Fine v. Dade County

32 S.E.2d 246, 198 Ga. 655, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 432
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedNovember 21, 1944
Docket15006.
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 32 S.E.2d 246 (Fine v. Dade County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fine v. Dade County, 32 S.E.2d 246, 198 Ga. 655, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 432 (Ga. 1944).

Opinions

Duckworth, Justice.

By an act of 1837 (Ga. L. 1837, p.’65), provision was made for creating Dade County out of that part of Walker County lying west of Lookout Mountain, it being enacted that “from and immediately after the passage of this act, the inferior court of the couiity of Walker shall be authorized and required to cause to be ran [sic] and plainly marked a line as hereinafter designated, beginning at lot one, in the ninth district of the fourth section, originally Cherokee now Walker County, thence a southwest direction for its general course, so as to run as near as possible on the middle of the top of the Lookout Mountain until it strikes the line of the State of Alabama, at or near lot No. one hundred and forty-five (145) in the eighteenth (18) district of the fourth section, and all that portion of said county lying west of and northwest of the aforesaid line shall constitute a new county, to be called Dade.” This court will take judicial cognizance of the fact that Walker and Dade Counties now exist as adjoining counties in this State, Walker County being east of Dade County.

According to a plat of survey made by A. A. Simonton and Kieffer Lindsey in August, 1944, the “middle of the top of the Lookout Mountain” has been located as being along the general course of a line which is equidistant from the eastern and western *661 brows of a plateau on tlie top of the mountain. According to this plat, the line is 3432 feet from the eastern brow of the plateau and a similar distance from the western brow. The eastern boundary of the petitioner’s land is 2167 feet west of the line between the counties as surveyed by Simonton and Lindsey. The western boundary of his land lies along the eastern side of Lookout Mountain Scenic Highway, a distance of 707 feet from the western brow of the plateau, and hence, if that survey be correct and of probative value, the petitioner’s land lies wholly in Dade County.

By the stipulation of facts between the parties, it is agreed: By general reputation and understanding for a period of forty years or more the line between Walker and Dade Counties has lain to the westerly side of the petitioner’s land, and hence, under such reputation and understanding, his land would lie wholly in Walker County, the line between the counties being along the easterly side of Lookorrt Mountain Scenic Highway, which highway is shown on the Simonton plat hereinbefore referred to, and which line is shown by a Branner survey hereinafter referred to as being the line between the counties. Other than Simonton and Lindsey, no person can be found who will testify as to the actual location of the line by measurement or survey. There has been found in the office of the Secretary of State a plat with field notes made by one Branner; this survey, according to copy of an executive order under date of September 23, 1892, having been made by appointment and direction of the Governor. If this survey is correct, the land of the petitioner lies wholly in Walker County.

The trial judge reached the following conclusions: General reputation and understanding must yield to an actual survey and measurement. The plat and field notes of Branner are without legal effect as. establishing the line, for the reason that it does not appear that the survey was made in accordance with the statute, and they can not be considered as public records. The middle of the top of Lookout Mountain and the boundary line between the two counties is to be determined by measurement from brow to brow, the line being the center of such measurement, and brow meaning the point at which the plateau breaks first sharply towards the valley and not meaning either the escarpment upon the side of the mountain or the tops of hills upon the top of the plateau of the mountain. Therefore, the trial judge ruled that the only proof *662 as to the line was the survey and testimony of Simonton and Lindsey, showing the true line as being 2167 feet east of the eastern boundary of the petitioner's land, thus placing his property wholly within Dade County, and accordingly holding that a denial of the injunction w-as demanded as a matter of law.

The act of 1887 (Ga. L. 1887, p. 106), making provision for settlement of a disputed county line is codified as sections 23-401 to 23-408, inclusive. Section 23-401 provides: “Whenever the boundary line between two or more counties shall be in dispute, and the grand jury of either county shall present that the same requires to be marked out and defined, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the superior court in the county where such presentments were made to certify such presentments to the Governor, and the Governor shall appoint some suitable and competent surveyor who shall not reside in either county, to survey, mark out, and define the boundary line in dispute, and return such survey with plat to the Secretary of State's office to be recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose.'' Section 23-402 provides for notice to be given by the surveyor to the proper county authorities of the time and place of the intended survey. Section 23-403 provides that he shall furnish the proper county authorities with a copy of the survey and plat. Section 23-404 provides: “The survey with plat, made and returned to the Secretary of State, shall be filed, but not recorded for the space of 30 days from the date of its reception in his office, and the entry of filing made thereon, for the purpose of allowing the authorities of either county dissatisfied therewith to file a protest or exceptions thereto within that time.'' Section 23-405 provides: “In case such protest or exceptions is filed in the Secretary of State's office within the 30 days, it shall be the duty of the Secretary of State to give 10 days’ written notice through the mail to the ordinaries or chairmen of the board of county commissioners of the respective counties, of the time when he will hear the same at his office, and upon hearing the contest he shall determine from the law and evidence the true boundary line in dispute between the respective counties.” Section 23-406 provides: “Upon such decision being made by the Secretary of State, or in case no protest or exceptions are t filed within the 30 days aforesaid, he shall cause the survey and plat to be recorded in a book to be kept for that purpose, whereupon the same shall be final and conclusive as to the boundary line in dispute.”

*663 There is no affirmative evidence that, in ordering the Branner survey in 1892, the Governor acted upon a request from a grand jury of either of the counties. It is settled law, however, that a public officer is presumed, until the contrary appears, to have properly performed his official duties and not to have exceeded his authority. Gran nis v. Irvin, 39 Ga. 22; Bedgood v. McLain, 94 Ga. 283 (2) (21 S. E. 529); Greer v. Fergerson, 104 Ga. 552 (30 S. E. 943); Durrence v. Northern Nat. Bank, 117 Ga. 385, 388 (43 S. E. 726); Connolly v. Atlantic Contracting Co., 120 Ga. 213 (2) (47 S. E. 575); Davis v. Baldwin, 185 Ga. 40, 41 (1) (193 S. E. 892); Hogg v. Rome, 189 Ga. 298, 302 (6 S. E.

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Bluebook (online)
32 S.E.2d 246, 198 Ga. 655, 1944 Ga. LEXIS 432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fine-v-dade-county-ga-1944.