NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: July 1, 2025
S25A0665. ADAMS v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
In June 2019, Appellant Xavier Adams, Jr., was convicted of
felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting
death of Sean Peterson.1 On appeal, Adams contends that (1) the
trial court erred by failing to vacate his conviction for felony murder
1 Peterson was shot on September 5, 2017. On March 28, 2018, a Clayton
County grand jury indicted Adams for malice murder, two counts of felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon), aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. At a trial from June 17 to 21, 2019, the jury found Adams guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and guilty on all the remaining counts. The trial court sentenced Adams to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for felony murder predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The remaining charges merged or were vacated by operation of law. On September 26, 2019, Adams filed a motion for new trial, which he amended with new counsel three times. After an evidentiary hearing on February 14, 2023, the trial court entered an order denying the motion for new trial on September 25, 2023. Adams filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was docketed in this Court for the term beginning in April 2025 and submitted for a decision on the briefs. predicated on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under the
modified merger rule; (2) the jury’s guilty verdicts of voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and felony
murder predicated on aggravated assault were mutually exclusive
from the guilty verdict on felony murder predicated on possession of
a firearm by a convicted felon; (3) the trial court committed plain
error by improperly commenting on evidence presented at trial; (4)
the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury on
the proximate cause standard for felony murder; and (5) the trial
court committed plain error by omitting the proximate cause
standard for felony murder in its response to a jury note. We affirm
because the modified merger rule is inapplicable to this case, the
jury’s guilty verdicts of voluntary manslaughter on malice murder
and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and felony
murder predicated on felon-in-possession were not mutually
exclusive, the trial court did not improperly comment on the
evidence presented at trial, the trial court did not commit plain error
in failing to include the proximate cause standard in its jury
2 charges, and Adams affirmatively waived any claim of error by the
trial court with respect to the trial court’s response to the jury’s
question during its deliberations.
The evidence presented at trial showed that, in 2017, Adams,
Peterson, and Adams’s then-wife Destinee Pannell 2 were roommates
at an apartment complex in Clayton County. On September 5, 2017,
Peterson attempted to contact Adams by cell phone to explain that
he did not have the entirety of his share of the rent, but Adams
refused to speak with him. Around 7:45 p.m. the same day, Adams
and Pannell were at their apartment when Peterson arrived,
requesting to speak with Adams about the rent. The two men
immediately began arguing, and Adams told Peterson that he had
“something for [Peterson],” then walked into his bedroom. Pannell
testified that she understood Adams’s statement to mean that he
was retrieving the gun that he kept in his nightstand, which he
purchased in May or June 2017.
When Adams went into the bedroom, Peterson walked out of
2 Adams and Pannell divorced prior to trial.
3 the apartment and returned with a 9mm pistol belonging to his
girlfriend, Tasiana Harmon, who was waiting for Peterson in the
parking lot of the complex. As Peterson reentered the apartment,
Adams came out of his bedroom with the gun and pointed it at
Peterson. While aiming the guns in each other’s direction, the two
men continued to argue until they decided to put their weapons
down and “go outside and handle it a different way.” Shortly after
exiting the apartment, the men returned because, according to
Adams, they did not want to be seen fighting by other residents in
the complex.
Upon reentering the apartment, the men picked up their guns,
resumed arguing, and started wrestling with their guns in hand.
Pannell asked Peterson to get off Adams because Adams could not
breathe, but Peterson said that he would not do so until Adams
relinquished his gun. Subsequently, Adams and Peterson gave their
guns to Pannell, who put both guns in a black handbag. A few
moments later, Peterson asked for Harmon’s gun back because he
needed it for his security job. Adams told Pannell that if she gave
4 Peterson the gun back, he would “beat [her] ass.” 3 Peterson then
called Harmon from his cell phone to come retrieve the gun from
Pannell. When Harmon entered the apartment, Adams instructed
Pannell not to give Harmon the gun and demanded his gun back.
The two men began to fight again, and while they fought, Pannell
gave Harmon her gun, which Harmon put in the waistband of her
pants.
Adams and Peterson eventually stopped fighting, and Peterson
began exiting the apartment. While walking out, Peterson remarked
that, if he found out that Adams had “put [his] hands on [Pannell],
[Peterson would] come back for [Adams].” Adams responded, “get
the hell out,” causing Peterson to turn around. Peterson told Adams
that he would leave once he collected all his belongings in the
apartment and then walked into his bedroom. Pannell put the black
handbag down, ran after Peterson, and urged him to leave before
Adams got more upset. Upon exiting Peterson’s bedroom, Pannell
saw that Adams had his gun raised and pointed in Peterson’s
3 Adams had a history of physically abusing Pannell.
5 direction. Peterson exited the bedroom soon after and attempted to
disarm Adams. Pannell testified that, when Peterson was
attempting to take the gun away from Adams, she heard a gunshot.
Pannell did not see who fired the gun because she immediately ran
out the door of the apartment when she heard the shot but testified
that the last person she saw with a gun was Adams. Harmon
testified that she saw Adams grab his gun out of Pannell’s black
handbag and shoot Peterson. According to Harmon, when Peterson
was shot, he was unarmed, and she had her gun in her waistband.
Shortly after exiting the apartment, Pannell heard someone
say, “he shot me” and “get up, man, you all right. It’s going to be
okay. . . .” She did not know who made either statement. When
Pannell came back into the apartment, she saw Peterson’s dead body
and asked Adams what happened and where the gun was. He
responded that “the gun went off” and that he would not tell her
where the gun was. Pannell tried to call the police, but Adams
stopped her, saying that they needed to get rid of Peterson’s body.
When Pannell refused and insisted on calling the police, Adams
6 again prevented her and said that they needed to go to the nightclub
where Adams worked to create an alibi.
On the way to the club, Adams threatened to harm Pannell if
the police found out what happened and asked her “not to fold on
him or turn him in.” When they arrived at the club, Adams told
Pannell that he needed lemon juice to remove any gunpowder
residue from his body and clothing. According to Pannell, Adams
then went to a nearby store “so that the manager could see his face
as part of the alibi . . . .” Adams also put paint on his clothes and
shoes to give the impression that he had been painting at the club
and instructed Pannell to video call her daughter so she could see
where they were. After about an hour, Adams and Pannell left the
club and drove around Atlanta until Adams’s brother called and
informed him that he needed to go to his apartment because the
police were there.4 When they arrived at the apartment, Adams told
Pannell to “ask where [Peterson] was to make it seem like [they]
4 The record reflects that Harmon called 911 after the shooting, and the
police responded to Adams’s apartment around 8:45 p.m. 7 didn’t know what had happened.” As soon as the couple exited the
car, they were immediately detained by the police.
Inside Adams’s apartment, the police found Peterson dead with
a gunshot wound to the back. No bullet was recovered from his body.
Police also recovered a .40 caliber bullet near Peterson’s body and a
9mm live round under his body. No shell casings were found at the
scene, and the weapon used to shoot Peterson was never located. A
ballistics expert testified that Harmon’s gun did not fire the .40
caliber bullet found near Peterson’s body. The medical examiner
testified that Peterson’s death was deemed a homicide caused by a
gunshot wound.
At trial, the State presented evidence of jail calls between
Adams and Pannell. On those calls, Adams said to Pannell, among
other things, that “they don’t have [the gun], no shell, no nothing”;
Pannell needed to “tell [investigators] that [she] went home[,] and
[Peterson] was in an altercation with Junior”;5 “why didn’t you stick
5 The record reflects that Adams also occasionally went by “Junior,” but
Pannell testified that, during this call, Adams was referring to another person named Junior. 8 to the f**king story”; and “it was our story against her,” which
Pannell testified referred to Harmon.
1. Adams contends that the trial court erred by sentencing
him for felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession rather than
for voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder and
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault counts, for which
he was found guilty. He contends that under the modified merger
rule articulated in Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865, 866-868 (2) (414 SE2d
865) (1992), the trial court should have vacated the felony murder
count predicated on felon-in-possession and entered a conviction and
sentence for voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.
In Edge, this Court adopted a “modified merger rule,”
concluding that, where the jury finds a defendant guilty of voluntary
manslaughter, “it cannot also find felony murder based on the same
underlying aggravated assault” because the jury’s guilty verdict of
voluntary manslaughter necessarily implies that the very same
assault was mitigated by provocation and passion. See id. at 865-
866 (“If the jury finds voluntary manslaughter, it necessarily finds
9 the felonious assault was mitigated by provocation[] and committed
without the mens rea essential to impute malice to the killing. Thus,
the felony of assault in that instance cannot support a felony murder
conviction because there is no malice to be transferred.” (emphasis
in original)). “We adopted such a rule because to hold otherwise
would eliminate voluntary manslaughter as a separate form of
homicide since, in that event, every voluntary manslaughter would
also be a felony murder.” Smith v. State, 272 Ga. 874, 879 (6) (a) (536
SE2d 514) (2000) (citation and punctuation omitted). Consequently,
where a defendant is found guilty of voluntary manslaughter and
felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, arising from the
same assault, the trial court should vacate the felony murder verdict
and “only the voluntary manslaughter conviction may stand.” See
Edge, 261 Ga. at 867 (2).
We subsequently extended the rule in Edge to apply in factual
scenarios where “the felony murder is premised on another
underlying felony that is equally integral to the homicide and
susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation and passion that
10 voluntary manslaughter involves.” See Griggs v. State, 304 Ga. 806,
808 (2) (822 SE2d 246) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted)
(refusing to extend Edge because the defendant’s possession of a
firearm as a convicted felon was independent of the killing). See also
Sanders v. State, 281 Ga. 36, 37-38 (1) (635 SE2d 772) (2006)
(extending Edge to aggravated battery and arson). However, we
noted in Edge that the modified merger rule is inapplicable where
“the underlying felony is independent of the killing itself, such as
burglary, robbery, or even an assault that is directed against
someone other than the homicide victim.” Edge, 261 Ga. at 867 (2)
n.3 (citation omitted) (emphasis supplied). See, e.g., Anothony v.
State, 303 Ga. 399, 403 (2) (a) (811 SE2d 399) (2018) (concluding that
“the culpability for unlawful participation in criminal gang activity
is generally not susceptible of mitigation by the sort of provocation
and passion that voluntary manslaughter involves”). And of
particular relevance here, we have consistently refused to extend
the rule in Edge to felony murder convictions predicated on
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See, e.g., DuBose v.
11 State, 299 Ga. 652, 653-654 (2) (791 SE2d 9) (2016); Amos v. State,
297 Ga. 892, 893-894 (2) (778 SE2d 203) (2015); Wallace v. State, 294
Ga. 257 258-259 (2) (754 SE2d 5) (2013); Lawson v. State, 280 Ga.
881, 883 (3) (635 SE2d 134) (2006); Sims v. State, 265 Ga. 35, 36 (3)
(453 SE2d 33) (1995).
Here, Adams’s unlawful possession of a firearm was
independent of the killing itself and not “the result of a sudden,
violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation
sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person,” OCGA § 16-
5-2 (a), given that the evidence presented at trial showed that
Adams possessed the gun he used to kill Peterson prior to the
shooting. See Griggs, 304 Ga. at 809 (2) (concluding Edge was
inapplicable where the evidence showed that the defendant had
“acquired the gun that he used to kill [the victim] ‘maybe five
days’ before the shooting”). Therefore, Edge is inapplicable, and the
trial court did not err in entering a judgment of conviction on the
jury’s verdict finding Adams guilty of felony murder predicated on
felon-in-possession and sentencing him accordingly.
12 2. Adams next argues that the jury’s guilty verdicts of
voluntary manslaughter—on the malice murder and felony murder
predicated on aggravated assault counts—and felony murder based
on possession of a firearm by a convicted felon were mutually
exclusive.
“The term mutually exclusive generally applies to two
guilty verdicts that cannot legally exist simultaneously.” McElrath
v. State, 308 Ga. 104, 110 (2) (b) (839 SE2d 573) (2020) (emphasis
removed) (punctuation omitted). “[I]f a jury returns verdicts of guilty
on two counts of an indictment, and those counts are mutually
exclusive, the convictions must be set aside and a new trial granted.”
Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b) (citation omitted). We conclude that
Adams’s guilty verdicts were not mutually exclusive.
A guilty verdict of voluntary manslaughter requires that a jury
find that the defendant intended to kill the victim, but such killing
occurred as a “result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion
resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion
in a reasonable person.” See OCGA § 16-5-2 (a). To convict a
13 defendant for felony murder, a jury must find that he committed a
felony, and during the commission of that felony, caused the death
of another with or without malice. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Critically,
a jury need not conclude that the defendant intended to cause the
death of another, only that he intended to commit the underlying
felony. See Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b).
Here, the intent supporting Adams’s felony murder conviction
was derived solely from the underlying felon-in-possession offense.
Because felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession of a
firearm does not require an intent to kill and considerations such as
provocation or passion have no bearing on it, Adams’s voluntary
manslaughter conviction has no bearing on whether Adams
committed felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession; rather,
the felony-murder verdict indicated that the jury concluded that
Adams intended to possess a firearm as a convicted felon, and during
such possession, caused the death of Peterson. Therefore, the felony
murder and voluntary manslaughter guilty verdicts were not
mutually exclusive. See Perez v. State, 316 Ga. 433, 452 (4) (888
14 SE2d 526) (2023); Smith, 272 Ga. at 880 (6) (b) (“Significantly, to
convict [the defendant] of felony murder, the jury did not have to
find that [he] did not act with an intent to kill, as malice and intent
to kill are not elements of the offense of felony murder.”).
3. Adams argues that the trial court plainly erred in three
respects. To show plain error, Adams (1) must point to an error that
was not affirmatively waived, (2) the error must have been clear and
obvious, (3) the error must have affected his substantial rights, and
(4) the error must have seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. See State v. Williams, 308
Ga. 228, 231 (2) (838 SE2d 764) (2020). We need not analyze all of
the elements of the plain error test if Adams fails to satisfy one of
them. See Hill v. State, 310 Ga. 180, 194 (11) (a) (850 SE2d 110)
(2020) (citation omitted). Here, we conclude that, as to two of his
claims, Adams cannot show a clear or obvious error by the trial court
and, as to the third claim, he affirmatively waived any alleged claim
of error by the trial court.
(a) Adams first contends that it was plain error for the trial
15 court to improperly comment on the evidence presented at trial.6
During the cross-examination of Pannell, Adams’s trial counsel
asked her four times whether she shot Peterson. Each time Pannell
responded that she did not. The fourth time the question was asked,
the trial court interjected and said, “[m]a’am, do not. She’s already
said she did not.” Trial counsel later asked, “Ms. Pannell, isn’t it
correct that [Adams] was concerned about you because he knew that
you were the one who fired the gun that night?” After Pannell
responded that she did not fire the gun, the trial court stated,
“[Counsel], I’m going to have her step down if there’s another
question about that. She’s already answered it.” Trial counsel did
not object to the trial court’s comments.
“It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case,
to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opinion as to whether
a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the
6 Although Adams’s brief does not address this enumeration of error under the plain error analysis, our review is limited to plain error because Adams did not object to the comments that he now wishes to challenge on appeal. See OCGA § 17-8-57 (b). 16 accused.” OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1). Here, the record does not show
that the trial court expressed an opinion about what had or had not
been proven in the case; on the contrary, it merely stated what
Pannell had already testified to, which does not violate OCGA § 17-
8-57 (a) (1). See Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 272 (4) (882 SE2d 227)
(2022) (“To violate [OCGA § 17-8-57 (a) (1)], the trial court’s
comments must pertain to a disputed issue of fact.” (citation and
punctuation omitted)). Moreover, the trial court acted within its
discretion “to keep the case moving along in the face of repetitive
questions by defense counsel.” Gebhardt v. State, 307 Ga. 587, 593
(3) (a) (837 SE2d 318) (2019) (citing OCGA § 24-6-611 (a) (2) (“The
court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . [a]void
needless consumption of time . . . .”)). Therefore, there was no clear
and obvious error here, and this claim fails.
(b) Adams next argues that it was plain error for the trial court
to omit the proximate cause standard from its jury charge.
As noted above, felony murder occurs when, during the
17 commission of a felony, the defendant causes the death of another
irrespective of malice. See OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). Proving that a
defendant “caused” the death of another requires proof of “proximate
cause,” meaning that the defendant was both the cause in fact and
legal cause of the death. See Melancon v. State, 319 Ga. 741, 751 2
(b) (906 SE2d 725) (2024) (citing State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 647
(2) (697 SE2d 757) (2010)).
Adams has not established that the trial court committed a
clear and obvious error here by not giving more detailed instructions
on the causation standard. To show clear and obvious error, the
defendant must identify “on-point controlling authority” or “the
unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule that plainly establish
that the trial court erred.” Hill v. State, 321 Ga. 177, 182 (913 SE2d
547) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). Adams has offered
no such authority, statute, or rule in support of this plain-error
claim. And we have rejected similar plain-error claims before where,
as here, the trial court read the indictment’s allegations as to how
the defendant caused the victim’s death; instructed the jury on the
18 statutory definition of felony murder, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (“A person
commits the offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony,
he or she causes the death of another human being irrespective of
malice.”); and told the jury that the State had the burden of proving
“every material allegation of the Indictment and every essential
element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” See
Campbell-Williams v. State, 309 Ga. 585, 587-588 (2) (a) (847 SE2d
583) (2020) (citation omitted). See also Flournoy v. State, 294 Ga.
741, 746 (2) (755 SE2d 777) (2014) (concluding that an indictment
alleging that the defendant caused the victim’s death by shooting
him during the commission of a felony, along with a jury instruction
referencing those allegations, sufficiently informed the jury that a
conviction required a finding that the defendant caused the death—
thus, a separate instruction on proximate cause was unnecessary);
Pennie v. State, 292 Ga. 249, 252 (2) (736 SE2d 433) (2013) (charge
omitting proximate cause standard was sufficient where the charge
as a whole informed “the jury that, in order to convict Appellant of
the felony murder of [the victim], it had to determine that he caused
19 . . . the victim’s death during the escape phase of the underlying
felonies”). Therefore, Adams has not established that the trial court
committed a clear and obvious error by failing to give more specific
instructions on proximate cause.7
(c) Adams finally argues that it was plain error for the trial
court to omit the felony-murder proximate cause standard in its
response to a jury note.
During the jury’s deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial
court, asking it to “[p]lease explain Count III in layman’s terms.”
The following colloquy then took place on the record between the
trial court and the parties regarding the note:
COURT: I can re-read that section of the instructions. . . . TRIAL COUNSEL: They do have the charges, Your Honor. So -- but they’ve asked for it in layman’s terms. Meaning, I would say, to indicate that they have difficulty understanding what is set out in the charges. I don’t know if the Court [could] [] simplify it for them in some way[?]
7 Although we reject the claim of plain error with respect to the trial
court’s jury instructions in this case, we recognize that there may be some factual scenarios where a more detailed instruction on proximate cause is necessary. See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 529 (4) (842 SE2d 45) (2020) (“A jury instruction must be adjusted to the evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement of law.” (citation and punctuation omitted)). 20 COURT: I could. Do you guys agree to that? PROSECUTOR: That’s fine, Your Honor. That’s fine. TRIAL COUNSEL: Uh-huh (affirmative response). Yes. . .. TRIAL COUNSEL: And I think your instruction that read would be -- yes -- you have to decide if the defendant committed a felony. And once you have decided -- the felony alleged being, being in possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. And then once you decide that[] you have then to decide if somebody [died] during the course of that felony. COURT: Right. TRIAL COUNSEL: I think that’s pretty much standard. I think that that is sufficient, Your Honor. COURT: Okay? PROSECUTOR: Yes, Your Honor. TRIAL COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor.
The trial court then brought the jurors back into the courtroom and
explained the following:
COURT: I’ve had an opportunity to talk with the State and with the Defense. And they have agreed on what I can say. So, what I’m going to do first, is first read Count III. That Mr. Adams with -- is charged with the offense of felony murder, for the said accused person in the County of Clayton, the State of Georgia, on or about the 5th day of September, 2017, while in the commission of the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a felony, did cause the death of Sean Petersen, a human being, by shooting him. So, first you have to determine if a felony was committed as alleged. The felony as alleged to have been committed was that he was in possession of a
21 firearm by a convicted felon. That would be the felony. Then you must go on to determine whether during the course -- you must then determine that if the defendant caused the death of another while in the course of that felony.
“For purposes of plain error review, an affirmative waiver is
the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
Holloway v. State, 320 Ga. 668, 671 (2) (911 SE2d 554) (2025)
(citation and punctuation omitted). Here, the record shows that
prior to the trial court’s reading of its response to the jury, Adams’s
trial counsel suggested language that was included in the response
and stated that the language was “sufficient” and “standard.” And,
when the trial court asked Adams’s trial counsel whether she
approved of the forthcoming response, she said, “Yes, Your Honor.”
Accordingly, because Adams—through his counsel—agreed to a
response that did not include specific detail about proximate cause,
he cannot now assert that the trial court’s response constituted plain
error. See Hughes v. State, 310 Ga. 453, 457 (2) (b) (851 SE2d 580)
(2020) (the defendant affirmatively waived his right to challenge the
trial court’s response to a jury note that requested the trial court to
22 explain portions of the jury charge in layman’s terms because the
defendant “agreed that re-reading the indictment was the
appropriate means to answer the jury’s questions”). Therefore,
Adams affirmatively waived any claim of error from the response by
the trial court, so there was no plain error by the trial court. Thus,
this claim fails.
Judgment affirmed. Peterson, CJ, Warren, PJ, and Bethel, Ellington, McMillian, Colvin, and Pinson, JJ, concur.
23 PINSON, Justice, concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court in full. With respect to the
Court’s conclusion in Division 3 (b) that the trial court did not
commit plain error by failing to give more specific instructions on
causation, I note that we have recently “clarified the standard for
proving causation under our murder statute.” Melancon v. State, 319
Ga. 741, 752 (3) (906 SE2d 725) (2024). In Melancon, we explained
that
Proving that a defendant caused the death of another human being requires proof of proximate cause. This showing has two components: cause in fact and legal cause. A defendant’s conduct is a cause in fact of a death if the defendant’s conduct played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the death — typically shown through evidence that the death would not have happened but for the defendant’s conduct — or if the defendant’s conduct materially accelerated the death. And a defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of a death if the death was reasonably foreseeable — that is, a probable or natural consequence of the criminal conduct according to ordinary and usual experience, not a merely possible result.
Id. at 751 (2) (b) (cleaned up). An instruction along these lines would
be both a correct statement of the law and useful to jurors who must
24 assess whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant has “cause[d] the death of another human being.”
OCGA § 16-5-1 (c). See Morris v. State, 308 Ga. 520, 529 (4) (842
SE2d 45) (2020) (“A jury instruction must be adjusted to the
evidence and embody a correct, applicable, and complete statement
of law.”).