Floss v. Ryan's Family Steak

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2000
• Docket: 99-5099
• Status: Published

Opinion

5RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0154P (6th Cir.) File Name: 00a0154p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

;  99-5099  SHARON FLOSS,  Plaintiff-Appellant,  Nos. 99-5099/5187

 v. >    RYAN’S FAMILY STEAK

Defendants-Appellees.  HOUSES, INC., et al.,      99-5187

Plaintiff-Appellee,  KYLE DANIELS,

   v.    RYAN’S FAMILY STEAK

Defendant-Appellant.  HOUSES, INC.,  1 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Districts of Kentucky at Covington and Tennessee at Knoxville. Nos. 98-00038; 98-00294—William O. Bertelsman and R. Leon Jordan, District Judges.

1 2 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Steak Houses, et al.

Argued: March 9, 2000 Decided and Filed: May 1, 2000 Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge; GWIN, District Judge.* _________________ COUNSEL ARGUED: Steven L. Schiller, Newport, Kentucky, for Appellant in 99-5099; Stephen F. Fisher, JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN, Greeneville, South Carolina, for Appellant in 99-5187. Stephen F. Fisher, JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN, Greeneville, South Carolina, for Appellees in 99-5099; April D. Carroll, RIDENOUR, RIDENOUR & FOX, Clinton, Tennessee, for Appellee in 99-5187. ON BRIEF: Steven L. Schiller, Newport, Kentucky, for Appellant in 99-5099; Stephen F. Fisher, JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN, Greeneville, South Carolina, Kelli L. Thompson, BAKER, DONELSON, BEARMAN, ANDERSON & CALDWELL, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellant in 99-5187. Stephen F. Fisher, JACKSON, LEWIS, SCHNITZLER & KRUPMAN, Greeneville, South Carolina, for Appellees in 99-5099; April D. Carroll, Bruce D. Fox, RIDENOUR, RIDENOUR & FOX, Clinton, Tennessee, for Appellee in 99-5187. _________________ OPINION _________________ GWIN, District Judge. With these appeals, consolidated for purposes of decision, the Court reviews whether

* The Honorable James S. Gwin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 3 Steak Houses, et al.

employees effectively waived their rights to bring actions in federal court under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (“FLSA”). At the district court, the plaintiffs attempted to sue their former employer, Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc. (“Ryan’s”). However, when applying for employment at Ryan’s, both plaintiffs had signed a form indicating they would arbitrate all employment-related disputes. In both cases, Ryan’s filed a motion to compel arbitration. Finding no valid arbitration agreement, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee refused to require Plaintiff-Appellee Kyle Daniels to arbitrate his claim under the ADA. In contrast, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky found that Plaintiff- Appellant Sharon Floss was required to arbitrate her dispute and could thus not pursue her claim under the FLSA in federal court. Ryan’s now appeals the district court’s refusal to require Daniels to arbitrate his ADA claim. Similarly, Floss appeals the district court’s order requiring her to submit her FLSA claim to arbitration. Because we find neither Daniels nor Floss validly waived their right to bring an action in federal court, we REVERSE the district court’s order requiring Floss to arbitrate her claim, and AFFIRM the district court’s order refusing to require Daniels to submit his claim to arbitration. I. In support of its argument that the plaintiffs agreed to waive their right to bring an action in federal court and instead agreed to arbitrate all employment disputes, Ryan’s relies upon a document identified as the “Job Applicant Agreement to Arbitration of Employment-Related Disputes.” Ryan’s includes this purported agreement in its employment application packet. Only those applicants who sign the 4 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 17 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

agreement are considered for employment at Ryan’s.1 Both disputes, including those involving federal statutory claims. Daniels and Floss acknowledge signing the agreement. Yet an employer cannot seek to do so in such a way that leaves employees with no consideration for their promise to The employee’s agreement to arbitrate is not with Ryan’s. submit their disputes to arbitration. Here, we find that Floss Instead, the agreement runs between the employee and a third- and Daniels did not receive any consideration for their party arbitration services provider, Employment Dispute promise to arbitrate their disputes. We thus refuse to enforce Services, Inc. (“EDSI”). In the agreement, EDSI agrees to their promise in favor of Ryan’s. provide an arbitration forum in exchange for the employee’s agreement to submit any dispute with his potential employer The judgment of the United States District Court for the to arbitration with EDSI. Although Ryan’s is not explicitly Eastern District of Tennessee in case 99-5187 is identified as a party to the agreement, the agreement says the AFFIRMED, and the judgment of the United States District employee’s potential employer is a third-party beneficiary of Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in case 99-5099 is the employee’s agreement to waive a judicial forum and REVERSED. arbitrate all employment-related disputes. The agreement gives EDSI complete discretion over arbitration rules and procedures. The agreement says that all arbitration proceedings will be conducted under “EDSI Rules and Procedures.” The agreement then gives EDSI the unlimited right to modify the rules without the employee’s consent. In July 1994, Kyle Daniels applied for employment with Ryan’s and received2 this agreement as part of the employment application packet. Similarly, Ryan’s gave Sharon Floss the agreement when she applied for employment in December 1997. Both Daniels and Floss signed the agreement and began their employment at Ryan’s shortly thereafter.

1 A notice on the inside cover of the packet informs applicants that they must agree to the terms and conditions outlined in the agreement in order to be considered for employment with Ryan’s. 2 The agreement received by Daniels designated Employment Dispute Resolution, Inc. (“EDR”) as the arbitration services provider. EDR is now apparently referred to as Employment Dispute Services, Inc. (“EDSI”). 16 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 5 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

that EDSI’s promise did not create a binding obligation. We Daniels ceased working at Ryan’s on August 13, 1997. On agree. that date, Daniels claims he attempted to resume his employment with Ryan’s after taking a medical leave to treat EDSI’s promise to provide an arbitral forum is fatally his viral hepatitis. However, Daniels says Ryan’s terminated indefinite. Though obligated to provide some type of arbitral him upon his return to the restaurant. forum, EDSI has unfettered discretion in choosing the nature of that forum. Specifically, EDSI has reserved the right to Floss ceased working at Ryan’s on January 23, 1998. Floss alter the applicable rules and procedures without any left her position with Ryan’s after a confrontation with two obligation to notify, much less receive consent from, Floss management employees. According to Floss, these and Daniels. EDSI’s right to choose the nature of its management employees intimidated and harassed her after performance renders its promise illusory. As Professor learning that she had complained to the United States Williston has explained: Department of Labor regarding Ryan’s pay practices. Where a promisor retains an unlimited right to decide On February 17, 1998, Floss sued Ryan’s in the United later the nature or extent of his performance, the promise States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky for is too indefinite for legal enforcement. The unlimited violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 Floss claimed that choice in effect destroys the promise and makes it merely Ryan’s (1) did not pay employees legally-required minimum illusory. and overtime wages, (2) failed to pay employees for certain hours worked, and (3) retaliated against her because she 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 43, at 140 (3d ed. complained of these practices to the United States Department 1957). of Labor. Floss sued in both her individual capacity and on behalf of similarly-situated Ryan’s employees. EDSI’s illusory promise does not create a binding obligation. The purported arbitration agreement therefore On May 19, 1998, Daniels filed his action against Ryan’s lacks a mutuality of obligation. Without a mutuality of in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of obligation, the agreement lacks consideration and, Tennessee. In this action, Daniels asserted a claim under the accordingly, does not constitute an enforceable arbitration ADA, alleging that Ryan’s terminated him on account of his agreement.8 handicapped status despite his ability to perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable V. accommodation.4 Ryan’s has pursued an acceptable objective in an unacceptable manner. An employer may enter an agreement with employees requiring the arbitration of all employment 3 Floss also asserted state-law claims for false imprisonment and intentional infliction of emotional distress, naming as codefendants the 8 two management employees involved in the alleged confrontation. Floss insists that the district court erred in determining as a matter of law that she was not fraudulently induced to sign the agreement. 4 Because the agreement is unenforceable on other grounds, we do not Daniels also asserted a claim under a state disability discrimination address this argument. statute. 6 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 15 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

In both actions, Ryan’s filed motions to compel arbitration. mutuality of obligation, a contract based on reciprocal In ruling on these motions, the respective district courts promises lacks consideration. See Dobbs v. Guenther, 846 reached different conclusions as to whether the agreements S.W.2d 270, 276 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); David Roth’s Sons, were enforceable. Inc. v. Wright and Taylor, Inc., 343 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961). Put more succinctly, such a contract “must be In Daniels’s action, the district court ruled that the binding on both or else it is binding on neither.” Morgan v. agreement was not enforceable. The court reasoned that Morgan, 218 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949). EDSI did not provide Daniels with any consideration for his promise to arbitrate his dispute with Ryan’s. Though EDSI Promises may fail to create legally binding obligations for promised to provide an arbitration forum, the court found that a variety of reasons. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 139 only Ryan’s and EDSI, rather than Daniels, actually benefitted (1991). Most notably, a promise may in effect promise from that promise. The court also found that the arbitration nothing at all. Such an illusory promise arises when a document did not bind EDSI. Specifically, the court noted promisor retains the right to decide whether or not to perform that the agreement gave EDSI an unlimited right to the promised act. See Trumbull v. Century Marketing Corp., unilaterally modify or amend the rules and procedures of the 12 F. Supp.2d 683, 686 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that arbitration proceeding without providing notice to Daniels. employer’s promise in employee handbook to arbitrate Finally, the court noted that even if enforceable, the disputes did not create binding obligation when employer agreement was not sufficiently clear so as to represent a retains right to revoke arbitration provision); David Roth’s knowing and intelligent waiver of Daniels’s right to pursue Sons, Inc., 343 S.W.2d at 391 (noting that a promise absent his disability discrimination claim in federal court. any fixed obligation to perform “is illusory in the sense that [the promisor] has made no legally enforceable commitment, However, the district court in Floss’s case enforced the and justice demands the other party should not be bound”). agreement.5 The court rejected Floss’s argument that claims A promise is also illusory when its indefinite nature defies under the FLSA could not be made subject to mandatory legal enforcement. See Kovacs v. Freeman, 957 S.W.2d 251, arbitration. 254 (Ky. 1997) (“Under Kentucky law, an enforceable contract must contain definite and certain terms setting forth Both Ryan’s and Floss now appeal the rulings adverse to promises of performance to be rendered by each party.”); them. Jamestowne On Signal, Inc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 807 S.W.2d 559, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (“‘Courts will not uphold agreements which are indefinite and uncertain as to the obligations imposed on the parties thereto.’”) (quoting Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712 (N.D. 1989). 5 In the purported agreement at issue in this case, EDSI The district court enforced the agreement under the Federal offered its promise to provide an arbitral forum as Arbitration Act (“FAA”). See 9 U.S.C. § 2. The FAA authorizes federal district courts to stay a proceeding if any matter raised therein is subject consideration for Floss and Daniels’s promise to submit any to an arbitration agreement and to issue an order compelling arbitration if dispute they may have with their employer to arbitration with a party has filed suit in contravention of an arbitration agreement. See 9 EDSI. In ruling in favor of Daniels, the district court found U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4. 14 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 7 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

to arbitrate the dispute in a contract which evidences a II. transaction in interstate commerce.” Hartford Lloyd’s Ins. Co. v. Teachworth, 898 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1990). Before turning to the merits of these appeals, we consider whether Floss timely filed her notice of appeal. Ryan’s says Floss and Daniels say the arbitration agreements they Floss failed to file her appeal within thirty days of the signed as part of their employment applications with Ryan’s issuance of the final order from which she appeals, as are unenforceable. In deciding whether the agreements are required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). enforceable, we examine applicable state-law contract principles. See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9, 107 On October 20, 1998, the district court issued an order S.Ct. 2520, 2527 n.9, 96 L.Ed.2d 426 (1987); Avedon staying Floss’s FLSA action pending arbitration. On Engineering, Inc., 126 F.3d at 1287; Shulze and Burch Biscuit December 21, 1998, the court, at Floss’s request, issued a Co. v. Tree Top, Inc., 831 F.2d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 1987); final order dismissing her action. Floss filed her notice of Coastal Indus., Inc. v. Automatic Steam Products Corp., 654 appeal on January 21, 1999. F.2d 375, 377-78 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, we review both Kentucky and Tennessee law to decide if Floss and Daniels Ryan’s says that the district court’s order granting a stay have executed valid arbitration agreements. constituted a final order with regard to the arbitrability of Floss’s FLSA claim. The second order dismissing Floss’s Consideration is an essential element of every contract. See action was, according to Ryan’s, superfluous. Because Floss Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924, 933 (Tenn. Ct. did not file her notice of appeal within thirty days of the stay App. 1984); Cuppy v. General Accident Fire & Life order, Ryan’s argues that Floss’s appeal is untimely. Assurance Corp., 378 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964). In other words, a promise is legally enforceable only if the We disagree. Floss could not have filed a notice of appeal promisor receives in exchange for that promise some act or based on the district court’s stay order. An interlocutory order forbearance, or the promise thereof. See Kozy v. Werle, 902 granting a stay pending arbitration is not appealable. See 9 S.W.2d 404, 411 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“Consideration U.S.C. § 16(b); Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1275 consists when the promisee does something that he is under (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that interlocutory order directing no legal obligation to do or refrains from doing [that] which parties to arbitrate dispute is not appealable). And contrary to he has a legal right to do.”); Sutton v. First Nat’l Bank of Ryan’s suggestion, the district court’s stay order was Crossville, 620 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981) (“‘It interlocutory rather than final.6 “[A] final order is one that is invariably held that the promise of one party is a valid dismisses an action in deference to arbitration.” Arnold, 920 consideration for the promise of the other party.’”) (quoting F.2d at 1275 (internal quotations omitted). The district Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op Assn. v. Mason, 263 S.W. 60, court’s stay order did no such thing. 67 (Tenn. 1924)); Phillips v. Phillips, 171 S.W.2d 458, 464 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943) (defining consideration as a legal right given to the promisor the exercise of which he is otherwise not entitled). 6 This Court has found that a stay order may constitute a final order A promise constitutes consideration for another promise when the stay delays the enforcement of a judgment pending the only when it creates a binding obligation. Thus, absent a clarification of that judgment. See M&C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1036-37 (6th Cir. 1998). Such is not the case here. 8 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 13 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

Floss filed her appeal within thirty days of the district bias exists. In light of EDSI’s role in determining the pool of court’s final order dismissing her action; therefore, her appeal potential arbitrators, any such bias would render the arbitral is timely. forum fundamentally unfair. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“At a III. minimum, statutory rights include both a substantive protection and access to a neutral forum in which to enforce We review de novo a district court’s decisions regarding those protections.”). both the existence of a valid arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of a particular dispute. See Bobbie Brooks, Inc. v. Moreover, EDSI’s current rules require an employee to Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, 835 F.2d 1164, 1170 generally pay one-half of the arbitrators’ fees as a condition (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that district court’s finding that a of pursuing a dispute. Such a fee structure could potentially contract exists is subject to de novo review); M&C Corp. v. prevent an employee from prosecuting a federal statutory Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 143 F.3d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. claim against an employer. Recognizing as much, the District 1998) (“A determination of the arbitrability of a dispute is of Columbia Circuit has refused to countenance an subject to de novo review.”). employer’s requirement that employees submit their disputes to arbitration as a condition of employment absent that IV. employer’s agreement to bear the full costs of the arbitrators’ fees. See Cole, 105 F.3d at 1484-85. In deciding whether to compel arbitration of a federal statutory claim, we initially consider whether the statutory Though we have concerns with both the fee structure and claim is generally subject to compulsory arbitration. If the potential bias of EDSI’s arbitral forum, we need not decide statutory claim is not exempt from mandatory arbitration, we whether these deficits prevent the arbitration of Floss and next consider whether the parties have executed a valid Daniels’s statutory claims. As explained below, Floss and arbitration agreement and, if so, whether the statutory claim Daniels are not contractually obligated to submit their federal falls within the scope of that agreement. See Mitsubishi statutory claims to arbitration in EDSI’s arbitral forum. Thus, Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, Floss and Daniels need not establish the unsuitability of 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3355, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985) (stating EDSI’s arbitral forum in order to litigate their statutory claims that courts should consider both whether the parties have in federal court. agreed to arbitrate a federal statutory claim and whether that claim is generally subject to compulsory arbitration). B. A. The Federal Arbitration Act declares that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save Mandatory arbitration of federal statutory claims continues upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation to generate considerable debate among courts and of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. However, “the FAA was not commentators. At bottom, this debate centers on the efficacy enacted to force parties to arbitrate in the absence of an of resolving “public disputes in private fora.” Harry agreement.” Avedon Engineering, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d Edwards, Where Are We Heading With Mandatory 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 1997). Indeed, “[t]he sine qua non of Arbitration of Statutory Claims in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. the FAA’s applicability to a particular dispute is an agreement U. L. REV. (forthcoming April 2000) (emphasis in original). 12 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 9 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”) With its informal nature, arbitration is widely-accepted as (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637). a sound method for resolving essentially private disputes, such as those arising from collective bargaining agreements Both Floss and Daniels argue that the specific arbitration and other contracts. Yet, for some, this informality renders forum provided by the current version of the EDSI Rules and arbitration suspect as a forum for resolving statutory claims, Procedures does not allow them to effectively vindicate their which typically implicate important public interests. As one claims under the FLSA and the ADA. They say the jurist and commentator has explained: procedures allow for the appointment of a biased and incompetent panel of arbitrators,7 as well as unduly limit the When public laws are enforced in private fora, however, participants’ discovery opportunities. we have no assurance that the underlying public interests are fully satisfied. This is not to say that private fora are We have serious reservations as to whether the arbitral incapable of resolving disputes in a manner protective of forum provided under the current version of the EDSI Rules the public interest. However, conflicts that are resolved and Procedures is suitable for the resolution of statutory through mediation and arbitration usually are not subject claims. Specifically, the neutrality of the forum is far from to public scrutiny, so we do not know whether such clear in light of the uncertain relationship between Ryan’s and resolutions are consistent with prevailing interpretations EDSI. Floss and Daniels suggest that EDSI is biased in favor of public law or whether the procedures followed were of Ryan’s and other employers because it has a financial inequitable. interest in maintaining its arbitration service contracts with employers. Though the record does not clearly reflect Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). whether EDSI, in contrast to the American Arbitration Association, operates on a for-profit basis, the potential for For a time, skepticism regarding the role of arbitration in resolving statutory claims held sway. This skepticism is perhaps best reflected in the Supreme Court’s approach to the 7 mandatory arbitration of statutory claims. The Court rejected Under EDSI’s current procedures, a panel of three “adjudicators” arbitration as the lone forum for vindicating claims under preside over every arbitration proceeding. Each adjudicator is selected from one of three “selection pools.” One pool consists of supervisors or Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Securities Act managers of an employer who has entered into an arbitration agreement of 1933. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, with EDSI. A second pool consists of nonsupervisory employees of an 47, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1019, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); Wilko v. employer who is a signatory to an EDSI arbitration agreement. A third Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438, 74 S.Ct. 182, 188-89, 98 L.Ed. 168 pool consists of attorneys, retired judges, and “other competent (1953). In so holding, the Court explained that arbitrators’ professional persons” not associated with either party. If the dispute involves more than $20,000, only licensed attorneys are included in this inexperience with legal concepts coupled with the lack of third pool. stringent procedural safeguards rendered an arbitral forum, in The selection process begins with EDSI furnishing both parties a list the context of the statutory claims at issue, an unsuitable of potential adjudicators organized according to each selection pool. replacement for a court of law. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S Information regarding each adjudicator’s recent employment history and at 57; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36. related biographical information is provided to the parties along with this list. The parties may then move to strike any adjudicator for cause. Following the removal of any adjudicators for cause, the parties each However, the tide soon turned. In a trio of cases decided in strike a name from the list until only one name remains from each the 1980s, the Supreme Court enforced arbitration agreements selection pool. 10 Floss v. Ryan’s Family Nos. 99-5099/5187 Nos. 99-5099/5187 Floss v. Ryan’s Family 11 Steak Houses, et al. Steak Houses, et al.

covering claims under the Sherman Act, see Mitsubishi the underlying purposes of the statute. McMahon, 482 U.S. Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 640, the Securities Act of 1933, see at 227. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 1921, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), Here, Floss argues that a conflict exists between arbitration the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see Shearson/American and her claim under the FLSA. Specifically, Floss insists that Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 107 S.Ct. an arbitral forum does not sufficiently allow for the 2332, 2344, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987), and the civil provisions furtherance of the important social policies implicated by the of the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act minimum wage provisions of the FLSA. Floss contends that (“RICO”), see McMahon, 473 U.S. at 242. These holdings a claim under these provisions involves not only an attempt led the Court to declare in 1991 that “[i]t is now well settled to receive an individual remedy, but also an effort to promote that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration a minimum standard of living for the nation’s lowest paid agreement, enforceable by the FAA.” Gilmer v. workers. According to Floss, requiring a party to seek Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. resolution of a minimum wage claim under the FLSA in an 1647, 1652, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). arbitral forum will thwart the latter objective. The Court addressed its growing acceptance of mandatory Floss’s argument does not persuade. Though a claim under arbitration for statutory claims in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson the FLSA certainly serves a purpose beyond providing relief Lane Corp., in which the Court upheld the mandatory to an individual claimant, we fail to see how the broader arbitration of claims under the Age Discrimination in policies furthered by such a claim are hindered when that Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. See id. at 27. In claim is resolved through arbitration. As the Supreme Court permitting the compulsory arbitration of statutory claims, the has held, both judicial and arbitral fora “can further broader Court recognized that by “‘agreeing to arbitrate a statutory social purposes.” Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28. Indeed, the Court claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded has upheld the compulsory arbitration of various statutory by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, claims that further both individual and societal interests, rather than a judicial, forum.’” Id. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, including claims under the Sherman Act and RICO. Floss 473 U.S. at 628). And the Court dismissed generalized attacks offers no compelling reason for drawing a distinction between on the suitability of arbitral fora as arising from a “‘suspicion these statutes and the FLSA. of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants.’” However, even if arbitration is generally a suitable forum Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481). for resolving a particular statutory claim, the specific arbitral Such a suspicion, the Court observed, was “far out of step” forum provided under an arbitration agreement must with the “current strong endorsement” of arbitration. Id. nevertheless allow for the effective vindication of that claim. Otherwise, arbitration of the claim conflicts with the statute’s Yet not all statutory claims are amenable to mandatory purpose of both providing individual relief and generally arbitration. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627-28. In creating deterring unlawful conduct through the enforcement of its a statutory cause of action, Congress may choose to mandate provisions. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (“[S]o long as the a judicial forum for its resolution. See id. at 628. Such an prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] intent is typically evidenced in the statutory text, legislative statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will history, or by an “inherent conflict” between arbitration and