Garcia v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc.

167 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 2001 WL 1181162
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Mexico
DecidedSeptember 28, 2001
DocketCIV. 00-1571 BB/DJS
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 167 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (Garcia v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Mexico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Garcia v. Allsup's Convenience Stores, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 2001 WL 1181162 (D.N.M. 2001).

Opinion

OPINION

BLACK, District Judge.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the wage plan under which an employer paid its former employee violates the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and on the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the damages the employee may recover should he prevail on the liability issue. See Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 17), filed July 11, 2001, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21), filed July 19, 2001. The Court has examined the parties’ submissions and the relevant legal authorities, and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment on the liability issue should be DENIED, and that the employer’s motion for summary judgment on the damages issue should be GRANTED.

I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael M. Garcia (“Employee”) brings this suit under Section 207 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“Act”) to recover overtime pay allegedly due him from his former employer, Defendant Alls-up’s Convenience Stores, Inc. (“Employer”). The Act covers workers like Em *1310 ployee who work for business enterprises like Employer that are engaged in interstate commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Federal law governs actions brought under the Act. See E.E.O.C. v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 76 F.Supp.2d 1151, 1152 (D.Kan.1999). Employee’s suit is therefore properly before this Court.

Employee was employed as a maintenance worker by Employer from sometime in 1995 until April 2000, when his employment was terminated. From 1995 until May 1998, he was paid a flat salary irrespective of the number of hours he worked. That changed in June 1998, when Employer implemented a new method of paying maintenance workers like Employee, known as the Fixed Salary for a Fluctuating Workweek method (“Fixed Salary Method”). Under the new method, Employee was to be paid a “base” salary each week plus half-time for hours worked in excess of forty hours.

Employer consulted with Joseph A. Wy-song, a Department of Labor (“DOL”) employee since 1961 who worked primarily in the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division, about its implementation of the Fixed Salary Method. Mr. Wysong provided Employer and its attorney with advice and written materials about the Act’s overtime provisions, specifically including information distributed by the DOL and other authoritative services about the Fixed Salary Method. Employer also consulted with an attorney knowledgeable in labor law.

Before implementing the Fixed Salary Method, Employer held a meeting, the purpose of which was to explain the new payment method to maintenance workers like Employee. Employer informed the workers that their base salary did not turn on the number of hours worked. Employer illustrated the point by providing written examples. One example provides: “Larry’s salary is $521 per week. He worked 38 hours this week. Calculate his pay this week. Answer: $521.00.” Employer’s memorandum brief at 2. Employer also informed the workers that if they missed work because of illness or vacation, they would have to note their absence on a written form designed for that purpose. If an employee turned in such forms, the employee would still receive full compensation.

At the end of the meeting, all affected maintenance workers were told to sign a form entitled “Pay Method Explanation and Acknowledgment” (“Explanation Form”), indicating that the Fixed Salary Method had been explained to them. Employee did so. The Explanation Form states:

Under this pay method the regular hourly rate of pay used to calculate additional pay will fluctuate from week to week. In addition, 1) the regular hourly pay rate will not reduce the weekly salary, 2) it will account for the unique functions performed by District Maintenance Personnel and 3) it will not reduce an employee’s pay unless they [sic] miss a full day of work.
The “Fixed Salary” method mentioned above will be paid with deductions only for full days missed. The variable in this pay plan is the overtime calculated for weekly bonus exceeding forty (40).

Employee’s memorandum brief, Exhibit 2 (emphasis added).

Employee received his full base salary under the Fixed Salary Method for every week that he performed some work, except for the week he was terminated. This includes five weeks in which Employee worked less than forty hours; specifically, it includes weeks in which he worked 38.50 hours, 39.25 hours, 39.5 hours, 38.75 hours, and 32.50 hours. There is not a single week in which Employee missed a full day (other than a vacation day or sick leave absence), so there is not a single week in *1311 which he worked less than thirty-two hours while the Fixed Salary Method was in effect. Employee received half-time for hours worked in excess of forty hours. This includes 62 weeks out of the 76 weeks in which Employee worked more than forty hours.

Employee filed suit in this Court in November 2000, claiming that Employer paid him less overtime than what is required under Section 207 of the Act. The parties now cross-move for summary judgment on the liability issue, and Employer moves for summary judgment on the damages issue.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence and draws all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Martin v. Kansas, 190 F.3d 1120, 1129 (10th Cir.1999). However, it is “not required to evaluate every conceivable inference which can be drawn from evidentiary matter, but only reasonable ones.” Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1401 (10th Cir.1988).

The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not establish that a trial on the merits is unnecessary. See Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir.1991) (“That both parties have moved for summary judgment does not preclude a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists”). Summary judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts. See James Barlow Family Ltd. Partnership v. David M. Munson, Inc., 132 F.3d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir.1997).

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Bluebook (online)
167 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 2001 WL 1181162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/garcia-v-allsups-convenience-stores-inc-nmd-2001.