Feneck v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Company

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 John V. Feneck, No. CV-22-01500-PHX-JJT

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 Lincoln National Life Insurance Company,

13 Defendant. 14 15 16 At issue are Plaintiff John V. Feneck’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint 17 (Doc. 32) and Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 42). 18 This is an insurance coverage dispute in which Plaintiff alleges that he inadvertently 19 failed to pay the full life insurance premium to Defendant Lincoln National Life Insurance 20 Company for coverage of his parents in the event they both die. As a result, the life 21 insurance coverage with Defendant lapsed, and Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application 22 for reinstatement of coverage. Plaintiff’s father is deceased and his mother is the surviving 23 widow, but he alleges that in the absence of life insurance coverage, he has suffered 24 damages in the amount of one million dollars, the amount of life insurance coverage he 25 had for his parents with Defendant. (Doc. 1-2 at 8–10.) 26 Plaintiff filed this action in state court on August 3, 2022 (Doc. 1-2 at 7), and 27 Defendant removed the case to this Court on September 6, 2022 (Doc. 1) and filed an 28 Answer on September 13, 2022 (Doc. 13). On October 7, 2022, the parties stipulated to the 1 dismissal of three of Plaintiff’s claims, leaving claims for breach of contract based on 2 Defendant’s alleged failure to notify Plaintiff of his premium payment delinquency 3 (Count 1) and for declaratory relief to reinstate coverage under the policy (Count 2). 4 The Court entered a Scheduling Order on November 28, 2022, setting a discovery 5 deadline of April 28, 2023, and a dispositive motion deadline of September 1, 2023. 6 (Doc. 22.) The Court set no deadline for amending the Complaint. Indeed, at the 7 Scheduling Conference (Doc. 21), the Court pointed out the parties had proposed no 8 deadline for amending the Complaint and asked counsel for Plaintiff, “Can I presume that 9 that is because the plaintiff views the case as static at this point in terms of who the players 10 are and what the theories of the case are?” (Nov. 28, 2022 Tr. at 3:18–20.) Counsel for 11 Plaintiff responded, “Correct,” and the Court directed the Courtroom Deputy to mark the 12 case management schedule with regard to a deadline for amending the Complaint as “not 13 applicable for that particular deliverable.” (Nov. 28, 2022 Tr. at 3:21–23.) 14 The Court granted Plaintiff’s request to change counsel on April 11, 2023 (Doc. 29) 15 and granted two Stipulations by the parties to extend Scheduling Order deadlines 16 (Docs. 35, 37, 43), whereby the new discovery deadline is August 28, 2023, and the 17 dispositive motion deadline is December 1, 2023. Plaintiff has filed two motions to amend 18 the Complaint (Docs. 32, 42), to add new claims and a new defendant to this lawsuit, 19 arguing that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 “favors freely allowing amendment so that 20 cases may be decided on their merits.” (Doc. 32 at 4 (internal quotation and citation 21 omitted).) 22 Rule 15 provides that leave to amend should be freely granted “when justice so 23 requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The power to grant leave to amend, however, is 24 entrusted to the discretion of the district court, which ‘determines the propriety of a motion 25 to amend by ascertaining the presence of any of four factors: bad faith, undue delay, 26 prejudice to the opposing party, and/or futility.’” Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 27 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting William O. Gilley Enters. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 588 F.3d 659, 669 28 n.8 (9th Cir. 2009)). A motion to amend the Complaint made after the deadline set forth in 1 the Scheduling Order—the situation Plaintiff presents here—is equivalent to a motion to 2 amend the case management schedule, which must meet the “good cause” requirement of 3 Rule 16(b)(4). See Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 284 F.R.D. 452, 459 (D. 4 Ariz. 2012). Specifically, Rule 16(b)(4) provides that the deadlines in the Scheduling Order 5 “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 16(b)(4). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard primarily considers the diligence of the party 7 seeking the amendment.” Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th 8 Cir. 1992). Thus, under Rule 16, “[p]rejudice is not the relevant inquiry.” Id. A party 9 moving to amend the Complaint must first demonstrate that he diligently worked to comply 10 with the schedule as originally set forth in the Scheduling Order. Morgal, 284 F.R.D. at 11 459–60. 12 As it pertains to Plaintiff’s present requests to amend the Complaint to add claims 13 and a party (Docs. 32, 42), Plaintiff did not address in the briefing his or his counsel’s 14 diligence under Rule 16 in the period before his counsel represented to the Court the claims 15 and parties were static and the Court entered a Scheduling Order on November 28, 2022.1 16 The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the theories and 17 party Plaintiff now proposes to add to the case arose from surprises in discovery that 18 Plaintiff did not know, or at least reasonably could not have known, about before the Court 19 entered the Scheduling Order. 20 In moving to extend discovery and dispositive motion deadlines (not at issue here), 21 Plaintiff squarely blames his prior counsel for any delinquency, who he states was 22 negligent and then abandoned him. (Doc. 31 at 4–5.) As Plaintiff himself points out, clients 23 are ordinarily charged with their prior counsel’s negligent acts. (Doc. 31 at 4 (citing 24 Community Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)).) Here, Plaintiff 25 focuses on an insinuation that his prior counsel abandoned him, which Plaintiff argues goes 26 1 Plaintiff did brief the Rule 16 standard as it pertained to his request to extend certain 27 deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions (Doc. 31), but the Court did not have an opportunity to address those arguments because it ruled on Plaintiff’s requests to extend 28 those deadlines based on the parties’ stipulations, including the expert discovery deadlines as part of the stipulated extension of discovery in this matter. || beyond negligent acts. (Doc. 31 at 3-4.) But Defendant shows that Plaintiff's prior counsel prepared for and participated in the case management planning, provided an initial || disclosure statement, and provided timely discovery responses. The case record does not 4|| support the conclusion that Plaintiff's prior counsel abandoned him in the period leading up to, or even after, the Scheduling Conference—the time period at issue here.” 6 In short, Plaintiff has not shown that the claims and party he now proposes to add || could not have been added with reasonable diligence before the Court entered a Scheduling 8 || Order. As aresult, Plaintiff has not shown good cause under Rule 16 for the Court to amend 9|| the Scheduling Order to allow Plaintiff to amend the Complaint now. 10 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend 11 || Complaint (Doc. 32) and Second Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. 42). 12 Dated this 9th day of August, 2023. CN 13 “wok: 14 wefehlee— Unig StatesDistrict Judge 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 2 While Plaintiff’s new counsel also argues that prior counsel did not adequately explain to Plaintiff certain Scheduling Order deadlines, the Court does not have evidence before it 28 ab Flaintitt or his prior counsel and declines to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the

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