OPINION
RONALD L. WALKER, Chief Justice.
Eusebio Soloranzo Costilla appeals his conviction for the third degree felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Costilla was sentenced to five years of incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, following a non-negotiated guilty plea to the court. He presents four points of error.
Point of error one contends that the appellant’s conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to substantially comply with Article 27.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In a felony case, a plea of “ ‘guilty’ ... must be made in open court by the defendant in person!.]” TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 27.13 (Vernon 1989). Costilla, a Spanish-speaking Mexican national, did not speak at all during the initial plea hearing. Although Costilla was present, when the trial court asked, “How does he plea?”, it was defense counsel who responded, “Guilty, your Honor.”
Because this error is raised for the first time on appeal, we must first determine whether the issue involves a right that is subject to procedural default. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The failure to enter any plea at all would, apparently, void the conviction, because without a plea no issue is joined. See Pate v. State, 21 Tex.App. 191, 17 S.W. 461, 462-63 (1886); Jefferson v. State, 24 Tex.App. 535, 7 S.W. 244, 245 (1888). Although not mentioned in the “short list” of void judgments more recently recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals, if the procedural error in taking the plea prevented jeopardy from attaching to the proceeding, such an error would not be subject to procedural default. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).
The intermediate courts have split on the effect of a guilty plea that is entered by counsel on defendant’s behalf, in defendant’s presence but in contravention of Article 27.13. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held the conviction was void. White v. State, 929 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.). The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, and held that although it entered a voidable judgment, the trial court had jurisdiction over the cause. See Martinez v. State, 5 S.W.3d 722, 725-26 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).1
The fact that the guilty plea is uttered by counsel rather than the defendant [364]*364does not mean that the subsequent proceedings are invariably void. Where the defendant was present in court while his attorney entered the plea for him, the Court of Criminal Appeals found compliance “not only with the spirit but with the letter of Article 27.13....” Shields v. State, 608 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Although he did not speak when asked for his plea, in Shields the defendant answered affirmatively when the trial judge asked him if his plea was voluntary. Id. From this, we gather that Article 27.13 is complied with, regardless of who actually speaks, so long as it occurs in open court, in the presence of the defendant, who acknowledges the plea as his. See also Manoy v. State, 7 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.).
Given Costilla’s silence throughout the hearing, can we determine from the record that Costilla personally entered his plea? Costilla appeared in person at the hearing and also executed written statements and waivers that clearly indicate he pleaded guilty at the hearing. In those papers, which were translated into Spanish by defense counsel, Costilla waived any rights, “[u]nder Art. 1.14,” secured to him by law. See TexCode Crim. PROC. Ajvn. art. 1.14 (Vernon Supp.2002). Unfortunately, defense counsel was apparently acting as his interpreter during that first hearing, and all communications with the court passed through counsel. Costilla does not speak English and therefore may not have been able to understand or communicate with the court. Nevertheless, Costilla’s affidavit, attached to his amended motion for new trial, which he filed after new counsel was appointed, is silent regarding that first hearing. In his affidavit Costilla claims: (1) that he was requesting probation and (2) that he thought he would get a two to three year sentence. Conspicuously absent from his affidavit is any claim that Costilla thought he had not entered a plea or had pleaded not guilty and asked for a jury trial. From his comments in the presentence investigation report, during the sentencing hearing, and on motion for new trial, we are confident in concluding that Costilla was aware that he was pleading guilty and that he would be convicted without contesting his guilt for the offense. Point of error one is overruled.
Point of error two contends that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court “did not comply with the standard plea colloquy with the defendant in direct violation of Article 26.13(a), rendering the plea, if any, involuntary.” Substantial compliance with Article 26.13 exists when the trial court has undertaken to admonish the defendant, the sentence given was within the range prescribed by law, and the defendant has faded to affirmatively show harm. See Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Costilla concedes that he signed a written waiver of oral admonishments and that he received written admonishments. Those admonishments were translated into Spanish for him by trial counsel. Before the trial court accepted the plea, trial counsel assured the trial court that Costil-la understood the admonishments. Costil-la argues that it was improper for the trial court to accept his waiver of oral admonishments because the appellant struck out the line that stated, “I am totally satisfied with the representation provided by my counsel and I received effective and competent representation.” He further argues that the trial court should have sua sponte appointed an interpreter rather than permit counsel to act as a translator.
Costilla failed to meet his burden to show that he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his action and that he suffered harm. See Eatmon v. State, 768 S.W.2d 310, 311-12 (Tex. [365]*365Crim.App.1989). Costilla argues that his case falls "within the exception for error that is not susceptible to a harm analysis because of the lack of dialogue in the record. See Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. We disagree. In his amended motion for new trial and attached affidavit, Costilla only complained of counsel’s representation in the later sentencing hearing. Likewise, a letter Costilla wrote to the court did not mention the plea hearing. Costilla never identified any admonishment that was not communicated to him, although he had the opportunity to do so, either in the sentencing hearing or in his motion for new trial affidavit. Regardless of the extent of Cos-tilla’s dissatisfaction with his attorney, he has not connected any act or omission by the attorney to the plea proceeding.
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OPINION
RONALD L. WALKER, Chief Justice.
Eusebio Soloranzo Costilla appeals his conviction for the third degree felony offense of driving while intoxicated. Costilla was sentenced to five years of incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, following a non-negotiated guilty plea to the court. He presents four points of error.
Point of error one contends that the appellant’s conviction must be reversed because the trial court failed to substantially comply with Article 27.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In a felony case, a plea of “ ‘guilty’ ... must be made in open court by the defendant in person!.]” TexCode CRiM. PROC. Ann. art. 27.13 (Vernon 1989). Costilla, a Spanish-speaking Mexican national, did not speak at all during the initial plea hearing. Although Costilla was present, when the trial court asked, “How does he plea?”, it was defense counsel who responded, “Guilty, your Honor.”
Because this error is raised for the first time on appeal, we must first determine whether the issue involves a right that is subject to procedural default. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). The failure to enter any plea at all would, apparently, void the conviction, because without a plea no issue is joined. See Pate v. State, 21 Tex.App. 191, 17 S.W. 461, 462-63 (1886); Jefferson v. State, 24 Tex.App. 535, 7 S.W. 244, 245 (1888). Although not mentioned in the “short list” of void judgments more recently recognized by the Court of Criminal Appeals, if the procedural error in taking the plea prevented jeopardy from attaching to the proceeding, such an error would not be subject to procedural default. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.2001).
The intermediate courts have split on the effect of a guilty plea that is entered by counsel on defendant’s behalf, in defendant’s presence but in contravention of Article 27.13. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held the conviction was void. White v. State, 929 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1996, no pet.). The San Antonio Court of Appeals disagreed, and held that although it entered a voidable judgment, the trial court had jurisdiction over the cause. See Martinez v. State, 5 S.W.3d 722, 725-26 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.).1
The fact that the guilty plea is uttered by counsel rather than the defendant [364]*364does not mean that the subsequent proceedings are invariably void. Where the defendant was present in court while his attorney entered the plea for him, the Court of Criminal Appeals found compliance “not only with the spirit but with the letter of Article 27.13....” Shields v. State, 608 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Although he did not speak when asked for his plea, in Shields the defendant answered affirmatively when the trial judge asked him if his plea was voluntary. Id. From this, we gather that Article 27.13 is complied with, regardless of who actually speaks, so long as it occurs in open court, in the presence of the defendant, who acknowledges the plea as his. See also Manoy v. State, 7 S.W.3d 771, 778 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1999, no pet.).
Given Costilla’s silence throughout the hearing, can we determine from the record that Costilla personally entered his plea? Costilla appeared in person at the hearing and also executed written statements and waivers that clearly indicate he pleaded guilty at the hearing. In those papers, which were translated into Spanish by defense counsel, Costilla waived any rights, “[u]nder Art. 1.14,” secured to him by law. See TexCode Crim. PROC. Ajvn. art. 1.14 (Vernon Supp.2002). Unfortunately, defense counsel was apparently acting as his interpreter during that first hearing, and all communications with the court passed through counsel. Costilla does not speak English and therefore may not have been able to understand or communicate with the court. Nevertheless, Costilla’s affidavit, attached to his amended motion for new trial, which he filed after new counsel was appointed, is silent regarding that first hearing. In his affidavit Costilla claims: (1) that he was requesting probation and (2) that he thought he would get a two to three year sentence. Conspicuously absent from his affidavit is any claim that Costilla thought he had not entered a plea or had pleaded not guilty and asked for a jury trial. From his comments in the presentence investigation report, during the sentencing hearing, and on motion for new trial, we are confident in concluding that Costilla was aware that he was pleading guilty and that he would be convicted without contesting his guilt for the offense. Point of error one is overruled.
Point of error two contends that the judgment must be reversed because the trial court “did not comply with the standard plea colloquy with the defendant in direct violation of Article 26.13(a), rendering the plea, if any, involuntary.” Substantial compliance with Article 26.13 exists when the trial court has undertaken to admonish the defendant, the sentence given was within the range prescribed by law, and the defendant has faded to affirmatively show harm. See Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Costilla concedes that he signed a written waiver of oral admonishments and that he received written admonishments. Those admonishments were translated into Spanish for him by trial counsel. Before the trial court accepted the plea, trial counsel assured the trial court that Costil-la understood the admonishments. Costil-la argues that it was improper for the trial court to accept his waiver of oral admonishments because the appellant struck out the line that stated, “I am totally satisfied with the representation provided by my counsel and I received effective and competent representation.” He further argues that the trial court should have sua sponte appointed an interpreter rather than permit counsel to act as a translator.
Costilla failed to meet his burden to show that he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his action and that he suffered harm. See Eatmon v. State, 768 S.W.2d 310, 311-12 (Tex. [365]*365Crim.App.1989). Costilla argues that his case falls "within the exception for error that is not susceptible to a harm analysis because of the lack of dialogue in the record. See Cain, 947 S.W.2d at 264. We disagree. In his amended motion for new trial and attached affidavit, Costilla only complained of counsel’s representation in the later sentencing hearing. Likewise, a letter Costilla wrote to the court did not mention the plea hearing. Costilla never identified any admonishment that was not communicated to him, although he had the opportunity to do so, either in the sentencing hearing or in his motion for new trial affidavit. Regardless of the extent of Cos-tilla’s dissatisfaction with his attorney, he has not connected any act or omission by the attorney to the plea proceeding. Point of error two is overruled.
Point of error three contends that Costilla was denied effective assistance of counsel at the “punishment phase” of the trial. In his appellate brief, Costilla limits his complaints to counsel’s performance during the sentencing hearing. The appellant’s brief on this point of error does not address counsel’s performance during the initial plea proceeding. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms, and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Any allegation of ineffective assistance must be firmly founded in the record. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). The presumption of reasonable effectiveness cannot ordinarily be overcome absent evidence in the record of the attorney’s reasons for his conduct. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim.App.1994).
During the sentencing hearing, Costilla stated that he wanted probation. Defense counsel proceeded to question Costilla about his preference for community supervision, which would require Costil-la to prove monthly that he was not drinking, and the possibility of instead asking for a short term of imprisonment. On appeal, Costilla complains that counsel failed to argue for probation. We do not have the benefit of a hearing in which counsel explains why he did not argue strenuously for a term of community supervision. It could be that he realized such a request would be futile. According to the presentence investigation report, Costilla admitted to having a drinking problem, had many prior incidents of driving while intoxicated, failed to successfully complete probation in the past, had twice been sentenced to prison terms for felony driving while intoxicated, and continued to drink after the first hearing in this case. Point of error three is overruled.
Point of error four urges that the appellant was denied conflict-free representation during the sentencing hearing. “In order for a defendant to demonstrate a violation of his right to the reasonably effective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest, he must show (1) that defense counsel was actively representing conflicting interests, and (2) that the conflict had an adverse effect on specific instances of counsel’s performance.” Ex parte Morrow, 952 S.W.2d 530, 538 (Tex. Crim.App.1997) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). The “actual conflict” asserted on appeal is the conflict between the appellant’s desire for probation and defense counsel’s “own goal and interest, which was that his client should go to prison.” [366]*366Costilla mentions that trial counsel was aware that his client was unhappy with the lack of progress in the case, but Costilla does not explain what interest of defense counsel conflicted with the defendant’s interests. Although he vaguely hints at a financial motive for ending the case quickly, nothing in the record suggests that defense counsel would receive a pecuniary benefit from any particular outcome of the case.
The appellant fails to demonstrate that trial counsel was required to make a choice between advancing his client’s interest in a fair trial or advancing his own interest, pecuniary or otherwise. See generally Monreal v. State, 947 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (Defense counsel’s inartful questioning about plea bargain negotiations did not create a conflict of interest where none otherwise existed). There may have been discord between attorney and client, but no conflict of interest has been exposed. Point of error four is overruled. The judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.