316 Ga. 808 FINAL COPY
S22G1050. MIDDLETON v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Patrick Middleton filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained
during a search by Officer Amanda Graw of the Kingsland Police
Department (“KPD”), arguing that she did not have authority to stop
or search him because she was outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the KPD. Officer Graw claimed that she did have authority to
perform the stop and search because she had been deputized by the
Camden County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) seven years earlier. After
the trial court granted the motion to suppress, the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Officer Graw had
presented sufficient evidence of her deputization. See State v.
Middleton, 363 Ga. App. 851 (872 SE2d 920) (2022) (“Middleton I”).
We granted Middleton’s petition for certiorari to consider whether
the trial court erred in its ruling. We vacate the Court of Appeals’
opinion with direction that it vacate the trial court’s order and
1 remand the case to the trial court with direction to clarify its basis
for ruling that the search and seizure of Middleton was unlawful.1
1. On February 15, 2020, KPD Officer Graw stopped
Middleton’s vehicle while outside Kingsland city limits in Camden
County. After smelling the odor of marijuana, Officer Graw
conducted a search of Middleton’s vehicle, found a controlled
substance, and arrested him. Prior to trial, Middleton asked the trial
court to suppress evidence obtained during the search because
Officer Graw, as a KPD officer, did not have authority to make a
traffic stop outside Kingsland city limits. At a motion-to-suppress
hearing, Officer Graw testified that she was employed by both the
KPD and CCSO by virtue of having “been deputized by the Camden
County Sheriff’s Office since 2013” while riding along with CCSO
deputies. She also testified that she had never worked a paid shift
as a CCSO deputy or received a paycheck from the CCSO.
The trial court granted Middleton’s motion to suppress under
1 We thank the Attorney General of Georgia, the Georgia Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia for their briefs amicus curiae. 2 OCGA § 40-13-30, which provides that a municipality’s law
enforcement officers lack arrest powers outside of the municipality’s
city limits. 2 In its written order, the trial court concluded that
“without a showing that extra-territorial jurisdiction was conferred
upon Officer Graw by local or other law, Middleton’s search and
seizure were unlawful.” In a footnote, the trial court stated that it
was “not persuaded that Officer Graw’s 2013 deputization by the
Camden County Sheriff to act as an agent of the CCSO as part of
her riding with CCSO deputies at the time changes its analysis,
especially where the State has failed to introduce evidence as to the
scope and/or content of said deputization.”
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding that Officer Graw’s testimony that she was deputized in
2 OCGA § 40-13-30 provides:
Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article, provided that officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.
3 2013 was sufficient to prove that she was acting within her
jurisdiction as a deputy sheriff at the time of the arrest. Middleton
I, 363 Ga. App. at 854-855. Middleton subsequently petitioned for
certiorari, which this Court granted to review the question of
whether the trial court erred in granting Middleton’s motion to
suppress evidence on the basis that Officer Graw was not engaged
in the lawful discharge of her official duties at the time of the search
and subsequent arrest.
2. We start with the scope of a deputy sheriff’s official duties.
“Sheriffs are authorized in their discretion to appoint one or more
deputies.” OCGA § 15-16-23. Deputy sheriffs in many ways stand in
the same shoes as the sheriff. They are usually presumed to have
the same powers as the sheriff. See Jones v. Rountree, 96 Ga. 230,
231 (23 SE 311) (1895) (“It is difficult to conceive why deputy-
sheriffs should be appointed at all, if they are not at least competent
to perform such duties pertaining to the sheriff’s office as serving
papers and making entries of such service.”); Veit v. State, 182 Ga.
App. 753, 756 (357 SE2d 113) (1987) (“A deputy sheriff is an agent
4 of the sheriff and in effecting the proper discharge of his duties is
empowered with the same duties and powers.”). Likewise, deputy
sheriffs are required by statute to take the same oath that sheriffs
do. See OCGA § 45-3-7 (“Before proceeding to act, all deputies shall
take the same oaths as their principals take . . . .”). However,
sometimes deputies are sworn in for a more limited role, such as to
work on a particular case or cases. See OCGA § 45-3-7 (exempting
deputies “employed in particular cases only” from having to file and
enter the record of their oath with their principal’s office).
Generally, “a public officer is presumed, until the contrary
appears, to have properly performed his official duties and not to
have exceeded his authority.” Fine v. Dade County, 198 Ga. 655, 663
(32 SE2d 246) (1944). At a minimum, that presumption may be
overcome if the party challenging the public officer’s action
persuades the court that the person being held out as a purported
deputy does not in fact hold that position at the time of arrest. See
id. Here, there is no dispute that Officer Graw was deputized in 2013
by the Camden County Sheriff; what is disputed is whether she was
5 still deputized when she arrested Middleton in 2020. The key
question is thus one of scope: Was Officer Graw deputized for
particular cases only, see OCGA § 45-3-7, or was the deputization
general in nature? If the deputization was not restricted in scope,
this case would present difficult questions about the duration and
legal effect of that 2013 deputization, but those questions do not
arise if in fact Officer Graw was deputized for particular cases only.
This initial question of scope is a question of fact. However, the
trial court’s order is ambiguous regarding whether it made a factual
finding when it took note of “Officer Graw’s 2013 deputization by the
Camden County Sheriff to act as an agent of the CCSO as part of
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
316 Ga. 808 FINAL COPY
S22G1050. MIDDLETON v. THE STATE.
BOGGS, Chief Justice.
Patrick Middleton filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained
during a search by Officer Amanda Graw of the Kingsland Police
Department (“KPD”), arguing that she did not have authority to stop
or search him because she was outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the KPD. Officer Graw claimed that she did have authority to
perform the stop and search because she had been deputized by the
Camden County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) seven years earlier. After
the trial court granted the motion to suppress, the State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Officer Graw had
presented sufficient evidence of her deputization. See State v.
Middleton, 363 Ga. App. 851 (872 SE2d 920) (2022) (“Middleton I”).
We granted Middleton’s petition for certiorari to consider whether
the trial court erred in its ruling. We vacate the Court of Appeals’
opinion with direction that it vacate the trial court’s order and
1 remand the case to the trial court with direction to clarify its basis
for ruling that the search and seizure of Middleton was unlawful.1
1. On February 15, 2020, KPD Officer Graw stopped
Middleton’s vehicle while outside Kingsland city limits in Camden
County. After smelling the odor of marijuana, Officer Graw
conducted a search of Middleton’s vehicle, found a controlled
substance, and arrested him. Prior to trial, Middleton asked the trial
court to suppress evidence obtained during the search because
Officer Graw, as a KPD officer, did not have authority to make a
traffic stop outside Kingsland city limits. At a motion-to-suppress
hearing, Officer Graw testified that she was employed by both the
KPD and CCSO by virtue of having “been deputized by the Camden
County Sheriff’s Office since 2013” while riding along with CCSO
deputies. She also testified that she had never worked a paid shift
as a CCSO deputy or received a paycheck from the CCSO.
The trial court granted Middleton’s motion to suppress under
1 We thank the Attorney General of Georgia, the Georgia Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers, and the Prosecuting Attorneys’ Council of Georgia for their briefs amicus curiae. 2 OCGA § 40-13-30, which provides that a municipality’s law
enforcement officers lack arrest powers outside of the municipality’s
city limits. 2 In its written order, the trial court concluded that
“without a showing that extra-territorial jurisdiction was conferred
upon Officer Graw by local or other law, Middleton’s search and
seizure were unlawful.” In a footnote, the trial court stated that it
was “not persuaded that Officer Graw’s 2013 deputization by the
Camden County Sheriff to act as an agent of the CCSO as part of
her riding with CCSO deputies at the time changes its analysis,
especially where the State has failed to introduce evidence as to the
scope and/or content of said deputization.”
The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding that Officer Graw’s testimony that she was deputized in
2 OCGA § 40-13-30 provides:
Officers of the Georgia State Patrol and any other officer of this state or of any county or municipality thereof having authority to arrest for a criminal offense of the grade of misdemeanor shall have authority to prefer charges and bring offenders to trial under this article, provided that officers of an incorporated municipality shall have no power to make arrests beyond the corporate limits of such municipality unless such jurisdiction is given by local or other law.
3 2013 was sufficient to prove that she was acting within her
jurisdiction as a deputy sheriff at the time of the arrest. Middleton
I, 363 Ga. App. at 854-855. Middleton subsequently petitioned for
certiorari, which this Court granted to review the question of
whether the trial court erred in granting Middleton’s motion to
suppress evidence on the basis that Officer Graw was not engaged
in the lawful discharge of her official duties at the time of the search
and subsequent arrest.
2. We start with the scope of a deputy sheriff’s official duties.
“Sheriffs are authorized in their discretion to appoint one or more
deputies.” OCGA § 15-16-23. Deputy sheriffs in many ways stand in
the same shoes as the sheriff. They are usually presumed to have
the same powers as the sheriff. See Jones v. Rountree, 96 Ga. 230,
231 (23 SE 311) (1895) (“It is difficult to conceive why deputy-
sheriffs should be appointed at all, if they are not at least competent
to perform such duties pertaining to the sheriff’s office as serving
papers and making entries of such service.”); Veit v. State, 182 Ga.
App. 753, 756 (357 SE2d 113) (1987) (“A deputy sheriff is an agent
4 of the sheriff and in effecting the proper discharge of his duties is
empowered with the same duties and powers.”). Likewise, deputy
sheriffs are required by statute to take the same oath that sheriffs
do. See OCGA § 45-3-7 (“Before proceeding to act, all deputies shall
take the same oaths as their principals take . . . .”). However,
sometimes deputies are sworn in for a more limited role, such as to
work on a particular case or cases. See OCGA § 45-3-7 (exempting
deputies “employed in particular cases only” from having to file and
enter the record of their oath with their principal’s office).
Generally, “a public officer is presumed, until the contrary
appears, to have properly performed his official duties and not to
have exceeded his authority.” Fine v. Dade County, 198 Ga. 655, 663
(32 SE2d 246) (1944). At a minimum, that presumption may be
overcome if the party challenging the public officer’s action
persuades the court that the person being held out as a purported
deputy does not in fact hold that position at the time of arrest. See
id. Here, there is no dispute that Officer Graw was deputized in 2013
by the Camden County Sheriff; what is disputed is whether she was
5 still deputized when she arrested Middleton in 2020. The key
question is thus one of scope: Was Officer Graw deputized for
particular cases only, see OCGA § 45-3-7, or was the deputization
general in nature? If the deputization was not restricted in scope,
this case would present difficult questions about the duration and
legal effect of that 2013 deputization, but those questions do not
arise if in fact Officer Graw was deputized for particular cases only.
This initial question of scope is a question of fact. However, the
trial court’s order is ambiguous regarding whether it made a factual
finding when it took note of “Officer Graw’s 2013 deputization by the
Camden County Sheriff to act as an agent of the CCSO as part of
her riding with CCSO deputies at the time.” It is not clear to us
whether this statement rests on a factual finding that Officer Graw
was deputized only for cases that arose as she was “riding with
CCSO deputies,” particularly in light of the trial court’s later
statement that “the State has failed to introduce evidence as to the
scope and/or content of said deputization.” If the trial court’s order
did depend on a factual finding as to the scope of Officer Graw’s
6 deputization, that finding would be entitled to deference;
alternatively, if the trial court’s ruling was based on the duration
and legal effect of a general deputization, it would be subject to de
novo review. See Nelson v. State, 312 Ga. 375, 377 (863 SE2d 61)
(2021) (“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a defendant’s motion
to suppress evidence, the trial court’s decision with regard to
questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly
erroneous; . . . [t]he trial court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de
novo, however.”).
In light of this unresolved and threshold factual question, we
vacate the Court of Appeals’ opinion with direction that it vacate the
trial court’s order and remand the case to the trial court with
direction that the trial court clarify whether its ruling that Officer
Graw did not have legal authority to stop and search Middleton was
based on the factual finding that Officer Graw had been deputized
7 for particular cases only.3
Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. All the Justices concur.
3 Although amici in their briefs suggest in the alternative that the trial
court erred because suppression is not an appropriate remedy for extraterritorial arrest, the State conceded at oral argument that this issue was never raised in proceedings below. Thus, we need not address it here. See Pfeiffer v. Ga. Dept. of Transp., 275 Ga. 827, 829 (573 SE2d 389) (2002) (“[A]bsent special circumstances, an appellate court need not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”) (cleaned up). See also Harrell v. State, 297 Ga. 884, 886 n.2 (778 SE2d 196) (2015) (“[T]he State did not raise any such issue below, before or after the trial court’s ruling on the subject, [so] its ability to [rely on that argument] on appeal has been waived.”). 8 Decided July 5, 2023.
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia — 363 Ga. App.
851.
Jonathan P. Lockwood, Brian C. Tyrone, for appellant.
Keith Higgins, District Attorney, Benjamin E. Gephardt,
Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Jill A. Travis, Mazie L. Guertin, Hunter J. Rodgers; Peter J.
Skandalakis, Robert W. Smith, Jr.; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney
General, Wayne R. Beckerman, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen
J. Petrany, Solicitor-General, Ross W. Bergethon, Deputy Solicitor-
General, amici curiae.