SIMPSON, Circuit Judge:
Appellants, Arthur Jackson, Jr. and Jasper Lee (“Tiny”) Cooks, appeal from the denial by two separate Alabama federal district courts of their respective petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The only issue presented by Jackson and one of two issues presented by Cooks is whether an indigent Alabama state prisoner unable to make bond due to indigency and who is sentenced to less than the statutory maximum sentence for his offense is entitled to credit on his sentence for the period of pre-trial or presentence detention. Cooks makes an additional contention: that he is entitled to credit against his sentence for the time he spent in custody pending direct appeal of his conviction, because of asserted unconstitutionality of the Alabama statutory scheme,1 which automatically suspends the execution of sentence pending appeal unless the appellant elects otherwise. We affirm the denials of both petitions for habeas corpus on the authority of binding prior decisions of this court. See United States v. Automobile Club Ins. Co., 5 Cir. 1975, 522 F.2d 1; Linebery v. United States, 5 Cir. 1975, 512 F.2d 510.
The underlying facts as to the appellants’ claims are briefly as follows: On September, 1970, Jackson was arrested and charged with first degree murder, Title 14, Section 314, Code of Alabama. Bail was fixed at $5,000, which Jackson contends he was unable to meet due to indigency. On August 19, 1972, however, after having spend approximately 23 months in custody awaiting trial Jackson made bond and was released. In a jury trial on April 20, 1973, Jackson was convicted of murder in the second degree, an included offense under the Alabama Statute, and was sentenced by the jury to 18 years imprisonment in the state penitentiary. Title 14, Section 318, Code of Alabama, provides that the sentence for second degree murder is within the discretion of the jury, provided that the term of imprisonment shall not be for less than 10 years in the state [1233]*1233penitentiary. Jackson did not appeal directly from his conviction, and did not seek state post-conviction relief by habeas corpus, error coram nobis or otherwise. Instead on September 11, 1974, he petitioned the court below for habeas corpus relief.2 His petition asserted that Jackson was entitled to credit toward the service of his 18 year sentence for the 23 months he was held in pre-trial custody, averring that the denial of such credit by the State contravened: (i) the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment; (ii) the Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment, applicable to the states-under the Fourteenth Amendment; (iii) the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district judge denied the petition holding that under the decisions of this court in Cobb v. Bailey, 5 Cir. 1972, 469 F.2d 1068, and Gremillion v. Henderson, 5 Cir. 1970, 425 F.2d 1293, Jackson was not entitled to credit for pre-sentence jail time.
Appellant Cooks was arrested on June 28, 1971, for burglary in the first degree, Title 14, Section 85, Code of Alabama. Bail was set at $15,000 on February 14, 1972. Cooks alleges he was unable to post bail due to his' indigency. He was held' in pre-trial detention for 283 days at the Mobile City and County Jails. Cooks was convicted at a jury trial on April 6, 1972 and sentenced to serve the statutory minimum sentence for first degree burglary of ten years in the state penitentiary,3 Title 14, Section 85, Code of Alabama. After the entry of judgment and sentence, Cooks filed a notice of appeal which under Alabama law automatically suspends execution of the sentence. Bail pending appeal was set at $10,000, which Cooks alleges he was unable to meet due to indigency. On April 26, 1972, he was transferred from the Mobile County Jail pursuant to court order to the State’s Medical and Diagnostic Center at Mt. Meigs, Alabama. He remained at Mt. Meigs until June 28, 1973, when he was transferred to the Alabama State Penitentiary at Holman, Alabama.
Cooks’ conviction was affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on February 13, 1973, and certiorari review was denied by the Alabama Supreme Court on April 19, 1973. Cooks v. State, 1973, 50 Ala.App. 49, 276 So.2d 634, cert. denied 1973, 290 Ala. 363, 276 So.2d 640. Since Cooks did not elect to take a “working” appeal under Alabama law his ten year sentence did not begin to run until April 19, 1973, the date on which the Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari review of his conviction. Therefore, Cooks received no credit for the 387 days which he spent in post-trial custody pending appeal. His right to credit against his ten year sentence for these 387 days is the second issue raised by Cooks’ appeal.
[1234]*1234In June 1973, Cooks filed two pro se petitions for the writ of error coram no-bis in the Mobile County Circuit Court collaterally attacking his conviction and seeking credit on the service of his sentence for the time he spent in post and pre-trial confinement. These petitions were denied by the trial judge.4
On April 2, 1974, Cooks filed his habeas petition in the court below urging four separate grounds for relief. One of the grounds5 urged by Cooks in support of his habeas petition was that he had been unlawfully denied credit toward service of his ten year sentence for the periods he was held in Mobile City and County Jails prior to trial and at the county jail and the facility at Mt. Meigs during the pendency of his appeal. The district court denied relief holding (1) that since Cooks had received a minimum sentence of ten years under the statute credit for pre-trial detention was not required, citing Cobb v. Bailey, supra; Hill v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1972, 465 F.2d 414; Hart v. Henderson, 5 Cir. 1971, 449 F.2d 183; and (a) that since he had not opted for a “working” appeal he was not entitled to credit for post-trial incarceration, citing Duke v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1970, 429 F.2d 531; Tandler v. Blackwell, 5 Cir. 1969, 412 F.2d 780.
PRE-SENTENCE JAIL TIME
The issue common to both appeals then is whether an indigent criminal defendant held in custody in a local jail prior to trial and sentencing due to his inability to post bail is entitled to credit for pre-sentence detention time upon the sentence ultimately imposed after conviction. The appellants’ position is that the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment require that the State grant such credit, that denial thereof constitutes an unconstitutional restriction upon a criminal defendant’s exercise of the right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and further constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. In support of these contentions the appellants rely on decisions of other circuits which hold that a State must grant credit to an indigent criminal defendant for all pre-sentence custody time even when the combined period of confinement (actual sentence plus time spent in pre-sentence custody) does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence proscribed for an offense. See King v. Wyrick, 8 Cir. 1975, 516 F.2d 321; Ham v. North Carolina, 4 Cir. 1971, 471 F.2d 406; Monsour v. Gray, E.D.Wis.1973, 375 F.Supp. 786; White v. Gilligan, S.D.Ohio 1972, 351 F.Supp. 1012. We are bound by prior decisions in this circuit on this issue and hence decline to follow the rationale of the cited cases.
Gremillion v. Henderson, supra, was the first case in which we considered [1235]*1235whether a state prisoner may be granted federal habeas corpus relief allowing credit on his sentence for time spent in custody prior to sentencing. We held that the State prisoner’s claim was not cognizable under federal habeas corpus because “there is no federal constitutional right to credit for time served prior to sentence”, and in the absence of a state statute the granting of such credit is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. Gremillion, supra, at 1294. See also Culotta v. Pickett, 7 Cir. 1974, 506 F.2d 1061, 1063, cert. denied 1975, 421 U.S. 968, 95 S.Ct. 1961, 44 L.Ed.2d 458. Subsequent decisions of this court while adhering to the basic rule of Gremillion v. Henderson, supra, have narrowed the scope of that rule as a result of Williams v. Illinois, 1970, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586, and Tate v. Short, 1971, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130.
The Supreme Court held in Williams v. Illinois that an indigent criminal defendant may not be confined beyond the statutory maximum term of imprisonment provided for a given offense because of his inability to pay a fine and court costs. Noting that although a state has wide latitude in fixing the punishment for state crimes, the Court stated: “once the State has defined the outer limits of incarceration necessary to satisfy its penological interests and policies, it may not then subject a certain class of convicted defendants to a period of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum solely by reason of their indigency”. Ibid at 241-42, 90 S.Ct. at 2022, 26 L.Ed.2d at 593 (emphasis supplied). Following Williams v. Illinois, the Court in Tate v. Short, supra, held that since the State of Texas had “legislated a ‘fines only’ policy for traffic offenses, that statutory ceiling cannot, consistently with the Equal Protection Clause, limit the punishment to payment of the fine if one is able to pay it, yet convert the fine into a prison term for an indigent defendant without the means to pay his fine.” Tate v. Short, supra at 399, 91 S.Ct. at 671, 28 L.Ed.2d at 133-34 (emphasis added).
This court in Hart v. Henderson, supra, after the decisions in Williams v. Illinois and Tate v. Short came down, was confronted with the factual situation where a prisoner had been sentenced to the statutory maximum term provided for an offense and given no credit on the service of that sentence for the time he was held in jail pending trial. We held in Hart v. Henderson “that the inability of an indigent criminal defendant to make bond should not result in extending the duration of his imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum ”. Hart v. Henderson, supra at 185 (emphasis added). Under the teachings of Williams v. Illinois, supra, and Tate v. Short, supra, we vacated the judgment of the district court denying Hart habeas corpus relief, and remanded for a determination of whether the appellant had been unable to post bail due to indigency. Again, in Hill v. Wainwright, 5 Cir. 1972, 465 F.2d 414, a case factually on all fours with Hart v. Hederson, supra, we followed the Hart exception to the basic rule of Gremillion, supra, and held that “a state prisoner who has received the maximum imposable prison sentence for an offense must be given credit for all presentence jail time if he was unable to make bail due to his indigence”. Id. at 415 (emphasis added). Hill v. Wainwright, supra, distinguished Gremillion v. Henderson on the ground that the appellant in that case had not received the maximum imposable prison sentence. Ibid, at 415, n. 3. Hence, although the decisions in Hart v. Henderson, supra, and Hill v. Wainwright, supra, narrowed the applicable scope of the rule enunciated in Gremillion v. Henderson, supra, in neither case did we hold contrary to Gremillion that all indigent state prisoners have an absolute constitutional right to credit for time spent in pre-sentence custody. Cobb v. Bailey, 469 F.2d at 1070; Parker v. Estelle, 5 Cir. 1974, 498 F.2d 625, 627, cert. denied 1975, 421 U.S. 963, 95 S.Ct. 1951, 44 L.Ed.2d 450.
The adherence of this circuit to the Gremillion rule as qualified by the decisions in Hart and Hill is illustrated by [1236]*1236Cobb v. Bailey, wherein an Alabama state prisoner contended that because she had received the maximum imposable sentence for the crime for which she was convicted she was entitled under Hart v. Henderson, supra, to credit on her sentence for pre-conviction jail time. We rejected the contention that the decision in Gremillion was eroded by our decision in Hart v. Henderson, noting that it was evident that there is no constitutional right to credit for time served pri- or to sentencing since it was necessary for Congress in 1966 to pass legislation, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 3568, requiring that in the future federal prisoners be given such credit. Following the decision in Gremillion this court denied relief to the appellant in Cobb since she had been held originally for a nonbailable offense and had not alleged that after bail was allowed she was discriminatorily denied the opportunity to make it.
Most recently, in Parker v. Estelle, supra, Judge Clark speaking for this court, clarified the rule in this circuit for crediting the sentences of state prisoners with pre-sentence jail time.
“[T]he plenary scope of Gremillion has been qualified by Hart v. Henderson, supra, and Hill v. Wainwright [supra], which hold that, although there is no absolute right to pre-sentence detention credit, a denial of such credit due to a defendant’s poverty (e. g., the financial inability to make bail) or to some other constitutionally impermissible basis will not be allowed to extend a state prisoner’s sentence beyond the maximum prescribed for the crime.”
Ibid 498 F.2d at 627.
The appellant in Parker, however, did not contend, as had the petitioners in Hart and Hill, that he was entitled to pre-conviction credit because he was unable to make bond due to indigency. Rather, the issues presented in Parker were (i) whether the Texas statutory scheme which required credit for post-conviction time spent in a mental institution,6 but provided that the granting of credit for pre-conviction time spent in a mental institution was within the discretion of the court7 invidiously discriminated between similar classes in contravention of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (ii) whether the disallowance of such credit violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Parker v. Estelle, supra at 627, nn. 3, 4. However, the court in Parker found it unnecessary to address the appellant’s challenge to the constitutionality of the Texas statutory scheme or his due process and double jeopardy arguments since it rejected the assertion that credit was denied, because the jury had been urged to consider the period of pre-sentence confinement in determining punishment and had returned a sentence of only ten years for an offense which carried a maximum penalty of life. Thus, Parker holds that since the sentence imposed plus the time spent in pre-sentence custody totaled less than the maximum imposable sentence for the offense, then, as in federal cases, there was a presumption that the jury in imposing sentence had given credit for the period of pre-sen-tence custody.
The rule in this circuit distilled from prior decisions, as to whether a [1237]*1237state prisoner is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief for credit on the service of his sentence for time spent in custody or detention prior to trial or sentencing is: While there is no absolute constitutional right to pre-sentence detention credit as such, where a person is held for a bailable offense and is unable to make bail due to indigency then if he is upon conviction sentenced to the statutory maximum imposable sentence for the offense he is entitled to credit for the time spent in jail prior to sentencing. See Parker v. Estelle, supra; Cobb v. Bailey, supra; Hill v. Wainwright, supra; Hart v. Henderson, supra; Gremillion v. Henderson, supra; Brown v. Beto, S.D.Tex. 1973, 359 F.Supp. 118, 121. Accord Hook v. Arizona, 9 Cir. 1974, 496 F.2d 1172. See also Gelis v. State, Fla.App.1973, 287 So.2d 368; State v. Williams, 1972, 262 La. 769, 264 So.2d 638; Meeks v. State, Mo.App.1974, 512 S.W.2d 215; State v. Crockrell, Mo.1971, 470 S.W.2d 507; Curlin v. State, Tex.Cr.App.1974, 505 S.W.2d 889; Ex Parte Freeman, Tex.Cr.App. 1972, 486 S.W.2d 556. The rationale of this rule is that to deny credit to indigent defendants in these circumstances would result in extending their sentences beyond the maximum prescribed for their offense, and in the imposition of a greater sentence than that determined by the state legislature as necessary to satisfy the states “penological interests and policies. 8 Williams v. Illinois, supra, at 242, 90 S.Ct. at 2022, 26 L.Ed.2d at 593. Applying the above test we hold that neither Jackson or Cooks has stated a claim cognizable on a federal writ of habeas corpus because, assuming that they failed to make bail because of indi-gency at the applicable time, both appellants upon conviction were sentenced to terms of imprisonment considerably less than the statutory maximum prescribed by the State of Alabama for their crimes.
ACT NO. 58
The appellants’ second contention with respect to pre-sentence credit is that Act No. 58 passed by the Alabama Legislature and signed into law on March 10, 1975,9 requiring that in the future the sentence of any persons convicted of any felony or misdemeanor be credited with time spent incarcerated pending trial, must be applied retrospectively since otherwise the Act establishes an irrational classification of persons sentenced before and after its effective date, and thus, invidiously discriminates against those persons in the former class in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 This claim is grounded on cases from the Fourth Circuit which hold that a similar statute granting credit for presentence confinement denied equal pro-
[1238]*1238tection to persons sentenced prior to the effective date of the act, and, therefore, that all prisoners have equal rights to credit for time served irrespective of whether they were sentenced before or after the enactment of the statute. See Ham v. North Carolina, 4 Cir. 1973, 471 F.2d 406; Mott v. Dail, E.D.N.C.1972, 337 F.Supp. 731, appeal dismissed, 4 Cir. 1973, 473 F.2d 908. See also Cole v. North Carolina, 4 Cir. 1969, 419 F.2d 127; People v. Frye, 1966, 35 Ill.2d 604, 221 N.E.2d 262. Because Act No. 58 was passed subsequent to the filing of these appeals the appellants did not urge this contention in their petitions filed in the district courts below, nor did they present it to the courts of Alabama. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, however, considered this issue in Ex Parte Miller, 1975, 54 Ala.App. 590, 310 So.2d 890, and held that Act No. 58 was not retroactive. Also, in Bryant v. Skinner, M.D.Ala.1975, Civil No. 75-301-N, District Judge Varner has held that Act No. 58 was not intended to apply retroactively, and does not deny equal protection to prisoners sentenced prior to the effective date of the Act. We agree.
As discussed above, pre-sentence credit is not an absolute constitutional right. It follows that Act No. 58 simply confers a benefit, not previously provided,11 on state prisoners sentenced after March 10, 1975. This is, of course, the result of all ameliorative legislation which goes into effect on a certain date.12 The enactment of ameliorative legislation or the repeal of a criminal statute, however, has not- been held to “arrest or interfere” with the execution of a finalized sentence. See Colvin v. Estelle, 5 Cir.1975, 506 F.2d 747; Welch v. Hudspeth, 10 Cir. 1942, 132 F.2d 434; United States ex rel. Cheramie v. Dutton, 5 Cir. 1935, 74 F.2d 740, cert. denied 295 U.S. 733, 55 S.Ct. 644, 79 L.Ed. 1681; Mirenda v. Ulibarri, C.D.Cal. 1972, 351 F.Supp. 676; Cherry v. Goslin, W.D.La.1972, 350 F.Supp. 1162; Comment, Today’s Law and Yesterday’s Crime: Retroactive Application of Ameliorative Criminal Legislation, 121 U.Pa. L.Rev. 120 (1972). We find in the circumstances here present that the “factors of reliance and burden on the administration of justice”, Stovall v. Denno, 1967, 388 U.S. 293, 300, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1205, outweigh the apparent inequity in determining a fixed cutoff date, and we hold also that the Alabama legislature’s conferring only prospectively the benefits of Act No. 58 violated no constitutional guarantee. See Jones v. Cupp, 9 Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 1091; Williams v. United States, 1964, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 255, 335 F.2d 290; Graham v. Thompson, 10 Cir. 1957, 246 F.2d 805; Comerford v. Commonwealth, 1 Cir. 1956, 233 F.2d 294, cert. denied 352 U.S. 899, 77 S.Ct. 141, 1 L.Ed.2d 90.
POST SENTENCE JAIL TIME
Under Alabama law a convicted felon is given the option of taking either a “non-working” appeal under Title 15, Section 372, Code of Alabama (Recomp. 1958) or a “working” appeal under Title 15, Section 373, Code of Alabama (Re-[1239]*1239comp.1958).13 Pursuant to Section 372 when a person convicted of an offense informs the trial court of his intention to appeal the court enters judgment but suspends execution of the sentence during the pendency of the appeal. While the appeal is pending the appellant has a right to bail, unless he was sentenced to more than 20 years’ imprisonment. Persons unable to gain release during appeal remain in custody in the county jail, and do not receive credit toward the service of the sentence imposed. An appellant, however, pursuant to Section 373 has the option, at any time before the trial transcript is forwarded to the appellate court, to waive suspension of sentence and begin service of his sentence in the state penitentiary. Whether a “nonworking” or a “working” appeal is elected does not affect the appellate process.
Although he did not elect to take a “working” appeal, Cooks contends nonetheless that he is entitled to credit for the time he was held in post sentence custody pending appeal in the Mobile County Jail and in the facility at Mt. Meigs. The claim is that the denial of such credit impedes access to the courts in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutes invidious discrimination on the basis of wealth in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and constitutes multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the Fifth Amendment as it applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Cooks principally relies in this respect upon Robinson v. Beto, 5 Cir. 1970, 426 F.2d 797, and Hart v. Henderson, supra, wherein this court held the Texas and Louisiana mandatory suspension of execution statutes unconstitutional under North Carolina v. Pearce, 1969, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2089, 23 L.Ed.2d 656.
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal; however, this court in Gamble v. Alabama, 5 Cir. 1975, 509 F.2d 95, cert. denied 423 U.S. 924, 96 S.Ct. 267, 46 L.Ed.2d 250, rejected the contention that Hart v. Henderson, supra, and Robinson v. Beto, supra, control the validity of the Alabama statutory scheme, and held that Section 373 was constitutional. Judge Godbold stated for the court in Gamble :
“The statutes scrutinized and ultimately held invalid in Hart and Robinson automatically stayed execution of sentence during pendency of appeal. An automatic stay would necessarily require a prisoner considering an appeal to weigh the doubt of success against the certainty of extended incarceration upon denial of appeal. The natural effect of these automatic stay statutes would be to inhibit the taking of appeals.
The Alabama scheme is, on its face, dissimilar from the Louisiana and Texas automatic suspension statutes. In Alabama stay of sentence execution is avoidable, and avoidance results in no adverse effect to the prisoner taking appeal. Appellee [Gamble] has not [1240]*1240contended that despite facial fairness the Alabama statutes in fact operate to curb the taking of appeals. In the absence of such a contention and supportive evidence of a ‘chilling’ effect, we find the Alabama optional stay of sentence scheme fulfills the due process requirements of Pearce.”
Gamble v. Alabama, supra, at 97.
Relying on Dimmick v. Tompkins, 1904, 194 U.S. 540, 24 S.Ct. 780, 48 L.Ed. 1110, the decision in Gamble also rejected the contention that credit must be granted for jail time served pending appeal because the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, found that the double jeopardy clause precludes multiple punishments for a single offense. The Supreme Court held in Dimmick that the petitioner, a federal prisoner, was not entitled to credit on his two year sentence for the 18-month period he was held in a county jail rather than in the penitentiary during the pendency of his appeal. Finding that Dimmick’s sentence specified “imprisonment in . prison”, and that he had sought detention in jail rather than in the penitentiary during the appeal, the Court stated that he could not “take advantage of his own action to thereby shorten the term of imprisonment in the state prison . . . . To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with the general principle that a person shall not be permitted to take advantage of any act of another which was committed upon his request, or was caused by his own conduct.” Dimmick v. Tompkins, supra, at 548-49, 24 S.Ct. at 782, 48 L.Ed.2d at 1114 (emphasis added). In Gamble we further found that the “appellee alone determined the locus of his detention and had the power to compel his own transfer to prison. He failed to exercise that power and cannot now complain of the result.” Gamble v. Alabama, supra, at 98.
Counsel for appellant asserts that Dimmick and Gamble are distinguishable from the present case since the record here does not demonstrate that Cooks voluntarily and knowingly waived the right to commence service of his sentence in the state prison, nor that he was informed of his right to choose a “working appeal”. Cf. Allen v. Henderson, 5 Cir. 1970, 434 F.2d 26. Statements by Cooks contained in pro se petitions and motions filed in the court below and in the Circuit Court of Mobile County refute this. They indicate, rather, that although informed of the option of taking a “working” appeal he chose, over the advice of his trial counsel, to take a “non working” or “standing”‘appeal.14 Cooks also seeks to distinguish Gamble from the present case since Cooks, unlike the appellee in Gamble, was transferred from the county jail to the Medical and Diagnostic Center at Mt. Meigs, Alabama, three weeks after conviction, and, therefore, was not given the benefits of local confinement. This contention is similarly without merit in light of the fact that appellant’s transfer to the facility at Mt. Meigs 15 “was caused by his own conduct”, Dimmick, supra, while confined in the county jail.16 It does not lie in Cooks’ mouth now to complain [1241]*1241since his own actions, like those of the petitioner in Dimmick and the appellee in Gamble, “resulted in his incarcerati n in the county jail [and at Mt. Meigs] and the resultant suspension of sentence execution”. Gamble v. Alabama, supra, at 98.
The judgments appealed from are each AFFIRMED.