Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac
This text of 315 S.W.3d 786 (Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
ORDER
Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, Inc. (“Speedway”), Daniel F. Ladd (“Ladd”), the President of Speedway, and Brice Ack-erman (“Ackerman”), the General Sales Manager of Speedway, (collectively the “Defendants”) appeal from the trial court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Larry Frye’s employment related claims. The Defendants contend that a program adopted by Speedway after Larry Frye began employment with Speedway and is a legally enforceable contract. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. 84.16(b). 1
. This Order has been issued contemporaneously with this Court’s Opinion in Kimberly Frye v. Speedway Chevrolet Cadillac, WD 71757. Mr. Frye’s motion for consolidation of this case with the aforesaid case was taken with the case and is denied.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
315 S.W.3d 786, 2010 Mo. App. LEXIS 1025, 2010 WL 3118593, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/frye-v-speedway-chevrolet-cadillac-moctapp-2010.