In Re Cesar Manuel Becerra v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 09-25-00306-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-25-00306-CV __________________

IN RE CESAR MANUEL BECERRA

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Original Proceeding County Court at Law No. 3 of Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 09-05-04838 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Cesar Manuel Becerra filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion

for release on personal recognizance. Becerra argues he is currently restrained

illegally by virtue of a judgment of civil and criminal contempt of a child support

enforcement order. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(d). We deny relief.

The record Becerra submitted with the habeas corpus petition consists of an

Amended Order Holding Respondent in Contempt for Failure to Pay Child Support

and Medical Support, Granting Judgment, and for Commitment to County Jail

signed on July 10, 2025, (the “judgment”) with an attached Order Enforcing and

1 Modifying Support Obligation (the “enforcement order”) signed on June 13, 2013.

The judgment holds Becerra in criminal contempt, assesses a $500 fine, and for each

separate violation orders that Becerra be confined in the Montgomery County jail

for 165 days beginning July 10, 2025, with the sentences to be served concurrently.

The judgment also holds Becerra in civil contempt, orders him to pay $10,000 as

child support arrearage, including any accrued interest, orders the Montgomery

County sheriff to confine Becerra until he purges himself of contempt, and it sets a

Compliance Hearing for September 3, 2025. The judgment grants a $51,541.09

cumulative judgment for child support arrearages, a $6,263.41 cumulative judgment

for medical support arrearages, and a $10,783.75 cumulative judgment for attorney’s

fees. The judgment orders—withholding beginning August 1, 2025, Becerra to pay

$500 each month towards the child support arrearage, to pay $150 each month

towards the medical support arrearage, and to pay $150 each month towards the

attorney’s fee award.

The enforcement order (1) found Becerra was ordered to pay child support of

$255 monthly beginning May 1, 2009; (2) confirmed a $4,021.55 arrearage as of

May 31, 2013; ordered Becerra to pay $50 each month on the arrearage beginning

July 1, 2013; and it modified the November 17, 2009 Agreed Order Establishing the

Parent-Child Relationship to require Becerra to pay $35 monthly medical support

beginning July 1, 2013.

2 A writ of habeas corpus will issue if the commitment order is void because it

deprives the relator of liberty without due process of law. Ex parte Swate, 922

S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding). “In a habeas corpus action

challenging confinement for contempt, the relator bears the burden of showing that

the contempt order is void.” In re Coppock, 277 S.W.3d 417, 418 (Tex. 2009) (orig.

proceeding).

Becerra contends the judgment is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.

The judgment includes the trial court’s findings for 526 separate violations of the

enforcement order. The findings identify Violations 1 through 290 on a chart

describing each numbered violation of the cumulative child support arrearage

judgment by Date Due, Date Paid, Amount Due, and Amount Paid. The findings

identify Violations 291 through 526 on a chart describing each numbered violation

of the cumulative medical support judgment by Date Due, Date Paid, Amount Due,

and Amount Paid. The judgment finds Becerra was able to pay child support and

medical support in the amounts and on the dates ordered and that he is guilty of a

separate act of contempt for each separate failure to pay child support and medical

support in the amounts ordered, and further finds that on the day of the hearing

Becerra had the ability to comply with the court’s orders by paying the child support

arrearages and medical support arrearages “set forth in violations 1-516 enumerated

above.” Becerra was represented by an attorney at the proceedings below and in this

3 habeas. Becerra argues there is a discrepancy between the findings because it

mentions “526” separate violations and then the other finding states he has the

present ability to pay the arrearages for violations “1 through 516” rather than using

the “526” number and he argues that voids the entire contempt judgment.

The trial court’s finding that Becerra has the present ability to pay the amount

ordered for violations 1 through 516 might reflect a scrivener’s error, as Becerra

suggests, but the lack of a finding of present ability to pay on violations 517 through

526 affects only the sentences the trial court imposed for violations 517 through 526.

“Where a trial court lists each failure to comply with the order separately and

assesses a separate punishment for each failure to comply, only the invalid portion

of the contempt order is void and the remainder of the contempt order is

enforceable.” Ex parte Arnold, 926 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996,

orig. proceeding).

Becerra contends the contempt judgment is void because the enforcement

order failed to provide to Becerra adequate notice that he must pay unpaid interest

on unpaid support. This argument is not supported by the record. Interest accrues on

delinquent child support that is greater than the amount of the monthly periodic

support obligation and on arrearages that have been reduced to money judgment. See

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.265(a). Accrued interest is part of the child support

obligation and may be enforced by any means provided for the collection of child

4 support. Id. § 157.267. The enforcement order notified Becerra that “[p]ursuant to

Texas Family Code § 157.269, the Court retains jurisdiction over this matter until

all current support and all support arrearages, including interest and any applicable

fees and costs, have been paid.” The trial court notified Becerra that he had to pay

interest and thus did not deprive Becerra of due process.

Next, Becerra claims the contempt judgment is void because the trial court

found that the child support payments for violations 3, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 44,

46, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, and 320 were paid in full, and the trial court

found an overpayment was made on violations 49 and 51. Becerra has not shown

that he has been held in contempt and punished for an order that he obeyed. The

judgment reveals that Becerra paid $255 on his child support obligation in July 2013

and $255 each month from September 2013 through March 2014, and that he paid

$35 in medical support in the months of September 2013 through March 2014, but

all of the payments were delinquent. The judgment shows Becerra was credited with

a $365 payment in May 2015, a $100.01 payment in June 2015, and a delinquent

$35 medical support payment in March 2015, but these are the only payments

credited between June 1, 2013, and June 1, 2025. Assuming without deciding that

the judgment was void as to violations that occurred in a month where Becerra was

credited with a late or partial payment, it would affect only 20 of the concurrent 165-

day sentences. See Ex parte Arnold, 926 S.W.2d at 624.

5 Becerra claims the trial court denied “basic and fundamental constitutional

protections implicating due process requirements, including adequate notice.” The

motion for contempt is not included in the record for this proceeding, and Becerra

does not argue that the trial court failed to provide the notice of hearing that is

required by statute. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 157.062(a). Rather, Becerra argues

the trial court denied Becerra due process in that it failed to grant a motion for a

continuance that he filed the day before the contempt hearing. The relator is

responsible for submitting a record containing a copy of every document that shows

the matter complained of. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a). Neither the motion for a

continuance nor the trial court’s denial of a request for a continuance is included in

the record. Becerra has not established a due process violation.

Becerra complains that the trial court reduced the arrearages to a money

judgment and ordered him to commence making monthly payments of $800

beginning August 1, 2025, without finding the amount of Becerra’s disposable

earnings. He argues this part of the judgment violated the Consumer Credit

Protection Act’s restriction on garnishment. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b); see also Tex.

Fam. Code Ann. § 158.009 (“An order or writ of withholding shall direct that any

employer of the obligor withhold from the obligor’s disposable earnings the amount

specified up to a maximum amount of 50 percent of the obligor’s disposable

earnings.”). Generally, a contempt order must be reviewed through habeas corpus or

6 mandamus, while the arrearage part of an enforcement action may be appealed. See,

e.g., In re A.C.J., 146 S.W.3d 323, 326 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, no pet.)

(dismissing issue related to contempt but addressing issue related to money

judgment in enforcement action); see also Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(d)

(authorizing court of appeals to “issue a writ of habeas corpus when [a person is]

restrain[ed in his] liberty[.]”). Becerra had an adequate remedy by appeal to

challenge the arrearage judgment or the withholding order, but he did not file an

appeal. Becerra has not been held in contempt and sentenced to confinement in jail

for violating these provisions in the judgment. Accordingly, this complaint is not

cognizable through habeas corpus.

Finally, Becerra contends the trial court violated Becerra’s right to due process

by ordering Becerra to pay child support and medical support while he is confined

for contempt. Becerra argues the order violates the federal anti-peonage statute. See

42 U.S.C.A. § 1994. 1 Becerra has not been held in contempt or sentenced to

confinement in jail for violating this part of the judgment. Accordingly, it is not

1 Section 1994 states: “The holding of any person to service or labor under the system known as peonage is abolished and forever prohibited in any Territory or State of the United States; and all acts, laws, resolutions, orders, regulations, or usages of any Territory or State, which have heretofore established, maintained, or enforced, or by virtue of which any attempt shall hereafter be made to establish, maintain, or enforce, directly or indirectly, the voluntary or involuntary service or labor of any persons as peons, in liquidation of any debt or obligation, or otherwise, are declared null and void.” 7 cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221(d)

(authorizing court of appeals to “issue a writ of habeas corpus when [a person] is

restrain[ed in his] liberty[.]”).

Becerra also appears to be asking this Court to order his discharge from

confinement for his continued confinement for his civil contempt which he claims

he may have in addition to his 165-day sentences for criminal contempt. Until his

confinement for criminal contempt is discharged, the likelihood of continued

restraint for the civil contempt remains hypothetical and not subject to attack by

habeas corpus. In re Thomas, No. 09-04-320-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6935, at

*2-3 (Tex. App. —Beaumont July 26, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

On this record, Becerra has failed to establish that the contempt judgment is

void. Accordingly, we deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the motion

for temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on August 26, 2025 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.