Opinion, by
Mr. Justice Chidsey,
As a result of a collision between an automobile owned and driven by the plaintiff James W. Finnerty and a truck owned by the defendant Carmelétta V. Darby, doing business as Darby Transfer and Storage, and driven by the latter’s employe, Harry Lloyd Cooke, plaintiff brought this action in trespass to recover for personal injuries sustained and damage done to his car. The defendant filed a counterclaim for .dámage [303]*303done to the truck. At the end of a lengthy trial the jury tendered a verdict which read: “Both parties were guilty of contributory negligence”. With the approval of the jury and acquiescence by counsel, the court molded the verdict so as to be read and entered: “And now, to wit: January 24, 1957, we, the Jurors empanelled in the above entitled case, find Both parties were guilty of contributory negligence and find a verdict against the Plaintiff and in favor of the defendant and with respect to the counterclaim a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the defendant.” Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which, after argument before the court en banc, was refused and judgment duly entered on the verdict. This appeal by plaintiff followed. Defendant does not appeal.
Appellant contends here as in the court below that the trial judge erred in admitting the' testimony of three witnesses as to the speed at which plaintiff was travelling and that the charge of the court was inadequate. A review of the testimony is desirable for a proper consideration of these contentions, none of which we find to be well founded. The accident happened on February 11, 1953 on Route 22 known as the William Penn Highway, in Indiana County, a few miles east of Armagh near the home of one Harry Rummel. Route 22 which runs east and west was at the time a two-lane blacktop highway, the paved portion being about 22 feet in width. The accident happened on a straight, almost level stretch of the highway about 2,000 feet long, referred to in the testimony as a plateau. According to the plaintiff, the accident happened about 6 P. M. Cooke, the defendant’s driver, placed the time as 5:30 P. M. Throughout the afternoon and at the time of the accident there was a precipitation, variously described by the witnesses as rain, rain and snow, drizzle and sleet, accompanied by a high wind. As a [304]*304result the highway was wet and slippery. Harry Rummel who arrived at the scene of the accident very shortly thereafter, called by plaintiff as a witness, said: “The road was terribly slippery. You just couldn’t stand up on it. . . .” Albert M. Luther who operated the tow truck that removed the vehicles after the accident, called by plaintiff as a witness, said: “It was kind of raining sleet”. “It was icy out where the wreck was . . . awfully slippery”. John Y. Lyons, Jr., a witness called by the defense, who had been operating a car westwardly on the highway and had become involved in an accident at the same point very shortly after the collision between plaintiff’s and defendant’s vehicles, said: “. . . I had to stop about every mile to clean my windshield off of snow, sleet or whatever it was. It was freezing on my windshield.”, that the road was “icy”, the road conditions “were the worst I have ever driven in”. Harold R. Kuczynski, a passenger in Lyons’ car, said the rain was freezing on the road; “. . . it was icy in spots and probably very deceptive because the road was wet. You couldn’t discern just where it was icy and where it was wet”. Arthur Minarcin, a State Policeman who got word of the accident by radio and proceeded immediately to the scene, driving through Homer City to Armagh and thence about four miles eastwardly on Route 22 to the place where the accident happened, said that it was raining and when the rain hit the road it froze; that “The highway itself was a sheet of ice.”
There were only three eye witnesses to the accident — Cooke, the driver of the defendant’s truck, the plaintiff and Harold S. Lang, a passenger in the plaintiff’s car. The latter was a Government expediter and inspector and had been associated with the plaintiff from two to four months in connection with a Government contract in which the plaintiff was interested. [305]*305Earlier in the day the two of them went from Altoona to Wilkinsburg in connection with work being done on this Government contract by a sub-contractor. They left Wilkinsburg at about 4:15 P. M. on the afternoon of February 11, 1953 on their way back to Altoona.
Plaintiff testified that it was raining and snowing during the trip back and most of the time he had his windshield wipers working. When asked by his attorney as to the general condition of the highway as he drove eastwardly on Route 22 from Wilkinsburg, he testified: “The road was wet. It wasn’t icy. Some place along through there, well, not icy, it was like scum like you get on to grease, just enough to give you a movement of your automobile other than normal, other than the normal rolling or forward — it wasn’t icy.”; that before reaching the 2,000 foot straightaway or plateau above mentioned there was a dip, then a rise in the road and when he got to the top of the rise and was entering on the plateau he saw the lights of an approaching car in the distance; that he was then about 300 or 400 feet from the Rummel house, travelling in the eastbound lane; that he was in high gear but his speed was not greater than 25 miles an hour; that when he reached the Rummel house his car went into a spin counterclockwise, the rear swinging around so that after proceeding two or three car lengths the car crossed the westbound lane and continued on to the berm on the north side of the road and was facing west, the direction from which he had come. He claimed that his engine had gone dead during the spin, that his car came to a stop and that he was attempting to start it; that he pushed the starter button located on the dash and disengaged the clutch (which he said took him 15 seconds to accomplish) when there was a “terrific impact or whack to the car”. From his testimony his car at the time of impact was from 150 to [306]*306200 feet beyond (east of) the Rummel house, in front of which he had started to skid.
Cooke, the driver of the defendant’s truck who had made a delivery at Altoona, left there about 3 P. M., and was returning to Pittsburgh, driving westward on the westbound lane of Route 22.. He was familiar with the road and had driven trucks over it for the same employer for 19 years. He testified that it was drizzling and turning to ice and the road was “all icy”; that after he came up a slight rise in the road and was travelling across the plateau or level stretch above referred to, he saw the plaintiff’s car about a half mile away; that it dipped out of his view and then he saw it again when it came up the rise onto the west end of the level straightaway; that when plaintiff’s car was some 20 to 25 yards away it swung crosswise on the road in a counterclockwise direction directly in the path of the truck; that he, Cooke, to avoid the plaintiff’s car, immediately drove his truck onto the right or north berm which was about 10 feet wide at that point; that plaintiff’s ear continued to swing around, went out onto the north berm and while travelling backwards,- collided into the front of the truck with its rear end; that when plaintiff’s car was leaving the icy road and coming onto the berm, Cooke applied his brakes and slid half a truck length (the truck was from 20 to 25 feet in length) to the point of impact. Before plaintiff’s car began to skid Cooke had his truck in the next lower gear to high and was travelling at 20 miles per hour while plaintiff’s car was going 50 to 60 miles per hour; that when the two vehicles collided plaintiff’s car was moving backward toward his truck. Plaintiff’s counsel made no objection to Cooke’s testimony regarding the speed of plaintiff’scar and, as said by the court below, “There could hardly have been one made since the witness was an ex[307]*307perienced driver and apparently had ample opportunity to observe the plaintiff’s car before it began to skid.”
It was undisputed that after the collision both vehicles were completely on the north berm, facing west, the plaintiff’s car being embedded in and under the front of the truck, the front bumper of which rested against the front seat of the plaintiff’s four-door sedan. The testimony was conflicting as to whether the accident occurred while it was still daylight or dark. The plaintiff testified that he had to turn his headlights on when he left a gas station where he had his gas tank filled just west of Armagh and that it was no longer daylight when he got to Armagh, four miles west of the scene of the accident. Plaintiff’s passenger Lang in his deposition hereinafter more fully referred to, said that when the accident happened “. . . it was about dusk”, and he did not know whether plaintiff had his headlights on. Cooke testified that it was still daylight, that he did not have his lights on nor did the plaintiff. Mervin Ling, one of a State Highway crew which subsequently engaged in ashing the highway, testified that he saw a car which the jury was justified in finding to be plaintiff’s proceeding eastwardly at a speed of 50 miles an hour at a point about a quarter or half mile west of the point of accident; that he walked to his home about an eighth of a. mile north of the highway where he was picked up by the driver of the ashing truck and driven back to the highway; and that it was his belief that it was then “just getting dark”. Plaintiff testified that the distance from Wilkinsburg to Altoona was 90 miles and that from Wilkinsburg to the scene of the accident “not over 60 miles”. He said the stop at the gas station for gasoline took 5 minutes. Since the jury could find that the accident occurred at 5 :30 P. M. as Cooke testi[308]*308fied, it appears that it took Cooke, who left Altoona at 3 P. M., two and one-half hours to travel 30 miles, while plaintiff, who left Yfilkinsburg at 4:15 P. M., covered the 60 miles to the scene of the accident in an hour and 10 minutes (deducting 5 minutes for the stop at the gas station). Route 22 was not a turnpike or limited-access highway.
The testimony of plaintiff’s passenger Lang contradicted the plaintiff’s statement that his car came to a stop before the collision. Both men Avere knocked unconscious by the impact. Lang testified that “When I lost consciousness the [plaintiff’s] car was still moving.” This was in accord with Cooke’s account of the collision. Lang’s testimony also established that plaintiff was driving substantially in excess of 25 miles per hour. On the morning following the accident plaintiff informed Minarcin, the State Policeman who investigated the matter, that he was travelling 40 miles per hour when his car began skidding.
The court carefully and properly instructed the jury that skidding of itself did not establish negligence but that negligence could cause skidding and the resulting consequences; that the question for the jury to determine was whether the plaintiff was travelling at a reasonable or an excessive rate of speed under the weather and road conditions prevailing. Plaintiff’s counsel makes no complaint of the charge in this regard. Although one of the reasons assigned in plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was that the verdict of the jury as it affected the plaintiff was against the weight of the evidence, such reason is not pressed. And advisedly so, for the evidence fully justified a finding by the jury that under the extremely slippery condition of the highway plaintiff was driving at an excessive, if not indeed a reckless rate of speed. Plaintiff’s contention is that the court erred iñ admitting the testi[309]*309mony of the witnesses Lang, Ling and Minarcin as to plaintiff’s speed.
Before discussing the testimony of these three witnesses, we note that the statement in appellant’s brief that the jury must have relied upon the testimony of one or more of these three witnesses as to the speed at which plaintiff was travelling, is not well founded. The assertion is premised upon the fact that the jury found the defendant negligent and therefore rejected Cooke’s version of the accident that placed the plaintiff’s speed from 50 to 60 miles per hour. The jury did not have to accept the defendant’s version of the accident in its entirety. “It is perfectly reasonable for the jury to believe so much of the testimony offered by a litigant as pertains to what the opposing party did, and disbelieve that part of the testimony as tends to absolve the litigant of liability.”: Antonelli v. Tumolo, 390 Pa. 68, 73, 132 A. 2d 285. Moreover, under the weather and road conditions prevailing, the jury could have found that even driving at 20 miles per hour, the speed at which Cooke testified he was travelling, was negligent. Indeed they could have found that continuing to drive on the treacherous and highly dangerous road surface that existed until it was ashed or conditions bettered, was foolhardy. Neither vehicle had chains on its wheels. Both plaintiff and the defendant’s driver had accomplished their missions and there was no compelling reason for haste on their return journeys.
We turn to the testimony of Lang, plaintiff’s companion who sat in the front seat of the car, as to the speed at which they were travelling. Lang’s testimony consisted of excerpts from his deposition
“A witness for the Commonwealth in answer to the question: ‘Do you have an opinion on the speed of the [defendant’s] truck?’ stated: ‘I would say twenty-five to thirty at a guess, but due to the size of the truck it is pretty hard to arrive at that’. The court over objection allowed the answer to stand. There was no error in the ruling. A non-expert witness is competent to ex[311]*311press an opinion as to the rate of speed of an automobile. Commonwealth v. Godshalk, 76 Pa. Superior Ct. 500. Regardless of the choice of words it is clear that the witness intended to express his opinion as to speed as best he could. . . .” (Emphasis supplied). And see Commonwealth v. Aurick, 138 Pa. Superior Ct. 180, 10 A. 2d 22.
Secondly, and more important after the witness unfortunately used the word “guess”, he again and again, albeit reluctantly, expressed his judgment as to the plaintiffs approximate speed, especially after he was advised that he need not give the exact speed but could testify to a range within which the ear was travelling. The witness testified positively that “We were going more than 25 miles an hour”, which was the speed plaintiff said he was travelling. Thereafter there was testimony by the witness as follows:
“. . . Were you going 35 miles an hour? The Witness: Well now, we are getting up in the area where I don’t know. Those very slow speeds I mean I am pretty sure of that, you know, because that is just creeping along but I mean I don’t know up around thosé speeds. We were probably going 35 miles an hour. Q. Your best estimate of the speed of Mr. Finnerty’s vehicle, for one or two miles prior to this collision is 35 miles an hour? The Witness: (Pause) Well, that nails me down to the specific speed, I don’t know. . . .
“The Witness: I would like to make a statement as to the speed and make it for the record if you want to. There are certain limits that I know that we were perhaps going within. But I mean now these very slow speeds like ten or fifteen miles an hour I know we were not going that and I know that at the time of the accident we were not going at an exceedingly high speed but there is a range in there that my memory tells me perhaps it might be in there. What I mean, I can’t [312]*312pinpoint that. I mean it is going on two years now. Q. What is that range, sir? A. Well, I don’t know, maybe 35 to 55, something in that order. . . .
“Well, I said maybe, that means to the best of my recollection. . . .
“By Mr. Martell [defendant’s counsel]: If you don’t know the exact speed in miles per hour give us a range in which the car was travelling. Now I thought you had indicated at one time that to the best of your recollection his car immediately prior to the accident was going from 35 to 55 miles an hour, am I correct? A. Yes, I indicated that on the basis that his car was neither going very slow nor very fast, in other words, I don’t think he was going higher than 55, no.”
The last question and answer were as follows: “. . . What is your best approximation of his speed immediately prior to the collision? A. (Pause) I give the figures 35 to 55 miles an hour as the best approximation of his speed on the basis that he was neither going very slow nor very fast at the time we started to skid.” Under the deposition the jury certainly could have found that plaintiff was driving not over 55 miles per hour, but more than 35 miles per hour. In any event the testimony was admissible and its weight a matter for the jury. Absolute accuracy is not required to make a witness competent to testify to the speed of an automobile: See Dugan v. Arthurs, 230 Pa. 299, 303, 79 A. 626.
Appellant additionally contends that all of Lang’s testimony as to speed was inadmissible because he was not qualified generally to express an opinion on the speed of an automobile, and not shown to have made any observation which would have enabled him to form an opinion as to the speed at which plaintiff’s car was traveling. It is sufficient answer to this contention [313]*313that it is made for the first time in this Court. Appellant made no objection when Lang’s deposition was offered in evidence, and appellant does not challenge appellee’s statement that no such objection or contention was raised or argued before the lower court on plaintiff’s motion for new trial. Under these circumstances the contention cannot be considered. A reason for granting a new trial which was not assigned in the court below cannot be considered for the first time on appeal: Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 127 A. 2d 101, and cases cited therein. Moreover, by not objecting to the introduction of Lang’s testimony when it was offered, plaintiff’s counsel deprived counsel for defendant of the opportunity to qualify Lang by introducing those portions of the deposition which related to the witness’s qualifications.
Lang’s entire deposition was 65 typewritten pages in length. At first plaintiff proposed to offer a portion thereof in evidence. This offer was withdrawn when the court ruled that the defendant could also introduce other portions which the court held to be relevant. The defendant then proposed to introduce a portion of the deposition in defendant’s case together with the portion desired by the plaintiff. At conference with the judge in chambers the court ruled on specific objections by plaintiff’s counsel to the inclusion or exclusion of certain testimony contained in the portions of the deposition which counsel agreed should be introduced into evidence in accordance with such rulings, and the same were then read to the jury. At no time did plaintiff object to any part of the deposition on the ground that Lang was not qualified to express an. opinion on the speed of an automobile. Indeed he was not in a position to do so because when the deposition was taken, defendant’s counsel at the outset qualified the deponent as follows: “Q. Let me [314]*314withdraw that question and ask you this, sir. Do you drive a ear yourself? A. Yes, sir. Q. For how long have you driven a ear? A. Oh, my goodness! 24 years. Q. During those 24 years, sir, have you had an opportunity to estimate the speed of a car? A. Oh, sure. Q. Either the one you are traveling in or one that you see along the street? A. Sure.” Under the circumstances it is anything but commendable for appellant’s counsel to advance this contention in our Court.
The witness Mervin Ling testified that shortly before the accident occurred he was crossing the William Penn Highway on his way to his home which, as above stated, was about an eighth of a mile north of the highway and when he was “right along the road” he observed a blue Mercury automobile proceeding eastwardly on the highway at a point one-quarter or one-half of a mile west of the scene of the collision. He said the automobile was either a 1950 or 1951 model, that there were two men in it and it was travelling not less than 50 miles per hour. It was not disputed that plaintiff owned and was driving a blue 1951 Mercury car when the collision occurred. Ling had driven a car from 20 to 25 years and had an opportunity to watch the car drive by and judge its speed as he stood along the side of the road. As above related, he continued to his home where he was picked up by the cinder or ash truck which returned to the highway and proceeded eastwardly, ashing the road to a point some distance beyond the scene of the accident; that when the truck passed the scene of the accident he saw the vehicles that had collided, standing off the road on the north berm, the truck at the rear of the car and both facing west. Apparently because he did not actually see the collision he would not say that the car was the same one that had earlier passed him, but said it looked to him like a blue Mercury. On [315]*315cross-examination counsel for the plaintiff asked him: “Did I understand you to say you thought there was a blue Mercury there but you weren’t sure?”, and he answered: “No, it looked to me like a blue Mercury.” Appellant suggests that a blue Mercury car is a common type of car and that the car which the witness saw passing him was not sufficiently proven to be plaintiff’s car. There was no evidence of any car other than the plaintiff’s proceeding eastwardly or westwardly in the vicinity prior to the approach of the car of the witness Lyons from the east, which was involved in an accident at the same point after the collision between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s vehicles. Cooke saw only the plaintiff’s car approaching from the west. The plaintiff testified to no other vehicles passing him in either direction and Lang testified that he saw no cars ahead or in back of the plaintiff’s Car.
However, plaintiff contends that assuming that it was plaintiff’s car which the witness Ling observed going by, his observation as to its speed was too remote from the scene of the collision to be relevant. This Court has frequently ruled that testimony as to the speed or operation of an automobile at a point near and a short time before the collision is admissible and relevant to the issue of the speed of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Such evidence is admissible, its weight and credibility being for the jury: Shellenberger et al. v. Reading Transportation Co., 303 Pa. 122, 154 A. 297; Gerhart v. East Coast Coach Co., 310 Pa. 535, 166 A. 564; Rooney v. Maczko, 315 Pa. 113, 172 A. 151; Commonwealth v. Pennzoil Company, 358 Pa. 221, 56 A. 2d 93; Pierontoni v. Barber, 384 Pa. 56, 119 A. 2d 503. Whether the evidence of speed is too remote in time and distance depends upon the facts in each case, and to an extent whether it is the only [316]*316evidence or is corroborative of other admissible evidence of speed.
In Shellenberger v. Reading Transportation Co., supra, a witness saw the defendant’s bus pass about 900 feet from the scene of the accident. The court held that the witness’s testimony as to the speed at which the bus was travelling was admissible in corroboration of the testimony of the plaintiffs as to the speed. In Commonwealth v. Pennzoil Company, supra, the testimony of a witness who saw a truck passing about 480 feet from the scene of the accident was held admissible, the court citing the Shellenberger case and the Gerhart case, supra. In the recent case of Pierontoni v. Barber, 384 Pa. 56, supra, wherein also we cited the Shellenberger case, testimony concerning the speed of a vehicle at a point 750 feet distant from the point of collision was held admissible.
Remoteness of the evidence is not determinable by distance and time alone, but as we have just said, depends upon the facts in each case. No exact limitation of distance or time can be fixed. Where the accident occurs in a city, for instance, with intersecting streets and traffic, evidence of a speed at a comparatively short distance before the accident may be too remote, whereas in rural areas evidence of speed at a greater distance may be relevant. In the instant case plaintiff was traveling in a rural area. There is no evidence of any intersecting roads, any traffic or curves which would have caused plaintiff to lower his speed during the half mile in question. Appellant states that no case can be found that would permit evidence of speed by a witness at a point so far distant as a half mile. On the other hand, appellant cites no cases nor does our search reveal any where this Court has placed any limitation upon the distance involved or period of time that has elapsed. If the only evi[317]*317dence of plaintiff’s speed was that of the witness Ling that the plaintiff’s car when it passed him was travel-ling 50 miles an hour, appellant’s objection to the admissibility of such evidence might be considered well taken. But here not only was there the evidence of the defendant’s driver Cooke that plaintiff was travelling 50 miles an hour immediately before the accident occurred, but evidence from which the jury could conclude that plaintiff maintained the same rate of speed from the point where the witness Ling saw him, to the scene of the accident. Plaintiff who testified he was going not over 25 miles an hour as he entered the level straightaway which he put at 500 or 550 feet from the point of collision, did not testify to any change of speed during the half mile in question, and plaintiff’s companion Lang who was seated in the car beside the plaintiff not only testified that immediately before the accident plaintiff’s car was going between 35 and 55 miles per hour, but at another point in his testimony, when asked for the best estimate of the speed of the car “for a mile or so prior to the accident”, said between 40 and 50 miles per hour.
Appellant cites cases in this regard that are readily distinguishable. In those cases the testimony of the witness at some place prior to the accident was the only evidence of speed or the car which passed the witness was not sufficiently identified as the car involved in the accident or the witness did not have sufficient opportunity to estimate the speed. In no one of them was there evidence, as here, that the approximate speed of the vehicle testified to by the witness was maintained from the point where the witness saw it to the point where it became involved in the accident. The objection to the testimony of a vehicle’s speed at a place and time substantially distant from the scene of the accident as evidence of the speed at the time of [318]*318the accident is that it rests upon speculative inference. In .the instant case that plaintiff maintained the same rate of speed — excessive under the weather and road conditions prevailing — does not rest upon inference but upon the direct testimony of Lang, the passenger in the plaintiff’s car.
Ling’s testimony, when considered in connection with that of Lang, was clearly admissible as corroborative of the testimony of the defendant’s driver, Cooke.
As above stated, Arthur Minarcin, a member of the State Police who investigated the accident in his official capacity, interviewed the plaintiff at the hospital in Johnstown where both plaintiff and his passenger Lang were taken after the accident and obtained a statement from the. plaintiff as to how the collision occurred. It is contended that as the result of the serious injuries plaintiff received, his condition was such as to render inadmissible the officer’s testimony in this regard. In his brief counsel for appellant attacks the credibility of the officer because the latter at first mistakenly testified that he interviewed the plaintiff at the hospital during the evening of the accident. Later • Minarcin who was at the hospital both on the night of the accident and the next morning, testified that the interview took place on the latter occasion, as was testified to by Mrs. Burkhardt, a nurse and clinical instructor at the hospital. Minarcin recalled that he was not allowed to talk to the plaintiff on the evening of the accident, but got such permission the next morning. It is not disputed that Minarcin was at the hospital and did obtain a statement from plaintiff, which was reduced, to writing and signed by Mrs. Burkhardt, the nurse then in attendance, as a witness. This statement which was read to the jury by Minarcin and later introduced into evidence, was as follows: “I was traveling east on Route 22 going about 40 miles [319]*319an hour. I came down this grade and went into a skid on the opposite side of the highway and faced the other direction as there was a truck coming in the westbound lane and he collided in the rear of me.” Minarcin testified that the statement followed his questioning of plaintiff as to what had occurred; that he then wrote it down, requested Mrs. Burkhardt, the nurse, to sign the statement after it had been read back to and approved by the plaintiff in the presence of both Mrs. Burkhardt and the officer. Mrs. Burkhardt fully corroborated the officer in this regard.
When the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital at 7:09 in the evening, he was suffering from shock and in an unconscious condition. He was so severely injured that his life was dispaired of and a rosary having been found upon his person, the last rites were administered to him while unconscious. His tongue was sutured to his cheek to facilitate breathing. As stated by the court below, his recovery was almost miraculous and no doubt due to the medical care he received and a very strong constitution. Both the hospital records and the testimony of Mrs. Burkhardt were to the effect that for a number of days following he was mostly in an unconscious or semi-conscious state. He was, however, at times conscious and comprehended what was said to him and observed his surroundings. This was true, the nurse testified, when Minarcin "obtained the statement at approximately 8 o’clock on the following morning. She testified that she did not recall' whether plaintiff talked to her that morning, but said he showed “recognition of anything asked of him”; that she remembered his complaining of a pain in his chest which she reported to the doctor. She testified that anchoring the tongue to the cheek was often done to prevent suffocation. She also said that “When a tongue is secured to the cheek it is not usually secured [320]*320in such a way that the patient is unable to swallow, and your tongue is used in swallowing and if he can swallow he can have some motion of the tongue.” When asked on cross-examination whether the plaintiff talked clearly that morning, her answer was “No, but he could have given enough of an answer or indicated an answer to any questions that were put to him.”, and that when the officer was in plaintiff’s room “Mr. Finnerty appeared to be conscious”.
The hospital record read into evidence, covering the nurse shift from 7 A.M. to 3 P.M. on the day following the accident, stated: “Patient sipped a little juice at breakfast. Drank 240 cc’s of tea at lunch.” As Mrs. Burkhardt explained, “240 cc’s is one glass, eight ounces.” It does not definitely appear whether the plaintiff was prone or in a sitting position when the officer interviewed him. Mrs. Burkhardt who was familiar with the hospital record which stated that plaintiff “had blood in his chest and lung”, testified that for that reason the doctor “wanted him in an upright position rather than a flat position which is common for any head injury: ordinarily we keep them flat in bed.” Minarcin testified that he did not know the extent of plaintiff’s injuries nor that he had his tongue anchored to his cheek; that plaintiff had heavy breathing of which he complained, but that he, Minarcin, did not have trouble in understanding plaintiff’s words when he uttered them. Mrs. Burkhardt testified that she heard Minarcin read the statement to the plaintiff who apparently comprehended what was being said to him and after it was read, indicated his approval by nodding in the affirmative, and that at the request of the officer she signed her name to the statement.
Dr. Kahl who attended the. plaintiff from the time he was brought to the hospital and thereafter, testified [321]*321at great length and in minute detail as to plaintiff’s injuries and his progress. He attended the plaintiff on the morning after the accident and therefore was in a position to testify as to the plaintiff’s ability to understand the officer’s questioning and intelligently respond thereto. He was not called in rebuttal after Minarcin’s and Mrs. Burkhardt’s testimony as presumably he would have been if he ivas of the opinion that plaintiff’s physical or mental condition prevented him from understanding and responding to the statement taken by Officer Minarcin.
The police officer and the nurse were entirely disinterested witnesses and we are of the opinion that the court committed no error in admitting their testimony. Of course the weight of their testimony was for the jury. The statement contributed little other than the admission that plaintiff was travelling at 40 miles per hour. The jury may have given little or no weight to this admission for there was other and ample testimony that plaintiff was travelling at a speed in excess of 40 miles per hour.
Appellant contends that the statement should not have been received in evidence because the witness Minarcin used it merely to refresh his recollection and it was not established that his memory was entirely embodied in the statement so as to make it admissible as an instrument of prior recollection recorded, citing Miller v. Exeter Borough, 366 Pa. 336, 77 A. 2d 395. The general rule relied on by plaintiff is not here applicable. The statement was an admission by the plaintiff and admissible as any other unsigned or oral statement by the plaintiff would have been. In the strikingly similar case of Commonwealth v. Moon, 389 Pa. 304, 132 A. 2d 224, the defendant after killing his victim, fled and when apprehended shot himself in the neck, from which he néarly bled to death: The bullet [322]*322also shot away a part of his tongue. The next morning an unsigned statement was obtained from him by police officers in the same manner as the statement was obtained by Minarcin in the present case. Moon was then unable to speak. In passing on the contention that the statement was not admissible, we said at p. 309: “. . . the defendant objects to the memorandum made by Commonwealth’s witness during an interview with the defendant while he was in the hospital. This memorandum was not signed or written by the defendant, nor is such necessary. The defendant was unable to speak due to his self-inflicted wounds and was instructed to nod his head yes or no, and to hold up fingers to indicate 'how many.’ The memorandum was clearly admissible just as an unsigned or oral statement of the defendant would have been. Its weight was for the jury, and the defendant was not harmed by the admission in evidence of the memorandum. . . .”
We find no merit in appellant’s complaint as to the charge of the trial judge. Appellant quotes isolated portions of the charge, but a reading of the entire charge (see Sherman v. Manufacturers Light and Heat Company, 389 Pa. 61, 67, 132 A. 2d 255) refutes and shows to be entirely unwarranted the appellant’s assertion that it “almost completely ignored” the plaintiff’s version of the accident and constituted “a one-sided presentation of the controverted facts”. The charge covers 26 pages of the record. We find it fair and impartial, especially in view of the fact that in our opinion the weight of the evidence militated heavily against plaintiff’s version of the accident. A trial judge is not required to refer to the testimony of every witness in reviewing the evidence in the case nor refer to every contention made by counsel in his presentation to the jury. Counsel, can always request amplification of the charge, and that , is exactly what happened here. [323]*323At the conclusion of his charge the court asked if there was anything he should correct. Appellant’s counsel then said he had several suggestions and the court thereupon charged on some six special matters ■which plaintiff’s counsel felt to have been neglected. Counsel for plaintiff thereupon said “That covers my list, your Honor. I have no other suggestions. . . .”. Counsel was apparently satisfied with the additional instructions for he asked for no further instructions; Under such circumstances, in the absence of basic or fundamental error — and we find none — a new trial will not be granted: See Risbon v. Cottom, 387 Pa. 155, 127 A. 2d 101; Pryor v. Chambersburg Oil and Gas Company, 376 Pa. 521, 103 A. 2d 125.
This case was tried by very able counsel before a very able and experienced judge. Despite sympathy for the plaintiff which his serious injuries must have engendered, the jury found him guilty of negligence. A painstaking review of the evidence is convincing that there was no trial error and that the verdict of the jury against the plaintiff was eminently just.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bell dissents.
At which both partiés were represented by counsel.