Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd.

392 F. Supp. 2d 717, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24134, 2005 WL 2622809
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd.. Read the opinion of the Court — 230 F.R.D. 438
District Court, M.D. North Carolina·Decided October 12, 2005·No. 1:04CV00010·Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

OSTEEN, District Judge.

Defendant Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd. (“Woodstock”) brings several counterclaims against Plaintiff Gardendance, Inc. (“Gardendance”). Woodstock asserts that Gardendance infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,547,371 (“ ’371 Patent”), entitled “Variable Torch Apparatus,” in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and induced infringement of the ’371 Patent, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(b). Woodstock also asserts two state law claims and seeks a declaratory judgment of invalidity of Gardendance’s copyright pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

In a patent infringement case, federal courts must follow a two-step process. The court must (1) construe the “meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed” and (2) compare the construed claims to the alleged infringing product. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed.Cir.1995), aff 'd, 517 U.S. 370, 391, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 1396, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). Moreover, “the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim.” Id. at 979. Before the court is Woodstock’s Motion to Construe U.S. Patent No. 5,547,371, which is the subject of this opinion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Woodstock and Gardendance are both sellers of lawn torches. The lawn torches are copper and have a torch apparatus that contains a tank of fuel and a wick. Woodstock, on August 20, 1996, procured a patent for a specific design of the copper lawn torches (the “ ’371 Patent”). Garden-dance has a copyright on its lawn torch design, of which Woodstock challenges the validity. Woodstock also claims Garden-dance’s design infringes the ’371 Patent.

II. ANALYSIS

This analysis covers the proper construction of the ’371 Patent claims. “To ascertain the meaning of claims [in a patent], [a court must] consider three sources: the [text of the patent’s] claims, the specification [listed in the patent], and the [patent’s] prosecution history.” Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1561 (Fed.Cir.1991). The analysis must construe meanings how “one [with] ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention” would construe them. Markman, 52 F.3d at 986. Because there is no prosecution history for this claim, the dis *720 cussion considers only the specification and the claim’s text.

A. The Specification

“The specification contains a ... description of the invention that must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention. For claim construction purposes, the description may act as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define terms used in the claims.” Id. at 979. Thus, “[c]laims must be read in view of the specification, of which they are a part.” Id. However, “[t]he written description part of the specification itself does not delimit the right to exclude. That is the function and purpose of claims.” Id. at 980.

The specification here does not limit the claim terms. The specification states that “it is obvious that modifications and changes therein may be made by those skilled in the art to which it pertains without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Accordingly, the scope of this invention is to be limited only by the appended claims and equivalents.” ’371 Patent col. 4 11. 4-9 (filed Aug. 20, 1996). Thus, the specification is not a limit on the claim terms’ scope. The following discussion, however, shows how the specification illuminates the claim terms.

B. Claim Terms

Only claim terms 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 of the ’371 Patent are at issue. In determining the meaning of these terms, the court uses the viewpoint of “one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 986.

“A patent claim typically has three parts: 1) the preamble; 2) the transition; and 3) the body.” E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Monsanto Co., 903 F.Supp. 680, 693 (D.Del.1995) (citing 2 Donald S. Chisum, Patents § 806[l][b] (1994)). The preamble may summarize the product or specific intended properties and uses. STX, Inc. v. Brine, Inc., 37 F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (D.Md.1999). The transition, which may be the word “comprising,” connects the preamble to the claim. Id. Finally, the body is the collection of terms that actually defines the item that the patent will protect. Id.

An issue in this matter is whether the preamble of the claim terms limits the body. ‘Whether to treat a preamble as a limitation is a determination ‘resolved only on review of the entire[ ] ... patent to gain an understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to encompass by the claim.’ ” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed.Cir.2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed.Cir.1989)). “Where a patentee uses the claim preamble to recite structural limitations of his claimed invention, the ... courts give effect to that usage.” Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed.Cir.1997). “However, if the body of the claim ‘describes a structurally complete invention such that deletion of the preamble phrase does not affect the structure or steps of the claimed invention,’ the preamble is generally not limiting unless there is ‘clear reliance on the preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art.’ ” Intertool, Ltd. v. Texar Corp., 369 F.3d 1289, 1295 (Fed.Cir.2004) (citation omitted) (quoting Catalina Mktg., 289 F.3d at 808-09). The preamble at issue is “[a] variable torch apparatus,” ’371 Patent col.4 11. 11, which appears in each of the claims.

From the text of the entire patent, this phras'e clearly must modify the claim terms. Nothing in the claims’ bodies suggests that the torch is modifiable. However, throughout the remainder of the pat

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Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd., 392 F. Supp. 2d 717, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24134, 2005 WL 2622809 (M.D.N.C. 2005).

392 F. Supp. 2d 717 (Gardendance, Inc. v. Woodstock Copperworks, Ltd.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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