Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. United States

139 F.2d 973, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2405
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedDecember 30, 1943
Docket10109
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 139 F.2d 973 (Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Food & Grocery Bureau of Southern California, Inc. v. United States, 139 F.2d 973, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2405 (9th Cir. 1943).

Opinion

DENMAN, Circuit Judge.

The Food and Grocery Bureau, a corporation, hereinafter .called the Bureau, and the persons composing its directorate, appeal from ■ a judgment of the district court in a jury waived case convicting them of conspiring to restrain interstate commerce in fixing retail prices of food -and groceries sold in the State of California but in large part brought into the state with the intent to sell them at the fixed prices, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1.

Appellants contended below that there was no violation of the Sherman Act if all their activities were confined to making effective the California Unfair Practices Act. 1 With this the district court agreed, stating: “* * * The Unfair Practices Act of California contains nothing which, in itself, is a violation of the anti-trust statute. -It forbids certain practices. And had the Bureau limited itself to advising the Trade, from time to time, as to the manner -of complying with it, had they been satisfied with issuing, from time to time, real surveys to guide persons in fixing their prices, there, probably, would have been no prosecution. * * *.” United States v. Food and Grocery Bureau of Southern California, D.C., 43 F.Supp. 974, 980.

. The language of the rulings in the trial court show that the issue there tried was whether the appellants’ price fixing activities were confined to acts making effective the Unfair Practices Act. The district court held they were not. With this we agree, and hence are not required to determine whether the enforcement of the California Unfair. Practices Act would violate the Sherman Act^

Our analysis of the Unfair Practices Act shows that it doe's not propose to prohibit sales below the cost of the vendor. He may sell his merchandise at any price he pleases in the ordinary course of his business. It is only when his sales are accompanied by the intent to injure some competitor or to destroy competition or to divert trade from a competitor that he is penalized. This appears from Section 3, of which the pertinent portions are:

“§ 3. It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business within this State, to sell any article or product at less than the cost thereof to such vendor, or give away any article or product, for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition, and he shall also be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be subject to the penalties set out in section 11 of this act for any such act. * * *
“The prohibition of this act shall be deemed among the other purposes and objects of the act to also prohibit the practice of using any article or product as a ‘loss leader.’ Loss leader, as used, herein, shall mean any article or product. sold at less than cost as herein defined to induce, promote or encourage, the purchase of other merchandise, or which may have the tendency or capacity to mislead or deceive purchasers or prospective purchasers, or which diverts trade from or otherwise injures competitors.”.

It is obvious that a grocer overstocked with any commodity may sell it at less than cost with no intent other than to make the sale, and that such sale may not divert trade from or in any way injure any competitor or deceive any customer. Equally obvious that such sales instead of destroying competition may greatly stimulate it. It is only when there is the intent or effect prohibited by- section 3 that the sale below cost is prohibited by the Unfair Practices Act.

The California supreme court holds that:

The Unfair Practices Act “ *o * * In its true serise it is not a price fixing statute at all. It merely fixes a level below which the producer or distributor may not sell with intent to injwre a competitor. In all other respects price is the result of urutrammelled discretion. * * *

“ * * * It must be borne in mind that this statute does not regulate the selling *975 of commodities — it is the predatory trade practice of selling below cost with intent to injure competitors which the legislature on reasonable grounds has determined is vicious and unfair that is prohibited. Such determination is clearly within the legislative power. The state may not have power to regulate all trade practices affecting competition, but it clearly has power to restrict or prohibit trade practices which upon reasonable grounds it determines are predatory, vicious, unfair and anti-social.
“It is next urged by appellant that every sale below cost, except as provided in section 6, is made unlawful by section 3 regardless of intent, and that so const rued the act is unconstitutional. It would certainly add to the weight of appellant’s argument on the main issue if the statute omitted intent as an integral part of the act prohibited. It is one thing, from a legal standpoint, to prohibit sales below cost engaged in for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition, and quite another to merely prohibit all such sales regardless of intent. It may well be that an absolute prohibition regardless of intent would be unreasonable. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. [State of] Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 506, 71 L.Ed. 893, 52 A.L.R. 163. However, it is our opinion that section 3, properly interpreted, requires the designated intent before selling below cost is prohibited. * * (Emphasis supplied.)

Wholesale T. Dealers v. National, etc., Co., 11 Cal.2d 634, 655, 658, 82 P.2d 3, 118 A.L.R. 486.

We are in agreement with this determination by the California supreme court of the character of the California statute which is binding on us in any event. Louisiana Highway Commission v. Farnsworth, 5 Cir., 74 F.2d 910, 913, certiorari denied 294 U.S. 729, 55 S.Ct. 638, 79 L.Ed. 1259.

The Bureau served some thousands of Southern California retailers of food and groceries with frequent statements of minimum prices at which particular items of the trade should be sold. They claim that in this they were doing no more than performing the function contemplated by section 5 of the Act: “§ 5. * * * Where a particular trade or industry, of which the person, firm or corporation complained against is a member, has an established cost survey for 'the locality and vicinity in which the offense is committed, the said cost survey shall be deemed competent evidence to be used in proving the costs of the person, firm or corporation complained against within the provisions of this act. * * The evidence shows that from 1935 to well into 1937 there was no such cost survey as contemplated by the Act. For reasons later stated it is irrelevant whether any such survey subsequently was made. What was thereafter done with any such surveys was to use them to fix minimum prices and not merely to provide rebuttable “evidence” in a prosecution in which the offense was having an intent to injure a particular competitor in making a particular sale at the price below defendant’s cost.

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Bluebook (online)
139 F.2d 973, 1943 U.S. App. LEXIS 2405, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/food-grocery-bureau-of-southern-california-inc-v-united-states-ca9-1943.