F. Mansfield & Sons Co. v. United States

94 Ct. Cl. 397, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 42, 1941 WL 4513
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 6, 1941
DocketNo. 43317; No. 43318; No. 43319; No. 43320; No. 43321; No. 43322; No. 43323; No. 43324
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 94 Ct. Cl. 397 (F. Mansfield & Sons Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. Mansfield & Sons Co. v. United States, 94 Ct. Cl. 397, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 42, 1941 WL 4513 (cc 1941).

Opinion

Whaeey, Chief Justice,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is one of eight suits brought pursuant to a special act of Congress approved January 20, 1936 (49 Stat. 2209), entitled “An Act to confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Claims to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claims of F. Mansfield and Sons Company, and others,” which reads as follows:

That jurisdiction is hereby conferred upon the Court of Claims of the United States to hear, determine, and render judgment upon the claims of the F. Mansfield and Sons Company, * * * for a compensation for damages sustained by said claimants by reason of the injury to oysters on beds operated under perpetual franchises or leases from the State of Connecticut and injury to such oyster beds, caused by officers, employees, and/or agents of the United States in performing dredging work in the harbor of New Haven, Connecticut, in 1933, 1934, and 1935: Provided, That suit hereunder shall be instituted within four months from the date of the approval of this Act, and proceedings therein shall be had in the same manner as in the case of claims over which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction, by virtue of section 145 of the Judicial Code, as amended.

Plaintiff held by perpetual franchises or leases from the State of Connecticut oyster lots in or near New Haven Harbor, Connecticut, and sues to recover damages for the destruction of large quantities of seed oysters and the value of the oyster beds on which they were planted. Damages are claimed to have resulted from the dredging of the channel at New Haven Harbor by the defendant between November 1, 1933, and June 9, 1935.

The contention is made that the special act admits negligence on the part of the Government. The special act simply gives the plaintiff the right which it would have had if it were bringing a suit against a private individual or corporation. It is practically in the same terms as the Jurisdictional Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 1049, which was incor[414]*414porated in the Rivers & Harbors Bill of that year as Section 13 and which confers upon the Court of Claims “jurisdiction to hear and determine claims for damages to oyster growers upon private or leased lands or bottoms arising from dredging operations and use of other machinery and equipment in making such improvements.” The plaintiff is given by the special act the right to be heard in Court on an alleged tortious act on the part of the defendant and its agents. This right would not have been accorded plaintiff under the general jurisdiction of this court. Actions sounding in tort are not cognizant under Section 145 of the Code. This section has been modified so far as oyster growers are concerned where dredging operations by the Government are involved, as provided for in the Act of 1935, supra.

It has been too well established to need a citation of authorities that special acts are always strictly construed. In each case the court will, from the language of the act, the nature of the case, and the surrounding circumstances, endeavor to ascertain and carry out the legislative intent. Braden v. United States, 16 C. Cls. 389.

The report of the House Committee on Claims, H. R. 1387, 74th Congress, First Session, which the Senate Committee Report incorporated verbatim shows conclusively that Congress, in the act, did not confess liability but intended that the plaintiff should establish negligence on the part of the United States as the proximate cause of the damages. The Committee Report states:

It appears to your Committee that the foregoing constitutes at least a prima facie claim against the United States, and it is our opinion that the claimants are entitled to this right of suit. The bill is merely jurisdictional, and no recovery can be had therewnder without proof of Mobility on the part of the United States and subsequent damages resulting to the claimants. [Italics ours.]

It is necessary for the plaintiff to prove its case by showing that the manner and method pursued by the Government were negligent and the proximate cause of its damages.

Under authority of the Rivers & Harbors Act of July 1930, 46 Stat. 918, 934, an examination and survey of the harbor had been made by the Engineer Corps, United States [415]*415Army, which, recommended a depth oí 25 feet below the mean low water level in the main channel instead of the 20 feet theretofore authorized and dredged by the defendant. On August 30, 1935, after the dredging had been completed, Congress under the Elvers & Harbors Act specifically adopted the recommendations of the survey. Following the enactment of the National Industrial Eecovery Act in June 1933, 48 Stat. 195, the deepening of the channel of the New Haven Harbor was adopted as a public work under Section 204 of Title 2 of the Act and money was allotted to carry out the project.

The harbor at New Haven contained about 7,500 acres, two-thirds of which were used in November 1933, for the cultivation of seed oysters and had been so used for many years prior thereto. The bed of the harbor had been surveyed and divided into lots and was held by private persons under “perpetual licenses” or leases from the State of Connecticut through its Shellfish Commission, which had been created by statute for the purpose of regulating, protecting, and fostering shellfish industries in the waters of the State of Connecticut. The channel began on the northern tip of lot 324 in the outer part of the harbor and extended north for a distance of approximately 5 miles from the wharves in New Haven. The southern or lower portion of the channel, which was designated and marked by the Government as Section I, was 16,650 feet in length and 400 feet wide. The upper portion, known as Section II, extended 9,700 feet and was 500 feet wide except for a short distance near the northern end where it widened to 1,000 feet, narrowing to 500 feet as it approached the wharves. The entire channel was deepened to 25 feet below mean water level.

Oyster lots operated by plaintiff were located in the bed of the channel and extended to varying distances on both sides thereof. On November 1, 1933, defendant commenced dredging operations in the southern portion of Section I, using a seagoing hopper type of dredge. At all times this type of dredge was used until the work was finally completed in June 1935.

The seagoing hopper dredge used by defendant contained a centrifugal pump or pumps to which was attached a [416]*416large adjustable pipe extending below the vessel to the surface to be dredged. Attached to this pipe at its lower end is a “drag” or. “suction-head” which, operating on a principle similar to that utilized in electric vacuum cleaners, draws material off the bottom as the suction-head is dragged over the surface and discharges it in bins within the vessel. During operation a large quantity of water is drawn into the bins and continuously overflows, this overflow containing substantial amounts of mud, silt, and other solid matter.

Quantities of mud and silt were placed in suspension in the water as a result of agitation caused by dragging the suction-head over the bottoms and as a result of the constant overflow of water containing mud and silt from the bins.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
94 Ct. Cl. 397, 1941 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 42, 1941 WL 4513, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-mansfield-sons-co-v-united-states-cc-1941.