Fornix Holdings LLC, et al. v. MW Media

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: June 29, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-04327
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Fornix Holdings LLC, et al., No. CV-25-04327-PHX-SMB

10 Plaintiffs, ORDER

11 v.

12 MW Media,

13 Defendant. 14 15 The Court now considers MW MEDIA’s (“MW”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 16 Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. 16). The Court denies the motion for the following reasons. 17 I. BACKGROUND 18 This action is brought by Plaintiffs Fornix Holdings LLC and CP Productions, 19 Inc.—Arizona corporations that “that own or license registered copyrights in various adult 20 video works.” (Doc. 1 at 1.) Plaintiffs allege that MW operates a website (the “Website”) 21 “that has been unlawfully hosting, storing, and redistributing copyrighted works.” (Id. 22 at 2.) MW is a Polish civil partnership with a permanent place of business in Poland. (Id. 23 at 3.) MW moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 24 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. 25 II. LEGAL STANDARD 26 When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, “[u]ncontroverted allegations in the 27 complaint must be taken as true, and factual disputes are construed in the plaintiff’s favor.” 28 Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero L. Grp., 905 F.3d 597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 “Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is proper where permitted by a 2 long-arm statute and where the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate federal due 3 process.” AMA Multimedia, LLC v. Wanat, 970 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2020), overruled 4 on other grounds by, Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739 (9th Cir. 2025). 5 The Court evaluates personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). “This Rule, which is 6 commonly known as the federal long-arm statute, permits federal courts to exercise 7 personal jurisdiction over a defendant that lacks contacts with any single state if the 8 complaint alleges federal claims and the defendant maintains sufficient contacts with the 9 United States as a whole.” Getz v. Boeing Co., 654 F.3d 852, 858 (9th Cir. 2011). This 10 Rule “was established in response to the Supreme Court’s suggestion that the rules be 11 extended to cover persons who do not reside in the United States, and have ample contacts 12 with the nation as a whole, but whose contacts are so scattered among states that none of 13 them would have jurisdiction.” Lang Van, Inc. v. VNG Corp., 40 F.4th 1034, 1040 (9th 14 Cir. 2022) (citation modified). 15 Rule 4(k)(2) applies when: (1) the claim asserted against the defendant arises under 16 federal law; (2) “the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s court of general 17 jurisdiction”; and (3) “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States 18 Constitution and laws.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2). The first two prongs are undisputed here.1 19 The analysis under the third prong is “nearly identical to the traditional personal 20 jurisdiction analysis with one significant difference: rather than considering contacts 21 between the defendants and the forum state, [courts] consider contacts with the nation as a 22 whole.” Lang Van, Inc, 40 F.4th at 1041 (citation modified). 23 A court has jurisdiction over a defendant not present in the forum if the defendant 24 has “certain minimum contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the suit does 25 not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v.

26 1 MW’s Motion primarily argues that it is not subject to jurisdiction in Arizona. (Doc. 16 at 11.) MW does not identify any other state where it would be subject to jurisdiction. 27 Thus, this Court is entitled to analyze jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2). See Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wartsila N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 461 (9th Cir. 2007). MW acknowledges 28 that “Plaintiffs may attempt to invoke [Rule] 4(k)(2),” but do not contend that the Rule does not apply here. 1 Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citation modified). The Court only evaluates 2 whether it has specific personal jurisdiction over MW because Plaintiffs do not contend 3 that MW is subject to general personal jurisdiction. 4 “There are three requirements for a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a 5 nonresident defendant: (1) the defendant must either purposefully direct his activities 6 toward the forum or purposefully avail himself of the privileges of conducting activities in 7 the forum; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s 8 forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play 9 and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, 10 Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation modified). The parties primarily dispute 11 the first prong. 12 Here, the first prong is evaluated under the “effects test.” See id. at 1069. Under 13 this test “the defendant must have (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at 14 the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 15 forum state.’” Id. (citation modified). The parties primarily dispute the second element. 16 At a general level, the second element is satisfied “[s]o long as a commercial actor’s 17 efforts are ‘purposefully directed’ toward residents of another State.” Briskin, 135 F.4th 18 at 752 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). Applied to 19 “conduct occurring in cyberspace,” the Ninth Circuit recognizes: (1) “contacts with the 20 forum state could be in the form of electronic contacts”; and (2) “‘something more’ than 21 mere passive nationwide accessibility [is] required to show express aiming at the forum 22 state and, thus, satisfy due process.” Id. (quoting Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 23 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)). “In determining whether a nonresident defendant has done 24 ‘something more,’ [courts consider] several factors, including the interactivity of the 25 defendant’s website; the geographic scope of the defendant’s commercial ambitions; and 26 whether the defendant ‘individually targeted’ a plaintiff known to be a forum resident.” 27 Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 28 modified). 1 The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that “express aiming” does not require a 2 defendant to have a “forum-specific focus” or “differential targeting.” Briskin, 135 F.4th 3 at 757. Instead, it is sufficient “if the company knows—either actually or constructively 4 about its customer base there and exploits that base for commercial gain.” Id. (citation 5 modified). Thus, “an interactive platform ‘expressly aims’ its wrongful conduct toward a 6 forum state when its contacts are its own choice and not random, isolated, or fortuitous, 7 even if that platform cultivates a nationwide audience for commercial gain.” Id. at 758 8 (citation modified) (first quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 9 351, 359 (2021); then quoting Mavrix Photo, 647 F.3d at 1230). 10 III. DISCUSSION 11 The Court begins with the Complaint’s allegations related to personal jurisdiction. 12 A. Personal Jurisdiction Allegations 13 The Complaint alleges as follows. MW is a Polish civil partnership and is the 14 designated service provider for the Website. (Doc. 1 at 3.) The Website provides that its 15 staff members and primary operations are based out of Hong Kong. (Id.) MW uses 16 whoisproxy.com for the Website, which has a Virginia address. (Id.) Plaintiffs contend 17 that personal jurisdiction is proper for the following reasons. 18 MW, through the Website, purposefully targeted the United States and a significant 19 portion of the Website’s users are based in the United States. (Id. at 4.) “[P]ublicly 20 available Google Trends historical data” show that searches for the Website occur “often” 21 in the United States and have occurred in each state. (Id.) The Website generates revenue 22 through “third-party advertising.” (Id. at 9.) MW used proxy and privacy services offered 23 by an American company and applied United States’ law on the Website. (Id. at 4.) MW 24 also used “Google, Bing, and Yahoo analytics to track the web traffic it uses for advertising 25 sales; and direct[ed] their users to its affiliated Reddit site and X profile, all of which are 26 U.S.-based.” (Id.) 27 Plaintiffs also point out that MW uses a “.com” top-level domain (“TLD”), which 28 can only operate with the services of VeriSign, Inc., a United States based company that 1 “is the authoritative registry for all domain names with the TLDs ‘.com.’” (Id.) Thus, 2 Plaintiffs contend that the Website “maintains the operation and popularity of its site 3 through use of a combination of . . . U.S.-based services.” (Id.) 4 B. Analysis 5 1. Purposeful Direction (“Effects Test”) 6 The Court first analyzes whether MW purposefully directed its activities towards 7 the United States. Again, this is evaluated under the effects test which asks whether MW 8 (1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the United States, (3) causing harm 9 known to likely be suffered in the United States. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228. The first 10 prong is not at issue in this case—operating a passive website is an intentional act.2 See, 11 e.g., Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 12 2010). Rather, the parties heavily contest whether MW expressly aimed this act at the 13 United States. Again, under Briskin, express aiming does not require MW to have had a 14 “United States focus.” 15 The Ninth Circuit found that the “expressly aims” requirements were satisfied when 16 a defendant “continuously and deliberately exploited” the forum’s market for commercial 17 gain by operating “a website whose economic value turns, in significant measure, on its 18 appeal to [forum residents].” See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1230. This case is similar to Mavrix. 19 To start, MW “makes money by selling advertising space on its website to 20 third-party advertisers: the more visitors there are to the site, the more hits that are made 21 on the advertisements; the more hits that are made on the advertisements, the more money 22 that is paid by the advertisers to” MW. See id. Additionally, the Website appeals to a 23 United States audience as Plaintiff alleges that a sizeable portion of its users are based in 24 the United States. (Doc. 1 at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that the Website generates 25 revenue solely through advertisements as users are not charged for using the website. (Id.

26 2 Plaintiffs, in their Reply, note that the “Website is more than a purely passive website because it has interactive features ‘that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of 27 computer files over the Internet,’ and ‘visitors must agree to certain terms and conditions’ . . . in order to make full use of the site.” (Doc. 17 at 8.) These points are well 28 taken. See Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1226; UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344, 353 (4th Cir. 2020). Nonetheless, these allegations do not appear in the Complaint. 1 at 9.) Taken together, the Website’s revenues are linked in sizeable part to the American 2 market. 3 Thus, it is also clear that MW knew, “either actually or constructively[,] about its 4 [United States] user base, and that it exploits that base for commercial gain by selling space 5 on its website for advertisements.” Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1230. On this point, “it is 6 immaterial whether” MW specifically targeted the United States. Id. Aside from a large 7 United States-userbase, it is alleged that MW: used American and proxy services; invoked 8 United States’ law on its website; used United States analytic and social media companies; 9 and maintains its TLD through a United States based company. (Doc. 1 at 3–5.) The Court 10 also notes that the Website is alleged to have hosted copyrighted American works and that 11 MW was notified of this fact. (Id. at 8–9.) In this way, the Website uses American services 12 to host American content viewed by American viewers. These facts, construed in 13 Plaintiffs’ favor, demonstrate that MW’s contacts with the United States were not “random, 14 isolated, or fortuitous.” Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984). These 15 facts demonstrate that MW knew of its United States user base and generated revenue from 16 that audience through advertising revenue. At bottom, the ongoing availability and 17 sustained profitability of the Website depends on American companies and citizens. 18 For its part, MW primarily points to the connections that MW does not have with 19 the United States. For example, MW points out that it neither has an office within the 20 United States nor is it registered here. (Doc. 16 at 12.) While true, these points do little to 21 assist the Court in evaluating the contacts MW does have with the United States. 22 Also, MW erroneously relies on this District’s decision in AMA Multimedia LLC v. 23 Wanat, No. CV-15-01674-PHX-ROS, 2017 WL 5668025 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’d, 24 970 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2020), which similarly evaluated whether there was personal 25 jurisdiction over MW under nearly identical circumstances. Although that court found that 26 personal jurisdiction did not exist, and that decision was affirmed on appeal, the Ninth 27 Circuit in Briskin expressly disavowed the thrust of those decisions and their incorrect 28 application of Mavrix. Of note, Judge Gould dissented on appeal in AMA and concluded 1 that there is personal jurisdiction over MW. The court in Briskin specifically noted that 2 Judge Gould relied “on a correct reading of Mavrik.” 135 F.4th at 757 n.14. The Court is 3 thus persuaded by Judge Gould’s dissent in AMA and finds that it applies here. 970 F.3d 4 at 1218 (Gould, J., dissenting). 5 2. Relates 6 The Court next considers whether Plaintiffs’ claim “arises out of or relates to the 7 defendant’s forum-related activities.” Axiom, 874 F.3d at 1068. The Court finds it does. 8 Here, the Website allegedly displayed copyright infringing videos, causing harm to 9 Plaintiffs in the United States. But for the Website, Plaintiffs would not have been harmed 10 in the forum. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ harm arises out of MW’s United States contacts. Cf. 11 Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1228 (“[The claimant’s] claim of copyright infringement arises out of 12 [the defendant’s] publication of the photos on a website accessible to users in the forum 13 state.”). 14 3. Reasonable 15 Finally, the Court considers whether it is reasonable to assert personal jurisdiction 16 over MW. This is determined based on a seven-factor balancing tests that looks to: (1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s 17 affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the 18 extent of conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial 19 resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the 20 plaintiff’s interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum. 21 Briskin, 135 F.4th at 761 (citation modified). MW bears the burden of presenting a 22 “compelling case” that exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. MW fails to 23 meet its burden; MW dedicates approximately one conclusory sentence to each factor. 24 At bottom, the Court already addressed that MW’s interjection into the United States 25 weighs in favor of jurisdiction. Additionally, the United States has a strong interest in 26 enforcing federal intellectual property laws and redressing corresponding injuries. MW’s 27 arguments on the remaining factors are bereft of any substance. For example, MW argues 28 that “the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of Defendant’s domicile contradicts 1 || with Polish and United States laws.” (Doc. 16 at 15.) MW does not expound on this 2|| supposed conflict or contradiction. MW’s other arguments proceed in a similarly vague || fashion. 4 The only factor that MW spends more than a single sentence discussing 1s the second 5 || factor—the burden to defend. The Court recognizes that it would be burdensome for MW 6 || to defend in the United States; however, MW merely points to the fact that it would have 7 || to “hire outside counsel and possibly travel and expend additional resources and expenses.” 8 || (Doc. 16 at 14.) While burdensome, this is insufficient to render the exercise of jurisdiction 9|| unreasonable. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is personal jurisdiction over MW. 10], IV. CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, 12 IT IS ORDERED denying Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction 13 || (Doc. 16). 14 Dated this 29th day of June, 2026. 15 = . 16 SO ts 17 A lonorable Susan M. Brnovich United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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