Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell

440 F.3d 278, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3523, 2006 WL 330120
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 14, 2006
Docket04-11300
StatusPublished
Cited by199 cases

This text of 440 F.3d 278 (Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Financial Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3523, 2006 WL 330120 (5th Cir. 2006).

Opinion

*282 RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

In this putative class action for securities fraud, Financial Acquisition Partners and John D. May (Plaintiffs) appeal the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal of their second amended complaint pursuant to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4. Plaintiffs’ claims arise from their purchase of shares, and the bankruptcy shortly thereafter, of Amresco Inc. Plaintiffs challenge the district court’s: (1) holding implicitly that collateral estoppel did not preclude the individual defendants’ raising certain defenses; (2) striking opinions from an expert’s affidavit attached to the complaint; (3) holding Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the PSLRA’s pleading requirements; and (4) denying leave to amend their complaint. AFFIRMED.

I.

The following factual recitation is based on the complaint at issue and public filings, all of which may be considered in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, as discussed infra.

Amresco was publicly traded. As a debtor in bankruptcy when this action was initiated, it was subject to the automatic stay provisions. 11 U.S.C. § 362.

Defendants L. Keith Blackwell, Jonathan Pettee, Randolph E. Brown, and Ron B. Kirkland (Individual Defendants) are former officers and directors of Amresco. Brown was chairman of the board and CEO from November 2000 until Amresco’s bankruptcy filing; Blackwell, its general counsel and president; Pettee, its chief financial officer; and Kirkland, its senior vice president and chief accounting officer. Defendant Deloitte & Touche LLP was Amresco’s auditor.

Prior to its 2 July 2001 bankruptcy filing, Amresco was a small and middle-market lending company with three main segments: commercial finance, asset management, and home equity lending. Its operations centered around its commercial finance line of business. Commercial finance revenues were primarily earned from (1) interest and fees on loans to small and middle-market business owners; (2) accrued earnings on retained interests in securitizations; (3) servicing fees on its loan portfolios; and (4) gains on the secu-ritization on sale of loans.

One of Amreseo’s significant divisions was a lender to restaurants (including well-known national chains) and other small to middle-market businesses. Am-resco funded these loans through a warehouse financing facility (revolving credit line) before bundling them for sale to a third party. These bundled loans were securitized' — sold into a trust and then bonds backed by underlying trust loans issued. Amresco retained an interest in the securitized loans. Borrowers signed a note for an amount 5 to 10% greater than the amount loaned and paid interest on that greater amount (credit enhancement). The credit enhancement also served as collateral for the loan; but, of course, if net losses in the securitization pool exceeded 10%, Amresco’s cash flow would decrease. The premium was returned to borrowers if there were no deficiencies within the pool; otherwise, they forfeited those payments. If the loans became more than 105 to 360 days delinquent (depending on the loan), payments to investors were accelerated; Amresco’s cash flow would decrease; and it would have to write-down some of its subordinated interests.

*283 Because the anticipated payments on the retained interests extended into the future, Amresco had to estimate, and report on its financial statements, the present fair value of those payment streams. The Form 10-K for the year 2000 (Y2000 10-K), signed on 30 March 2001 and filed on 2 April, noted that different assumptions might materially affect the estimates.

Two key assumptions in that Y2000 10-K were the projected credit loss and the discount. Amresco believed net losses would not exceed the credit enhancement range, so that borrowers would absorb the entire loss. Therefore, it estimated a net credit loss of zero percent. Amresco stated that a 1.5% credit loss increase would reduce the value of Amresco’s retained interest by $27 million.

Amresco’s Y2000 10-K, accompanied by Deloitte’s audit, reported assets of $715 million and shareholders’ equity of $165 million. It also showed Amresco suffered losses of $69 million in 1998, $221 million in 1999, and $218 million in 2000. The Y2000 10-K stated Amresco no longer had access to its prior warehouse financing. Therefore, Amresco needed to find a new lender; but, the Y2000 10-K stated a new lender was not guaranteed and that, until one was found, Amresco’s ability to make new loans was substantially impaired.

This action concerns shares of Amresco purchased from 29 March 2001 to 2 July 2001 by a claimed class. (Again, the Y2000 10-K primarily at issue was signed on 30 March 2001 and filed on 2 April.) Plaintiffs claim fraud relating to (1) Am-resco’s financial statements; (2) statements its officers made to certain shareholders; and (3) other omissions. The allegations primarily involve the following events: (1) in April 2000, Amresco agreed to a material executive compensation plan for its officers, including the Individual Defendants, that should have been, but was not, disclosed immediately to the public; (2) on 12 March 2001, Am-resco retained Greenhill & Co. to explore restructuring options, including, but not limited to, bankruptcy; (3) on 2 April 2001, Amresco filed its Y2000 10-K, signed by Brown, Pettee, and Kirkland (Plaintiffs allege numerous material misstatements and omissions related to this filing, including Amresco’s not disclosing the potential for default, and eventually the default, of a $50 million loan to Duke & Long); and (4) on 10 May 2001, Brown, Pettee, and Blackwell met with shareholders in Oklahoma, allegedly telling them Amresco would obtain new warehouse financing. (These alleged statements were the subject of another action, discussed infra, Prescott Group Aggressive Small Cap, L.P. v. Blackwell, et al, No. 02-CV-0517-EA (M) (N.D.Okla. 25 Aug. 2003) (unpublished).)

Plaintiffs’ complaint was filed in mid-2002. Approximately six months later, by joint motion, Plaintiffs declared their intention to file an amended complaint and Defendants agreed to delay moving to dismiss until that complaint was filed. The motion was granted.

The first amended complaint was filed in early 2003. After Defendants moved to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed an opposed motion for leave to amend (to file the second amended complaint at issue). In July 2003, in granting leave to amend, the district court cautioned: additional amendment “[would] not be granted absent extraordinary circumstances”. Fin. Acquisition Partners, L.P. v. Blackwell, 2003 WL 22006271, No. 3:02-CV-1586-K (N.D.Tex. 28 July 2003) (unpublished).

Accordingly, that month, Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint (SAC); Defendants moved to dismiss, including Deloitte’s moving to strike Plaintiffs’ expert’s affidavit attached to the SAC. Re *284

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440 F.3d 278, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 3523, 2006 WL 330120, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/financial-acquisition-partners-lp-v-blackwell-ca5-2006.