Callahan, J.
Certification was granted in this case limited to the question: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). The Appellate Court answered this question in the affirmative. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988). We disagree.
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and have been set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court; id.; but can be briefly summarized as follows. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55.1 Although his bail, initially set at $100,000, was later reduced to $50,000, [593]*593the petitioner was unable to post a bond and was confined in jail for 293 days prior to trial. In addition, he spent 378 days in a mental hospital while his competency to stand trial was determined. Id.
On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (repealed and replaced by General Statutes § 17-257),2 the petitioner was sent to Norwich Hospital for a psychiatric examination. On April 27, 1978, the trial court found the petitioner to be a danger to himself or others and ordered him committed to a mental institution for a term of ten years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (b). See General Statutes § 17-257c (e) (1) (A). Thereafter, the state declined to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the maximum term of his commitment set by the court.
On March 24,1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial jail time was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.3 The habeas court denied his peti[594]*594tion finding no equal protection violation. On appeal,* **4 the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the habeas court and held that the state’s practice of denying jail time credits to insanity acquittees violated the petitioner’s equal protection rights. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988).
At this point we note that “the concept of equal protection [under both the state and federal constitutions5 6] has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen[595]*595ter, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 578, 512 A. 2d 893 (1986). The “equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 577-78. Rather, a state may make classifications when enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on some reasonable ground. Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283,18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037 (1898); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra; State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531, 473 A. 2d 775 (1984). To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider “the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an “inherently suspect” group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id., 342; Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 345, 472 A.2d 328 (1984); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A. 2d 1063 (1975). On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group “it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” Laden v. Warden, supra, 543; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970).
[596]*596To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently. The petitioner in the instant case argues that by refusing to credit the. time he spent in jail prior to his trial against the fixed maximum term of his commitment, the state is treating wealthy and poor insanity acquittees differently. Based on the premise that all acquittees are discharged at the expiration of the fixed maximum term of confinement set by the court at the commencement of commitment to a mental hospital under § 17-257c (e) (1) (A), the petitioner maintains that indigent acquittees who are held prior to trial because they are not able to afford bail will be confined for the full duration of the fixed maximum term in addition to the time they spend confined in jail prior to their trial, whereas those acquittees who are able to avoid confinement prior to their trial because they can afford bail will be confined only for the duration of the fixed maximum term set by the court. According to the petitioner, this alleged classification based on wealth that affects his fundamental liberty interest cannot be justified by a compelling state interest and, therefore, violates his guarantees of equal protection of the laws. A review of the statutory framework reveals, however, that the petitioner’s reliance on the fixed maximum term as a measuring point for calculating an insanity acquittee’s date of discharge from confinement is misplaced. When § 17-257a et seq. is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the discharge date of insanity acquittees cannot be calculated in days, but rather, is indeterminate, and dependent on the acquit-tee’s ability to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others.6
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Callahan, J.
Certification was granted in this case limited to the question: “Did the state violate the guarantees of equal protection contained in the Connecticut and United States constitutions by declining to credit pretrial jail time against the length of an insanity acquittee’s commitment to a mental hospital?” Franklin v. Berger, 208 Conn. 816, 546 A.2d 282 (1988). The Appellate Court answered this question in the affirmative. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988). We disagree.
The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute and have been set forth in the opinion of the Appellate Court; id.; but can be briefly summarized as follows. On March 5, 1976, the petitioner was arrested and charged with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55.1 Although his bail, initially set at $100,000, was later reduced to $50,000, [593]*593the petitioner was unable to post a bond and was confined in jail for 293 days prior to trial. In addition, he spent 378 days in a mental hospital while his competency to stand trial was determined. Id.
On January 5, 1978, a criminal court adjudged the petitioner not guilty by reason of insanity. Pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (repealed and replaced by General Statutes § 17-257),2 the petitioner was sent to Norwich Hospital for a psychiatric examination. On April 27, 1978, the trial court found the petitioner to be a danger to himself or others and ordered him committed to a mental institution for a term of ten years pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 1977) § 53a-47 (b). See General Statutes § 17-257c (e) (1) (A). Thereafter, the state declined to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the maximum term of his commitment set by the court.
On March 24,1987, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the refusal to grant him credit for his pretrial jail time was violative of the equal protection guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.3 The habeas court denied his peti[594]*594tion finding no equal protection violation. On appeal,* **4 the Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the habeas court and held that the state’s practice of denying jail time credits to insanity acquittees violated the petitioner’s equal protection rights. Franklin v. Berger, 15 Conn. App. 74, 544 A.2d 650 (1988).
At this point we note that “the concept of equal protection [under both the state and federal constitutions5 6] has been traditionally viewed as requiring the uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to the governmental action questioned or challenged.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cen[595]*595ter, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1985); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 578, 512 A. 2d 893 (1986). The “equal protection clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages.” Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 2437, 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra, 577-78. Rather, a state may make classifications when enacting or carrying out legislation, but in order to satisfy the equal protection clause the classifications made must be based on some reasonable ground. Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283,18 S. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037 (1898); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., supra; State v. Reed, 192 Conn. 520, 531, 473 A. 2d 775 (1984). To determine whether a particular classification violates the guarantees of equal protection, the court must consider “the character of the classification; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972). Where the classification impinges upon a fundamental right or impacts upon an “inherently suspect” group, it will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be set aside unless it is justified by a compelling state interest. Id., 342; Bruno v. Civil Service Commission, 192 Conn. 335, 345, 472 A.2d 328 (1984); Laden v. Warden, 169 Conn. 540, 542, 363 A. 2d 1063 (1975). On the other hand, where the classification at issue neither impinges upon a fundamental right nor affects a suspect group “it will withstand constitutional attack if the distinction is founded on a rational basis.” Laden v. Warden, supra, 543; see also McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270, 93 S. Ct. 1055, 35 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S. Ct. 1153, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491 (1970).
[596]*596To implicate the equal protection clauses under the state and federal constitutions, therefore, it is necessary that the state statute in question, either on its face or in practice, treat persons standing in the same relation to it differently. The petitioner in the instant case argues that by refusing to credit the. time he spent in jail prior to his trial against the fixed maximum term of his commitment, the state is treating wealthy and poor insanity acquittees differently. Based on the premise that all acquittees are discharged at the expiration of the fixed maximum term of confinement set by the court at the commencement of commitment to a mental hospital under § 17-257c (e) (1) (A), the petitioner maintains that indigent acquittees who are held prior to trial because they are not able to afford bail will be confined for the full duration of the fixed maximum term in addition to the time they spend confined in jail prior to their trial, whereas those acquittees who are able to avoid confinement prior to their trial because they can afford bail will be confined only for the duration of the fixed maximum term set by the court. According to the petitioner, this alleged classification based on wealth that affects his fundamental liberty interest cannot be justified by a compelling state interest and, therefore, violates his guarantees of equal protection of the laws. A review of the statutory framework reveals, however, that the petitioner’s reliance on the fixed maximum term as a measuring point for calculating an insanity acquittee’s date of discharge from confinement is misplaced. When § 17-257a et seq. is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the discharge date of insanity acquittees cannot be calculated in days, but rather, is indeterminate, and dependent on the acquit-tee’s ability to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others.6 This being so, the state’s denial of [597]*597jail time credits to indigent acquittees such as the petitioner does not result in disparate treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees and, therefore, the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions have not been violated.
General Statutes §§ 17-257a through 17-257w govern the treatment of persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-13.* *****7 Under § 17-257c (a), a person acquitted under § 53a-13 is automatically, upon a verdict, committed by the court to the custody of the commissioner of mental health for initial confinement and examination. After a psychiatric examination in a state [598]*598hospital; General Statutes § 17-257c (b);8 the court is required to hold a hearing in order to “make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee.” General Statutes § 17-257c (e). On the basis of its findings and, “considering that its primary concern is the protection of society,” the court, under § 17-257c (e), has two options. “If the court finds that the acquittee is a person who should be confined, the court shall order the acquittee committed to the jurisdiction of the board and confined in a hospital for mental illness for custody, care and treatment pending a hearing before the board [to review the status of the acquittee].” General Statutes § 17-257c (e) (1). If confined, “the court shall fix a maximum term of commitment, not to exceed the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if the acquittee had been convicted of the offense.” General Statutes § 17-257c (e) (1) (A). At this initial hearing, the court may also determine that based on its findings “the acquittee is a person who should be discharged” and, if so, order the acquittee’s discharge. General Statutes § 17-257c (e) (2). The acquittee has the “burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a person who should be discharged.” General Statutes § 17-257c (f).
If the acquittee is confined, he is under the sole jurisdiction of the psychiatric security review board (board). General Statutes § 17-257c (h). Although the statute states that the acquittee “shall be immediately discharged at the expiration of the maximum term of commitment”; General Statutes § 17-257c (h); he may be confined for either more or less time than that originally set by the court under § 17-257c (e) (1) (A), depending on his dangerousness to himself or others. The acquittee will be discharged before the end of the [599]*599term set by the court if, after periodic status review hearings9 that are statutorily mandated during the term of the acquittee’s commitment,10 the board determines that the acquittee is a “person who should be discharged”* 11 and makes application to the court for the discharge of the acquittee from confinement under General Statutes § 17-257n (a).12 The acquittee may, however, also be confined beyond the maximum term originally set by the court if, at least ninety days prior to the expiration of said term, the state’s attorney determines that the acquittee’s discharge would “constitute a danger to himself or others” and petitions the court for an [600]*600order of continued commitment. General Statutes § 17-257n (c).13 In the case of either an application for discharge from custody or a petition for continued commitment, the court is required to conduct a hearing at which it must “make a finding as to the mental condition of the acquittee and, considering that its primary concern is the protection of society,” determine whether the acquittee is a person who should be discharged. General Statutes § 17-257n (g); see also General Statutes § 17-257n (d) and (e).
Under § 17-257n, therefore, an acquittee will not be released from confinement until he is no longer a danger to himself or others, regardless of the maximum term originally set by the court under § 17-257c (e) (1) (A). Our interpretation of § 17-257n is supported by its legislative history. Discussing the discharge of insanity [601]*601acquittees from confinement, Senator Richard B. Johnston stated that “an acquittee might only be finally discharged upon application to the Superior Court, and acting only on the recommendation of the Psychiatric Review Board. I think this is an important piece of legislation, in that I believe the public would find this as a protection of public interest, and it would enhance the public’s confidence in the fact that dangerous, or potentially dangerous mentally ill persons are not, and would not, be discharged in society.” (Emphasis added.) 28 S. Proc., Pt. 15, 1985 Sess., p. 4913.
The date of discharge of an acquittee from confinement is, therefore, not calculated by counting days as if the acquittee were sentenced to prison, but rather, is indeterminate, being totally dependant on the acquit-tee’s personal mental health. Since the fixed maximum term set by the court does not determine the date an acquittee will be discharged from confinement, the petitioner’s argument that the refusal of the state to credit his jail time against the fixed maximum term creates distinctions in the calculation of confinement time based on wealth is not valid. Subtracting an indigent acquit-tee’s pretrial jail time from the fixed maximum term will not secure his discharge from confinement any sooner than if he were not credited with jail time. Jail time credit is irrelevant in calculating the release of an insanity acquittee because he is confined or released based on his dangerousness. There is, therefore, no difference in the treatment of wealthy and indigent acquittees under § 17-257n. The discharge of all insanity acquittees from confinement, rich or poor, is based on their ability to prove that they are no longer a danger to themselves or others, not on a lapse of time. General Statutes § 17-257n (f).
In addition to arguing that the fixed maximum term set by the court at the commencement of an acquittee’s commitment is significant in calculating his discharge [602]*602date, the petitioner maintains that the expiration of said term is important because it shifts the burden to prove dangerousness under § 17-257n (f). The petitioner argues that while the acquittee has the burden to prove that he is not a danger to himself or others and that he should be discharged prior to the expiration of the fixed maximum term set by the court, he claims that the burden shifts to the state to prove that he should be retained in confinement after the expiration of the term set by the court.14 He contends, therefore, that the failure to reduce an indigent acquittee’s fixed maximum term with his pretrial jail time causes the acquit-tee to be confined for a longer period of time prior to [603]*603the shifting of the burden of proof than wealthier acquittees who make bail. We do not agree.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1987) § 17-257n (f), which discusses the need for a hearing prior to a court ruling on all applications for discharge or petitions for continued confinement, states that “the acquittee or the board when applying for an order of discharge, shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” Although § 17-257n (f) appears to be silent on the issue of who bears the burden of proof at hearings for continued commitment, amendments were made to that section in 1987 which place the burden on the acquittee to prove that he is a person who should be discharged at a hearing on an application of discharge and at a hearing on a petition for continued commitment. Public Acts 1987, No. 87-486. The 1987 amendment eliminated the language “when applying for an order of discharge” from § 17-257n (f), and the statute now reads: “After receipt of the board’s report and separate examination reports, the court shall promptly commence a hearing on the recommendation or application for discharge or petition for continued commitment. At the hearing, the acquittee shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the acquittee is a person who should be discharged.” (Emphasis added.) While the 1987 amendment is not controlling in this case,15 in our opinion the amendment was not intended by the legislature to change the existing law, but rather was meant to clarify it; see 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 28, 1987 Sess., pp. 10, 183—90; and, therefore, “the amending language ‘ “must be accepted as the legislative declaration of the meaning of the [pre-amended] act.” Tax Commissioner v. Estate of Bissell, 173 Conn. 232, 246, 377 A.2d 305 [604]*604(1977); see Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th Ed.) §§ 22.31, 22.35.’ Lee v. Board of Education, 181 Conn. 69, 75, 434 A.2d 333 (1980); see also Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 540, 489 A.2d 363 (1985).” Shelby Mutual Ins. Co. v. Della Ghelfa, 200 Conn. 630, 640-41, 513 A. 2d 52 (1986). Accordingly, in light of the 1987 amendment to § 17-257n (f), the acquittee bears the burden to prove that he is no longer a danger to himself or others when seeking discharge before the expiration of the fixed maximum term and also when contesting a petition by the state seeking continued confinement beyond the fixed maximum term. There is, therefore, no shifting of the burden of proof brought about by the petition for continued- confinement at the expiration of an insanity acquittee’s maximum term. The burden remains on the acquittee, either way, to prove that he is not a danger to himself or others before he may be discharged. There is, therefore, nothing that distinguishes insanity acquittees who are unable to make bail from those who are able to make bail.
Accordingly, because confinement of all acquittees under § 17-257 et seq. is based on dangerousness, the state’s refusal to credit the petitioner’s pretrial jail time against the fixed maximum term set by the court does not cause him to be confined for a longer period of time than acquittees who were not confined prior to trial because they were able to-post a bond. Since the statute treats all acquittees the same, the equal protection clause is not implicated. State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465, 67 S. Ct. 374, 91 L. Ed. 422 (1947) (if a “law applies to all alike, the requirements of ‘equal protection [of the laws]’ are met.”)
The judgment of the Appellate Court is reversed.
In this opinion Covello and Hull, Js., concurred.