Falls v. Arteta

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 13, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-00830·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK RAIQUAN K. FALLS, Petitioner, 23-CV-830 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND PAUL ARTETA, Respondent. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Petitioner, who is currently incarcerated at Orange County Jail, brings this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought under New York Civil Practice Law & Rules § 7002, challenging his current detention. By order dated March 2, 2023, the Court granted Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The Court directs Petitioner to file an amended petition within 60 days of the date of this order as detailed below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody challenging the legality of his detention on the ground that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The Court has the authority to review the petition and “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled [to such relief].” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally and interpret them “to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Green v. United States, 260 F.3d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant is not exempt “from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Triestman, 470 F.3d at 477 (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). BACKGROUND Petitioner brings this habeas corpus petition, which is captioned for the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, asserting that he is being held

“illegally, without consent or probable cause,” and seeking to be released from custody. (ECF 1 ¶ 1.) The following facts are drawn from the petition. Throughout 2021 and 2022, Petitioner was arrested a number of times, and he was arraigned in the City of Newburgh Court in connection with those arrests.1 (ECF 1 ¶ 6.) Petitioner was “released on his own recognizance on many different instances after his initial release from jail,” but he was repeatedly rearrested and detained. (Id.) For a number of reasons, Petitioner’s criminal proceedings were adjourned and stayed multiple times, and Petitioner objected to the delays in his proceedings on speedy trial grounds. In particular, Petitioner objected to requests by his attorneys that his fitness to proceed be examined under N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law § 730. (Id.)

On October 22, 2022, Petitioner was again released on his own recognizance, and a trial date was set, apparently for November 14, 2022. Petitioner “was advised that his failure to

1 Petitioner previously challenged his custody during 2021 and 2022, in a filing that the Court construed as a petition under Section 2241. See Falls v. Annucci, ECF 1:22-CV-8055, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 2022) (“Falls I”) (detailing Petitioner’s allegations of unlawful custody, alerting Petitioner that the court would construe his submission as a petition under Section 2241 if he did not withdraw it, and granting him leave to file an amended petition to allege exhaustion of state court remedies). Petitioner did not submit an amended petition, and the Court dismissed Falls I without prejudice. ECF 1:22-CV-8055, 7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023). Petitioner alleges in this petition that he was released while Falls I was pending, suggesting that that is why he did not file an amended petition. (ECF 1 ¶ 2); see also Falls v. Annucci, ECF 1:22-CV-8743, 5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2023) (dismissing petition without prejudice as duplicative of Falls I.) appear for any later scheduled court date would result in a bench warrant for arrest,” but he was not specifically advised that he would “face [a] criminal penalty of bail jumping charges as a result of such failure to appear.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner failed to appear on November 14, 2022, but he called the court and told an employee in the clerk’s office about “his possible anticipated

absence.” (Id.) The clerk’s office employee informed Petitioner that a “later ‘required date’ scheduled in adjournment was set for [his] appearance on December 12, 2022.” (Id.) When Petitioner failed to appear on December 12, 2022, Judge Jude T. Martini issued a bench warrant for his arrest. (Id.) On December 19, 2022, Petitioner appeared in the Newburgh City Court for a “separate scheduled court date,” apparently in connection with other cases. Petitioner told his Legal Aid attorneys that he was “availab[le] to comply with any mandated court orders,” and he also told them that he was having “adjustment stability issues with respect to steady income, housing, phone service, and transportation.” (Id.) Petitioner was permitted to leave court that day without being apprehended or detained. On December 28, 2022, however, Petitioner was arrested on a

bench warrant for bail jumping in the third degree, in connection with his failure to appear in court on December 12, 2022, and he was remanded into custody. At his arraignment on January 6, 2023, Petitioner objected to the arrest, and he entered a not guilty plea. (Id.) In this petition, Petitioner alleges that he cannot be prosecuted for bail jumping because he was “involuntarily arrested before the expiration of the 30-day grace period following the alleged failure to appear on the ‘required date’ set by the court.” (Id.) Citing to New York Penal Law § 215.55, Petitioner asserts that the “issuance of a warrant letter constitutes a consent to adjournment of the ‘required date’ of appearance within the meaning of” the statute, and “provides a criminal defendant a 30-day grace period in which to voluntarily appear and precludes [Petitioner’s] involuntary return or arrest, prior to the running of such 30 days.” (Id.) Petitioner further alleges that he was not provided with a copy of the “accusatory instrument.” (Id.) According to the petition, “no appeal has been taken” in connection with his current detention on the bail jumping charge. (Id. ¶ 7.)

DISCUSSION A. Pretrial habeas corpus relief To the extent that Plaintiff seeks release from state pretrial detention, the appropriate vehicle for such relief is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, e.g., Clemente v. Conn., No. 3:21-CV-0408, 2022 WL 527757, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 27, 2022); Fullwellen v. City of New York, No. 21-CV-7219, 2021 WL 4940984, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2021); Robinson v. Sposato, No. 11-CV-0191, 2012 WL 1965631, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2012); see also Hoffler v. Bezio, 831 F. Supp. 2d 570, 575 (N.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d on other grounds, 726 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013); Marte v. Berkman, No. 11-CV-6082, 2011 WL 4946708, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2011), aff’d on other grounds sub nom., Marte v. Vance, 480 F. App’x 83 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order).

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