Finisar Corp. v. the DirecTV Group, Inc.

416 F. Supp. 2d 512, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603, 2006 WL 399712
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedFebruary 17, 2006
Docket4:05-cv-00264
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 416 F. Supp. 2d 512 (Finisar Corp. v. the DirecTV Group, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Finisar Corp. v. the DirecTV Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 512, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603, 2006 WL 399712 (E.D. Tex. 2006).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIM TERMS OF UNITED STATES PATENT NO. 5,404,505

CLARK, District Judge.

Plaintiff Finisar Corporation (“Finisar”) filed suit against Defendants The DirecTV Group, Inc., DirecTV Holdings, LLC, DirecTV Enterprises, LLC, DirecTV Operations, LLC, DirecTV, Inc., and Hughes Network Systems, Inc. (collectively “DirecTV or Defendants”) claiming infringement of United States Patent No. 5,404,505 (“the ‘505 patent”). The court conducted a Markman hearing to assist the court in interpreting the meaning of the claim terms in dispute. Having carefully considered the patent, the prosecution history, the parties’ briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the court now makes the following findings and construes the disputed claim terms as follows.

I. Claim Construction Standard of Review

Claim construction is a matter of law. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (“Markman II”). “The duty of the trial judge is to determine the meaning of the claims at issue, and to instruct the jury accordingly.” Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1555 (Fed.Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

“ ‘[T]he claims of the patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’ ” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc) (citation omitted). “Because the patentee is required to ‘define precisely what his invention is,’ it is ‘unjust to the public, as well as an evasion of the law, to construe it in a manner different from the plain import of its terms.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 52, 7 S.Ct. 72, 30 L.Ed. 303 (1886)).

The words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning. Phillips 415 F.3d at 1312. The “ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 1 *515 Id. at 1313. Analyzing “how a person of ordinary skill in the art understands a claim term” is the starting point of a proper claim construction. Id.

A “person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. Where a claim term has a particular meaning in the field of art, the court must examine those sources available to the public to show what a person skilled in the art would have understood disputed claim language to mean. Id. at 1414. Those sources “include ‘words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

“[T]he ordinary meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314. In these instances, a general purpose dictionary may be helpful. Id.

However, the Court emphasized the importance of the specification. “[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’ ” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996)). A court is authorized to review extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, inventor testimony, and learned treaties. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317. But their use should be limited to edification purposes. Id. at 1319.

The intrinsic evidence, that is, the patent specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history, may clarify whether the patentee clearly intended a meaning different from the ordinary meaning, or clearly disavowed the ordinary meaning in favor of some special meaning. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed.Cir.1995). Claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the patentee demonstrated “clear intent” to deviate from the ordinary and accustomed meaning of a claim term by redefining the term in the patent specification. Johnson Worldwide Assoc., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed.Cir.1999).

The “ ‘ordinary meaning’ of a claim term is its meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321. However, the patentee may deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning by characterizing the invention in the prosecution history using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or restriction, representing a “clear disavowal” of claim scope. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327 (Fed.Cir.2002). It is clear that if the patentee clearly intended to be its own lexicographer, the “inventor’s lexicography governs.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316.

*516 II. Claim Construction— The ‘505 patent

Dr. Frank Levinson is the inventor of United States Patent No. 5,404,505. The assignee is Finisar Corporation. The ‘505 patent describes the transfer of information, from an information database, to subscribers, upon request, through satellite transmission. In general, this involves a central supplier station sending regularly scheduled data to its subscribers via satellite. However, a portion of the available bandwidth is reserved for subscriber requested data. Here, although that data is actually broadcast to all subscribers, only those who have requested the data will have access to it (i.e., be able to view the data). There is also the'possibility of remote systems (usually local programming) sending data to subscribers.

The first five disputed terms are contained in the beginning of claim 1.

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416 F. Supp. 2d 512, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6603, 2006 WL 399712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/finisar-corp-v-the-directv-group-inc-txed-2006.