Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc.

68 F. Supp. 3d 486, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175261, 2014 WL 7232590
District Court, S.D. New York·Decided December 18, 2014·No. No. 11cv6201 (DLC)·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

DENISE COTE, District Judge:

This Opinion addresses a motion in li-mine brought by plaintiff Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) to prohibit defendants1 from presenting, in connection with its Section 11 claims, evidence to the jury of principal and interest payments made on the certificates at issue in this action (the “Certificates”) after September 2, 2011, which is the date on which this lawsuit was filed (the “Posh-Filing Payments”).2 For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

FHFA, acting as conservator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (together, the “Government Sponsored Enterprises” or “GSEs”), filed suit on September 2, 2011 against defendants alleging that the offering documents (“Offering Documents”) used to market and sell seven Certificates to the GSEs associated with residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”) contained material misstatements or omissions. RMBS are securities entitling the holder to income payments, from pools of residential mortgage loans (“Supporting Loan Groups” or “SLGs”) held by a trust.

FHFA brought these claims pursuant to Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”), as well as Virginia’s and the District of Columbia’s Blue Sky laws. This lawsuit is the sole remaining action in a series of similar, [489] coordinated actions litigated in this district by FHFA against banks and related individuals and entities to recover losses experienced by the GSEs from their purchases of RMBS. A description of the litigation and the types of misrepresentations at issue in each of these coordinated actions, including the instant case, can be found in FHFA v. Nomura Holding Am., Inc., 60 F.Supp.3d 479, 484-88, 498-500, 11cv6201 (DLC), 2014 WL 6462239, at *3-6, *16-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18,2014) (“Nomura").

The GSEs purchased the seven Certificates between November 30, 2005 and April 30, 2007. The Certificates had an original unpaid principal balance of approximately $2.05 billion, and the GSEs paid slightly more than the amount of the unpaid principal balance when purchasing them. Six were purchased by Freddie Mac; one was purchased by Fannie Mae. The GSEs have retained the Certificates.

Nomura acted as sponsor and depositor for all seven of the Certificates, and as the sole lead underwriter and seller for two of them. RBS was the sole lead underwriter for three of the Certificates and a co-lead underwriter for a fourth. For an explanation of the RMBS securitization process, including the roles of mortgage loan originators, sponsors, and underwriters, see Nomura, 60 F.Supp.3d at 485-89, 2014 WL 6462239, at *4-6.

Section 11 and Section 12(a)(2), as described below, use different measures of damages. The Blue Sky laws adopt the Section 12(a)(2) measurement of damages. As a result, FHFA’s expert Dr. James K. Finkel (“Finkel”) has used two different methodologies in calculating damages, and has also applied three different interest rates to his calculations. Finkel has calculated damages as high as roughly $1 billion for the claims against Nomura, and roughly $750 million against RBS.

Dr. Timothy Riddiough (“Riddiough”), one of defendants’ experts, submitted a report on November 10, 2014 (the “Ridd-iough Report”) in which he critiqued Fink-el’s valuation of the Certificates at the time of suit and offered his own valuation model. As explained below, where a plaintiff holds a security through judgment, Section 11 damages are equal to the difference between the purchase price (or the offering price, if lower) and the security’s value at the time the suit is filed.

Each Certificate entitled its holder to the receipt of certain monthly payments, which were based on the principal balance for that Certificate.3 The monthly payments to the Certificate holder were equal to a coupon payment — effectively interest, at a predetermined rate, on the remaining principal balance — plus some additional amount that paid down the principal balance.

Certificates were linked to tranches of varying seniority. Generally, holders of the most senior certificates for a given Supporting Loan Group were paid first, after which holders of the next-most-senior certificates received payment, and so on. Thus, should some borrowers in an SLG default on their loans, certificates in the junior-most tranche would absorb all or most of the shortfall before payments to more senior certificates were affected. Accordingly, the most senior certificates were subject to less risk than were more junior certificates. By apportioning risk in this way, defendants were able to create AAA-rated securities from Alt-A and sub-prime loans. The GSEs purchased senior certificates — often only the most senior— with the highest credit ratings.

[490] For instance, in Nomura Securitization 2006-FM1, Freddie Mac purchased a Certificate linked to the senior-most tranche, class I-A-l, which was supported by Group I loans. That tranche had an initial principal balance of approximately $525 million; the nine subordinated (“mezzanine”) tranches below had a total principal balance of approximately $223 million. All realized losses on Group I loans were to be allocated to the nine mezzanine tranches, until their $223 million principal balance was reduced to zero.4 This subordination, in addition to certain other credit enhancements,5 protected Freddie Mac’s senior Certificate from loss, even in the face of substantial defaults (and limited recovery through foreclosure).

A certificate’s value in the market is determined, in large part, by the expected future flow of payments to the certificate holder. Because payments to the certificate holder depend upon borrowers’ payments pursuant to the underlying mortgage loans, the expected rate of borrower defaults is a key determinant of the certificate’s value. The average expected loss severity — which measures the shortfall between the unpaid principal balance of a loan and the amount recovered through foreclosure (less costs incurred in foreclosure) — is another key factor. In the years following September 2, 2011, all but one of the Certificates never missed a payment.

In his valuation analysis, Riddiough considered the performance of the Certificates after the date this suit was filed, September 2, 2011, for two purposes. First, Ridd-iough compared actual post-filing rates of default within the relevant Supporting Loan Groups against his and Finkel’s pre-dieted default rates, finding that his “forecasts ... are much closer to what actually happened.” Second, Riddiough looked at actual post-filing market prices for the Certificates as “an ex-post check” of his conclusion, based on trading volume, that the RMBS market was illiquid at the time of filing. Riddiough noted that, by one measure, the Certificates’ prices in the market have increased by 28 to 81 percent.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 486, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175261, 2014 WL 7232590 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

68 F. Supp. 3d 486 (Federal Housing Finance Agency v. Nomura Holding America, Inc.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Twigg v. AbbVie Inc.
2025 IL App (1st) 221581 (Appellate Court of Illinois, 2025)
Cai v. Switch, Inc.
D. Nevada, 2020