Garrett v. Denver C.A.R.E.S.

Opinion

Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 28, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court BRIAN GARRETT,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 24-1363 (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-01033-DDD-JPO) DENVER C.A.R.E.S., a behavioral health (D. Colo.) facility operated by Denver Health Medical Center/Denver Health and Hospital Authority; CHRISTIAN C. THURSTONE, M.D.; DANIEL PADDOCK; SAMUEL AZIAMART; GOUN SKEEN, RN; ALICIA VELASQUEZ; GINNA MICHALK; JAHARRI ASTEN, CAC; MATHEW BUSTOS, CAC,

Defendants - Appellees.

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CATO INSTITUTE,

Amicus Curiae. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, EID, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 2

A concerned neighbor called authorities to report what appeared to be an

altercation occurring on Plaintiff Brian Garrett’s front lawn. Officers responded and

placed Plaintiff in the back of a patrol car. Ultimately, officers caused him to be

transported to Denver CARES—a behavioral health facility located in Denver,

Colorado. While there, Plaintiff registered a 0.196 blood alcohol level. Denver

CARES held Plaintiff for about eleven hours so that he could sober up before

discharging him.

Plaintiff sued Denver CARES and several of its staff members for allegedly

violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The

district court determined that Plaintiff had not plausibly alleged a constitutional

violation and dismissed his case. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

affirm.

I.

The Denver Health and Hospital Authority (“DHHA”) is a political

subdivision of the State of Colorado. DHHA operates Defendant Denver Community

Addiction Rehabilitation and Evaluation Services (“Denver CARES”). Denver

CARES provides short-term and residential treatment for drug and alcohol users.

DHHA also operates the Emergency Service Patrol (“ESP”), which responds to

police and community requests to transport intoxicated individuals to Denver

CARES.

After attending a Colorado Rockies game, Plaintiff Brian Garrett joined his

roommate and some friends for drinks on his front lawn. At some point, Plaintiff and

2 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 3

his roommate began to argue. The argument led to a physical altercation. A

neighbor saw the brawl and called the Denver Police Department (“DPD”). Officers

handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him in the back of a police car. Officers contacted

ESP. When ESP arrived, personnel moved Plaintiff from the police car to the ESP

van. ESP transported Plaintiff to Denver CARES. ESP personnel noted that they

“received [Plaintiff] from [DPD] officers” and that Plaintiff “was very verbally

aggressive and cursing and threatening lawsuit,” “ha[d] a strong odor of alcohol and

ha[d] slurred speech,” and “walked to the [ESP] van with a staggered gait . . . .” At

no point did officers or ESP personnel administer a breathalyzer or a field sobriety

test.

Upon Plaintiff’s arrival, Denver CARES initiated its standard admission

process. A Denver CARES technician administered a breathalyzer to determine

Plaintiff’s blood alcohol level (“BAL”). The breathalyzer established Plaintiff’s

BAL upon arrival at 0.196. 1 Denver CARES technicians used this number to

determine Plaintiff’s estimated sober time (“EST”)—the estimated time that his BAL

would be 0.000—at around ten hours later. Technicians also took Plaintiff’s vitals

and other relevant medical history. Despite Plaintiff asking to leave and refusing to

BAL (or BAC) refers to the percentage of alcohol in a person’s bloodstream 1

and is the measurement used to determine legal impairment. For reference, under Colorado law, a person commits Driving Under the Influence when his BAL is 0.08 or more at the time of driving or within two hours of driving. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-4-1301(2)(a) (West). 3 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 4

sign a consent for treatment, Denver CARES staff escorted him to the male dormitory

to sober up.

Plaintiff asked staff multiple times to allow him to leave, telling them that he

was not a danger to himself or anyone else. Staff told him that the doors were

locked, that he would need to wait to see a counselor before he could leave, and that

he could not see a counselor until closer to his EST. At some point, a staff member

informed a counselor about Plaintiff’s requests to leave. A counselor noted in

Plaintiff’s chart that Plaintiff “repeatedly interrupted staff” and “request[ed] to leave”

and that staff “de-escalated” and “encouraged [Plaintiff] to stay.”

Approximately thirty minutes after Plaintiff’s EST, Denver CARES discharged

him. Plaintiff refused to sign any forms or meet with a counselor.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting Fourth Amendment and state law tort

claims against Denver CARES and several of its employees. Defendants moved to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege municipal

liability against Denver CARES because no constitutional violation occurred. For

the same reason, Defendants argued that the law entitled the individual defendants to

qualified immunity. Specifically, Defendants argued that they did not violate

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights because officers had probable cause to detain

Plaintiff, and ESP and Denver CARES staff reasonably relied on that determination.

In a careful and well-reasoned order, the district court agreed that Plaintiff failed to

allege that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights and dismissed his

4 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 5

complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 2 Plaintiff

appeals.

II.

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 640 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Lemmon v.

Envirocare of Utah, Inc., 614 F.3d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 2010)). “We accept as true

all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and view them in the light most

favorable to the [plaintiff].” Id. (quoting Burnett v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys.,

Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013)). We must assess whether the specific

factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint alone plausibly support a legal claim for

relief. Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Alvarado v.

KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007)).

The individual defendants’ qualified immunity defense and Plaintiff’s

municipal liability claim against Denver CARES both turn on the existence of an

underlying constitutional violation. See A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1134 (10th

Cir. 2016) (“When a defendant asserts the defense of qualified immunity, ‘the onus is

on the plaintiff to demonstrate “(1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right . . . .”’” (quoting Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir.

2015))); Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 419 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that a

2 Because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims, it also declined to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice. 5 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 6

plaintiff must show “that a municipal employee committed a constitutional violation”

to succeed on a municipal liability claim (citing Myers v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998))). Thus, to proceed with his Fourth

Amendment claims, Plaintiff must plausibly plead that a municipal employee

violated his constitutional rights.

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that he failed to

allege that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. First, he argues that

Defendants did not have probable cause at any point to detain him. Second, Plaintiff

argues that Denver CARES unreasonably detained him for eleven hours. He

contends that, even if probable cause supported his initial seizure, Denver CARES’s

assessments of him did not indicate that he was intoxicated and clearly dangerous

and, thus, Denver CARES should have released him. We disagree.

A.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.

“The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.” Soza v.

Demsich, 13 F.4th 1094, 1107 (10th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Merritt, 695

F.2d 1263, 1272 (10th Cir. 1982)). A warrantless seizure is reasonable when it is

based on probable cause. Anaya v. Crossroads Managed Care Sys., Inc., 195 F.3d

584, 590 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Pino v. Higgs, 75 F.3d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir.

1996)). This is true even outside of a criminal arrest, such as seizures for mental

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health evaluations or detoxification. 3 Id. at 591–92. “[T]o justify seizure for

intoxication by alcohol, an officer must have probable cause to believe an intoxicated

person is a danger to himself or others.” Id. at 591. “The determination of probable

cause ‘is based on the totality of the circumstances, and requires reasonably

trustworthy information that would lead a reasonable officer to believe,’ in this

context, that the individual posed a danger to himself or others.” United States v.

Gilmore, 776 F.3d 765, 769 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d

1108, 1116 (10th Cir. 2007)).

Plaintiff does not challenge DPD officers’ probable cause to seize him

initially. Instead, Plaintiff argues that ESP and Denver CARES did not

independently have probable cause to seize him for detoxification. He insists we

need not decide whether the law requires Defendants to reassess probable cause.

Instead, he argues Defendants did, in fact, make a probable cause assessment and are

subject to liability because the totality of the circumstances did not support their

probable cause finding.

Plaintiff alleges that when ESP arrived and received Plaintiff from DPD,

Plaintiff was in the back of a police car in handcuffs. From these facts, ESP could

3 The ability of the state to seize individuals for these purposes stems from the state’s inherent police power to “maintain the health, safety and welfare of the public.” Anaya, 195 F.3d at 591 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 479 (1987)). Such interference and “encroachment upon private interests” demands that the seizure is in the public interest and that “the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.” Id. (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594–95 (1962)). 7 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 8

reasonably infer that officers believed Plaintiff was intoxicated and a danger to

himself or others. And because ESP could rely on DPD’s assessment, these facts

weigh in favor of Denver CARES’s probable cause conclusion. After all, we have

held that other officers and medical personnel can rely on the seizing officer’s

probable cause assessment. 4 See Baptiste v. J.C. Penney, Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1260

(10th Cir. 1998) (“An officer . . . is not required to reevaluate the arresting officer’s

probable cause determination in order to protect herself from personal liability.”);

Marshall v. Columbia Lea Reg’l Hosp., 345 F.3d 1157, 1179–1181 (10th Cir. 2003)

(holding that a nurse could not be sued for performing a blood test on a protesting

patient because it was objectively reasonable for her to rely on the officer’s probable

cause determination). Additional facts support the presence of probable cause as

well. Plaintiff “was verbally aggressive and cursing and threatening lawsuit,” had “a

strong odor of alcohol and [] slurred speech,” and “walked to the [ESP] van with

staggered gait . . . .” When Plaintiff arrived at Denver CARES, a breathalyzer

established his BAL at 0.196—more than twice the legal limit for operating a motor

vehicle. Plaintiff “repeatedly interrupted staff,” who had to “de-escalate[]” the

situation. These facts confirm that the totality of the circumstances available to ESP

and Denver CARES supported probable cause to detain Plaintiff for alcohol

intoxication.

4 Officers can even rely on “what proves to be the flawed conclusions of a fellow police officer” if that reliance is “objectively reasonable.” Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Rogers v. Powell, 120 F.3d 446, 455 (3d Cir. 1997)). 8 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 9

Perhaps recognizing that the facts generally support probable cause, Plaintiff

argues that our analysis must be more nuanced because the original seizure occurred

on his front lawn and not in a public place. Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court’s

Caniglia v. Strom, 593 U.S. 194 (2021), decision counsels that officers have little

leeway to intrude on private property for “community caretaking” tasks, such as

detaining an intoxicated individual who is a danger to himself or others. To be sure,

Caniglia rejected a general “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth

Amendment’s prohibition against warrantless entry onto private property. Id. at 199.

But Plaintiff’s strategic pleading choices foreclose this theory. Plaintiff does not

challenge DPD’s decision to seize him from his front yard—he specifically disavows

such a challenge. Instead, his challenge begins with the transfer of custody to ESP,

which occurred not on his front lawn but with his transfer from a police vehicle.

Accordingly, his Caniglia-based argument is without merit.

B.

In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that, even if Defendants had probable cause

for the initial seizure, that probable cause dissipated and Denver CARES should have

released him.

In the criminal arrest context, a person must be released if new information

comes to light that would dissipate probable cause. Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2020). But an arresting officer is

“not required to reassess his probable cause conclusion at every turn,” and an

arrestee’s “bare proclamations of innocence” do not dissipate probable cause. Id.

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(quoting Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1986) and citing Romero v.

Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995)). “[A]rresting officers must release a

suspect only if the police discover that ‘the suspicion (probable cause) which forms

the basis for the privilege to arrest is unfounded.’” Id. (quoting Thompson, 798 F.2d

at 556). In other words, probable cause dissipates when police receive new

information that “nullifies information critical to the earlier probable cause

determination . . . .” United States v. Dalton, 918 F.3d 1117, 1128 (10th Cir. 2019)

(citing Wayne Lafave, Search and Seizure § 4.7(a), at 822 (5th ed. 2012)).

Applying this logic here, neither ESP nor Denver CARES staff received new

information that rendered “information critical to the earlier probable cause

determination” unfounded. Indeed, any new information staff learned supported

probable cause, especially his 0.196 BAL. If probable cause dissipated at any point,

it would have been at or around his EST, and Denver CARES released Plaintiff

within thirty minutes of that time. At most, Plaintiff made protests and “bare

proclamations” to Denver CARES, and those acts do not suffice to dissipate probable

cause. See Hinkle, 962 F.3d at 1221.

AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

Joel M. Carson III Circuit Judge

10 Appellate Case: 24-1363 Document: 65 Date Filed: 07/28/2026 Page: 11

24-1363, Garrett v. Denver C.A.R.E.S., et al.

EID, J., concurring in the judgment.

I join the majority in dismissing Garrett’s suit. I do so, however, on the ground

that Denver CARES personnel are entitled to qualified immunity. To avoid the

application of qualified immunity, Garrett must demonstrate that it was clearly

established at the time of his detention that their conduct in failing to re-breathalyze him

violated his constitutional rights. See Palacios v. Fortuna, 61 F.4th 1248, 1256 (10th Cir.

2023). To show clearly established law, we do not require a plaintiff to identify “a case

directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). Crucially,

Garrett fails to identify Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent in which a court held

facility personnel liable for continuing to detain an intoxicated person without re-

breathalyzing him. Accordingly, I join the majority in dismissing Garrett’s complaint,

but I do so on different grounds.