ORR, Judge.
I.
Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process. The sufficiency of process for any civil action filed in North Carolina is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4. Rule 4(a) states that “[u]pon the filing of the complaint, summons shall be issued forthwith . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(a) (1990). Rule 4(b) states that a summons “shall be directed to the defendant or defendants.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(b) (1990).
On the significance of a summons, this Court has stated:
The summons constitutes the means of obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . The summons, not the complaint, constitutes the exercise of the power of the State to bring the defendant before the court. As such, defects in the summons receive careful scrutiny and can prove fatal to the action.
Lantham v. Cherry, 111 N.C. App. 871, 873, 433 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1993), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 556, 441 S.E.2d 116 (1994) (quoting Childress v. Forsyth County Hospital Auth., 70 N.C. App. 281, 285, 319 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484 (1985)).
[34]*34Where there is a defect in the process itself, the process is generally held to be either voidable or void. Where the process is voidable, the defect generally may be remedied by an amendment because the process is sufficient to give jurisdiction. Where the process is void, however, it generally cannot be amended because it confers no jurisdiction.
Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 542, 319 S.E.2d. 912, 916 (1984).
Rule 4(i) permits trial courts to allow the amendment of any process “unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(i) (1990); Harris, 311 N.C. at 545, 319 S.E.2d at 918. “Material prejudice” in this context “refers primarily to the interposition of the statute of limitations.” 1 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure, § 4-10, p. 44. The power of the court to allow amendment of process is discretionary and permits amendment to correct a misnomer or mistake in the name of a party. Harris, 311 N.C. at 542, 319 S.E.2d at 918. When “the misnomer or misde-scription does not leave in doubt the identity of the party intended to be sued, or even where there is room for doubt as to identity, if service of process is made on the party intended to be sued, the misnomer or misdescription may be corrected by amendment at any stage of the suit.” Id. at 919 (citing Bailey v. McPherson, 233 N.C. 231, 235, 63 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1951)). However, “if the amendment amounts to a substitution or entire change of parties, however, the amendment will not be allowed.” Id. (citing Hogsed v. Pearlman, 213 N.C. 240, 195 S.E. 789 (1938)). Our Supreme Court has stated that “[substitution in the case of a misnomer is not considered substitution of new parties, but a correction in the description of the party or parties actually served.” Blue Ridge Electric Membership Corporation v. Grannis Bros., Inc., 231 N.C. 716, 720, 58 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1950). Thus, resolution of plaintiffs’ assignments of error turns on whether plaintiffs naming “Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.” as the defendant in the original summons and complaint was a misnomer.
The record shows by the affidavit of E.D. Whitley, Safety Manager, for Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., that “Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.” was not a corporate entity on record with the Secretary of State. It further shows that at no time pertinent to this action did Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ever own, lease or operate the store located at 651 Western Boulevard Extension. Moreover, while Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. and Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. are both Florida corporations authorized to [35]*35do business in North Carolina, they have been and were separate and distinct corporations at the time the cause of action accrued.
Therefore, we hold that the named defendant in the original summons and complaint, “Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.”, was not a mistake or misdescription permitting the amendment of the summons. Rather, Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. was the correct name of the wrong corporate party defendant, a substantive mistake which is fatal to this action. Quite simply, plaintiffs sued the wrong corporation.
Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to correct their original defective summons by alias and pluries summons. They rely on Latham v. Cherry, 111 N.C. App. 871, 433 S.E.2d 478 (1993) and Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Key Way Transport, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 36, 379 S.E.2d 665 (1989). As defendant correctly points out, plaintiffs’ reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In Latham, this Court said that “[a] party may correct a failed or defective original service by ... application for alias and pluries summons within ninety days of original issue. . . .” Latham, 111 N.C. App. at 873, 433 S.E.2d at 480; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d) (1990) (emphasis added). The issue in Latham was defective service, not defective process. In Anderson, again the issue before the court was whether service was defective. Anderson, 94 N.C. App. at 44, 379 S.E.2d at 670. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d), on which plaintiffs rely, “pertains to the extension of time for ‘service’ of a summons which has been properly issued against a named defendant.” Roshelli v. Sperry, 63 N.C. App. 509, 511, 305 S.E.2d 218, 219, review denied, 309 N.C. 633, 308 S.E.2d 716 (1983). Rule 4(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When any defendant in a civil action is not served within the time allowed for service, the action may be continued in existence as to such defendant by either of the following methods of extension:
(2) The plaintiff may sue out an alias or pluries summons returnable in the same manner as the original process. Such alias or pluries summons may be sued out at any time within 90 days after the date of issue of the last preceding summons in the chain of summonses or within 90 days of the last prior endorsement.
[36]*36N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d) (1990). This provision relates only to defective original service, not defective original process. Plaintiffs’ repeated issuance and service of alias and pluries summonses was not only consistently defective, but also ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the defendant Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc.
In Roshelli, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Lawrence F. Sperry seeking recovery under the family purpose doctrine for personal injuries received on 31 March 1978 in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the defendant’s daughter, Beverly N. Sperry.
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ORR, Judge.
I.
Plaintiffs’ first assignment of error is that the trial court erred in granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process. The sufficiency of process for any civil action filed in North Carolina is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4. Rule 4(a) states that “[u]pon the filing of the complaint, summons shall be issued forthwith . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(a) (1990). Rule 4(b) states that a summons “shall be directed to the defendant or defendants.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(b) (1990).
On the significance of a summons, this Court has stated:
The summons constitutes the means of obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant. . . . The summons, not the complaint, constitutes the exercise of the power of the State to bring the defendant before the court. As such, defects in the summons receive careful scrutiny and can prove fatal to the action.
Lantham v. Cherry, 111 N.C. App. 871, 873, 433 S.E.2d 478, 480 (1993), cert. denied, 335 N.C. 556, 441 S.E.2d 116 (1994) (quoting Childress v. Forsyth County Hospital Auth., 70 N.C. App. 281, 285, 319 S.E.2d 329, 332 (1984), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 796, 325 S.E.2d 484 (1985)).
[34]*34Where there is a defect in the process itself, the process is generally held to be either voidable or void. Where the process is voidable, the defect generally may be remedied by an amendment because the process is sufficient to give jurisdiction. Where the process is void, however, it generally cannot be amended because it confers no jurisdiction.
Harris v. Maready, 311 N.C. 536, 542, 319 S.E.2d. 912, 916 (1984).
Rule 4(i) permits trial courts to allow the amendment of any process “unless it clearly appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights of the party against whom the process issued.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(i) (1990); Harris, 311 N.C. at 545, 319 S.E.2d at 918. “Material prejudice” in this context “refers primarily to the interposition of the statute of limitations.” 1 G. Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure, § 4-10, p. 44. The power of the court to allow amendment of process is discretionary and permits amendment to correct a misnomer or mistake in the name of a party. Harris, 311 N.C. at 542, 319 S.E.2d at 918. When “the misnomer or misde-scription does not leave in doubt the identity of the party intended to be sued, or even where there is room for doubt as to identity, if service of process is made on the party intended to be sued, the misnomer or misdescription may be corrected by amendment at any stage of the suit.” Id. at 919 (citing Bailey v. McPherson, 233 N.C. 231, 235, 63 S.E.2d 559, 562 (1951)). However, “if the amendment amounts to a substitution or entire change of parties, however, the amendment will not be allowed.” Id. (citing Hogsed v. Pearlman, 213 N.C. 240, 195 S.E. 789 (1938)). Our Supreme Court has stated that “[substitution in the case of a misnomer is not considered substitution of new parties, but a correction in the description of the party or parties actually served.” Blue Ridge Electric Membership Corporation v. Grannis Bros., Inc., 231 N.C. 716, 720, 58 S.E.2d 748, 751 (1950). Thus, resolution of plaintiffs’ assignments of error turns on whether plaintiffs naming “Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.” as the defendant in the original summons and complaint was a misnomer.
The record shows by the affidavit of E.D. Whitley, Safety Manager, for Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., that “Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.” was not a corporate entity on record with the Secretary of State. It further shows that at no time pertinent to this action did Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. ever own, lease or operate the store located at 651 Western Boulevard Extension. Moreover, while Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. and Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. are both Florida corporations authorized to [35]*35do business in North Carolina, they have been and were separate and distinct corporations at the time the cause of action accrued.
Therefore, we hold that the named defendant in the original summons and complaint, “Winn Dixie Stores, Inc.”, was not a mistake or misdescription permitting the amendment of the summons. Rather, Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. was the correct name of the wrong corporate party defendant, a substantive mistake which is fatal to this action. Quite simply, plaintiffs sued the wrong corporation.
Plaintiffs contend that they were entitled to correct their original defective summons by alias and pluries summons. They rely on Latham v. Cherry, 111 N.C. App. 871, 433 S.E.2d 478 (1993) and Anderson Trucking Service, Inc. v. Key Way Transport, Inc., 94 N.C. App. 36, 379 S.E.2d 665 (1989). As defendant correctly points out, plaintiffs’ reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In Latham, this Court said that “[a] party may correct a failed or defective original service by ... application for alias and pluries summons within ninety days of original issue. . . .” Latham, 111 N.C. App. at 873, 433 S.E.2d at 480; see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d) (1990) (emphasis added). The issue in Latham was defective service, not defective process. In Anderson, again the issue before the court was whether service was defective. Anderson, 94 N.C. App. at 44, 379 S.E.2d at 670. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d), on which plaintiffs rely, “pertains to the extension of time for ‘service’ of a summons which has been properly issued against a named defendant.” Roshelli v. Sperry, 63 N.C. App. 509, 511, 305 S.E.2d 218, 219, review denied, 309 N.C. 633, 308 S.E.2d 716 (1983). Rule 4(d) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
When any defendant in a civil action is not served within the time allowed for service, the action may be continued in existence as to such defendant by either of the following methods of extension:
(2) The plaintiff may sue out an alias or pluries summons returnable in the same manner as the original process. Such alias or pluries summons may be sued out at any time within 90 days after the date of issue of the last preceding summons in the chain of summonses or within 90 days of the last prior endorsement.
[36]*36N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(d) (1990). This provision relates only to defective original service, not defective original process. Plaintiffs’ repeated issuance and service of alias and pluries summonses was not only consistently defective, but also ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the defendant Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc.
In Roshelli, the plaintiff filed a complaint against Lawrence F. Sperry seeking recovery under the family purpose doctrine for personal injuries received on 31 March 1978 in an automobile accident allegedly caused by the defendant’s daughter, Beverly N. Sperry. On the date the complaint was filed, 27 March 1981, a summons was issued in the name of Beverly Sperry. A summons in the name of the defendant, Lawrence F. Sperry was issued on 7 April 1981, after the limitations period had expired. On appeal from the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff contended that because the 7 April 1981 summons issued in the name of Lawrence Sperry was endorsed by the clerk, it related back to the 27 March 1981 issuance of the original summons in the name of Beverly Sperry, a nonparty. This Court held that the clerk’s endorsement of the summons directed to Lawrence Sperry after the limitations period had run did not cause the endorsed summons to relate back to the issuance within the limitations period of original summons directed to Beverly Sperry. “The purpose of Rule 4(d) is only to keep the action alive by means of an endorsement on the original summons or by issuance of an alias or pluries summons in situations where the original, properly directed summons was not yet served.” Roshelli, 63 N.C. App. at 511, 305 S.E.2d at 219. When an original summons is issued in the name of a person other than the defendant and not a party to the action, Rule 4(d) does not apply. Id.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs’ attempt to amend the original summons was prohibited because it constituted “a substitution or entire change of parties.” Harris, 311 N.C. at 546, 319 S.E.2d at 918. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of process.
II.
Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for insufficiency of service of process. We disagree.
“The purpose of a summons is to give notice to a person to appear at a certain place and time to answer a complaint against him.” [37]*37Wearring v. Belk Brothers., Inc., 38 N.C. App. 375, 376, 248 S.E.2d 90, 90 (1978); see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(b) (1990). The statutory method for service of process on a corporation is set forth in Rule 4(j)(6). In pertinent part, Rule 4(j)(6) states that to effect service on a corporation, a summons and complaint must be delivered, in person or by registered or certified mail, to an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation, by leaving copies in the office of such persons. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(6) (1990) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated in the preceding argument, the 29 September 1992 and the 23 December 1992 alias and pluries summonses naming “Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.” as the defendant were ineffective attempts at amending the original summons. Interestingly, plaintiffs cite several Court of Appeals cases which support the defendant’s contention that service was insufficient. All of the cases on which plaintiffs base their contention that service of process was sufficiently accomplished in this case make it clear that service is complete on the day summons and complaint are delivered to the addressee. See Taylor v. Brinkman, 108 N.C. App. 767, 425 S.E.2d 429, review denied, 333 N.C. 795, 431 S.E.2d 30 (1993) (“. . . service of process attempted by registered or certified mail, as permitted by N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 4(j)(1)(c), is ‘complete on the day the summons and complaint are delivered to the address thereon’ ” (quoting Lynch v. Lynch, 303 N.C. 367, 370, 279 S.E.2d 840, 843 (1981)).
The defendant Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. did not become a party defendant in this case until 20 April 1993, the date plaintiffs filed their Amended Complaint. At no time on or after the filing of the Amended Complaint- did the plaintiffs serve a summons in the name of Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. The September and December summonses which named Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. as the defendant were both issued when the defendant named in the then pending original complaint was Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. In short, plaintiff has simply never served a summons and complaint on Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. at a time when Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. was a named defendant in this case.
As defendant succinctly states in its brief, “ [i]t is axiomatic that if the summonses themselves were void, then the service of those summonses was also invalid.” Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit on the ground of insufficiency of service of process.
[38]*38III.
Plaintiffs’ final assignment of error is the crucial issue presented in this case. Here, the issue before the court is whether the trial court erred in dismissing their lawsuit against Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run. The statute of limitations for personal injury due to negligence is three years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52(16) (Supp. 1993).
Plaintiffs filed their original summons and complaint on 24 August 1992, the last date on which they could file a timely claim. However, they sued and served the wrong party since both the original summons and complaint named Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. as the defendant. On 20 April 1993, over seven months after the original complaint was filed and the statute of limitations had run, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint naming “Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc.” as the defendant. Plaintiffs served no corresponding summons on anyone. They contend that the amended complaint merely corrected the name of a party already in court and thus relates back to the date of the original complaint. In other words, they argue that they properly extended the statute of limitations by the clerk’s issuance of a corrected alias and pluries summons and subsequent amendment to the complaint in order to properly accomplish service of process on defendant Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. Plaintiffs’ argument on this issue is also without merit.
Unless relation back occurs, the statute of limitations is a'defense for defendants. Rule 15(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure states the following:
A claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claim in the original pleading was interposed unless the original pleading does not give notice to the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 15(c) (1990).
In Ring Drug Company, Inc. v. Carolina Medicorp Enterprises, Inc., 96 N.C. App. 277, 385 S.E.2d 801 (1989), this Court noted that on three other occasions it had decided whether Rule 15(c) would permit a complaint to be amended to add a new party defendant after the limitations period had expired. In all three cases, this Court decided the issue against the plaintiffs. See Teague v. Asheboro Motor Company, 14 N.C. App. 736, 189 S.E.2d 671 (1972); Callicutt v. American [39]*39Honda Motor Company, Inc., 37 N.C. App. 210, 245 S.E.2d 558 (1978); Stevens v. Nimocks, 82 N.C. App. 350, 346 S.E.2d 180, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 511, 349 S.E.2d 873 (1986). “Whether a complaint will relate back with respect to a party defendant added after the applicable limitations period depends on whether that new defendant had notice of the claim so as not to be prejudiced by the untimely amendment.” Ring, 96 N.C. App. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
In Ring, the court adopted the federal test for determining when a party defendant may be added after the limitations period has run. Relation back will occur under the federal rule when
1) the basic claim arises out of the conduct set forth in the original pleading, 2) the party to be brought in receives such notice that it will not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense, 3) the party knows or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning identity, the action would have been brought against it, and 4) the second and third requirements are fulfilled within the prescribed limitations period.
Id. (citing Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 29, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 2384, 91 L. Ed. 2d 18, 27 (1986)).
If some nexus among defendants will permit the trial judge to infer that the new defendant had notice of the original claim so as not to be prejudiced by the amendment, Callicut, 37 N.C. App. at 213, 245 S.E.2d at 560, Rule 15(c) will allow a complaint to be amended so as to add a new party, expiration of the statute of limitations notwithstanding. The statute of limitations should furnish the defendant at bar, however, when a plaintiffs use of Rule 15(c) would circumvent any other procedural requirement, see Stevens, 82 N.C. App. at 352, 346 S.E.2d at 181, or when the plaintiffs failure to name the defendant originally is solely attributable to the plaintiff.
Ring, 96 N.C. App. at 283, 385 S.E.2d at 806.
Applying the federal test to the present case, we hold that the trial judge correctly ruled that the statute of limitations was a bar to the instant case. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint does not relate back because defendant Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc. would be unfairly prejudiced by allowing the amendment to relate back; and plaintiffs’ failure to name Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. originally was solely attributable to the plaintiffs. By allowing the amended complaint to relate back, defendant would lose the benefit of the statute of limitations as [40]*40a bar to plaintiffs’ cause of action. This is particularly evident since, after being informed by Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. that they were not the proper defendant, plaintiffs’ waited over six months to file the amended complaint. Therefore, defendant properly asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs’ effort to “correct the name of the party already in court.” The amended complaint filed on 19 April 1993 initiated a new action. The commencement of this action occurred more than three years after the accident on 24 August 1992 and is barred by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-52.
Summarizing, we agree with the defendant that the record does not demonstrate that plaintiffs’ failure to name Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. as the defendant resulted from a misnomer. Rather, it shows plaintiffs’ unjustified failure to name Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc. as the party defendant in a timely fashion.
Plaintiffs filed their original summons and complaint on 24 August 1992, the last date on which they could file a timely claim. Yet, it was not until plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, more than three years after Mr. Franklin’s accident, that the proper corporate defendant “Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc.” was named. To this day, as required by the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs have never served the defendant Winn Dixie Raleigh, Inc., through the proper agent designated to receive service, C T Corporation System, with a summons accompanied by a complaint naming it as a defendant. Under these circumstances, the defendant has never been a party to this action. Plaintiffs’ original and alias and pluries summonses conferred no jurisdiction over the defendant because the original summons was void and could not be amended. The named defendant in the original summons and complaint, “Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.”, was the correct name of the wrong corporate party defendant, a substantive mistake which is fatal to this action. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court dismissing plaintiffs’ action.
Affirmed.
Judge JOHNSON concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents with separate opinion.