Opinion issued June 13, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-21-00513-CV ——————————— CHRISTIAN EDGLEY, Appellant V. LATEISHA RAGLAND, Appellee
On Appeal from the 505th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 15-DCV-228707
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Christian Edgley appeals from the trial court’s September 27, 2021
Order Enforcing Possession and Access Order with Commitment Suspended.
Because the order is not appealable, we dismiss the issues appealing the order.
Because Edgley has requested mandamus review of one of his appellate issues, we grant that request but determine that he has not established his right to mandamus
relief. Thus, as to that one issue, we deny mandamus relief.
The trial court’s September 27, 2021 enforcement order states that appellee
LaTeisha Ragland filed an amended motion for enforcement. The clerk’s record
does not contain the motion. The enforcement order further states that, in the motion,
Ragland sought enforcement of certain provisions of the trial court’s order issued on
December 11, 2019. The December 11, 2019 order is not in the clerk’s record. The
reporter’s record indicates that the trial court dismissed all alleged violations listed
in the amended motion for enforcement, which is not in the record, except for
violations 12, 14, and 44. The trial court stated that it found Edgley to be in contempt
for failing to comply with the December 11, 2019 order because he failed to
surrender the child to Ragland for her court-ordered period of possession on
December 15, 2019 and December 28, 2019 (violations 12 and 14). The court
ordered Edgley confined to the Fort Bend County Jail for 30 days but suspended the
jail commitment as long as he complied with the condition of serving five years of
community supervision by complying with the current possession and access order.
Edgley filed a timely notice of appeal.
Edgley is not physically confined in jail because the trial court suspended
commitment and placed him on community supervision. The order does not require
him to report to a community supervision officer or to participate in any other
2 programs or counseling. Instead, it merely requires compliance with the current
possession and access order.
Typically, when a party is found in contempt and committed to jail, the
remedy for challenging this order is by petition for writ of habeas corpus when the
contemnor is restrained of liberty by virtue of an order issued by a court or judge
based on violation of an order in a civil case. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221(d).
But contempt orders that do not impose confinement are not reviewable by writ of
habeas corpus. See In re Look, No. 01-02-00959-CV, 2003 WL 876650, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2003, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing to Ex
parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1985)). In Look, the trial court found the
relator in contempt and ordered her confined for six months for each of 75 violations
of the prior order, but suspended commitment and placed her on community
supervision for 36 months or until the child support arrearage was paid, whichever
occurred first. Id. at *1. This Court held that the relator had not sustained her burden
of showing she was restrained and entitled to habeas relief because her incarceration
was a speculative possibility. See id. at *2.
Because Edgley has not sought habeas relief, but has instead appealed from
the order, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal from
a contempt order. We have jurisdiction to consider appeals from final judgments
and interlocutory orders for which appeal is permitted by statute. See Lehmann v.
3 Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Contempt orders are not final,
appealable orders, but must instead be attacked by petition for writ of habeas corpus
if the contemnor is restrained of his liberty or by petition for writ of mandamus if no
restraint is involved. See In re Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 915–16
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, orig. proceeding). Thus, appellate courts do not have
jurisdiction to review contempt orders by direct appeal. See Crenshaw v. Thomas,
No. 03-21-00064-CV, 2022 WL 2162933, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2022,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
A notice was sent to Edgley on March 21, 2023, advising him that the Court
might dismiss his appellate issues for lack of jurisdiction unless he responded and
established that we had jurisdiction. Edgley requested an extension of time to
respond until May 15, 2023, but he did not file a response.
We may, however, construe an appeal to be a mandamus petition if the
appellant specifically requests it. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452
(Tex. 2011). In CMH Homes, the parties were unable to agree on an arbitrator and
the trial court appointed one, but CMH Homes filed an interlocutory appeal
challenging the appointment and requesting alternatively that its appeal be treated as
a mandamus petition. See id. at 446. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction because there was no provision for interlocutory appeal of the
trial court’s order appointing an arbitrator. See id. Although the Texas Supreme
4 Court agreed with the court of appeal’s determination that the order was
interlocutory and not appealable, the Texas Supreme Court held that the court of
appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because CMH Homes
specifically requested mandamus relief and judicial efficiency militated against
requiring CMH Homes to file a separate original proceeding. See id. at 453–54. The
Texas Supreme Court also observed that briefs in mandamus actions and
interlocutory appeals have generally the same requirements and it would not
promote judicial efficiency to require the appellant to file a separate original
proceeding. See id. at 454.
Here, Edgley expressly requested mandamus relief in his brief, but only as to
one issue in his brief—issue five. We grant his request and review this issue as a
request for mandamus relief. See id. Because we lack jurisdiction as to the
remaining appellate issues, we will dismiss those for lack of jurisdiction.1
In issue five, Edgely appears to present more than one argument. First, he
contends that he is entitled to mandamus relief voiding the trial court’s order because
he claims that he was not served with the prior order by the time he allegedly
committed violation 12, which occurred, according to Edgely, four days after the
December 11, 2019 order was signed and before he was served with the order.
Edgely also claims the contempt order is void because the trial court failed to grant
1 Appellee did not file a brief in this case. 5 his oral motion for continuance when there was no service on Edgley of Ragland’s
amended motion for enforcement.
“An order or judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering
it had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no
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Opinion issued June 13, 2023
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-21-00513-CV ——————————— CHRISTIAN EDGLEY, Appellant V. LATEISHA RAGLAND, Appellee
On Appeal from the 505th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 15-DCV-228707
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Christian Edgley appeals from the trial court’s September 27, 2021
Order Enforcing Possession and Access Order with Commitment Suspended.
Because the order is not appealable, we dismiss the issues appealing the order.
Because Edgley has requested mandamus review of one of his appellate issues, we grant that request but determine that he has not established his right to mandamus
relief. Thus, as to that one issue, we deny mandamus relief.
The trial court’s September 27, 2021 enforcement order states that appellee
LaTeisha Ragland filed an amended motion for enforcement. The clerk’s record
does not contain the motion. The enforcement order further states that, in the motion,
Ragland sought enforcement of certain provisions of the trial court’s order issued on
December 11, 2019. The December 11, 2019 order is not in the clerk’s record. The
reporter’s record indicates that the trial court dismissed all alleged violations listed
in the amended motion for enforcement, which is not in the record, except for
violations 12, 14, and 44. The trial court stated that it found Edgley to be in contempt
for failing to comply with the December 11, 2019 order because he failed to
surrender the child to Ragland for her court-ordered period of possession on
December 15, 2019 and December 28, 2019 (violations 12 and 14). The court
ordered Edgley confined to the Fort Bend County Jail for 30 days but suspended the
jail commitment as long as he complied with the condition of serving five years of
community supervision by complying with the current possession and access order.
Edgley filed a timely notice of appeal.
Edgley is not physically confined in jail because the trial court suspended
commitment and placed him on community supervision. The order does not require
him to report to a community supervision officer or to participate in any other
2 programs or counseling. Instead, it merely requires compliance with the current
possession and access order.
Typically, when a party is found in contempt and committed to jail, the
remedy for challenging this order is by petition for writ of habeas corpus when the
contemnor is restrained of liberty by virtue of an order issued by a court or judge
based on violation of an order in a civil case. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221(d).
But contempt orders that do not impose confinement are not reviewable by writ of
habeas corpus. See In re Look, No. 01-02-00959-CV, 2003 WL 876650, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 5, 2003, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing to Ex
parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1985)). In Look, the trial court found the
relator in contempt and ordered her confined for six months for each of 75 violations
of the prior order, but suspended commitment and placed her on community
supervision for 36 months or until the child support arrearage was paid, whichever
occurred first. Id. at *1. This Court held that the relator had not sustained her burden
of showing she was restrained and entitled to habeas relief because her incarceration
was a speculative possibility. See id. at *2.
Because Edgley has not sought habeas relief, but has instead appealed from
the order, we must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over an appeal from
a contempt order. We have jurisdiction to consider appeals from final judgments
and interlocutory orders for which appeal is permitted by statute. See Lehmann v.
3 Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Contempt orders are not final,
appealable orders, but must instead be attacked by petition for writ of habeas corpus
if the contemnor is restrained of his liberty or by petition for writ of mandamus if no
restraint is involved. See In re Office of Atty. Gen. of Tex., 215 S.W.3d 913, 915–16
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, orig. proceeding). Thus, appellate courts do not have
jurisdiction to review contempt orders by direct appeal. See Crenshaw v. Thomas,
No. 03-21-00064-CV, 2022 WL 2162933, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin June 16, 2022,
pet. denied) (mem. op.).
A notice was sent to Edgley on March 21, 2023, advising him that the Court
might dismiss his appellate issues for lack of jurisdiction unless he responded and
established that we had jurisdiction. Edgley requested an extension of time to
respond until May 15, 2023, but he did not file a response.
We may, however, construe an appeal to be a mandamus petition if the
appellant specifically requests it. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452
(Tex. 2011). In CMH Homes, the parties were unable to agree on an arbitrator and
the trial court appointed one, but CMH Homes filed an interlocutory appeal
challenging the appointment and requesting alternatively that its appeal be treated as
a mandamus petition. See id. at 446. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for
want of jurisdiction because there was no provision for interlocutory appeal of the
trial court’s order appointing an arbitrator. See id. Although the Texas Supreme
4 Court agreed with the court of appeal’s determination that the order was
interlocutory and not appealable, the Texas Supreme Court held that the court of
appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because CMH Homes
specifically requested mandamus relief and judicial efficiency militated against
requiring CMH Homes to file a separate original proceeding. See id. at 453–54. The
Texas Supreme Court also observed that briefs in mandamus actions and
interlocutory appeals have generally the same requirements and it would not
promote judicial efficiency to require the appellant to file a separate original
proceeding. See id. at 454.
Here, Edgley expressly requested mandamus relief in his brief, but only as to
one issue in his brief—issue five. We grant his request and review this issue as a
request for mandamus relief. See id. Because we lack jurisdiction as to the
remaining appellate issues, we will dismiss those for lack of jurisdiction.1
In issue five, Edgely appears to present more than one argument. First, he
contends that he is entitled to mandamus relief voiding the trial court’s order because
he claims that he was not served with the prior order by the time he allegedly
committed violation 12, which occurred, according to Edgely, four days after the
December 11, 2019 order was signed and before he was served with the order.
Edgely also claims the contempt order is void because the trial court failed to grant
1 Appellee did not file a brief in this case. 5 his oral motion for continuance when there was no service on Edgley of Ragland’s
amended motion for enforcement.
“An order or judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering
it had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no
jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.”2 Mitchell v.
Turbine Resources Unlimited, Inc., 523 S.W.3d 189, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). Edgley has not established that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to enter the contempt order.
Procedurally, a relator seeking mandamus relief must provide an appendix or
record sufficient to establish his entitlement to relief. See Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992). And, in his petition, the relator must include citations
to that appendix or record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(g), (h). In this case, Edgley has
provided a clerk’s record that contains only the trial court’s contempt and
commitment order, but not the amended motion for enforcement or a copy of the
December 11, 2019 order he allegedly violated. Relator also fails to cite to the record
in his statement of facts.
2 When a contemnor has been restrained of his liberty and seeks habeas relief, the contemnor claiming that the contempt order is void must show that the order deprives the relator of liberty without due process or that it was beyond the court’s power to issue. See Ex parte Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1996). 6 Edgley complains that he had not been served with the December 11, 2019
order at the time he allegedly committed the violation on December 15, 2019. There
are two problems with this complaint. First, the reporter’s record does not indicate
that Edgley raised this complaint in the trial court. “A party’s right to mandamus
relief generally requires a predicate request for some action and a refusal of that
request.” In re Perritt, 992 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. 1999). The failure to object to
violation 12 in the trial court on the ground that appellant had not been served with
the December 11, 2019 order defeats his right to mandamus relief. See id. The
predicate requirement is relaxed only if the request would have been futile. See id.
And Edgley has not argued that an objection to violation 12 on the lack of service
ground would have been futile.
Moreover, Edgley has not provided a sufficient record to establish the date of
service of the December 11, 2019 order. Edgley complains that the first alleged
violation occurred four days after the December 11, 2019 order was served on him,
but this order is not in the record. Absent a sufficient record showing the prior order
or other proof of lack of service or awareness of the order’s provisions presented in
an oral rendition, Edgley has not established his entitlement to mandamus relief. See
Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837.
Finally, Edgely complains that he was denied a continuance. During the
hearing held on August 24, 2021, Edgley’s counsel learned that Ragland had filed
7 an amended motion for enforcement. Counsel claimed that her client Edgley had
not provided her with a copy of the amended motion and requested a one-week reset
of the hearing, but the trial court asked Ragland’s counsel if the amended motion
was served and she agreed that it was. The request for reset was denied. Edgely has
not provided proof that the amended motion for enforcement was not served on him
and thus, he has not presented a sufficient record to support mandamus relief. See
id.
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and we deny mandamus relief.
Any pending motions are dismissed as moot.
Richard Hightower Justice
Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.