Ex Parte Swate

922 S.W.2d 122, 1996 WL 242524

• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Decided: June 14, 1996
• Docket: 94-0460
• Status: Published

Opinions

On Petition FOR WRIT of Habeas CORPUS

ENOCH, Justice,

delivered the opinion of the Court,

in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, HECHT, CORNYN, SPECTOR, BAKER, and ABBOTT, Justices join. GONZALEZ, Justice, filed a concurring opinion, in which OWEN, Justice, joins.

Relator Judy Cox Swate petitions this Court for writ of habeas corpus from a commitment order issued in connection with a turnover order. Because we hold that the commitment order is void, we order Relator discharged.

This case has a convoluted procedural history. . See Ex parte Swate, 874 S.W.2d 831 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, orig. proceeding); Eikenburg v. Webb, 880 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding). The following facts are sufficient for the purposes of the present proceeding. In 1981, the 309th District Court rendered a decree divorcing Tommy Swate (Swate) and Dian Hartwell Swate (Hartwell) based on Swate’s agreement to pay child support and alimony. Swate violated the terms of the agreement and Hartwell sued him in the 309th to reduce the amount of arrearage to judgment. The case was tried before a jury and Swate, an attorney, represented himself. Based on favorable jury findings, the 309th rendered judgment in the sum of $572,284.14 plus interest for Hartwell.

Sometime after his divorce from Hartwell, Swate married Judy Cox Swate (Cox). Cox eventually filed for divorce from Swate in the 312th District Court. A little more than a month after the 309th rendered judgment for Hartwell, the 312th rendered a divorce decree dividing the marital estate of Swate and Cox. The divorce decree awarded Cox approximately $105,000 from the community property of the marriage but placed most of the funds in the registry of the court pending any appeal.

A few months later, the 309th appointed John J. Eikenburg as the receiver to take control of Swate’s assets and apply them toward the satisfaction of the judgment due Hartwell. Eikenburg sought to intervene in the divorce action in the 312th, but that court dismissed the intervention with prejudice, presumably because it had already rendered final judgment and all that remained was disbursement of the funds in the court’s registry to Cox. Eikenburg then filed a motion in the 309th to enforce the judgment against Swate by ordering Cox to turn over the money she received in her divorce from Swate. After a hearing, the 309th signed an order compelling Cox to turn over any funds she received from the 312th to Eikenburg as soon as she obtained them. Subsequently, the 312th entered an order disbursing the funds in its registry to Cox, but Cox did not give Eikenburg the money.

Eikenburg filed a motion for contempt in the 309th, alleging that Cox had violated the turnover order. After a hearing, the trial court rendered a judgment of contempt against Cox, finding that she had violated the turnover order, and set her punishment at confinement in the county jail for three days and thereafter until she paid $10,000 to Eik-enburg and a $500 fine to the court. The trial court then suspended the punishment provided Cox paid the fine, paid the $10,000 to Eikenburg, and made “suitable payment arrangements” to pay Eikenburg $39,671.35, representing other funds she had received from the 312th, plus $13,816 in attorney’s fees.

A few months later, the 309th held a compliance hearing, after which it issued a commitment order revoking Cox’s suspension because she had not complied with the contempt order. This commitment order commanded the sheriff to arrest Cox and keep her in jail not only “until she ha[d] paid the fine of $500.00 ... and ... ha[dj served the three (3) days imprisonment and ... ha[d] purged herself of contempt by paying the sum of $10,000,” but also until she had made “written arrangements to pay the sums of $39,671.35 and $13,816.00.” The sheriff took Cox into custody. She sought habeas relief in the court of appeals, but her request was denied. 874 S.W.2d 831. Cox then sought habeas relief in this Court. We released her on bond pending our decision.

Cox argues that she is entitled to release because the commitment order increased her punishment beyond that assessed in the original contempt order, thus violating her due process rights. A commitment order may be collaterally attacked in a habeas corpus proceeding. Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex.1980). A writ of habeas corpus will issue if the commitment order is void because it deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law. Id,.; Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex.1979); Ex parte Rhodes, 163 Tex. 31, 352 S.W.2d 249, 250 (1961). A writ of habeas corpus will not issue if the order is merely erroneous. Rhodes, 352 S.W.2d at 250. Thus, we must determine whether Cox’s commitment order is void or simply erroneous.

In Ex parte Parr, this Court held that a contemnor is entitled to know what acts or omissions will subject her to punishment. 505 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex.1974). She is entitled to an opportunity to explain why, if guilty of contempt, she should be spared punishment. Id. at 245-46. A contemnor’s post-contempt conduct cannot be used to subject her to additional punishment. Id. at 246. If a court wishes to increase a contem-nor’s punishment, it must again give the contemnor notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. When a contemnor’s punishment is enhanced in the absence of a second notice and a second hearing, we may conclude that the contemnor was denied procedural due process. Id.

In its contempt order, the 309th set Cox’s punishment at confinement in the county jail for three days, continuing thereafter until she paid a $500 fine to the court and $10,000 to Eikenburg. However, in its commitment order, the trial court set Cox’s punishment at confinement in the county jail for three days, continuing thereafter until she paid a $500 fine to the court, $10,000 to Eikenburg, and made written arrangements to pay Eikenburg $53,487.35. By adding the “making written arrangements” feature as a prerequisite to Cox’s jail release, the trial court converted what had been only a condition for Cox’s suspended sentence into part of Cox’s contempt sentence. Thus, the commitment order increased Cox’s punishment beyond that provided in the contempt order, even though Eikenburg never requested additional relief. The record is devoid of any evidence that Cox received notice that if she did not pay Eikenburg the $10,000, she would not only spend three days in jail and remain in jail until she paid the $10,000 and the fine, but she further would be kept in jail until she made written arrangements to pay $53,-487.35.

Because the commitment order enhanced punishment without giving Cox notice or an opportunity to be heard, she was deprived of due process. The commitment order is void. Accordingly, we grant Cox’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and order her discharged and her bond released.