Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States

556 F.2d 1118, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 81,277, 213 Ct. Cl. 442, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 8, 1977
DocketNo. 603-71
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 556 F.2d 1118 (Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Blue Bell, Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1118, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 81,277, 213 Ct. Cl. 442, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12 (cc 1977).

Opinion

Per Curiam:

This is a petition transferred from the United States Tax Court, where it was originally filed, for redetermination of plaintiffs excessive profits for its fiscal year ended October 31, 1967, as received or accrued by its predecessor in interest, Hicks-Ponder Company, under defense contracts and subcontracts. We have jurisdiction under 50 U.S.C. App. § 1218, as amended. The Renegotiation Board, by its unilateral order dated May 14, 1970, determined that plaintiff realized excessive profits in the amount of $275,000, there being no adjustment for state income taxes, and before computation of the Federal tax credit.

The case was tried before Trial Judge Philip R. Miller who has submitted a recommended decision and conclusion of law under Rule 134(h). After briefing and oral argument, the court partly agrees with the said recommended decision, with modifications, and adopts the same as its own, with modifications. Said modifications include the omission of all of Part H and substitution of the paragraphs immediately following, in the court’s own words, leaning heavily on the Trial Judge’s reasoning, but not [445]*445repeating it, particularly where it is anticipated by our decision in Major Coat Co. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 1, 543 F.2d 97 (1976), which was tried after, but decided before, the instant case.

Hicks-Ponder in 1966 was a successful and growing manufacturer of men’s and boys’ casual slacks, work clothes, and jeans. It had plants along the Mexican Border at Eagle Pass, Del Rio, and El Paso, Texas, and at Yuma, Arizona. Approximately 80 percent of its production was by contract for large retail outlets such as Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, and J. C. Penny. It had not done Government business for many years. In January 1966, it received a "rated order” from the Defense Supply Agency (DSA) for the manufacture of 160,000 pairs of men’s fatigue trousers, following discussions that had continued for some time. The Trial Judge describes the circumstances in more detail. The action was, of course, a result of the growing requirements of the war or quasi-war in Southeast Asia.

The order necessitated retraining of employees, and conversion of facilities, despite the apparent resemblances, to the uninitiated, of civilian and military pants. Plaintiffs executives did not believe they could retrieve the expenses thus incurred unless they were given follow on orders which were not guaranteed. They could keep their facilities operating at capacity, and expanding, with civilian business. They doubted their ability to compete for Government business with its regular suppliers when competitive conditions returned. For these reasons, as a matter of business judgment, the plaintiffs executives were much opposed to accepting the order, and would not have done so if they had not believed that coercive measures would be applied against them, in case of refusal, and if they had not believed in the existence of an emergency, wherein their assistance was greatly needed. The legal foundation and effect of a rated order is stated in Major Coat, Co., supra. But according to a knowledgeable Government witness, it was not so much a matter of direct arm-twisting as a dawning realization that those who accepted rated orders could extend them to divert from noncooperating manufacturers the mill products, the textiles, they all needed to keep producing, and which would be in short supply. At [446]*446any rate, the Government was able to place its rated orders without great difficulty, other producers yielding after initial reluctance, as plaintiff did, so no overt coercion was necessary. Still, a rated order is a rated order.

In Major Coat Co., supra, plaintiff accepted a similar rated order, for coats, and the adverse consequences to its civilian business were serious and so far as appears, irreparable. The consequences of entering military production, to plaintiff here, were less serious, though they did include a permanent loss of Sears Roebuck as a customer for work pants. Sears was retained for other business.

Once one was started on military production, to stay on it was the path of least resistance, if only to avert or delay another set of retraining and conversion expenses. Thus, after the use of rated orders had ceased, we see plaintiff bidding still for both prime and subcontract requirements for military pants. Such bids may be deemed to have been caused by the original rated order. As anticipated, plaintiff was unable to compete when competitive conditions fully returned, so it then, in 1968, reconverted all its facilities to civilian business as soon as might be.

In World War II, when the economy was fully converted to war production, (except for the bare minimum of essential civilian needs) we suppose all defense orders to private industry were "rated” and such ratings were welcome, for without having them to extend, a producer surely could not obtain needed materials and might be in difficulty as to labor. In World War II renegotiations, the ratings were so universal in the background that they were not even mentioned. A mention would not distinguish one case from another. However, we see in 1966-68 an economy with, in general, no mandatory conversion. We had, as the slogan went, "guns and butter.” In such circumstances, the use of war powers to force military production on a small group of producers in a particular industry only, while the suppliers of other war material are those who desire to do that business, is to present problems to us if we are to renegotiate with fairness to all concerned. The Government procurement authorities fully recognized that they owed plaintiff special consideration. They were willing to negotiate any price, within reason and having justifica[447]*447tion, and the prices to plaintiff at least were much above what had been the going rate a few months earlier. Finding 115 shows that some awards at the time, under the same program, were at higher prices, and some were at lower, than plaintiffs. Is it fair to take away this special concession in renegotiation, and reduce plaintiff to the same ratio of profit to sales as is allowed to a producer who makes pants for the military at all times and of his own volition?

It would appear that the statutory risk factor, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1213(e)(3), would support some favorable allowance here, both as compared to what the contractor would earn in his normal peacetime business, which he is obliged to abandon in part, for the nonce, and as compared to what a regular supplier of an item would earn, which the contractor undergoing renegotiation supplied as a temporary emergency contribution. "Where a risk is borne that is not compensated in any comparable firm’s profit” [here, a comparable of one of two above kinds] "it is nonetheless compensable by an upward adjustment of an otherwise reasonable profit for the risk-bearer, however judgmental in nature that adjustment must be.” Major Coat Co. v. United States, supra, 211 Ct. Cl. at 40, 543 F. 2d at 119. If the Government is unable, or unwilling, to support enough production capacity to meet the needs of this limited emergency, by its regular suppliers, it should expect to extend some kind of special recognition to those temporarily brought in against their own volition, to fill the void. The issue reduces itself to one of quantum.

By the requirements of the fiscal year method, conversion costs incurred in 1966 were largely ineffective to reduce the renegotiable 1967 profit.

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Bluebook (online)
556 F.2d 1118, 23 Cont. Cas. Fed. 81,277, 213 Ct. Cl. 442, 1977 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/blue-bell-inc-v-united-states-cc-1977.