Durham, J.
On the evening of Friday, October 26,1984, Timothy Geschwind was a passenger in a truck driven by Timothy Flanagan. At approximately 12:55 a.m. on the morning of October 27, Flanagan drove his truck off the road, killing himself and injuring Geschwind. Both men were significantly intoxicated. In a subsequent action brought by Geschwind to recover damages for his injuries, a jury found him to be 70 percent at fault for his own injuries. Pursuant to RCW 5.40.060, which prohibits recovery by an intoxicated plaintiff if the intoxication was a proximate cause of the injuries and the plaintiff is more than 50 percent at fault, Geschwind was denied recovery, and the defendant was awarded judgment. We are asked to answer two distinct questions: (1) can a negligent passenger ever be more at fault for his or her injuries than a negligent driver? and (2) does RCW 5.40.060 prohibit recovery to an intoxicated passenger when the intoxication was a proximate cause of his or her injuries, and the passenger is found to be more than 50 percent at fault for those injuries? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
The facts of this case follow a pattern which, despite the best efforts of the citizens, courts and Legislature of this state, remains all too commonplace. On the evening in question, Geschwind and Flanagan planned to "go out and party, and . . . get a little buzzed." Report of Proceedings (RP) vol. 5, at 15. With Flanagan driving, they drank a number of beers while on Whidbey Island, and then caught the 8:30 p.m. ferry to Everett. After arriving in Everett, they stopped in one tavern where they had another beer or two, then continued on to a bar, where Geschwind had at least two potent mixed drinks. They ended their drinking at a third bar, where Geschwind recalléd having a beer and a shot. Although Geschwind was not monitoring Flanagan's alcohol intake, he believed that Flanagan was drinking about the same amount.
[836]*836While pulling out of his parking space at the last bar, Flanagan bumped the cars in front of him and behind him. Geschwind then asked his friend if he (Geschwind) should drive, but Flanagan declined the offer. Geschwind believed Flanagan's driving was passable once Flanagan was on the main road, and Geschwind dozed off in the passenger seat. Subsequently, Flanagan drove off the road and crashed into a telephone pole. Flanagan's blood alcohol content (BAC) at the time of the accident was .38; Geschwind's BAC was .17.1
At trial, Geschwind admitted that both of them planned to "get buzzed." RP vol. 5, at 14-15. Geschwind defined being "buzzed" as any point before being falling-down drunk. He also testified that he considered it safe to drive with "somebody who's got a buzz on, so long as they're not falling down drunk[.]" RP vol. 5, at 16. Geschwind admitted that although he thought that Flanagan was "over-buzzed", he voluntarily chose to stay in the truck rather than get out in an area that he did not know.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of contributory negligence as follows:
If you find that the plaintiff was the passenger and that he voluntarily rode in the truck after he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, the driver's condition, and if you also find that a person using ordinary care would not have ridden in the truck, and if you further find that the driver's condition was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury or damages, you will find plaintiff contributorily negligent.
Defendant's Clerk's Papers (DCP), at 22. The jury was also instructed as to the effect of RCW 5.40.060, which prohibits recovery if the plaintiff was intoxicated, the intoxication was a proximate cause of the injuries, and the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault. The jury returned an answer in a special verdict form2 which attributed 70 percent of the fault [837]*837for his injuries to Geschwind himself. The jury also found that Geschwind's intoxication was a proximate cause of his injury. Pursuant to RCW 5.40.060, judgment was entered for the defendant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Accepting Geschwind's argument that a passenger cannot legally be responsible for more than 50 percent of his or her injuries, the court stated that "[wjhile the jury apparently found appellant highly culpable, it should not have been permitted to find him more culpable than the intoxicated driver who had the primary responsibility for reasonably safe operation of the vehicle." Geschwind v. Flanagan, 65 Wn. App. 207, 214, 828 P.2d 603 (1992). This court accepted the petition for review.3
Generally, the issue of contributory negligence is one for the jury. Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn.2d 655, 661, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983). The jury found Geschwind 70 percent at fault for his own injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that a passenger can never, as a matter of law, be liable for more than 50 percent of his or her injuries. This raises an issue of first impression.
In 1981, Washington adopted contributory fault as a method of apportioning damages as between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant. Laws of 1981, ch. 27, § 8, p. 117, codified at RCW 4.22.005. "Fault" is defined as including "unreasonable assumption of risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury.. ,."4 RCW 4.22.015. The determination of the percen[838]*838tage of total fault attributable to each party, "including the claimant or person suffering personal injury", is specifically reserved for the trier of fact. Former RCW 4.22.070.
The courts of this state have long held that a passenger may be found to be contributorily negligent by voluntarily riding in a car with a driver who he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is intoxicated. Traverso v. Pupo, 51 Wn.2d 149, 152-53, 316 P.2d 462 (1957); Morse v. Frank, 1 Wn. App. 871, 873, 466 P.2d 166 (1970). See also WPI 12.01.01 (can find plaintiff contributorily negligent if driver intoxicated, plaintiff knew, or should have known, of driver's condition, person of ordinary care would not have ridden in car, and driver's condition is a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury). Prior to the adoption of the comparative fault statute, a plaintiff's contributory negligence acted as a complete bar to recovery, regardless of the percentage of fault. E.g., Morse, at 873.
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Durham, J.
On the evening of Friday, October 26,1984, Timothy Geschwind was a passenger in a truck driven by Timothy Flanagan. At approximately 12:55 a.m. on the morning of October 27, Flanagan drove his truck off the road, killing himself and injuring Geschwind. Both men were significantly intoxicated. In a subsequent action brought by Geschwind to recover damages for his injuries, a jury found him to be 70 percent at fault for his own injuries. Pursuant to RCW 5.40.060, which prohibits recovery by an intoxicated plaintiff if the intoxication was a proximate cause of the injuries and the plaintiff is more than 50 percent at fault, Geschwind was denied recovery, and the defendant was awarded judgment. We are asked to answer two distinct questions: (1) can a negligent passenger ever be more at fault for his or her injuries than a negligent driver? and (2) does RCW 5.40.060 prohibit recovery to an intoxicated passenger when the intoxication was a proximate cause of his or her injuries, and the passenger is found to be more than 50 percent at fault for those injuries? We answer both questions in the affirmative.
The facts of this case follow a pattern which, despite the best efforts of the citizens, courts and Legislature of this state, remains all too commonplace. On the evening in question, Geschwind and Flanagan planned to "go out and party, and . . . get a little buzzed." Report of Proceedings (RP) vol. 5, at 15. With Flanagan driving, they drank a number of beers while on Whidbey Island, and then caught the 8:30 p.m. ferry to Everett. After arriving in Everett, they stopped in one tavern where they had another beer or two, then continued on to a bar, where Geschwind had at least two potent mixed drinks. They ended their drinking at a third bar, where Geschwind recalléd having a beer and a shot. Although Geschwind was not monitoring Flanagan's alcohol intake, he believed that Flanagan was drinking about the same amount.
[836]*836While pulling out of his parking space at the last bar, Flanagan bumped the cars in front of him and behind him. Geschwind then asked his friend if he (Geschwind) should drive, but Flanagan declined the offer. Geschwind believed Flanagan's driving was passable once Flanagan was on the main road, and Geschwind dozed off in the passenger seat. Subsequently, Flanagan drove off the road and crashed into a telephone pole. Flanagan's blood alcohol content (BAC) at the time of the accident was .38; Geschwind's BAC was .17.1
At trial, Geschwind admitted that both of them planned to "get buzzed." RP vol. 5, at 14-15. Geschwind defined being "buzzed" as any point before being falling-down drunk. He also testified that he considered it safe to drive with "somebody who's got a buzz on, so long as they're not falling down drunk[.]" RP vol. 5, at 16. Geschwind admitted that although he thought that Flanagan was "over-buzzed", he voluntarily chose to stay in the truck rather than get out in an area that he did not know.
The trial judge instructed the jury on the issue of contributory negligence as follows:
If you find that the plaintiff was the passenger and that he voluntarily rode in the truck after he knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, the driver's condition, and if you also find that a person using ordinary care would not have ridden in the truck, and if you further find that the driver's condition was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury or damages, you will find plaintiff contributorily negligent.
Defendant's Clerk's Papers (DCP), at 22. The jury was also instructed as to the effect of RCW 5.40.060, which prohibits recovery if the plaintiff was intoxicated, the intoxication was a proximate cause of the injuries, and the plaintiff was more than 50 percent at fault. The jury returned an answer in a special verdict form2 which attributed 70 percent of the fault [837]*837for his injuries to Geschwind himself. The jury also found that Geschwind's intoxication was a proximate cause of his injury. Pursuant to RCW 5.40.060, judgment was entered for the defendant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. Accepting Geschwind's argument that a passenger cannot legally be responsible for more than 50 percent of his or her injuries, the court stated that "[wjhile the jury apparently found appellant highly culpable, it should not have been permitted to find him more culpable than the intoxicated driver who had the primary responsibility for reasonably safe operation of the vehicle." Geschwind v. Flanagan, 65 Wn. App. 207, 214, 828 P.2d 603 (1992). This court accepted the petition for review.3
Generally, the issue of contributory negligence is one for the jury. Young v. Caravan Corp., 99 Wn.2d 655, 661, 663 P.2d 834, 672 P.2d 1267 (1983). The jury found Geschwind 70 percent at fault for his own injuries. The Court of Appeals reversed on the theory that a passenger can never, as a matter of law, be liable for more than 50 percent of his or her injuries. This raises an issue of first impression.
In 1981, Washington adopted contributory fault as a method of apportioning damages as between a negligent plaintiff and a negligent defendant. Laws of 1981, ch. 27, § 8, p. 117, codified at RCW 4.22.005. "Fault" is defined as including "unreasonable assumption of risk, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury.. ,."4 RCW 4.22.015. The determination of the percen[838]*838tage of total fault attributable to each party, "including the claimant or person suffering personal injury", is specifically reserved for the trier of fact. Former RCW 4.22.070.
The courts of this state have long held that a passenger may be found to be contributorily negligent by voluntarily riding in a car with a driver who he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is intoxicated. Traverso v. Pupo, 51 Wn.2d 149, 152-53, 316 P.2d 462 (1957); Morse v. Frank, 1 Wn. App. 871, 873, 466 P.2d 166 (1970). See also WPI 12.01.01 (can find plaintiff contributorily negligent if driver intoxicated, plaintiff knew, or should have known, of driver's condition, person of ordinary care would not have ridden in car, and driver's condition is a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury). Prior to the adoption of the comparative fault statute, a plaintiff's contributory negligence acted as a complete bar to recovery, regardless of the percentage of fault. E.g., Morse, at 873.
The Court of Appeals concluded that there could be no distinction between causation of the "injuries" and causation of the "accident", because "all of appellant's injuries resulted from a single accident." Geschwind, at 213. This reasoning misunderstands the nature of contributory negligence. "A plaintiff's negligence relates to a failure to use due care for his own protection whereas a defendant's negligence relates to a failure to use due care for the safety of others." Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wn.2d 230, 238, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978). Accord Taylor v. Taug, 17 Wn.2d 533, 540, 136 P.2d 176 (1943); Murray v. Amrine, 28 Wn. App. 650, 656, 626 P.2d 24 (1981). See also W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 65, at 451 (5th ed. 1984) ("Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.").
[839]*839We recognize that it may seem inconsistent to allow a passenger to be held more at fault for his or her injuries than a negligent driver. However, when a person has voluntarily engaged in behavior which increases the risk of injury, he or she may be held to be predominantly hable for the injuries occurring as a result thereof. Shorter v. Drury, 103 Wn.2d 645, 695 P.2d 116, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 827 (1985) provides an illustration of this principle. In Shorter, a woman and her husband, both Jehovah's Witnesses, signed a release absolving a doctor from responsibility for any untoward results due to the wife's refusal to accept blood transfusions for religious reasons. The doctor negligently performed the operation and the wife bled to death as a result of both her injuries and her refusal to accept a transfusion. On a jury verdict for the plaintiff husband, the jury reduced the plaintiff's wrongful death damages by 75 percent based on the husband's and wife's assumption of the risk. Shorter, at 647. This court upheld that verdict. Shorter, at 659. Although that case involved express assumption of the risk, which is not subsumed by contributory negligence, Shorter, at 656, the principle that a plaintiff who did not directly "cause" the accident may still be held more hable for his or her injuries than the accident-causing tortfeasor is clearly illustrated.
The argument that a passenger cannot be more than 50 percent at fault also violates the express language of the comparative fault statute. "In all actions involving fault of more than one entity, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of the total fault which is attributable to every entity which caused the claimant's damages, including the claimant or person suffering personal injury or incurring property damage, defendants, [and all other entities]." (Italics ours.) Former RCW 4.22.070. There was no error assigned to the jury instructions, and the jury properly determined the percentages of fault to be assigned to each party in this action.
Moreover, a limitation on the percentage of fault attributable to a passenger would similarly violate article 1, section 21 of our constitution which states that "[t]he right [840]*840of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . The right to a jury trial may not be impaired by either legislative or judicial action. Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wn.2d 155, 159, 160 P.2d 529 (1945). In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989), we struck down a statutory limit on the recovery of non-economic damages as violative of this constitutional right since it operated to "tak[e] a jury's finding of fact and alter[] it to conform to a predetermined formula." Sofie, at 653. An arbitrary limitation on a passenger's comparative fault would accomplish the same result. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the jury's determination of fault.
We must next decide whether RCW 5.40.060 was properly applied in this case. That statute reads, in relevant part:
It is a complete defense to an action for damages for personal injury or wrongful death that the person injured or killed was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death and that such condition was a proximate cause of the injury or death and the trier of fact finds such person to have been more than fifty percent at fault.
RCW 5.40.060. As a matter of law, Geschwind was found to be under the influence at the time of the accident. See RCW 5.40.060; RCW 46.61.502. It is uncontested that his intoxication was found to be a proximate cause of his injuries, and that he was found to be more than 50 percent at fault. Thus, on its face, the statute would appear to bar recovery.
Nonetheless, respondent, as well as amicus curiae Washington State Trial Lawyers Association (WSTLA), argue that the Legislature could not have meant this statute to apply to an intoxicated, but passive, passenger. They argue that there is uncertainty as to the legislative intent which raises the possibility of ambiguity. However, respondent and WSTLA have failed to demonstrate any actual ambiguity in the statute. Rather, their arguments attempt to bypass this threshold inquiry and address instead their fundamental disagreement with the substance of the statute. Without a showing of ambiguity, though, we derive the statute's meaning from its language alone. Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of [841]*841Labor & Indus., 109 Wn.2d 819, 822, 748 P.2d 1112, 7 A.L.R.5th 1086 (1988). In interpreting a statute, the court should assume that the Legislature meant exactly what it said. King Cy. v. Taxpayers of King Cy., 104 Wn.2d 1, 5, 700 P.2d 1143 (1985). We are obliged to give the plain language of a statute its full effect, even when its results may seem unduly harsh. State v. Pike, 118 Wn.2d 585, 591, 826 P.2d 152 (1992).
Our review of the statute leads us to conclude that it is clear and unambiguous and, applied to the ease at hand, acts to deny any recovery to this plaintiff. Since it is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to examine legislative history in order to interpret the statute. Similarly, there is no need to inquire into common-law tort standards, since it is the Legislature's prerogative to change or define tort law for this state.
Even if we were convinced that the statute is ambiguous, our review of the legislative history shows that the Legislature was aware of the potential effect of the statute. Throughout its drafting, the Legislature referred specifically to "causation of the injury", not "causation of the occurrence leading to injury". Senate Journal, 49th Legislature (1986), at 471, 475-76; Senate Journal, 50th Legislature (1987), at 635. Moreover, although the original language of the bill in the Senate only spoke in terms of "negligence per se", the bill was amended in the House to clarify that the effect of the statute was to bar recovery altogether. Compare Senate Journal, 49th Legislature (1986), at 475 with House Journal, 49th Legislature (1986), at 1052. Although RCW 5.40.060 might be interpreted as conflicting with RCW 4.22.005, which states that contributory fault "does not bar recovery", the Legislature is free to create exceptions to statutes, as well as common law. Cf. Morris v. Blaker, 118 Wn.2d 133, 147, 821 P.2d 482 (1992) ("A conflict between two statutory provisions can be resolved by giving effect to the more specific and more recently enacted statute . . ..").
The application of RCW 5.40.060 to passengers is in accord with a number of secondary sources, as well. The comment to [842]*842WPI 12.01.015 states that RCW 5.40.060 "may bar the recovery of a passenger plaintiff who was also intoxicated at the time of the accident." WPI 12.01.01 comment. The Washington Motor Vehicle Accident Deskbook is in agreement with this commentary.
[I]t is now a complete defense to a personal injury or wrongful death action that the person injured or killed was under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the occurrence causing the injury or death if the condition contributed more than 50% to the claimant's injuries. . . .
The new rule may apply to a variety of typical fact patterns. . . . Likewise, a passenger's own intoxication may preclude liability. A passenger's own intoxication is admissible to prove contributory fault. The rationale for this rule is that intoxication diminishes a passenger's appreciation of danger and renders the passenger more likely to take greater risks than usual.
(Citations omitted.) Washington State Bar Ass'n, Washington Motor Vehicle Accident Deskbook § 12.2(5) (1988). We find that the statute is clear and unambiguous and was properly applied by the trial court in this case.
Lastly, respondent Geschwind contends that there was insufficient evidence to submit the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury. This claim was also raised below at the Court of Appeals, where that court found the claim to be "completely without merit". Geschwind, at 212. We agree with that court's analysis. There was more than enough evidence for an instruction on contributory negligence and the instruction was properly given.
In sum, we reverse the Court of Appeals' decision to remand for a new trial and order that the jury verdict be reinstated. We find that RCW 5.40.060 properly applies to this case and acts as a bar to the respondent's recovery. The Court of Appeals is affirmed on the sufficiency of the evidence issue.
Andersen, C.J., and Brachtenbach, Guy, and Madsen, JJ., concur.