Fifth Third Bank v. Carroll Building Co.

905 N.E.2d 1284, 180 Ohio App. 3d 490, 2009 Ohio 57
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 9, 2009
DocketNo. 22361.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 905 N.E.2d 1284 (Fifth Third Bank v. Carroll Building Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Ohio Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fifth Third Bank v. Carroll Building Co., 905 N.E.2d 1284, 180 Ohio App. 3d 490, 2009 Ohio 57 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).

Opinion

Wolff, Judge.

{¶ 1} The city of Dayton appeals from a judgment of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which determined that a commercial ground lease between the city and Carroll Building Co., L.L.C. (“CBC”) had been renewed.

2} Although it was undisputed that CBC (through its receiver) did not exercise its option to renew in accordance with the terms of the lease, the trial court concluded that the city was estopped from terminating the lease. For the *492 reasons that follow, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and the matter will be remanded for further proceedings.

I

{¶ 3} The city entered into a commercial ground lease with Ponderosa/Metromedia Steakhouses Company (“Ponderosa”) for property located at the Dayton Metropolitan Airport. The initial term of the lease was six years, from May 1, 1987, through April 30, 1993, with several ten-year renewal options. Ponderosa owned a building on the property known as the Aset Building, a 70,000 square foot commercial office building, and several tenants leased space in the building. The city’s lease to Ponderosa provided that title to the office building would vest in the city when the lease was terminated.

{¶ 4} In 1993, Ponderosa exercised its first ten-year renewal option. In 1997, Ponderosa assigned the lease to CBC with the city’s consent. CBC subsequently executed several mortgages on its interest in the ground lease. Pramco CV6, L.L.C., an assignee of Fifth Third Bank, holds three mortgages totaling more than $2 million; CityWide Development Corporation holds a mortgage of approximately $51,000; and the U.S. Small Business Administration holds a mortgage of approximately $955,000.

{¶ 5} In early 2002, Fifth Third filed a complaint for judgment on its notes and sought the appointment of a receiver because CBC was in default. The complaint named numerous other interested parties, including the other lien holders and the city. In April 2002, the trial court appointed a receiver, Arthur Hollencamp. Under the receivership, Hollencamp made timely payments on CBC’s obligations, and through an agreement with Fifth Third Bank, paid the arrearage on CBC’s lease payments to the city.

{¶ 6} The first ten-year renewal period on the lease was due to expire on April 30, 2003. The lease provided, “Lessee shall notify Lessor in writing, not less than six months prior to the expirations of the Primary Term or Option Period then in effect, of its intent to exercise the ensuing Option Period.” Pursuant to the lease, the required notices to the lessor were to be delivered to the city’s director of aviation. It is undisputed that the receiver had the authority to exercise the lease options. It is also undisputed that the receiver did not notify the city of an intent to renew for an additional ten-year period by October 31, 2002, the date six months prior to the expiration of the term then in effect.

{¶ 7} The city and the receiver did not have any communication about the future of the lease until March 2003, when the receiver contacted the airport property manager to inquire about the amount of the rent payment for the next ten-year term because he was trying to obtain an appraisal of the property. The *493 same day, the property manager faxed the receiver a memo confirming the rent increase that would go into effect for the next ten-year term. The manager and the receiver did not discuss the notice requirement for renewal of the lease, and neither seemed to have realized that the date for renewal had passed. Eleven days later, the city’s director of aviation sent a letter to CBC advising of its failure to exercise its option to renew the lease and of its status as a month-to-month holdover tenant as of May 1, 2003.

{¶ 8} On April 10, 2003, the receiver filed a motion for determination of status of lease in the trial court seeking to clarify CBC’s status under the lease. The trial court held a hearing in December 2003. On January 15, 2004, the trial court found that the lease had been renewed and would remain operative until April 30, 2013. Although the trial court recognized that neither CBC nor its receiver had notified the city in writing that it intended to renew the lease, the trial court found that circumstances justified the extension of the lease. Specifically, the trial court found that the city would not be prejudiced by the extension of the lease, that the city should have understood from the receivership proceedings that “everyone intended for the lease to continue” for at least ten more years, that CBC and the lien holders would suffer substantial losses if the lease terminated, and that the doctrine of estoppel prevented the city from successfully arguing that the lease had been terminated.

{¶ 9} The city raises one assignment of error on appeal.

II

{¶ 10} The city’s assignment of error states:

{¶ 11} “The trial court erred in failing to enforce the unambiguous terms of the commercial ground lease that required the lessee to send written notice to renew the lease.”

{¶ 12} The city contends that the trial court erred in modifying the lease to eliminate an unambiguous renewal provision.

{¶ 13} When construing and interpreting lease provisions, courts have applied traditional contract principles and have enforced a lease as written if its language is clear and unambiguous. Myers v. E. Ohio Gas Co. (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 121, 125, 5 O.O.3d 103, 364 N.E.2d 1369. See also Hybud Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., Ltd. (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 657, 665, 597 N.E.2d 1096; Saunders v. Mortensen, 101 Ohio St.3d 86, 2004-Ohio-24, 801 N.E.2d 452, at ¶ 9.

{¶ 14} “[W]here a contract is plain and unambiguous, it does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work a hardship upon one of the parties thereto and a corresponding advantage to the other * * Dugan & Meyers Constr. Co., Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Admin. Servs., *494 113 Ohio St.3d 226, 2007-Ohio-1687, 864 N.E.2d 68, ¶ 29, citing Ohio Crane Co. v. Hicks (1924), 110 Ohio St. 168,172,143 N.E. 388. It is not the province of courts to relieve parties of improvident contracts. Id. “[UJnless there is fraud or other unlawfulness involved, courts are powerless to save a competent person from the effects of his own voluntary agreement.” Id., citing Ullmann v. May (1947), 147 Ohio St. 468, 476, 34 O.O. 384, 72 N.E.2d 63.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
905 N.E.2d 1284, 180 Ohio App. 3d 490, 2009 Ohio 57, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fifth-third-bank-v-carroll-building-co-ohioctapp-2009.