Gibraltar Manufacturing Co. v. United States

546 F.2d 386, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 80,876, 212 Ct. Cl. 226, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 307
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 15, 1976
DocketNos. 597-71 and 364-72
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 546 F.2d 386 (Gibraltar Manufacturing Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Gibraltar Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 546 F.2d 386, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 80,876, 212 Ct. Cl. 226, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 307 (cc 1976).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

These cases, which were consolidated for trial, come before the court on plaintiff’s and defendant’s exceptions to findings of fact and recommended decision on October 14,1975, by Trial Judge George Willi, in accordance with Bule 134(h). He redetermined after trial the alleged excessive profits received or accrued by plaintiff during its fiscal years ended June 30,1967 and June 30,1968, on defense [228]*228contracts and subcontracts, under 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1212-18, as amended.

The case has been submitted on the briefs of the parties and oral argument of counsel. Upon consideration thereof, since the court agrees with the said recommended decision, as hereinafter set forth, with modifications to be explained, it affirms and adopts the said decision, as modified, as the basis for its judgment in this case.

The plaintiff argued orally that the then very recently announced decision of Butkin Precision Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 110, 544 F. 2d 499 (1976), mandated a clearance herein. The cases do have similarities. Both involve small industrial concerns specializing in the production of one or a few difficult component parts of military hardware of the more complex varieties. Both were well managed and efficient, largely because of the unusual skills of the founder and owner. Both had a history of “normal” existence on a thin diet of profit, followed by greatly increased volume and profit during a brief flurry of war demand. Both pose difficulty in fair dealing in renegotiation under the fiscal year method, with danger of tunnel-visioned concentration on profitable years only, in disregard of thin years of preparation and recuperation. We determined that Buthin was entitled to a clearance, using the thin pre-war years as a base period of “normal” earnings but with very substantial upward adjustment in allowable profit expressly required by statute and regulation. We held, alternatively, that defendant failed in its burden of proof because of its failure to quantify or “cap” a demonstrated “contribution” that could have warranted a clearance all by itself, or with other favorable factor considerations. Plaintiff here does not fare so well. With a similar thin “starting point” it has not demonstrated its right to factor adjustment of such magnitude. Comparison of the factor analysis in this opinion with that will exemplify the statement. Defendant at the least of it has earned its burden of proof that excessive profits were realized in some substantial amount, equalling or exceeding for each year the minimum $40,000 determination prescribed in KBK. § 1460.5(a).

[229]*229The difficulty is to fix figures, as we must, with the “abouts” and “approximatelys” left off. Comparisons here are not very helpful. Those tendered by plaintiff, using IRS statistical composites, fail for the same reasons as those tendered by defendant in ButTcin. About all else that is offered is the excess of other bids, over plaintiff’s for items plaintiff supplied. These were unsuccessful bids, generating no awards. The probative value is therefore less than in Buthin, where higher bidders were also successful, in the sense that they were awarded subcontracts for the same components Buthin supplied, after Buthin?s capacity was fully utilized. Such comparisons have much more weight, for many obvious reasons.

Plaintiff’s pre-award profit estimates of 2.45% to 5% are properly treated as not controlling. Plaintiff refused to allow defendant to verify its figures, which obviously were in the nature of seller’s talk. There is no statutory or regulation factor giving weight to that. The defendant’s negotiators disregarded it and projected that 10% of cost was a fair amount of profit for plaintiff, which the prices contracted for would allow. In Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 106, 518 F. 2d 1341 (1975), we held that plaintiff there could not avail itself of such expectation to support a higher profit than the court deemed otherwise justified. Nor can defendant use them here.

The trial judge inveighed against being asked to render a “jury verdict”, in language we leave standing to explain our comment upon it. In A. C. Ball Co. v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 223, 531 F. 2d 993 (1976), we objected to the term “jury verdict” while holding that the broad brush approach there used was appropriate and necessary under the Act. We think that in executing our responsibilities under 50 U.S.C. App. § 1218, it will at times be necessary to select a course among possible alternatives, none of which the evidence obliges us to accept, or to reject. Cf. The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 131 (1897); and Meredith Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 1, 405 F. 2d 1214 (1968). In choosing among possible alternatives, none of which the evidence may not accord the Board decision a presumption of correct[230]*230ness, or treat it as evidence in support of its conclusion. We do think we may take a sideways glance at it as a mere suggestion. This is what the trial judge did, we think properly. Unfortunately, he appears to have misconstrued the Board decision in some respects, and in making our own, we must look at it through our own eyes, not his.

The trial judge recommended that we adopt the Board’s refund amounts, $125,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1967, and $475,000 for fiscal year ending June 30, 1968. However, when we examine the Board decision and the one recommended for us, we observe a discrepancy which may be summarized as follows:

In the second line for each year, the trial judge’s “Profits” were lower than the Board’s because the Board had made salary disallowances which defendant did not insist on and did not obtain here. In some instances restoration of a dis-allowance may be partially or entirely offset by treating the contractor as a “high cost contractor,” but in this case the restoration does not make the costs high enough to have any effect in factor analysis. Defendant believes the high salaries were justified. Logically it would seem that one who wished to follow the Board (as the trial judge did) would wish to leave the contractor with the same retained profit the Board did. This the trial judge’s proposed decision does not do. Moreover a portion of Finding 34, which we have modified, asserts that the Board allowed 10.62% of sales for fiscal year 1967, and 10.35% of sales for fiscal year 1968. This apparently reflected the sales without adjustment, but by [231]*231KBB. § 1460.3 the determination should “adjust” the sales by subtracting the excessive profit to be eliminated. We have made the adjustments in our calculations above, with respect to both the Board’s decisions and the ones the trial judge proposes.

We conclude on all the evidence that the plaintiff realized excessive profits of $65,000 in its fiscal year 1967, and $375,000 in its fiscal year 1968, both figures before adjustment for State and Federal taxes. This summarizes as follows:

Differing with the Board, we think that the plaintiff is entitled to a somewhat more favorable ratio of adjusted profit to sales in its fiscal year 1968 because only in the 1967 year it used Government-furnished machinery at a moderate if not nominal rental. The efficiencies resulting from plaintiff’s technical innovations were fully realized only in the 1968 year. See Findings 10-14.

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546 F.2d 386, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 80,876, 212 Ct. Cl. 226, 1976 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 307, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/gibraltar-manufacturing-co-v-united-states-cc-1976.