Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 16, 2021·No. 1:21-cv-10260·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

GOOGLE LLC, Plaintiff, v. Civil Action No. 1:21-cv-10260-DLC

DMITRY STAROVIKOV; ALEXANDER FILIPPOV; Does 1-15, Defendants. {PROPOSED} PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ORDER

Plaintiff Google LLC has filed a complaint for injunctive and other relief to stop Defendants Dmitry Starovikov and Alexander Filippov, and Does 1 through 15— through their participation in, and operation of, the Glupteba Enterprise—from continuing to control and operate a botnet of over a million devices, continuing to distribute malware to infect new devices, and continuing to carry out their criminal schemes, Google filed a complaint alleging claims under: (1) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d} (Count I); (2) the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Count II); (8) the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (Count IID; (4) the Lanham Act (Count IV); (5) and common-law theories of unfair competition and unjust enrichment (Counts V—VI). ECF No. 5. On December 7, 2021, this Court issued a temporary restraining order

and order for Defendant to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. ECF No. 8. THE COURT HEREBY FINDS THAT: Jurisdiction and Venue 1. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over Google’s claims under RICO, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the Lanham Act under 28 U.S.C, § 1331. This court also has jurisdiction over the Lanham Act and related state and common law unfair competition claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1388, and 15 US.C. § 1121. This court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1867. 2, This Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because:

a. The Defendants distribute malware to Google users in this district and within New York state; b. The Defendants send commands to infected user computers in this district and within New York state to carry out their illicit schemes; C. Google’s complaint and moving papers demonstrate that the Defendants undertook these activities intentionally with knowledge that their actions would cause harm to users in New York and cause Google harm in New York. Google does business in New York and has done business in New York for many years. 3. Venue is proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) because Defendants are not residents of the United States and may be sued in any judicial district. Venue is also proper in this judicial district under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 1965 because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to Google’s claims occurred in this judicial district, because a substantial part of the property that is the subject of Google’s claims is situated in this judicial district, because a substantial part of the harm caused by Defendants has occurred in this judicial district, and because Defendants transact their affairs in this judicial district. Moreover, Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in this district and

no other venue appears to be more appropriate. 4, The complaint pleads facts with the specificity required by the Federal Rules and states claims against Defendants for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)-(d) (Count 1); the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (Count I), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (Count IID, Lanham Act (Count IV), and unfair competition and unjust enrichment (Counts V—-VI). Preliminary Injunction Order Factors The Court finds that Google has established each of the factors required for a preliminary injunction: (1) irreparable harm; (2) a likelihood of success on the merits

or a substantial question as to the merits; (3) the balance of hardships tips in Google’s favor; and (4) a preliminary injunction serves the public interest. Benihana, Inc. v, Benihana of Tokyo, LLC, 784 F.3d 887, 895 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. as Trustees for Femit Tr. 2006-FF6, 368 F. Supp. 3d 728, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The standard[s] for granting a temporary restraining order and

.

a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of [Civil] Procedure

are identical.”). Irreparable Harm 5. Google has established that it will suffer immediate, irreparable harm if this Court denies its request for a preliminary injunction. In particular, it has shown that the Defendants—through their participation in, and operation of, the Glupteba Enterprise—have threatened the security of the internet, including Google platforms, by transmitting malware through the internet to configure, deploy, and operate a botnet. The Enterprise has distributed malware on devices of Google users, compromising the security of those devices and continues to issue commands to those devices to carry out criminal activities, such as selling access to Google user accounts and selling fraudulent credit cards to use on those accounts. 6. The Defendants control a botnet that has infected more than one million devices. At any moment, the botnet’s extraordinary computing power could be harnessed for other criminal schemes. Defendants could, for example, enable large ransomware or distributed denial-of-service attacks on legitimate businesses and other targets. Defendants could themselves perpetrate such a harmful attack, or they could sell access to the botnet to a third-party for that purpose, 7, In addition, Defendants’ conduct is infringing Google’s trademarks, injuring Google’s goodwill, and damaging its reputation by creating confusion as to the source of the Ghipteba malware because the Defendants used a domain that

infringes Google’s YouTube mark to distribute malware, That constitutes irreparable harm, Likelihood of Success on the Merits 8. Google has shown at a minimum that its complaint presents a substantial question as to each of its claims, and indeed that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. 9. CFAA. Google has shown a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that Defendants violated and continue to violate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The CFAA prohibits, among other things, intentionally accessing a protected computer, without authorization, and thereby obtaining information from that computer. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Defendants intentionally accessed thousands of users’ computers operating in interstate commerce through the internet, without authorization, to infect them with malware.

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Google LLC v. Dmitry Starovikov, (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

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