Fisher-New Center Co. v. State Tax Commission

157 N.W.2d 271, 380 Mich. 340
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedMay 6, 1968
DocketCalendar 4, Docket 51,603
StatusPublished
Cited by37 cases

This text of 157 N.W.2d 271 (Fisher-New Center Co. v. State Tax Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fisher-New Center Co. v. State Tax Commission, 157 N.W.2d 271, 380 Mich. 340 (Mich. 1968).

Opinions

Adams, J.

On January 6, 1964, appellant’s property in Detroit, known as the Fisber-New Center Complex, was valued at $9,779,170 by the State tax commission. Detroit bad assessed the property at $13,241,460 for 1963. While appeal by the city was pending, we remanded to the commission for further bearing. In re Fisher-New Center Company (1965), 375 Mich 559. By stipulation of the parties, the new bearing also covered 1964 and 1965 assessments. The commission reaffirmed its order of Jan[349]*349uary 6, 1964, found the true cash value of the property to he $19,558,348, the general level of property assessments in Detroit to be at 50% of true cash value, and the proper assessment to he $9,779,170. The case is now here upon grant of petition to bypass the Court of Appeals.

I. Scope oe Review.

Basic to decision in this case is a determination of the extent and nature of judicial review of final board or agency decisions relating to valuation or allocation for spreading of property taxes.

Since 1899, section 1521 of the general property tax act (CL 1948, § 211.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 7.1 et seg.]) has provided for a hearing procedure before a State hoard or agency,2 or a member thereof, for review of assessment rolls to determine whether any property subject to taxation has been omitted or individual assessments have not been made in compliance with law. Throughout its existence, section 152 has provided that action by the board or agency, or a member, in accordance with the act shall be final. This Court has held that it was foreclosed from judicial review except where the action taken was challenged on the grounds of fraud, errors of law, or adoption of wrong principles. This doctrine has been described as the “finality rule.” Newport Mining Co. v. City of Ironwood (1915), 185 Mich 668, 685; Moran v. Grosse Pointe Township [350]*350(1947), 317 Mich 248; Kingsford Chemical Company v. City of Kingsford (1956), 347 Mich 91; Pavilion Apartments, Inc., v. State Tax Commission (1964), 373 Mich 601.

It is the contention of appellant, however, that because of the provisions of Const 1963, art 6, § 28, the scope of judicial review of an order of the State tax commission has been broadened.

Article 6 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution relates to the judicial branch. Its section 28 reads:

“All final decisions, findings, rulings and orders of any administrative officer or agency existing under the constitution or by law, which are judicial or quasi-judicial and affect private rights or licenses, shall be subject to direct review by the courts as provided by law. This review shall include, as a minimum, the determination whether such final decisions, findings, rulings and orders are authorized by law; and, in cases in which a hearing is required, whether the same are supported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record. Findings of fact in workmen’s compensation proceedings shall be conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law.
“In the absence of fraud, error of law or the adoption of wrong principles, no appeal may be taken to any court from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation(Emphasis supplied.)

Appellant contends article 6, § 28, incorporates as a constitutional requirement the law as it had been developed by prior decisions of this Court; that, by the Constitution, the courts are authorized to review actions of all agencies, including the State tax commission; that section 28 grants direct judicial review to determine as a minimum whether administrative findings are supported by competent, material and [351]*351substantial evidence on the whole record; that, in valuation cases, the scope of such review is expressly-limited to a determination of whether the agency decision is based on fraud, error of law, or the adoption of wrong principles; and that a valuation decision by the State tax commission which is unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record is an error of law and an adoption of wrong principles. By this argument appellant seeks to avoid the limiting provisions of the second paragraph of article 6, § 28.

Valuations of property for tax purposes are first set by an assessor or a board of assessors acting for local governmental units. Such assessments are then reviewed by a local board of review where any taxpayer may appear to protest the assessor’s valuation. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of review, he may appeal to the State tax commission.

Decisions by the local assessor or the board of review have finality only for the year in question. Even a determination by the State tax commission has finality for a period of not to exceed three years. CL 1948, § 211.152, as last amended by PA 1964, No 275 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 7.210). The decision-making process, basically an annual one and subject to change from year to year, is quite unlike the usual procedure in judicial matters where, once a case has been tried, decided, and accorded appellate review, it becomes a final adjudication, Because of the repetition, year after year, of the decision-making process, and because of the need of units of government to be reasonably assured of their tax revenues, the finality rule evolved.

The delegates to the constitutional convention for the 1963 Michigan Constitution were aware of this [352]*352situation as is revealed by their debates.3 Consequently, when it was desired to spell out in the new Constitution rights of review of administrative decisions, the convention was careful to provide an exception to such rights in connection with appeals from any final agency provided for the administration of property tax laws from any decision relating to valuation or allocation. Appellant attempts to impose the minimum review requirements in the first paragraph of article 6, § 28, upon appeals permissible under the last paragraph. We do not so construe the section. The last paragraph was clearly [353]*353intended to provide a more limited review in property tax matters than is provided for in the first paragraph. Appeals under the last paragraph are restricted to a showing of fraud, error of law, or the adoption of wrong principles.

"VVe granted review here in order that the nature and extent of judicial review might be considered in the light of the provisions of the 1963 Michigan Constitution and because of taxpayer’s claims that the State tax commission committed errors of law and adopted wrong principles in arriving at its decision. In the light of our above holding, much of taxpayer’s argument loses effectiveness because predicated on an interpretation of article 6, § 28, which this Court does not accept. Taxpayer’s claims for upsetting the valuation assessments of its property, fixed by the State tax commission, will be considered for the restricted purpose of determining whether the commission committed errors of law or adopted wrong principles. No fraud is claimed by taxpayer.

II. The HeabiNg.

In Pavilion Apartments, Inc., v. State Tax Commission, supra,

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Bluebook (online)
157 N.W.2d 271, 380 Mich. 340, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fisher-new-center-co-v-state-tax-commission-mich-1968.