Freeman v. Wells Fargo & Company

District Court, N.D. California·Decided July 26, 2023·No. 4:23-cv-00476·Unknown

Opinion

SHELLEY FREEMAN, Case No. 23-cv-00476-DMR

Plaintiff, ORDER ON SPECIAL MOTION TO v. STRIKE AND MOTION TO DISMISS

WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 20 Defendants.

Plaintiff Shelley Freeman filed this action alleging defamation and related claims against her former employer, Wells Fargo & Company and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (together, “Wells Fargo”). Wells Fargo filed a special motion to strike the complaint pursuant to California’s anti- SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, and to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). [Docket No. 20.] This matter is suitable for determination without a hearing. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The anti-SLAPP motion is denied without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim but is otherwise denied. Freeman makes the following allegations in the complaint, all of which are taken as true for purposes of these motions.1 Freeman is a Florida resident. She began working for Wells Fargo in 1996 in its brokerage and private banking departments and held various positions until her termination in 2017. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 10, 11, 14, 27, 66-67, 106, 138. In 2002, Freeman joined Wells Fargo’s Community Bank as Regional President in charge 1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) of the Los Angeles region. The Community Bank “was responsible for customers’ checking and savings accounts, certificates of deposit, debit cards, credit cards, etc.” through Wells Fargo’s branches. Id. at ¶¶ 3, 28, 28. The complaint describes the Community Bank as “an aggressive sales organization.” Id. at ¶ 30. Freeman led the Los Angeles region from 2002 through the end of 2008 and describes her tenure there as “a period of rapid expansion,” with large increases in the numbers of bankers and branches. Id. at ¶¶ 19, 32, 48. She alleges that she “devoted herself to elevate the professionalism of team members,” installed a 16-week training program, and placed “[l]eading with integrity and improving the customer experience . . . at the forefront of [her communications with her team.” Id. at ¶ 34. She received positive annual performance reviews that included praise for her integrity and commitment to Wells Fargo’s “vision and values” and running of “a safe and sound banking operation.” Id. at ¶ 39(a), (f), (l), (p). The complaint identifies “sales practice issues” during Freeman’s tenure in the Los Angeles region. These “primarily centered around debit cards for which the compensation plans rewarded bankers no matter how many were given to a single customer.” Id. at ¶ 40. Freeman “repeatedly complained to Wells Fargo senior management that . . . sales credit should only be given for one card,” but this policy, “which incentivized bankers to deliver multiple debit cards, remained in effect . . .” Id. Freeman also had “‘zero tolerance’ for unfunded accounts” and “advocated providing sales credit to bankers only when accounts funded, but more senior Wells Fargo Community Bank management disagreed” and the bank “continued to provide sales credits to its bankers for accounts that were opened, even if they were not funded.” Id. at ¶ 41. Nonetheless, Freeman “made it known that she had zero tolerance for bankers in her region who opened checking accounts that were not funded,” including emailing her team in August 2007 that “we must have zero tolerance for being in the red on checking.” Id. at ¶ 43. In 2008 Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia. Freeman left the Los Angeles region in late 2008/early 2009 after being promoted to Wells Fargo’s Lead Regional President in Florida. In that role, she alleges that she “promoted Wells Fargo’s ‘Vision and Values’ amongst the former Wachovia employees,” emphasized the importance of “[s]ales integrity training” and “repeatedly Freeman “showed no tolerance for improper sales practices” while she was the Lead Regional President in Florida. In July 2009, she instructed “her team to investigate these issues” and emailed them that “she had zero tolerance for ‘gaming’ (manipulating the incentive system for personal gain or cheating to achieve sales goals).” Id. at ¶ 57. Freeman alleges that when she was in Los Angeles, Wells Fargo’s sales goals had been “set through a highly collaborative process” which she describes as a “bottoms-up” approach that “created accountability.” Id. at ¶ 58. She alleges that the sales goals changed to a “top-down approach” after she moved to Florida, and that from 2009 through 2011, “the Wells Fargo regions were given unrealistic sales goals.” Id. at ¶¶ 59, 60. Freeman objected to these sales goals and to Wells Fargo’s “dismantl[ing] [of] its previous hiring and training practices to get bankers working in stores as quickly as possible.” Id. at ¶¶ 61-63. She alleges that “Florida had the lowest cross- sell of all the Eastern regions” and that “Florida did not sell as many debit cards as other regions due to [her] adamant refusal to allow team members in Florida to sell customers debit cards that they did not need.” Id. at ¶ 65. However, sales practice violations increased throughout the Community Bank “[a]s poorly trained bankers attempted to achieve sales goals that were not achievable.” Id. at ¶ 64. Nonetheless, Freeman “continued to receive outstanding performance reviews” during her tenure in Florida. Id. at ¶ 13. She ultimately “became demoralized and despondent” “[a]s a result of the changed environment at Wells Fargo’s Community Bank” and took a new position in October 2013 that did not involve managing retail branches. Id. at ¶¶ 66- 67, 88. In 2013, it came to light that Wells Fargo’s Community Bank had been engaging in improper sales practices. Specifically, “[t]he Bank was caught selling unwanted, unneeded products to its customers and opening millions of unauthorized accounts.” Id. at ¶ 8. Starting in the summer of 2013, Wells Fargo investigated simulated funding, which the complaint defines as “the improper manipulation of funds in and out of accounts” or “funding one account, and then transferring those same funds between other accounts for the sole purpose of meeting funding requirements.” Id. at ¶¶ 73, 76, 77. Wells Fargo determined that the highest concentration of County, and terminated numerous employees following the investigation. Id. at ¶¶ 77-85. In October 2013, the Los Angeles Times published its first article about the scandal, entitled “Wells Fargo fires workers accused of cheating on sales goals.” The article referred to “employees being placed under intense pressure to meet sales goals.” Id. at ¶ 86. Around the same time, employees in the Los Angeles/Orange County region sent two anonymous communications to Wells Fargo’s Board of Directors and members of senior management accusing specific leaders of “inappropriate and unlawful conduct” and “extreme sales pressure being exerted” on employees. Id. at ¶¶ 96, 99-100. In particular, the anonymous employees accused Freeman’s successor, John Sotoodeh, “of creating a hostile environment.” Id. at ¶¶ 50, 99. The Los Angeles Times published a second article in December 2013, entitled “Wells Fargo’s pressure-cooker sales culture comes at a cost.” It stated that “the relentless pressure to sell has . . . led to ethical breaches . . . [t]o meet quotas, employees have opened unneeded accounts for customers, ordered credit cards without customers’ permission and forged client signatures on paperwork.” Id. at ¶ 103. Freeman alleges that “Los Angeles became known as the epicenter of simulated funding, the most well-known aspect of the sales practice failures a

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