Gonzalez v. Layton

429 S.W.2d 215, 1968 Tex. App. LEXIS 2143

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: May 31, 1968
• Docket: 358
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

NYE, Justice.

Plaintiff Beatrice Gonzalez, brought suit against James E. Layton for damages and personal injuries resulting from an automobile collision in Corpus Christi, Texas. The defendant filed a cross-action for damages to his vehicle. The case was tried before a jury resulting in jury findings of negligence and proximate cause as to both the plaintiff and the defendant. The trial court entered a take nothing judgment as to both parties by reason of their suits.¹

The evidence was substantially uncontra-dicted. The plaintiff was driving her vehicle at a slow rate of speed on a residential street during daylight hours on a clear day. Two of her children were riding in the back seat of the car. The defendant was following the plaintiff, driving at a somewhat faster rate of speed, but within the speed limits provided by law. The evidence was that somewhere back from where the accident took place, the defendant attempted to pass the plaintiff. He noticed that she turned and motioned to her children in the back seat, causing her automobile to slightly swerve over to the center portion of the street. When her car straightened up again the defendant again attempted to pass the plaintiff. As he neared the position where the front end of his vehicle was near or opposite the rear end of her vehicle the plaintiff made a left turn into her driveway, whereupon the defendant’s right front portion of his vehicle struck the left rear portion of her car, causing the resulting damages and injuries. The jury in answer to a number of special issues, convicted the defendant of three acts of negligence, all of which were found to be a proximate cause of the collision in question. The jury further found that the plaintiff failed to maintain such a lookout for the defendant’s car as a reasonably prudent person in the exercise of ordinary care would have maintained under the same or similar circumstances. The jury found that this was also a proximate cause of the collision in question. Plaintiff has perfected her appeal.

Plaintiff’s first and second points are that the jury’s answer to the issues of contributory negligence and proximate cause were against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and are not supported by sufficient evidence as a matter of fact. These points of error concerning the insufficiency of the evidence as to lookout and proximate cause, require the Court of Civil Appeals to balance substantial evidence that supports the verdict against substantial evidence that is against the verdict and determine whether the great weight and preponderance of the evidence favors or is against the verdict. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Railway Company v. Deen, 158 Tex. 466, 312 S.W.2d 933 (1958).

The record is rather lengthy concerning what took place during the few moments of time that immediately preceded the accident in question. As one might suspect from this type of case there is evidence from the plaintiff that she kept a proper lookout and that from the defendant that she did not. Insofar as there may be a conflict in the testimony of the witnesses, it is well settled law that the jury in the exercise of its prerogative is the sole judge of the facts proven, of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony. Equally well settled is that any ultimate issue may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. The defendant testified that as he started to pass the plaintiff she turned abruptly into the driveway while he was even with the back portion of her vehicle. It has been said that “when one in a stream of traffic slows his vehicle, or stops it, or changes his course, a duty arises to see what is behind when he makes the change.” Berry v. Sunshine Laundries & Dry Cleaning Corp., 387 S.W.2d 948 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1965, n. r. e.). We have reviewed all of the evidence and are convinced that the jury was warranted in finding that the plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout, and that such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision in question. Appellants’ points one and two are overruled.

Appellants’ other point is that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the testimony of witness Malinowski to the effect that defendant Layton had told him after the accident “I guess it was my fault.” The record shows that the plaintiff informed the trial judge, that he had a matter that he wished to take up with the court that he thought would be objected to, and rather than risk a mistrial he wished to take it up out of the presence of the jury. This concerned the testimony of the witness Malinowski. After the jury had been excused the witness testified to the effect that the defendant came over to his house to use the telephone after the accident. He testified that the defendant stated “I don’t know why it happened, * * * I didn’t see the blinker light.” Q. “What else did he say?” A. “That’s all he said, said he didn’t see the blinker, light, he said T guess it is my fault’.” The plaintiff offered the statement for two reasons: (1) that it was an admission against interest, a shorthand rendition of what took place and (2) for impeachment (the defendant had denied earlier that he had made any such statement to this witness). The court ruled that it would permit part of the statement to be introduced that: the defendant did not “see the blinker light”, but would not permit the other part of the statement, “I guess it was my fault” to be admitted.

The appellant argues that the exclusion of the statement was prejudicial, since, if the jury had been allowed to consider the statement it is reasonably probable that the jury would have rejected the defendant’s version of the manner in which the accident happened. Moreover, the appellant argues that the error in excluding the testimony was calculated to cause and probably did cause the jury to give the answer that the plaintiff failed to maintain a proper lookout for defendant’s vehicle. We reject this theory and argument.

It is true that there is divided authority in this and other states as to the hearsay rule of evidence that permits admissions of a party to the law suit to be received into evidence when it is a spontaneous contemporaneous opinion statement as part of the res gestae. Both parties cite authority substantiating their position. McCormick & Ray on Evidence, Sec. 1126, p. 23 says:

“By the better view a party’s admissions are in no way limited by the Opinion Rule. This is clearly supported by every day practice in our courts, where statements made by a party that he was ‘at fault’, ‘in the wrong’, and like inferential conclusions are customarily received in evidence against him without question. * * * »

In the pocket part edition of McCormick & Ray under Section 1126 the authors criticize as unsound, the opinion of the Supreme Court in Isaacs v. Plains Transport Company, 367 S.W.2d 152 (Tex.Sup.1963). The court in a per curiam opinion held that statements of a driver that were pure conclusions and opinions, and were not offered for impeachment, were not admissible.

In 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 421, at page 1038, the commentary on expressions of opinion had this to say about the res gestae rule:

It * * * “permits the introduction in evidence of statements of fact rather than of a conclusion of the declarant. Expressions of opinion are not ordinarily admissible as part of the res gestae (Knapik v. Edison Bros., Inc., Civ.App., 313 S.W.2d 335, error refused—Morgan v. Maunders, Tex.Civ.App., 37 S.W.2d 791, error dismissed—Hardin v. Rust, Tex.Civ.App., 294 S.W. 625—W. F. Norman & Sons v. Clark, Tex.Civ.App., 221 S.W. 235), even though they are accompanied by acts tending to show that the declarant really entertained the opinion so expressed; * * * Expressions of opinion as to whose fault caused the accident are generally not admissible as part of the res gestae (San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Alexander, Com.App., 280 S.W. 753; A.B.C. Storage & Moving Co. v. Herron, Tex.Civ.App., 138 S.W.2d 211, error dismissed judgment correct—Red Arrow Freight Lines v. Gravis, Tex.Civ.App., 84 S.W.2d 540, Rosenthal Dry Goods Co. v. Hillebrandt, Civ.App., 280 S.W. 882), but in a number of cases spontaneous exclamations by the person causing the injury that it was his fault have been held to be admissible (Galveston Transit Co. v. Morgan, 408 S.W.2d 728, Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1966).”

In Galveston Transit Co. v. Morgan, 408 S.W.2d 728, Justice Coleman speaking for the First Court of Civil Appeals, said of the following testimony:

“ * * * ‘He said “it’s not your fault at all.” He said “I’m to blame for it.” He said, “I got a broken toe and when I got on the brake that toe hurt me and I took it off,” and he said “I couldn’t stop for the stop sign, I got a broke toe.” ’

“The statement was spontaneous and was made within such time after the collision as to indicate that the speaker was still dominated, by emotion and had not returned to normal calmness. If otherwise admissible, the statement constituted res gestae and should have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.”

In 29 Am.Jur.2d, Sec. 718, the text writers said at page 784:

“ * * * that if an utterance tends to elucidate an accident, and if it appears in its nature, manner, and circumstances to have been so responsive to the mental impact of the accident as to be but an unconsidered reproduction of what the speaker has seen or experienced, and if it was made so soon after the accident as to render it improbable that perverting motive or false memory has intervened, it is admissible in evidence. * * * ”

In 53 A.L.R.2d, page 1245, annotations on admissibility of res gestae statements or exclamations relating to the cause of or responsibility for, motor vehicle accidents at Section 16, page 1287, it is said that:

“Although it would seem clear that opinions as to the cause of or responsibility for a motor vehicle accident are admissible as a part of the res gestae or as spontaneous exclamations if they meet the tests embodied in such rules of admissibility, a number of courts have denied admission to statements alleged to be of this kind, stating that the character of such statements as ‘opinions’ bars application of the res gestae and spontaneous exclamation principles.”

Citing San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Alexander, 280 S.W. 753 (Tex.Civ.App.1926); Morgan v. Maunders, 37 S.W.2d 791 (Tex.Civ.App.-Ft. Worth 1930, error dismissed); Red Arrow Freight Lines v. Gravis, 84 S.W.2d 540 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1934).

In 24 Tex.Jur.2d, Sec. 586, Evidence, the authors attempt to summarize the Texas rule that opinions are not admissible under the res gestae rule (where the opinion in question is purely the product of reflection or premeditation). However, they qualify such rule by saying:

“ * * * However, it must be remembered that the res gestae rule is concerned with the relevancy of evidence, instead of its nature or its probative force. Consequently, it is aptly observed that if a particular statement was actually made as part of the principal transaction or event, it is then immaterial whether it was an opinion, a statement of fact, or merely an exclamation.”

Recent developments concerning spontaneous exclamations as to their admissibility in opinion type statements are collected in the Southwestern Law Journal which has set forth an excellent commentary on the cases and rules in Texas. There they say:

“If the spontaneous utterance is also an opinion, there is a split of authority whether it should be admitted. If allowed, it must come in as an exception, not only to the Hearsay Rule, but also to the Opinion Rule. By the weight of authority, in Texas and elsewhere, this is one rule too many. The courts have taken the position that, since the declarant would not be allowed to give his opinion if he were testifying in court, his opinion given out of court is similarly unacceptable. However, some have admitted highly opinionated statements because they were part of the res gestae. Others have said the statement by a participant was not really an opinion or conclusion because he was there and knew what happened. Opinion statements have also been admitted for impeachment purposes if the declarant took the stand and said he did not make any statement at the scene of the accident * * 18 Southwestern Law Journal 313, at 315— 316.

It seems clear that the modern text writers and courts are leaning toward the admission of such opinion statements where they are spontaneous, a part of the res gestae, and couched in language setting forth a shorthand rendition of the facts, or are used for an impeachment purpose.

Here the timing of the statement was not made clear from the testimony; the yellow blinking light was a block away and had little, if anything, to do with the accident in question; and the witness’s rendition of the statement apparently bore little importance to events that had just taken place, as he had to be reminded again “what else did he say?” The court offered to admit the first part of the statement apparently for impeachment purposes. This was proper.

Lastly, the failure to admit the opinion of the defendant that it was his fault, could not be reversible error to the appellant’s cause, since the jury has already found the appellee guilty of three counts of negligence, all of which were found to be a proximate cause of the accident. I find no authority which would permit the opinion to be used for the purpose of exonerating contributory negligent acts. This point is overruled.

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

1 . Plaintiff’s child received $200.00 for personal injuries but is not involved in this appeal.