Finnegan v. Wework Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 26, 2021
Docket1:21-cv-05593
StatusUnknown

This text of Finnegan v. Wework Inc. (Finnegan v. Wework Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Finnegan v. Wework Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2021).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SEAN MATTHEW FINNEGAN, Plaintiff, 21-CV-5593 (LTS) -against- ORDER OF DISMISSAL WEWORK, INC., Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, appearing pro se, brings this action invoking the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, and federal statutes that apply to government contracts, 41 U.S.C. §§ 6503, 6509. By order dated July 15, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses this action but grants Plaintiff leave to replead the complaint. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). BACKGROUND Plaintiff Sean Finnegan brings this action against WeWork, Inc., a company that provides shared workspace to members. Plaintiff lists an address for himself in Washington, D.C., but states that his claims arose in “Miami, Washington, New York, Atlanta, Miami Beach, Virginia, Beverly Hills and other” places. (ECF 2 at 5.)

According to Plaintiff, Defendant WeWork, Inc., “has breached contracts and agreements,” and Plaintiff invokes 41 U.S.C. §§ 6503, 6509, federal statutes applicable to government contracts. Defendant WeWork, Inc., has also allegedly “harassed and stalked,” “sexually harassed,” and “unlawfully evicted” Plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant “has made up stories and lies” and “terminated the Plaintiff’s employment,” causing him “catastrophic personal and professional damage.” (Id.) Plaintiff has been hospitalized numerous times, allegedly because of Defendant’s actions. Moreover, “Defendant’s security guards are also threatening, abusing, assisting, and harassing the Plaintiff.” (Id. at 6.)1 Plaintiff seeks damages (id.) and an injunction prohibitingDefendant from restricting Plaintiff’s access to any of its locations (ECF 3 at 1-2).

DISCUSSION The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. § 3729, imposes civil liability upon “any person” who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). A suit under

1 Plaintiff recently filed two additional actions in this Court. The first is an action against an insurance complaint, in which Plaintiff alleges that defendant breached its contract and is “harassing” and “abusing” him, causing him to become homeless, Finnegan v. Lemonade, ECF 1:21-CV-05719, 2 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.). The second is an action against the New York City Police Department (NYPD) for failing to investigate matters that he brought to the attention of NYPD officers, Finnegan v. New York City Police Dep’t, ECF 1:21-CV-5798, 2 (LTS) (S.D.N.Y.). In addition, it appears from public records that Plaintiff has filed dozens of actions in courts across the country. the FCA may be brought by either the federal government or by a private person, or “relator,” who sues for the United States in a qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(1); United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 932 (2009). Private individuals, however, cannot bring qui tam actions under the FCA pro se, and must instead be represented by counsel. See United States ex rel. Mergent Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 2008); Klein v. City of New York, 10 –

CV-9586, 2012 WL 546786, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2012). Because Plaintiff cannot proceed pro se in asserting claims under the FCA, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s FCA claims without prejudice. Plaintiff also invokes 41 U.S.C. §§ 6503, 6509, but he fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted under these statutes because he does not plead any facts showing that this matter involves a government contract. Plaintiff’s complaint must therefore be dismissed in its entirety. Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint “without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis v.

Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But a court has inherent power to dismiss without leave to amend or replead in “where … the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its face,” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988) (citation omitted), or where amendment would otherwise be futile, Hill v. Curcione, 657 F. 3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); see also Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450, 455-56 (2015) (holding that federal-question jurisdiction is lacking where the claims are “wholly insubstantial and frivolous,” “essentially fictitious,” or “obviously without merit” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Here, it is unclear if Plaintiff may intend to allege that he worked for Defendant WeWork, Inc., and suffered some unlawful employment action, or if Plaintiff had an interaction with a security guard at WeWork, Inc., that Plaintiff contends violated his rights under some federal law. Because it is not wholly clear that granting leave to amend would be futile, the Court

grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. CONCLUSION Plaintiff’s claims under the False Claims Act are dismissed without prejudice because a private individual cannot proceed pro se in a qui tam action. Plaintiff’s claims under 41 U.S.C. §§ 6503

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Chavis v. Chappius
618 F.3d 162 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
United States Ex Rel. Mergent Services v. Flaherty
540 F.3d 89 (Second Circuit, 2008)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Shapiro v. McManus
577 U.S. 39 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Dolan v. Connolly
794 F.3d 290 (Second Circuit, 2015)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Finnegan v. Wework Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finnegan-v-wework-inc-nysd-2021.