial court largely tracked the then-current pattern instruction on
statements and admissions by co-conspirators, noting that there
was “very little deviation” from the pattern charge and that “there
were some minor adjustments made based upon the specifics of the
case and how the evidence came out at trial.” We agree with
appellate counsel’s characterization of the instruction. See
Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases, §
2.02.40 (2006). Moreover, the record reflects that the additions to
the pattern instruction were included by the trial court at the State’s
request for the express purpose of tailoring the pattern instruction
to the needs and circumstances of the case. Specifically, one of Morris’s co-conspirators, Davis, made certain out-of-court
statements to his girlfriend about the robbery and murder of Bush
that were admitted at trial as declarations of co-conspirators. Under
the former Evidence Code, those out-of-court statements could only
be admitted if other evidence (apart from those statements)
established the existence of a conspiracy. See Lord v. State, 304 Ga.
532, 538 (5) (b) (820 SE2d 16) (2018) (Under the former Evidence
Code, “[t]he co-conspirator hearsay exception permitted admission
of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator, made in the course of
the conspiracy, so long as a prima facie case of conspiracy was
established apart from the hearsay statement itself.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). See also former OCGA § 24-3-5 (“After the
fact of conspiracy is proved, the declarations by any one of the
conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be
admissible against all.”). However, the record reflects that, because
Morris’s other co-conspirator, Handy, testified at trial about the
conspiracy to rob Bush, the State wanted to add language to the
pattern charge clarifying that, while Davis’s out-of-court statements could not be used to make the prima facie showing of conspiracy,
Handy’s in-court testimony could be used by the jury for that
purpose.
Thus, the charge given by the trial court was an accurate
statement of the law that was properly adjusted to the evidence and
circumstances of the case. Although the instruction given to the jury
was lengthy, the jury was provided with a copy of the instruction
during its deliberations and asked no questions about it. “[Q]ualified
jurors under oath are presumed to follow the instructions of the trial
court,” Allen v. State, 277 Ga. 502, 504 (3) (c) (591 SE2d 784) (2004),
and Morris has offered no evidence that the jury was confused or
misled by this instruction or that the jury did not follow the
instruction as given. This enumeration of error therefore fails.
5. Morris argues that the trial court’s direction to close and
lock the doors to the courtroom while the court charged the jury
violated his right to a public trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. I,
Par. XI (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. However, “[t]he improper closing of a courtroom is a structural error requiring
reversal only if the defendant properly objected at trial and raised
the issue on direct appeal.” Reid v. State, 286 Ga. 484, 488 (3) (c)
(690 SE2d 177) (2010). Because the record reflects that Morris did
not make a contemporaneous objection to the locking of the
courtroom doors at trial, he has waived his right to appellate review
of the trial court’s action. See Benton v. State, 300 Ga. 202, 205 (2)
(794 SE2d 97) (2016).
6. Finally, Morris argues that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by not objecting to the locking of the doors
during the trial court’s charge to the jury. Although Morris waived
appellate review of the trial court’s decision to lock the courtroom
doors by failing to object, he may raise a claim that he was denied
his right to a public trial in the context of a claim of ineffective
assistance, and he has done so here. See State v. Abernathy, 289 Ga.
603, 611 (5) (715 SE2d 48) (2011) (“[B]ecause [the appellant] did not
raise an objection to this procedure at trial, the issue of closure may
only be raised in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). As with other claims of
ineffective assistance, to prevail, Morris
has the burden of proving both that the performance of his lawyer was professionally deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. To prove deficient performance, [Morris] must show that his trial counsel acted or failed to act in an objectively unreasonable way, considering all of the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms. To prove resulting prejudice, [Morris] must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would have been different. In examining an ineffectiveness claim, a court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.
(Punctuation omitted.) Stuckey v. State, 301 Ga. 767, 771 (2) (804
SE2d 76) (2017) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687
(104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)).
“A strong presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls
within the broad range of professional conduct.” (Citation omitted.)
Ford v. State, 298 Ga. 560, 566 (8) (783 SE2d 906) (2016). And
“where, as here, the issue of a courtroom closure is raised in the
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, prejudice will
not be presumed.” Reid, 286 Ga. at 488 (3) (c). Pretermitting whether the failure to object to the locking of the
courtroom doors constituted deficient performance, Morris has
failed to show how he was prejudiced by counsel’s lack of objection.
The record reflects, and Morris concedes, that the locking of the
courtroom was announced in advance by the trial court, that the
court gave those in the gallery the opportunity to remain in the
courtroom after the doors were shut and locked, and that some
individuals did so. Most importantly, Morris has not shown that any
person who wished to be present in the courtroom for the charge of
the jury was prevented from entering or remaining in the courtroom
while the charge was given. Morris has thus failed to articulate how
the trial court’s locking of the courtroom and his counsel’s failure to
object to this action prejudiced his constitutional right to a public
trial. “We therefore cannot find a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different” had the courtroom
doors not been locked during the trial court’s charge to the jury.
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Reid, 286 Ga. at 488 (3) (c).
Accordingly, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
DECIDED APRIL 20, 2020. Murder. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Cox. Crawford & Boyle, Eric C. Crawford, for appellant. Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Lyndsey H. Rudder, Marc A. Mallon, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Leslie A. Coots, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.