Frederick H. Jackson v. United States

348 F.2d 772, 121 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5354

• Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
• Decided: June 4, 1965
• Docket: 18344
• Status: Published

Opinions

PER CURIAM:

This appeal is from a conviction of robbery. 22 D.C.Code § 2901 (1961). The complaining witness, the only witness to the alleged crime, testified that, while she was standing at a crowded bus stop, she felt her purse fall open. She turned immediately and saw appellant holding her billfold in his hand which was moving away from her open purse. On trial, appellant’s counsel argued that, since no one saw appellant actually take it, possibly the billfold had fallen from the open purse and he was in the act of returning it, which he did.

Appellant contends on appeal that his conviction must be reversed because of an erroneous instruction on the essential element of intent. The only definition of intent given the jury was the following:

“I will now instruct you as to the law on intent. Regarding intent which the Court has already instructed you to be an element of the offense of robbery with which the defendant is charged, you are instructed that, of course, when you do a thing on purpose, you do that which you intend to do.”

This instruction was clearly erroneous since commission of the crime of robbery requires the specific intent to deprive the victim of her property, not merely the general intent to take something “on purpose.” Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Mills v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 131, 228 F.2d 645 (1955); United States v. Kemble, 3 Cir., 197 F.2d 316 (1952). Although no objection was made, it is clear that the charge left the jury misinformed on an essential element of the crime.¹

The instruction on the other elements of the offense was somewhat confusing. The statute was read to the jury:

“Whoever by force or violence, whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, shall take from the person or immediate actual possession of another anything of value, is guilty of robbery.” 22 D.C.Code § 2901.

And the indictment, which was in language similar to the language of the statute,² was read and sent to the jury room. The statutory language defines several patterns of behavior as robbery in a single convoluted sentence and does not clearly set forth the elements which the Government had to prove in this case. The reading of the indictment further confused the matter, since it replaced the disjunctives in the statute with conjunctives.³

Recently, we held that the defendant’s right to have the jury pass on each element of the offense imposes a duty on the judge to give proper instructions on each element, even though no request is made by defense counsel. Byrd v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 342 F.2d 939 (1965). See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945). In Williams v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 299, 300, 131 F.2d 21, 22 (1942), a rape case in which the trial court failed to instruct on the elements cf the crime, this court stated:

“ # * * We have always been proud that under our law the elements which go to make up a crime are definitely established. To insist that a jury be told what rape is * * * is not to demand meaningless ritual. * * * ”

Obviously, if the jury is to function effectively, it must be given a clear statement of each element which the Government must prove. The elements, as expressed in the statute, are hardly set forth with sufficient clarity to permit the jury to perform its duty intelligently. Compare Wheeler v. United States, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 143, 190 F.2d 663 (1951); People v. Pereles, 125 Cal.App.Supp. 787, 12 P.2d 1093 (1932).

The inadequacy of the instruction given in this case⁴ requires a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial. Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim. P.

Appellant also argues that the indictment in which he was charged is so defective that his conviction must be reversed and the indictment dismissed. While we do not hold that the indictment would in itself require reversal, we note that it leaves much to be desired both in completeness and in clarity. The ■element of specific intent should be clearly stated. Furthermore, the indictment should state the offense charged more precisely, rather than set forth the omnibus statutory provision under which the accused is charged. Compare Hag-ner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932), with Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962).

Reversed and remanded.

1 . The rest of the charge aggravated the misstatement of the law on intent. The instruction on identification contained a suggestion that the jury could convict without any finding on intent whatsoever:

“If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt then you may convict the defendant of this offense. If you find that the defendant did take this pocket book or this purse, and you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the identification of the defendant, as the man who took it, then you may find the defendant guilty.”

2 . “The grand jury charges that on or about January 30, 1963 within the District of Columbia, Frederick Jackson by force and violence and against resistance, and by sudden and stealthy seizure and snatching, and by putting in fear, stole and took from the person, from the immediate actual possession of Selma J. Nooten-boom, property of the value of about $12.95; consisting of one billfold of the value of $2.00 and $10.95 in money.”

3 . The prosecuting attorney requested the judge to clarify the ambiguities created by this difference in language, but his request was refused.

4 . See Scurry v. United States, 120 U.S. App.D.C.-, 347 F.2d 468 (No. 18,633, decided April 15, 1965); Moore v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. -, 345 F.2d 97 (1965).